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ABSTRACT 
 
Politics After a Ceasefire:  





This dissertation is a multi-sited ethnographic study of the cultural formations of moral 
and political community among Tamils displaced and dispersed by three decades of war 
and political violence in Sri Lanka. Drawing on twenty months of field research among 
Tamils living in Toronto, Canada and Tamil Nadu, India, I inquire into the histories, 
discourses, and practices of diasporic activism at the end of war between the Government 
of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Tamils abroad were 
mobilized to protest the war, culminating in months of spectacular mass demonstrations 
in metropolitan cities around the world. Participant-observation among activists and their 
families in diaspora neighborhoods and refugee camps, and their public events and 
actions, as well as semi-structured interviews, media analysis and archival work, reveal 
how “diaspora” has become a capacious site of political becoming for the identification 
and mobilization of Tamils within, across, and beyond-nation states and their borders. 
 Part One of this study considers how migration and militancy have historically 
transformed Tamil society, giving rise to a diasporic politics with competing ethical 
obligations for Tamils living outside Sri Lanka. Chapters One and Two describe and 
analyze how distinct trajectories of migration and settlement led to diverse forms of 
social and political action among diaspora Tamils during Sri Lanka’s 2002 ceasefire and 
peace process. Chapter Three turns to the history and historiography of Sri Lanka to 
contrast narratives about the emergence of Tamil politics, nationalism and militancy with 
	  
diaspora narratives developed through life history interviews with activists. Taken 
together, these chapters provide a layered social and historical context for the 
ethnography of Tamil diaspora life and activism. 
Part Two of the dissertation ethnographically explores how and why Tamils in 
Canada and India protested the recent war, soliciting their states, national and 
transnational publics, and each other to “take immediate action” on behalf of suffering 
civilians. Chapter Four examines diaspora community formation and activism in Toronto, 
a city with the largest population of Sri Lankan Tamils outside Asia, in the wake of 
Canada’s ban on the LTTE. Chapter Five turns to refugee camps in Tamil Nadu, India, to 
discuss how camp life shaped refugee politics and activism, while Chapter Six follows 
the narratives of two migrants waiting and preparing to migrate from India to the West. 
Chapter Seven examines how Tamil activists in Toronto and Tamil Nadu publicly 
invoked, represented, and performed suffering to mobilize action against the war. The 
dissertation concludes with a discussion of the modes of Tamil migration, asylum-
seeking, and diaspora activism that emerged in response to the war’s end and its 
aftermaths. 
In their actions of protest and dissent, I argue that Tamils from Sri Lanka create 
new modes of belonging and citizenship out of transnational lives forged from wartime 
migration and resettlement in multicultural and pluralist states. A political subject of 
“Tamil diaspora” has thus emerged, and continues to shape Sri Lanka’s post-war futures. 
This ethnography contributes to scholarly debates on violence, subjectivity and agency; 
the nation-state and citizenship; and the politics of human rights and humanitarianism at 
the intersections of diaspora, refugee and South Asian studies.
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PART ONE: Sri Lanka’s War and the Making of a Tamil Diaspora, 1983-2009 
 
 

















PART TWO: “The Final War,” 2008-2009 
 
 
Chapter Four: Mobilizing Diaspora: Activism and Community Under 
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Introduction 
The Politics and Ethics of Tamil Displacement and Diaspora 
 
In January 2009, four months into my fieldwork with Sri Lankan Tamil refugees 
in India’s southern state of Tamil Nadu, I was invited to visit a small refugee camp called 
“Maattupatti.” Tamil refugees who worked with a relief and advocacy organization in 
Chennai created “by and for refugees” returned to their respective camps during the 
holidays to spend time with their families. One of the workers invited me, and a foreign 
volunteer, to stay with his family and participate in what he described as the “proper” 
festivities of the season, away from the dust and density of the city. The holiday was the 
Tamil harvest festival of Pongal, which was celebrated with the sharing of food and 
cultural activities over a period of four days in mid-January. This marked the state of the 
Tamil calendar, and the month of Thai. 
As dusk fell on the eve of Thai Pongal, people gathered in the space between their 
line houses to tell me how they felt about the upcoming holiday. “We cannot celebrate 
properly,” they told me, “because of the war.” They referred to the war in northern Sri 
Lanka, and mass displacement from Mannar, the region from which they all hailed. As 
we talked, they decided that as someone who had come from Canada, I should meet their 
former camp leader who was now the children’s English teacher. 
The teacher, Muthusamy, was one of thousands of Hill-Country Tamils 
(malaiyaka thamilar) displaced by the 1977 anti-Tamil riots in Sri Lanka, which took him 
from Nawalapitiya (in the centre of the island) to Vavuniya and Mannar (in the north), 
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where he was later displaced by war. Of nine brothers and sisters, he was the only one 
living outside the country. Some of his siblings decided to return to the tea plantations 
where they had worked and lived; others remained displaced in the north. Muthusamy’s 
own children are scattered in south India, in Trichy, Pollachi and Kerala. None could 
meet the burden of proof required to claim citizenship in India. Nor did they hold 
citizenship in Sri Lanka, as the descendants of Indian-origin Tamils who were 
disenfranchised in postcolonial Ceylon. 
As Muthusamy and I talked, we eventually returned to the topic that preoccupied 
every Sri Lankan Tamil I met during my fieldwork: Sri Lanka’s war. Muthusamy 
speculated about the motivations of the parties to the war—the Government of Sri Lanka 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)—and global powers like the United 
States and India. He was definite about one thing: “This is not terrorism. This is a 
freedom struggle,” he told me, even as he criticized the LTTE’s tactics. Like many Tamil 
refugees and immigrants abroad, Muthusamy was very concerned about the latest war’s 
high number of civilian casualties. When I asked him what he thought people should do 
to bring about the war’s end, he said, “The diaspora (pulam peyarnthor) must put 
pressure on the international community.” 
When Muthusamy told me this, I was taken aback. Did he consider himself to be 
a part of this diaspora? As we discussed what would “pressure” the international 
community to end the war, I wondered: How did a man who is stateless come to believe 
that Tamils living abroad must act to end the war and decide his family’s future? What is 
the power of moving, living and organizing across nation-states and their borders? 
The Subject of Tamil Diaspora  
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My dissertation project explores how Sri Lankan Tamils, displaced and dispersed 
by over thirty years of political violence and war, form moral and political communities 
as they remake their lives across the globe. My research examines, in particular, how 
these communities are formed as Tamil activists mobilized and protested war in Sri 
Lanka. As a 2002 ceasefire between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) disintegrated into total war in 2008-09, Tamil activists 
mobilized thousands of diasporic Tamils to non-stop public protest in metropolitan cities 
around the world. Through an ethnographic study of diasporic activisms, I discuss how 
and why Tamils in Canada and India protested the war, soliciting their states, fellow 
citizens and each other to “take immediate action” on behalf of a suffering people. I also 
consider what forms of community and contestation were entailed by practices of Tamil 
activism. 
My argument proceeds as follows: 
• I argue that the historical transformation of Tamil society through militancy and 
migration, in response to decades of discrimination and violence, created a diasporic 
politics that obliged Tamils living outside Sri Lanka to take action to end the war in 
their homeland. 
• This action was publicly organized during the ceasefire into two competing  
tendencies: Those who supported the LTTE and its nationalist goals of a separate 
Tamil state through a politics of protest, and those who opposed the LTTE, its 
political goals, and/or militant actions through a politics of dissent.  
• The politics and ethics of Tamil protest and dissent reveal internal social differences 
among Tamils from Sri Lanka, along the lines of gender, caste, class, region, time of 
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migration, and legal status—differences that also complicate the “pro-LTTE” versus 
“anti-LTTE” binary, which delineates Tamil activism in the diaspora. Activists’ 
attempts to negotiate these internal boundaries or repress differences in the name of 
unity were central to the production of Tamil identity in diaspora. 
• Notwithstanding the above differences, Tamils were socially and affectively oriented 
to respond to the war, and the suffering it created among Tamils on the island. This 
public engagement with wartime suffering has come to define what it means to be a 
Tamil living outside Sri Lanka, even among those who generally stay away from the 
domains of “politics” and the “political.” 
• Ultimately, the contested practices of Tamil migration and activism I document here 
have generated new forms of cultural citizenship and transnational belonging for 
displaced and dispersed Tamils on the margins of liberal democratic polities. In other 
words, transnational migration and activism are critical processes through which 
Tamils have fashioned diaspora communities across the geopolitical borders of the 
international system of nation-states.   
Ceasefire and the End/s of War 
Migration and displacement have been unavoidable facts of life for many Sri 
Lankans.1 During thirty years of violent conflict, over two million people—one-tenth of 
Sri Lanka’s population—have been displaced and dispersed several times from their 
homes.2 Though preceded by growing tensions between the state and aggrieved Tamil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In addition to Tamil migration and asylum-seeking, hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankan women and men 
of all communities have migrated to Gulf countries—primarily Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and U.A.E.—in the 
last two decades of war, working in construction, service industries and domestic labor. 
2 The majority of the displaced have been Tamils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, including Hill-
Country Tamils from the central highlands who were re-settled among them. Sinhalese and 
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politicians, activists and militant youth, Sri Lanka's war began after state-organized anti-
Tamil violence in 1983 drove thousands of Tamil youth to join burgeoning militant 
organizations. These groups received support and training from India’s intelligence 
agencies in South India (and the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh) to fight a war against 
the Sri Lankan state, with the ultimate goal of a separate homeland for ethnic Tamils. 
However, in the struggle for national liberation, many of these groups and political 
parties were decimated through internecine fighting and targeted assassinations, giving 
rise to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s claim to “sole representation” of Sri 
Lanka’s Tamils. During these years (1983-90), hundreds of thousands of Tamils who 
were internally displaced by war fled on small boats for neighboring India (from which 
many traveled to Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America) or traveled by circuitous 
air and land routes to seek asylum in Western countries. After the failure of an Indian-
negotiated peace accord (1987-90) and return to war, a new wave of migration emerged 
throughout the 1990s.  
The historical transformation of Tamil society through militancy and migration 
created a diasporic politics with competing ethical obligations for Tamils outside Sri 
Lanka. Tamils who left Sri Lanka and the militant struggle during the early years of war 
were once derided by the Tigers as “traitors,” or a “lost generation,” even as the 
organization developed a sophisticated overseas network to finance its war against the 
state.3 Eventually, the growing diaspora’s financial and political clout could not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(predominantly) Tamil-speaking Muslims living in these provinces and ‘border regions’ have also been 
subject to violence and forced eviction throughout the conflict. In 2015, six years after the war, tens of 
thousands of Tamils and Muslims were yet to be resettled in their former homes. 
3 On the notion of the “traitor” in LTTE and Tamil nationalism, see Thiranagama (2010, 2011); the social 
and political use of this term is also elaborated in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. The LTTE leader referred 
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ignored. By the late 1990s, an estimated one in three Sri Lankan Tamils lived outside the 
island.4 Tamils dispersed by violence were mobilized to demonstrate support for militants 
fighting the war “back home” and their project of national liberation through a separate 
state. A 2002 ceasefire redoubled these efforts, as diaspora activists who traveled back to 
the island viewed the war’s devastation and cultivated a diasporic duty upon their return. 
In contrast, activists involved in a wide range of different movements—including former 
members of other Tamil militant groups and parties (for example, members of TELO, 
EROS, PLOTE, EPRLF, and EPDP), leftist parties and trade unionism, grassroots 
women’s circles and feminist movements, and human rights groups—critiqued nationalist 
ends, the social relations (of caste, class and gender) they concealed, and the violent 
actions taken to pursue these ends in war and peace.  Whether publicly supportive or 
critical of the Tigers’ dominance and public hegemony, Tamil diaspora activists shared at 
least one thing: an imperative of action, wrought from the fragmentation and dispersal of 
Tamil struggles for self-determination. 
In journalistic and policy-oriented academic accounts, Sri Lanka’s Tamil diaspora 
is often presented as a monolithic entity that provides relentless financial and political 
support to the LTTE (see for example, Gunaratne 1999; Chalk 2000; Byman et al. 2001; 
Fair 2007). Moreover, a Tamil diaspora is perceived by many in Sri Lanka to be 
responsible for the decades of war. My study points to the diversity of Tamil socio-
economic origins, political identities, displacements and settlement experiences that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to the diaspora as a “lost generation” (tholaintha santhathi) at a 1990 conference according to Jeyaraj 
(2009). 
4 See Fuglerud (1999) and Cheran (2001). This narrative about Tamil political mobilization post-1983 is 
only one (though significant) part of a longer genealogy of Tamil diasporic activism that I explore in 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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comprise diaspora communities and activisms. Furthermore, this project examines how 
those activists who have been blamed for the suffering of war understand their work, in 
their own words. Whether in protest of state violence, or in dissent from LTTE 
nationalism, diasporic Tamils take action because they seek to alleviate suffering and 
bring about the war’s end. I argue that diaspora subjects imagine themselves as a 
community in suffering and struggle, making those who share prior experiences of 
violence—and often kinship and intimate relationships with Tamils in Sri Lanka—
obliged to act to end Tamil suffering in that country. 
This study thus argues for a more complex analysis and understanding of Sri 
Lanka’s Tamil diaspora—one that attends to the social differences through which 
diasporic subjects and their political communities are formed. In doing so, this project 
examines and recognizes the various ways in which Tamils have been affected by the 
war, and how these affects shape their public and personal actions. To be “affected” by 
the cycles of violence in Sri Lanka is not only to suffer privately or send money to fight; 
Tamils are affectively mobilized to many forms of action, including migration, social 
disengagement and an avoidance of politics, social work, grassroots organizing among 
workers, as well as political protest and dissent. 
Theorizing Diaspora Citizenship and Belonging 
Sri Lanka and Tamil Studies 
This project examines how the political subject of a Tamil diaspora emerges out 
of transnational migration and activist engagements with Sri Lanka’s war. The project 
therefore builds upon the concerns of a vast literature on the politics of war and 
nationalism in Sri Lanka, and its Tamil diaspora. 
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Sri Lanka’s war has been referred to as a “civil war” and “ethnic conflict” by 
many scholars (Tambiah 1986; de Silva 1998; Devotta 2004, among others). The latter 
term has had particular traction among social scientists, as the trend of studying “ethnic 
conflict” in the 1990s coincided with the intensification of war in Sri Lanka. The 
intellectual stakes of this project are inspired by the engaged scholarship of Sri Lankan 
scholars in the humanities and social sciences, whose critical studies of ethnicity and 
nationalism (in the politics of civil society and the state) began in the late 1970s with 
analyses of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as a political ideology, a socio-historical 
development, and cultural practice (Abeyesekera and Gunasinghe 1987; Jayawardena 
1985; Obeyesekere 1984; Social Scientists’ Association 1984; Tennekoon 1988, 1990). 
These studies were undertaken in the context of a rising tide of Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism, political authoritarianism, and local civil rights movements; they continued 
during the early years of war.5  
Critical scholarship on Sinhala nationalism was paralleled and followed by work 
that interrogated its counterpart in Tamil nationalism. Studies of Tamil nationalism began 
in the late 1970s, and were concerned with finding the ‘origins’ of nationalism in the 
Tamil/Saivite cultural-religious reform and revival movement led by Arumuga Navalar in 
mid-nineteenth century Jaffna (Sivathamby [1979]1984; Kailasapathy [1979]1984).6 
They understood this early nationalism as a “defensive” response to British colonial and 
missionary activities. However, these scholars also revealed how Tamil revival 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Civil Rights Movement, the Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality, and the formation of the 
Social Scientists’ Association are of particular note here. The Civil Rights Movement was initially a 
response to the state repression following the JVP insurrection of 1971. 
6 For a historical study of Arumuga Navalar’s role in the Tamil Saivite revival, see Ambalavanar (2006), 
and Bate (2005) on the influence of Navalar’s sermon (piracangam) on the practice of Tamil oratory 
(medaithamizh), a practice that came to define modern Tamil political communication (Bate 2009). 
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movements were shaped and formed by the traditions and practices they sought to 
critique, in order to buttress their own dominant Vellala caste and upper-middle class 
positions  (Bastin [1979]1998; Sivathamby 1995, 1984; Kailasapathy 1984; Arasaratnam 
1981).  
Later discussions of Tamil nationalism applied this notion of a “reactive” or 
“defensive” nationalism in relation to the rise of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism in late 
colonial and post-independence Sri Lanka (Gunasingam 1999; Manogaran and 
Pfaffenberger 1994; Wilson 2000). Such studies presume a unity of Tamil identity and 
belonging, and in doing so, efface social differences within Tamil communities and 
within the project of Tamil nationalism itself.  Consequently, the notion of a “defensive” 
nationalism has been challenged by other scholars (Cheran 1992; Hellmann-
Rajanayagam 1990a).7  
Scholars have also questioned the gender politics of Tamil nationalism in the 
LTTE and, to a lesser extent, Tamil militancy in general (Coomaraswamy and Perera-
Rajasingham 2004; de Mel 2001; Maunaguru 1995; Sivamohan 2001), largely in 
response to claims of women’s participation in the LTTE as evidence of a feminist 
politics and transformation of Tamil society. These scholars have shown that Tamil 
women’s participation in militancy has created limited forms of social agency, or what 
Rajasingham-Senanayake (2001b) has written of as an “ambivalent empowerment.”  
Moreover, they show how this transformation was undermined by the militants’ 
patriarchal regulation of women’s sexuality and enforcement of gender norms in Tamil 
society during the war (Maunaguru 1995; Sivamohan 2001). These studies of gender (and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I discuss nationalist histories and these critical arguments in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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its intersections with caste, class and region) point to internal differences that limited full 
belonging to the national community of the LTTE.   
Studies of the Tamil Diaspora 
The scholarly literature on Sri Lanka’s Tamil diaspora extends the concerns of the 
critical studies above. Much of this scholarship documents and analyzes the migration of 
Tamils due to war in Sri Lanka, and diaspora social formations in relation to Tamil 
nationalism (Cheran 2000, 2003, 2007, 2010; Daniel 1996; Daniel and Thangaraj 1995; 
Fuglerud 1999; McDowell 1996; Ranganathan 2010; Steen 1993). Other works have 
considered the political economy of the migration-development nexus and the impact of 
remittance networks (Hyndman 2003; Sriskandarajah 2002) on the political economy of 
the ‘homeland’ on the one hand, and the relationship between ‘homeland ties’ and ‘civic 
participation’ in ‘host societies,’ on the other (Wayland 2002, 2004). 
The first book-length publication about a Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora appeared 
when Fr. Santhiapillai Guy de Fontgalland, an activist working with refugees in India, 
published Tamil Diaspora: Sri Lankans in Exile, through Ceylon Refugees and 
Repatriates Organization (CERRO) in 1986. Santhiapillai’s book provided a historical 
account of the conflict and resulting migration, and catalogs the social and political 
conditions of Tamils living in 15 countries throughout North America, Europe and Asia.8 
A number of brief, policy-oriented articles followed along these lines (Chandrahasan 
1989; Aruliah 1994). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The countries included in the book are (in order of presentation): India, Germany, France, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, 
and Australia.   
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Scholarship on the Tamil diaspora began ten years later, with studies of Tamil 
society and politics in exile. In 1996, British sociologist Christopher McDowell published 
his study of Sri Lankan Tamils in Switzerland, whom he dubbed an “asylum diaspora.” 
McDowell wrote that Tamils were engaged in a “politics in exile,” wherein ““the conflict 
which contributed to the creation of the diaspora is now fueled continuously by the 
diaspora itself” (31). Øivind Fuglerud’s 1999 book, Life on the Outside: The Tamil 
Diaspora and Long-Distance Nationalism, makes a more complex argument about the 
form and meaning of exile politics. Fuglerud draws parallels between social exclusions in 
Sri Lanka and in Norway to argue that Tamil nationalism provides Tamils in Norway 
with “a name for individual nostalgia and shared exclusion from host society” reshaping 
individual consciousness through migration and its social transformations (1999: 186). 
He examines how this “revolutionary nationalism-in-exile” became circumscribed by 
LTTE politics, which provides Tamils with a reshaped historical consciousness of a lost 
authentic self, and in so doing, replaces the moral authority of “traditional structures” of 
‘honor’ with ‘dignity’ in a ‘”politics of equality.” The LTTE thereby becomes a source of 
regeneration for Tamil identity in exile (136). 
These two early studies reveal the centrality of belonging and exclusion to the 
transnational practice of Tamil politics, whether implicitly, as is the case with McDowell, 
or more explicitly, in Fuglerud’s book. My project builds on these studies of Tamil 
diaspora nationalism, and others that document the “resistant” and “liberationist” projects 
that emerged in the diaspora in contrast to LTTE politics (Cheran 2000). However, I 
argue against their use of Benedict Anderson’s notion of “long-distance nationalism” to 
describe Tamil diaspora politics. This concept, as articulated by Anderson (1998, 1994), 
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assumes that a modular “nation” exists prior to its replication in exile. “Long-distance 
nationalism” does not sufficiently account for the heterogeneity of diasporic social life in 
the local contexts that form transnational Tamil politics. Daniel’s  (1996, 1994) research 
among Tamil refugees and immigrants in Britain and the United States provides me with 
another approach. Daniel examines the social cleavages within a suffering “nation-in-
alienation” that enables a “disaggregation of identity” (1996: 186) for Tamils living in 
diaspora. I build on his insights to argue that the transnational politics of Sri Lanka’s 
Tamil diaspora emerges from these social differences and conflicts, and their negotiation, 
in attempts to produce a national unity.  
Tamil diaspora studies have focused exclusively on communities living in North 
America and Europe. Studies of Tamil refugees in India focus almost exclusively on 
camp refugees (Balasundaram 2012; Hans 1997; Suryanarayan and Sudarsen 2000; 
Tesfay 2007; Xavier 2007). My project brings these two sets of literature together, to 
better understand how immigrant and refugee populations understand and practice 
citizenship and belonging in diaspora. I have found only one other text that studies Tamil 
refugees in India in the context of transnational migration—a dissertation focused on 
Tamil refugees self-settled near the city of Madurai (Paus 2005). This points to the 
widespread exclusion of refugees in the global South from conceptualizations of 
diaspora. My project addresses this exclusion, and considers how two different sets of 
refugees in India—camp refugees, and urban refugees waiting to migrate to the West—
inhabit the margins of diasporic belonging. 
Rethinking Diaspora 
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In the humanities and social sciences of the 1990s and early 2000s, diaspora 
seemed to be everywhere. This led Khachig Tölölyan, the founder and editor of the 
journal, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies and an Armenian diaspora scholar, 
to proclaim, “Where once were dispersions, there now is diaspora” (1996: 3), a term he 
and other scholars (cf. Brubaker 2005) felt was in danger of becoming “a promiscuously 
capacious category” (1996: 8). Tölölyan’s reflections on the new field of diaspora studies 
led him to consider “why and how… a term once saturated with the meanings of exile, 
loss, dislocation, powerlessness and plain pain became a useful, even desirable way to 
describe a range of dispersions” (1996: 9).  
For the early scholars of diaspora such communities were primarily shaped by 
“the maintenance of group consciousness defined by a continued relationship with an 
original homeland” (Safran 1991), rather than their integration or assimilation into so-
called ‘host societies.’ This model of twentieth-century diaspora studies thus took for 
granted the notion of a homeland as a singular “place of origin,” (Safran 1991) and 
diaspora, as the spatially dispersed community formed out of “a people’s” migration to 
two or more peripheral places, could become a site for studies of cultural survivals and 
processes of acculturation and assimilation among racialized and minoritized group.9 In 
addition to the notion of “home” and “host” countries, these studies defined diasporas as 
communities that viewed the ancestral homeland as a place of eventual return or one to 
maintain or restore (Safran 1991; Sheffer 2003). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Scott (1991) provides a good summary and critique of such studies in his analysis of Herskovits’s 
scholarship as a Caribbeanist. 
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Subsequent work incorporated the powerful insights of black British cultural 
studies (Brown 1998; Gilroy 1993; Hall 1990, 1994) to examine and redefine diaspora as 
a transnational space of traversal (Clifford 1994), exchange, and cultural production. 
Such work wrote against the essentialism of what anthropologist Brian Axel (1998, 2004) 
has termed the ‘place of origin’ thesis—the notion described above of a diaspora 
constituted by its relationship to an original homeland. By emphasizing the plurality of 
antagonisms that constitute diasporic identity and the diaspora’s retrospectively produced 
origins (Axel 2001; Edwards 2001) this next generation of scholars also questioned 
displacement as the privileged explanatory trope of diaspora, and its spatializing effects 
(Brown 1998; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1994). These scholars critiqued earlier studies that 
pathologized diaspora as a failure to obtain or inhabit the normative ideal of national 
sovereignty (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1994).  
However, as valuable and important as this work is, it has not fully de-authorized 
the spatial assumptions of the “place of origin” model, which has only gained increasing 
traction in popular discourse. This presents scholarship with a contradiction. On the one 
hand, the first strand of diaspora studies, with its model of an original community 
scattered from a homeland, provides the form in which many people, including Sri 
Lankan Tamils, imagine and narrate their lives as “diasporic.” On the other hand, the 
second strand, led some scholars to uncritically celebrate diasporas as plural and hybrid 
social formations (Gilroy 1993; Bhabha 1994) that inaugurate a “stateless power of the 
transnational moment” (Tölölyan 1996). 
Similarly, I am neither arguing to recenter the nation-state, nor to preemptively 
celebrate its total dissolution. Rather, I suggest that the heuristic of “diaspora” allows me 
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to re-examine tightly-conscripted notions of ethnicity, territoriality and sovereignty in Sri 
Lanka and the fight for Tamil Eelam. In doing so, however, I suggest that this critical 
project is undermined by scholarship that takes the claim of “stateless power” at face 
value. Diaspora, as a modern social imaginary and a translocal form of political 
community, emerges in relation to the nation-state under globalization. My approach here 
parallels that of recent historical and anthropological scholarship on diaspora in the 
contexts of historical empires (Ho 2004), colonial indenture and ethnolinguistic pluralism 
(Eisenlohr 2006; Trnka 2008), and social movements (Sökefeld 2006). As we shall see 
(particularly in the ethnographic chapters of this dissertation), the political community of 
Sri Lanka’s Tamil diaspora encompasses national and ‘post-national’ senses of 
belonging. And yet this belonging is defined in relation to the politics of the Sri Lankan 
state and Tamil separatist movements, as well as the laws and policies of the states in 
which Tamils currently reside, particularly with respect to asylum-seeking, immigration 
and citizenship. For this reason—and in contrast to most cultural studies of diaspora—
this ethnography examines the policies and laws that have deeply shaped Tamil diaspora 
formation and political activism. 
The Anthropology of Violence and Suffering 
Contemporary anthropology has generated an abundant and theoretically rich 
literature on violence and suffering.10 The discipline turned to violence and suffering in 
the context of massive political and economic shifts during the late 1980s and 1990s: the 
end of the Cold War, the growth of late capitalism and, most visibly, new ethnic and civil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For a summary of this literature, see Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004). In a recent analysis, Robbins 
(2013) suggests that anthropology’s turn to violence has produced a new “suffering slot” that replaces the 
problematic “savage slot” (Trouillot 1991) of colonial anthropology, while revealing new problems of its 
own. 
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wars. The Global War on Terror that followed September 11, and the spread and 
implementation of neoliberal economic policies has only made the topic of “violence” 
more relevant to scholars. Consequently, the anthropology of violence and suffering has 
centered on the following phenomena: political violence, communal violence, and ethnic 
wars (Das 2007, 1995; Daniel 1996; Feldman 1991; Malkki 1995a; Nordstrom 1997; 
Sluka 2000); experiences of displacement and the bureaucratic management of refugees 
(Daniel and Thangaraj 1995; Malkki 1995, 1996); forms of suffering that result from 
structural violence (Farmer 2005; Das, Kleinman et al, 1997; Scheper-Hughes 1992); 
human rights discourses on culture and violence (Abu Lughod 2001; Merry 2006; Riles 
2006; Allen 2013, 2009); and the biopolitical violence of humanitarianism (Fassin 2007; 
Ticktin 2011, 2006). I draw several insights from this literature. 
First, anthropologists have examined the history of colonialism in constructing, 
categorizing and reifying social differences that, amid unequal distributions of power 
within a racial hierarchy, lay the ground for postcolonial conflicts (Daniel 1996; 
Mamdani 2001; Taussig 1987). In Sri Lanka (which was known as Ceylon before 1972), 
this is apparent in the very notion of a “Tamil” people, amid multiple historical and social 
formations of Tamilness. Political technologies such as the census and “communal 
representation” were crucial to British governance of the colony, and created distinct 
ethnic groups that were later mobilized under the sign of the nation (Nissan and Stirrat 
1990; Rajasingham-Senanayake 2002). During the late colonial period of the 1920s-
1940s, changes to the form of political representation assigned to local elites and the 
granting of so-called universal franchise under colonial tutelage led to the rise of “ethnic 
politics” (Wickramasinghe 1995) and a series of political maneuvers from Sinhalese 
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political elites during the writing of a new constitution on the eve of independence. In 
short, colonial statecraft produced “majority” and “minority” communities, setting in 
motion a chain of events that led to the political conflicts and forms of violence discussed 
throughout this dissertation. 
Second, anthropologists’ studies of representations of violence contributed to 
theoretical approaches to the nature of language and signs, with particular attention to the 
problem of how violence is and is not communicated among sufferers of pain and 
survivors after violence (Daniel 1996; Das, Kleinman and Lock 1997). This work focuses 
on the activity of signs and their interpretation in the making and remaking of social life 
after violence (Daniel 1996; Das 2007). I suggest that attention to the study of signs in 
life after violence is important to the study of Tamil diaspora formation, and political 
activism especially. Whereas social scientific studies of diaspora politics tend to study 
transnationally dispersed ethnic groups as “actors” (whether collective, or as individual 
representatives), a semiotic approach to the study of violence and diaspora activism 
allows for a fine-grained analysis of multiple forms of action.  
Third, in their attention to structural violence (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 
2004; Farmer 2005), this scholarship on violence urges me to attend not only to the 
spectacular forms of violence such as torture and assassination that pervaded the war, but 
also to the less visible and ‘slow’ violence of poverty and deprivation that constituted 
everyday life in wartime, and among socially marginalized refugees and immigrants in 
diaspora. Finally, on a related point, anthropologists of violence and suffering have 
turned increasingly to the study of human rights and humanitarianism as regimes that 
discipline and govern subjects in the context of growing global inequality (Feldman 
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2008; Allen 2009, 2013; Redfield and Bornstein 2010; Clarke 2010; Fassin 2011; 
Feldman and Ticktin 2010; Ticktin 2006, 2011; Gabiam 2012); they illuminate the 
contradiction between humanitarianism’s ideal that all lives are sacred and the inequality 
of human lives in conditions of structural violence (Fassin 2007; Redfield 2005).  
Anthropologists have also critiqued human rights as a discourse of power in 
which those who enjoy such rights in the global north assume “moral ownership” of third 
world suffering to authorize their own interventions (de Waal 1997; Jackson 2005) in 
what has been termed “the new humanitarianism” (Chandler 2001). Humanitarian action 
organized by international non-governmental organizations has thus become a 
fundamental part of the state’s military and economic interventions (Fassin and Pandolfi 
2009). While humanitarianism has typically operated through non-governmental 
organizations (Ticktin 2014: 274), scholars have also shown how “humanitarian 
government”  (Pandolfi 2008; Agier 2010) as a “politics of life” (Fassin 2007) is being 
incorporated into the policies of the governmental state (Ticktin 2006) to manage life and 
death across a variety of domains, including biotechnology, the environment, and 
immigration.  
More specifically for my project, the anthropology of humanitarianism has 
contributed critical insights to refugee and migration studies by examining what Miriam 
Ticktin (2011) has called “the biopolitics of immigration” and what Didier Fassin (2011) 
terms “the governmentality of immigration in dark times.” These writers study the effects 
of humanitarian regimes on the recognition and mobility of asylum-seekers, refugees and 
immigrants from the global south. They find that as immigration laws and policies 
became increasingly restrictive in the West, the refugee’s “suffering body” has become a 
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site for the verification of “truth” and legitimacy in determining claims for asylum or 
refugee status (Fassin and D’Haillun 2005); these studies also show that not all human 
suffering is equal: Only certain forms of suffering entail political recognition from the 
state, while other kinds of suffering are obscured and easily ignored (Ticktin 2011; see 
also Daniel 1996, Daniel and Knudsen 1995). The turn to human rights and 
humanitarianism in the last decade thus allows us to critically examine how political 
claims are made in the name of humanity (Feldman and Ticktin 2010), as a discourse and 
a practice of power, and how attempts to alleviate suffering through transnational 
humanitarian action can often produce violence and harm, particularly when organized on 
behalf of state policies and institutions (Ticktin 2006).  
Instead, transnational humanitarianism becomes a way to define “our” humanity 
and capacity in relation to “their” helplessness. This literature encourages us to think 
against the grain of contemporary appeals to compassion that seek to mobilize us to 
action by drawing attention to the structures and discourses of power that, on the one 
hand, ascribe the humanity of “bare life” to some people (Agamben 1998), while 
investing other human subjects with agency. My dissertation considers this problem from 
the vantage point of Tamil diaspora activisms that appropriated human rights and 
humanitarian discourses as a new way of “doing politics” in the twenty-first century. In 
their desire to alleviate and bring an end to Tamil suffering, activists were confronted by 
and made use of human rights reporting on Sri Lanka and their diaspora communities; 
their frequent use of such reports, from a variety of Sri Lankan and international groups, 
discursively shaped the ethics and politics of their work. This became especially apparent 
when the Government of Sri Lanka banished international humanitarian workers from the 
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active war zone in the north in September 2008. During the final months of the war in 
January to April 2009, activists organized large crowds of diaspora Tamils to protest and 
call for Sri Lanka to declare a “humanitarian ceasefire.”  I suggest that Tamil protests 
served as a way for diaspora Tamils to intervene in the war in lieu of humanitarian 
access. 
Violence in Diaspora Formation 
Violence is often mentioned in studies of diaspora populations, but analyzed 
rarely. Diaspora studies, as an interdisciplinary field that emerged during the 1990s, has 
largely remained the province of two sets of disciplines: literary and cultural studies, on 
the one hand, and sociology, political science and international relations, on the other. In 
each of these fields, violence has been taken to be a basic condition of possibility for 
diasporic immigrant populations. Indeed, for some scholars, what differentiates a 
diaspora from other transnational migrants is the notion of a forced migration away from 
physical violence and harm (Cheran 2003). As a result, the concept of violence itself and 
its relationship to diaspora formation has not been sufficiently explored within the 
humanities and social sciences.  
This project brings the insights of the anthropology of violence and suffering to 
bear on theories of diaspora and the study of Tamil activism. In doing so, my efforts are 
informed by two anthropologists whose work examines representations and discourses of 
violence in the making of diasporas. Brian Axel (2001, 2004) theorized the relationship 
between violence and diaspora in his study of Sikhs and the transnational fight for 
Khalistan. Axel argues that representations of the “tortured body,” a political artifact of 
state violence, have become central to the social imaginary and formation of a Sikh 
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diaspora (2001: 122). In an article titled, “The Violence of Diaspora,” Deborah Thomas 
(2009) examines the discursive construction of Jamaica and its diasporas in the United 
States and elsewhere as mired in a “culture of violence.” Thomas argues that academic 
diaspora studies has been complicit in the perpetuation of multiple forms of violence, 
through scholarship that privileges culturalist analysis, and in doing so, obscures 
socioeconomic inequality and systemic racism. My study of Tamil diaspora finds 
resonances in Thomas’s and Axel’s scholarship, as Tamils in Sri Lanka and the diaspora 
have had to contend with discourses that assume a cultural basis for separatist violence 
and question their multiple loyalties. In the case of Sri Lanka’s Tamils, an additional 
point should be made: The notion of a “culture of violence” in the form of the LTTE 
blamed Tamils for their suffering—even as the government claimed its ‘humanitarian 
operation’ rescued civilians from the Tigers—and thus allowed for thousands of people to 
be killed at the war’s end without consequence.   
This dissertation extends the above scholarly concerns with violence in diaspora 
formation to the study of political activism. However, I assert that the political subject of 
a Tamil diaspora has not only been formed out of activists’ circulation of texts and 
images of wartime violence and suffering. Tamil diaspora activists and protesters also 
publicly remembered their own embodied experiences with violence in the context of 
anti-Tamil riots and pogroms and the ongoing war, and commemorated the suffering of 
their relatives. I argue that violence was, in this way, a fundamental part of the 
“background practices” (Daniel 1996: 155) of Tamil diaspora political life and action. 
Signs and Subjects in Action 
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This dissertation also brings Peirce’s theory of signs to the study of diaspora 
politics and social life. Many social theorists who study language and culture have 
followed a dyadic theory that relates signs and objects.11 A Saussurean theory of the sign 
(semeieon), for example, considers the relationship between the “signifier” (sign) and 
“signified” (object). Peirce’s semeiotic introduces a third element into sign-object 
relations: the interpretant. For Peirce, a sign (also called a representamen) is anything 
that stands for something—its object—in relation to something, i.e. its interpretant. This 
interpretant could then serve as the representamen in another triadic relationship. 
Peirce divided signs by breaking down into various categories their structure, 
depending on their “ground.” He termed a sign based on a quality a “qualisign,” an 
existent thing or actuality as a “sinsign,” and a sign of law or habit as a “legisign.” 
Further, by considering the sign’s relation to its dynamic object (“the really efficient but 
not immediately present object”), Peirce (1894, “What is a Sign?”) differentiated between 
a sign that resembles its object (icon), a sign that has an actual connection to its object 
through causation or contiguity (index), and a sign that is related to its object by 
convention or habit (a symbol).12  The effectiveness of each of these types of signs 
depends on people’s understandings of how they signify (Keane 1997: 19).  
For purposes of clarity, I do not draw on all of Peirce’s myriad terms, which 
include further divisions of the above trichotomy of signs into a ten-fold classification. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For example, the Prague School of linguistics (with the exception of Jakobsen, who later became 
interested in Peirce), Roland Barthes’s semiologie, Levi-Strauss’s structural anthropology, Derridean 
deconstruction, the postcolonial and Subaltern Studies of Spivak and Guha. 
12  Peirce uniquely recognized differences among types of signs. Only the third type, the symbol, relies 
entirely on social convention in a way that parallels what Saussurean linguists have characterized as the 
“arbitrary” relationship between the signifier and signified.   
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The latter three—icon, index, and symbol—are ones I use regularly throughout the 
dissertation to differentiate particular kinds of signs in political action.  
In addition to the above terms, Peirce’s theory of signs provides us with a unique 
vantage point from which to theorize the place of signs in the making of human 
subjectivity and action. As Vincent Colapietro (1989) notes, much of Peirce’s approach 
to the self was implicit to his theory, and it has been up to sympathetic scholars to wade 
through the density of his prose in order to take up this direction in his work. Peircean 
semiotics illuminates subjectivity not only by understanding human subjects “as users of 
signs, but also as themselves processes and products of semiosis” (Colapietro 1989: 47). 
In contrast to psychological and sociological studies of individual thoughts and 
behavior, a semiotic/pragmaticist approach to the study of human subjectivity and culture 
focuses on processes and habits of action. At a basic level, this approach understands 
signs to be constitutive of actions, and the meanings that we create from actions. When 
this insight is applied to the ethnographic study of the political, we arrive at another 
important finding: Signs also create the power and authority they appear to reflect 
through human practices of interpretation and exchange (Keane 1997; see also Daniel 
1996). 
Peirce’s notion of semiotics as a theory of reasoning, and his interest in the ethics 
of self-governance (as being rooted in habits of self-observation and self-criticism, 
Colapietro 1989: xix) resonate with Foucault’s theories of power and subjectivity, in spite 
of their different intellectual genealogies. His general theory of signs, “insofar as it is a 
normative account of reasoning, entails a commonsensical understanding of human 
agency,” in which “agents are beings who possess the power to exercise real, although 
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limited, control over the course of their conduct.” The study of signs as a pragmatic 
analysis of agency and habit-formation can contribute to the study of power relations of 
discipline and government, as forms of power that act upon subjects and “act upon their 
actions” to achieve its desired ends (Foucault 1991).  
Citizenship, Belonging and the Liberal State 
 This project aims to bring into focus the problem of citizenship in liberal 
democratic states. Citizenship has been typically understood as a legal category of the 
nation-state that confers rights and obligations (Marshall 1950). However, citizenship as 
a juridical form of state recognition does not wholly define belonging and its exclusions, 
especially in the context of globalization and transnational migration. In contrast to such 
formalistic definitions of citizenship, anthropologists have focused on the everyday 
processes by which people are made into subjects of the nation-state. This project also 
discusses citizenship in an expanded sense as a social practice (Lister 2003) and cultural 
form of membership and belonging. 
 Among anthropologists, the notion of “cultural citizenship” refers to citizenship in 
this wider sense. The concept was developed in the mid-1990s out of ethnographic 
studies of the exclusion and inclusion of Latino immigrants (Rosaldo 1994; Flores and 
Benmayor 1997) and Southeast Asian refugees (Ong 2003, 1996) in the United States, 
and in relation to the “flexible citizenship” of transnational Chinese elites (Ong 1999, 
1996).13 Subsequent scholarship has extended and expanded this concept in studying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 While “cultural citizenship” and “flexible citizenship” are both practiced in relation to the governmental 
state, Ong uses the latter to refer to practices of highly mobile “capital-bearing subjects,” and more 
specifically, “the strategies and effects of mobile managers, technocrats, and professionals seeking to both 
circumvent and benefit from different nation-state regimes by selecting different sites for investments, 
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racialized and marginalized minorities in the United States, Asia, and other transnational 
and diasporic locations (Clarke 2012; Maira 2009; Siu 2001; Rosaldo 2003).  
“Cultural citizenship” has been defined in multiple ways. Renato Rosaldo, in his 
discussion of educational democracy, refers to it as “the right to be different and to 
belong in a participatory democratic sense” (Rosaldo 1994:402). The anthropologist 
Aihwa Ong’s work has, as Kamari Clarke writes, “popularized ways of thinking about 
agency and belonging beyond the state” (2013: 465). Ong defines cultural citizenship, 
broadly, as “a process of self-making and being-made in relation to nation-states and 
transnational processes” (737). Whereas Rosaldo focuses on assertions made by 
immigrants, who appear to be already constituted political subjects, Ong considers 
cultural citizenship to be a process of subjectification in relation to the biopolitical state 
(Foucault 2003, 1991). Ong argues accordingly of the need to attend to the regulatory 
regimes of the state and civil society institutions (1996:738) to understand the making of 
immigrant and refugee subjects in intersecting hierarchies of racial and cultural 
difference.14 
Like the anthropologist Sunaina Maira (2009) in her study of Muslim immigrant 
youth and citizenship in the U.S. after 9/11, I aim to bridge these approaches in order to 
better analyze the contradictions of “multicultural citizenship” (Kymlicka 1995) and its 
exclusions in liberal democratic nation-states. When the political agency of migrants and 
technologies of state regulation are studied together, the practice of cultural citizenship 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
work, and family relocation” (1999: 112). The concept has since been used by other scholars in ways that 
diverge from her use; see, for example, Maira (2009). 
14 Although the 1996 article also notes intersections of class and gender (the latter of which could use 
deeper elaboration), Ong’s primary concern is to intervene in the “race-versus-culture” debate at that time. 
She rightly refers to this debate as “a red herring” (739). See the Comments and Reply to the article for 
further discussion.  
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may critique the state while remaining within its framework (2009: 85; Grewal 2005). 
This problem becomes quite apparent in multicultural discourses of “inclusion” which 
often assert liberal values of “tolerance” and “diversity” (Brown 2006) while 
sidestepping problems of political and economic inequity that are especially acute for 
racialized immigrants and minorities. 
This project examines multiple forms of citizenship in the migration and political 
activism of Tamils from Sri Lanka. The notion of citizenship I use draws on the above 
literature to denote a practice of social membership and subjective belonging across 
multiple scales of human action. I consider many forms of “action” in studying Tamil 
practices of citizenship and belonging in Canada and India. First, I study the actions taken 
by Tamils to become mobile citizen-subjects in processes of international migration and 
settlement, on the one hand, and in preparing for future return to Sri Lanka, on the other. 
Second, I examine highly visible forms of community mobilization and public action 
such as rallies and demonstrations, postering, digital videos, debates, and commemorative 
ceremonies, as well as less apparent practices of political activism such as fundraising. 
Third, I consider how activists seek to address inequities and create social change within 
diaspora communities.  
Legal citizenship for immigrants does not guarantee belonging to a national 
community or rights, as the sociologist Monisha Das Gupta has argued in her study of 
South Asian immigrant organizing among service workers, feminists and queer activists 
in the United States (2006: 14). Instead, Das Gupta contends that non-citizen immigrants’ 
activisms construct a “transnational complex of rights” that do not rely on citizenship to 
make claims of the state (Das Gupta 2006). I find this concept useful in thinking about 
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how Tamil refugees—especially in India’s camps—participate in diasporic activism. I 
suggest, following Das Gupta, that immigrants and refugees embody and transform the 
relationship between states, national citizenship and rights in their border-crossing 
actions, even as they confront the limits of laws that exclude and deprive them. 
A resurgence of interest in political anthropology at the end of the twentieth 
century has led to new fields of study, from state institutions to non-governmental 
organizations, and new social movements to transnational humanitarianism. We have 
seen the importance of Foucault’s theories of “governmentality” and “biopower” in this 
new anthropology of “the political” for an analysis of the making and management of 
people as populations.  This has led to an “anthropology of the state,” which 
ethnographically examines “the state effect” (Mitchell 2006)—the social abstraction of a 
unitary state produced out of multiple institutional apparatuses, and their application of 
techniques of power in the everyday lives of the governed (Chatterjee 2004). The 
government of populations generates contemporary categories of identity, making an 
anthropology of the state critical to the study of popular mobilizations of identity. Indeed, 
I suggest that Tamil diaspora political activism as a practice of citizenship and belonging 
offers a unique vantage point from which to analyze the effects of the Sri Lankan state. I 
examine these effects through the state’s transnational extension in the lives of expelled 
and excluded citizens abroad, and as this intersects with internationally circulating human 
rights and humanitarian discourses. 
Building on anthropological concerns with the state and citizenship, this study 
also engages with political theories of democracy. I focus especially on contemporary 
philosophical debates on the public sphere (Habermas 1992), on the one hand, and 
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multiculturalism, pluralism, and the politics of recognition (Fraser and Honneth 2003; 
Kymlicka 1995; Markell 2003; Taylor 1995), on the other, to interrogate the political 
rationality of liberal democracy and analyze the relationship between affect and agency in 
the social practice of citizenship. Liberal theorists have argued that rational consensus is 
the foundation of democratic politics (Rawls 1971; Habermas 1989). On the basis of his 
work on discourse ethics and communicative action, the philosopher, Jurgen Habermas, 
has been one of the strongest proponents of a “deliberative democracy,” in which 
participants reach a consensual agreement through public communication. In response, 
poststructural feminist theorists (Butler; Fraser 1992; Young 1990) have drawn attention 
to the inequities that undergird Habermas’s ideal-rational public sphere, showing how the 
social differences that delineate the public sphere make some “voices” more powerful 
than others. In contrast to liberal deliberation and consensus, radical theorists value 
conflict as inherent to the practice of democracy, which becomes an arena for an 
agonistic pluralism (Honig 1993) and a collective struggle for hegemony (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985; Mouffe 2000).  
The debate between consensus and conflict in the practice of democracy is 
important in the case of Sri Lanka and the ‘Tamil national question,’ as well as the 
internal politics of community among Tamils in and outside the country. Sri Lanka, India 
and Canada are all liberal democratic states formed out of British imperialism and 
colonial rule, making these debates especially relevant to my project. In spite of their 
different historical formation, all three states have shared since their inception an ongoing 
concern with managing and governing a heterogeneous polity, in which subjects have 
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made claims for resources and political power on the basis of language, indigeneity, race, 
ethnicity, religion, caste, class, and gender.  
In the Sri Lankan case, architects of the 2002-2006 peace process emphasized 
liberal norms designed to effect a “consensus” between the two warring parties. Local 
intellectuals also argued that a more “liberal” system of governance was the need of the 
hour. This could, of course, take many forms. However, the peace process was designed 
so that differences and conflicts within social formations were smoothed over in favor of 
a top-down process of “representation” at talks to find consensus between two defined 
groups. Consequently many social groups were left out of the formal peace process: 
Muslims, non-LTTE Tamil militant groups, IDPs and refugees, and (for the most part) 
women. The failure of Sri Lanka’s peace process shows that attempts to build a top-down 
consensus between dominant “representatives” did not resolve “the conflict,” let alone 
address the social and economic inequities that contributed to the war. The dissertation 
understands these dynamics of conflict as integral to struggles for a pluralistic democracy 
in Sri Lanka and within Tamil diaspora communities.   
Fieldwork in a Time of War and Counterinsurgency 
From January 2008 to August 2009, I carried out ethnographic and archival 
research in Toronto, Canada and Tamil Nadu, India. My fieldwork spanned the official 
return to war, the announcement of the war’s end, and the first few months of the post-
war period. I also conducted a brief visit to London in early 2010 to follow-up with 
diaspora activists I had met in my primary field sites who were active in the wider 
diaspora. This multi-sited ethnography is further supplemented by the insights I have 
gained from visits to Sri Lanka in the summers of 2004 through 2006 and May 2012.  
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Methods 
In each site, I employed multiple qualitative methods, including the following: (1) 
Participant-observation among activists and their families in diaspora neighborhoods and 
refugee camps, and their public events and actions, to investigate how they create and 
inhabit the social spaces of ‘community,’ ‘diaspora’ and ‘homeland’; (2) Informal 
interviews at events, semi-structured interviews, and life histories of key interlocutors, to 
examine how personal and political narratives of ‘critical events’ such as war, migration, 
death, and protest constitute diasporic subjects as ethical selves and political agents; (3) 
Mapping social networks and kinship across time and geographic distance, to study 
overlapping activist networks and their interactions; (4) Constructing an archive of 
diasporic activism by collecting documents from libraries, organizations, community 
media and activists’ personal collections, to trace the public formation of a Tamil 
diaspora. 
My long-term research proceeded in three phases, coinciding with the final phases 
of the Sri Lankan war. Fieldwork began in Toronto in January 2008, following the 
Government of Sri Lanka’s official abrogation of the 2002 ceasefire. In Toronto, I spent 
the first three months of my fieldwork reinitiating contacts I had made during previous 
stints of pre-dissertation research, attending a wide range of public events, making new 
contacts and generally introducing myself to ‘the community.’ I spoke with community-
based activists, writers, journalists, educators and social workers, with a focus on those 
who were affiliated with the following organizations: the Canadian Tamil Congress 
(CTC), the World Tamil Movement (WTM), Canadian Tamil Youth Development 
(CanTYD), Tamil Youth Organization (TYO-Canada), etc. I also met 'alternative' groups 
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such as the Tamil Resource Centre, Karumaiyam, Canadian-Sri Lankan Women’s Action 
Network, Canadians for Peace (C4P), and dissenting activists, who were often members 
of groups including the Sri Lanka Democracy Forum (SLDF), Canadian Democratic 
Tamil Cultural Association (CDTCA), EPDP-Canada, etc. I conducted participant-
observation at demonstrations and rallies, 'awareness events,' activist workshops, 
organizing and planning meetings, community debates, literary and political discussions, 
commemorative ceremonies (e.g. a vigil remembering victims of the 1983 anti-Tamil 
pogrom known as “Black July,” and Heroes Day, an LTTE commemoration of martyrs), 
rehabilitation fundraisers, exhibits, theatre performances and “cultural shows.” Through 
such events and the connections I had made, I became increasingly involved in the social 
and political life of Tamil Toronto.  
Throughout this period, I interacted with hundreds of Tamils, and conducted 
eighty-eight individual and group interviews with activists. These semi-structured 
interviews allowed me to gather basic details about personal backgrounds (for example, 
places of birth and residence, education, occupation), migration trajectories, and 
settlement processes, and were accompanied by several open-ended questions designed to 
open the interview up into a broader conversation about diasporic social life and political 
activism. Some interviewees were key interlocutors who spoke with me on multiple 
occasions; as a consequence, their stories and words appear more frequently throughout 
the dissertation. 
Next, in October 2008, I went to Tamil Nadu, where protests initiated by local 
Indian political parties, civil society groups and, later, student activists were matched by 
unprecedented protests among Sri Lankan Tamil refugees. I partnered with a local NGO, 
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the Organization for Eelam Refugees’ Rehabilitation (OfERR) to work with refugees and 
the social activists among them in camps throughout the state. In Tamil Nadu, my 
interviews were primarily with residents of refugee camps and refugee workers and 
activists, but I also conducted interviews with Indian activists, academics and 
government officials to better situate my research among refugees. In Tamil Nadu, I also 
asked interlocutors to complete a brief questionnaire aimed at gathering basic data about 
household composition and family migration at the conclusion of our interview. 
Additionally, in Chennai, I collected documents on the history of Tamil politics and 
separatist activism at the Periyar Thidal, Anna Arivalayam, the International Institute of 
Tamil Studies, and OfERR’s library. During the second-half of this phase of research, 
some of my interlocutors in Canada, while watching and communicating with Indian 
activists, organized mass demonstrations and street actions of their own.  
 Finally, at the end of war in May 2009, and again in July and August, I returned to 
Toronto to conduct follow-up research among Tamil protesters, community leaders, and 
dissenting activists, to examine their ongoing actions, feelings and aspirations at the end 
of war. 
Some considerations 
Given the contentious politics and migration practices researched in this 
dissertation, I have taken great care to ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of my 
interlocutors during fieldwork and writing. I did not respond to requests to share names 
of those I had already interviewed when asked during research. Only two activists 
explicitly requested that I use their personal names. I have also used the names of official 
and public figures. All other names in this dissertation are pseudonyms. I have also 
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changed the names of the smaller refugee camps I discuss. In addition, all data, including 
my fieldnotes, were coded and encrypted on password-secured hard drives. 
On my presentation of the material 
This dissertation presents and interprets an ethnographic record constituted out of 
multiple, interconnected fragments gathered during fieldwork. This is in part due to the 
nature of diaspora research, which involves fieldwork among people whose lives are 
physically and socially dispersed across multiple places and networks.  
My presentation of the material also emerges from intellectual and political 
concerns that arise from this research project. The history of anthropology has shown a 
disciplinary preference for unified narratives of social continuity that often explains away 
conflict. This has certainly changed with the influence of poststructuralist theories 
(notably, Foucault’s work on discourse and power), postcolonial studies (for example, the 
Subaltern Studies collective) and anthropology’s turn to violence and suffering under 
conditions of globalization and neoliberalism. Yet, contemporary ethnographies still rely 
on academic traditions of argumentation that, even in their complexity, may force 
connections to produce a unity of subject and theoretical import. Similarly, in the war 
between the state and the LTTE, nationalists in Sri Lanka and diaspora activists 
frequently asserted the need for unity—whether as “Tamils,” “Sinhalese,” or “Sri 
Lankans.” In contrast, contemporary research on postcolonial Sri Lanka has tended to 
focus on the social and political crises that have led to insurgency, violence and war. Yet, 
in doing so, many of these studies have also presumed the unity of the groups they 
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present as being in an inevitable conflict—“the Tamils” and “the Sinhalese.”15 My effort 
here has been to explore the mutually constitutive relationship between social unity and 
conflict among Tamils, through a narrative that presents the contradictions and 
ambivalences inherent to Tamil diaspora life and politics. 
Situated research 
I was born in Canada to Tamil parents from Jaffna, Sri Lanka. My father and 
mother were the first of their siblings to leave the island, and planned to return in a few 
years, only to find they could not—after the anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983 (known to 
many as ‘Black July’), the country slid inexorably into war. Tamils migrated to Canada in 
large numbers during the 1980s and 1990s, and my parents’ siblings and cousins, and 
their families, were among the new immigrants. My parents moved frequently within 
Canada and the United States during this time. Although a formative part of my later 
childhood and adolescence was spent in Toronto, my peripatetic upbringing allowed me 
to observe a growing community with which I was affiliated, but from which I lived apart 
more often than not. 
I later attended the University of Toronto, where I completed undergraduate 
degrees in history and anthropology, and turned my attention to studying the country (Sri 
Lanka) and region (South Asia) that my parents had not-so-willingly left behind, 
alongside my study of Canadian history, society and politics. Toronto is ‘home’ in these 
ways and more—more accurately, it is one of my many homes—and this understanding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See, for example de Silva (1981), Devotta (2005), Wilson (1988, 2000). I analyze this problem further in 
Chapter 3. 
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has led not only to the intensive study that produced this dissertation, but also to critical 
reflection on the purpose and social relevance of this enterprise. 
The research for this dissertation was undertaken due to my desire to critically 
investigate the social dynamics of violence and conflict that led to Sri Lankan Tamil 
migration and the creation of far-flung yet interconnected diaspora communities. In time, 
I became increasingly interested in how activists mobilized diasporic communities out of 
Tamil migrant and refugee populations.  
As a diasporic ethnographer, I write here with the assumption that my work can 
(and likely will) be read by members of the diasporic communities and transnational 
networks discussed, of which I am and have been a part. My early awareness of this fact 
led, at first, to difficulties in writing up my fieldwork. Eventually, this gave way to an 
understanding of the necessity of telling this story as only I know how to tell it. I write 
with an awareness of fieldwork-based ethnography as a product of partial and situated 
knowledge (Haraway 1988), as is the work of every researcher. 
A note on “Tamil” 
This dissertation’s inquiry into Tamil diaspora activism warrants a brief 
explanation of my use of the ethnolinguistic category, “Tamil.” Scholarly accounts of 
modern Ceylon and Sri Lanka have observed a distinction between “Ceylon Tamils” and 
“Indian Tamils” on the island. In the twentieth century, Ceylon Tamils also distinguished 
themselves from the Indian Tamils by calling themselves “Indigenous Tamils,” thus 
making a claim to centuries of historical habitation on the island, in contrast to Tamils 
who traveled from India to Ceylon between 1870 and 1930 to labor on British-owned tea 
plantations, and the laborers’ descendants. In fact, as I discuss in the first two chapters of 
	   38	  
the dissertation, this differentiation among Tamils—and the relationship between territory 
and belonging it implies—shaped and was shaped by the island’s early postcolonial 
politics. Today, those who once described themselves as Ceylon or Indigenous Tamils 
may use “Sri Lankan Tamils” or “Eelam Tamils,” depending on their politics. In contrast, 
I occasionally use “Sri Lankan Tamil” diaspora to refer to all Tamils from the island, 
including Tamils from the Hill-Country (malaiyaka) region, who form communities 
living outside the island. 
In addition to country of origin, Tamil identity is often qualified by regional 
distinctions in Sri Lanka and the diaspora. In Toronto and throughout much of Sri 
Lanka’s Tamil diaspora, “Jaffna Tamils”—Tamils from the Jaffna peninsula of northern 
Sri Lanka—predominate, and this group tends to assume a synecdochal relationship to 
the rest of Sri Lanka’s north and east. In Tamil Nadu, however, Tamils from the Jaffna 
peninsula were few among camp refugees, who were mostly from other districts and 
regions: Mannar, Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi (taken together as the Vanni), Trincomalee, 
Nuwara Eliya (or malaiyaka, the Hill-Country), and so on. Finally, in addition to regions 
and countries of origin, diaspora Tamils also use their country of residence and/or 
citizenship to distinguish groups within the wider diaspora: e.g. Canadian Tamils, British 
Tamils, Swiss Tamils, etc. 
These distinctions among Tamils often gave way to a general identity as Tamils 
affected by systemic discrimination, violence and war. My use of the “Tamil” category 
varies contextually, as it does among those who are identified as Tamils. When I refer to 
“Tamils” or a “Tamil diaspora” in general, I do so in the context of a diasporic politics 
that generalizes across the abovementioned differences: an activism predicated upon a 
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shared group identity as potential targets of violence in Sri Lanka.16 However, I do not 
take these differences for granted, and at times draw attention to the ways in which 
Tamil, as a political identity, obscures important social differences among the people 
described. 
Overview of Dissertation Chapters 
This dissertation is organized around three interlocking concerns: (1) I examine 
the social transformations of Tamil migration and militancy that led to the formation of a 
new ethical and political self among those previously expelled from the state and the 
Tamil national project: The creation and naming of a diasporic political subject who 
bears a moral obligation to act to prevent and stop war from the relative safety of distance 
from its physical exigencies. (2) I consider how and why diasporic activists represented, 
reenacted, and mediated suffering to protest war and express dissent. (3) More broadly, 
my research seeks to understand how and why “diaspora” has become a concept and 
location with moral, cultural and political salience not only for Tamils dispersed by 
violence and war, or social scientists, but those who claim belonging to today’s “global 
diasporas.” These concerns unfold in the following chapters: 
Part I of this dissertation delves into the historical and social transformations that 
gave rise to a diasporic politics with competing ethical obligations for Tamils living 
outside Sri Lanka. 
Chapter One introduces the reader to my ethnographic field, “the Tamil diaspora,” 
and begins to map out the conditions of possibility that produced Tamil protest against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For example, this general category appear in a statement I often heard during my fieldwork in Canada 
and India: “The government [of Sri Lanka] is killing Tamils.” 
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war. The first half of the chapter maps the global dispersion of Tamils from Sri Lanka 
and provides the reader with an ethnographic introduction to the social life of Tamils in 
my two primary fieldsites: Toronto, Canada and Tamil Nadu, India. Chapter Two 
examines how these two different trajectories of migration and settlement resulted in 
political movements with contrasting ends, First, I describe the political situation in Sri 
Lanka during the 2002-2008 ceasefire and the failure of the peace process. Then I turn to 
Sri Lankan Tamil activisms in Canada and India during this period. In Toronto, I examine 
the Pongu Thamil (Tamil Uprising) movement, tracking the event from Jaffna, Sri Lanka 
to its diasporic iterations in Toronto in 2004 and 2008. In Tamil Nadu, I examine 
movements of refugee return to Sri Lanka and how a local NGO “of, by and for refugees” 
mobilized and prepared refugees for their eventual return to the island. 
In Chapter Three, I explore diaspora histories of Tamil politics, and how a new 
political subject emerges in activists’ practices of historical narration. The first half of the 
chapter presents dominant narratives of Tamil politics and the events that have typically 
defined this domain in colonial and postcolonial Ceylon/Sri Lanka. In addition to a 
synthesis of prevailing accounts, I undertake a reading of Tamil political histories written 
by scholars and activist writers during the war (1983-2009). The second half of the 
chapter supplements this historiography with ethnographic insights drawn from life 
history interviews and oral histories recorded during fieldwork among diaspora activists. 
I juxtapose these diasporic narrations of Tamil political histories and the ‘critical events’ 
(Das 1995) they invoke to construct a genealogy of the political conditions and 
contestations at the core of an emerging Tamil diaspora politics. In contrast to academic 
and activist histories that claim the “end” of Tamil politics with the start of war, I argue 
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that a specifically “Tamil” politics and Tamil political identities in Sri Lanka were 
instead displaced—figuratively and literally—and transformed in the parallel 
developments of Tamil militancy and diaspora activism. 
Part II of the dissertation explores Tamil forms and formations of diasporic 
community in actions of protest and dissent at the end of Sri Lanka’s war. Chapter Four 
focuses on Tamil diaspora activism in Toronto, a city with the largest population of Sri 
Lankan Tamils outside Asia. First, I outline the social, cultural and political lives of 
Tamils in Toronto, and describe the hegemony of the LTTE in diaspora politics. Then, I 
investigate the notions of “community” and “citizenship” that give form to Tamil 
belonging in diaspora. Specifically, I examine the politics of community and citizenship 
in the context of Canada’s state policies of multiculturalism and anti-terrorism laws that 
led to proscriptions on the LTTE in 2006, and the World Tamil Movement in 2008. 
Through participant-observation, interviews and everyday conversations with activists, 
and a discursive analysis of Canadian laws and media coverage, I consider the social 
meaning and political effects of the ban on Tamil diaspora community formations and 
activisms. I argue that, after the ceasefire, Canada’s ban on the LTTE catalyzed Tamil 
protest as an assertion of a diasporic identity and community.  
Chapter Five and Chapter Six each provide a thick description of the social and 
political lives of Tamils from Sri Lanka living in the refugee camps and cities of Tamil 
Nadu, India. Taken together, these chapters demonstrate that two forms of refugee life—
the camp and the city—are relational and constitutive of one another in Tamil Nadu and 
in the larger formation of a Tamil diaspora. In contrast to philosophies that idealize “the 
refugee” as an exemplary political subject of our times (Agamben 1994; 1998), by virtue 
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of her exclusion from the polis, these chapters reveal the ambivalent and multiple values 
of the polysemic figure of “the refugee” for Sri Lankan Tamils now settled in India. 
Despite their lack of legal status, Tamils who live in the camps are socially 
recognized as refugees, and inhabit this identity to make strategic claims upon the state as 
they organize to improve their lives and protest Sri Lanka’s war. Camp Tamils expect 
they will return to Sri Lanka one day, and organize community and collective actions in 
their displacement as part of their prospective return. In Chennai, however, Tamils who 
were self-settled at the city’s limits became refugees in order to migrate from India to the 
West, where they hoped to settle in a diasporic community of citizens. Whether through 
collective action or international migration, I suggest that it is precisely in contested 
attempts to reinhabit a world that, to quote Hannah Arendt (1968[1951]) “makes opinions 
significant and actions effective,” and to invoke and appropriate its loss, that Tamil 
refugees enact a new political subjectivity at the limits of modern citizenship. 
The final chapter of this dissertation, Chapter Seven, brings my fieldsites together 
to examine Tamil actions in response to suffering. I discuss how Tamil diaspora 
communities mobilized against the war, and more specifically, in response to Tamil 
suffering during the final months of battle. In the first part of the chapter, I discuss two 
exhibits that were organized by activists in Canada to raise awareness about historical 
suffering. The first exhibit, “Remembering Silenced Voices,” was organized by the 
Canadian Tamil Congress to commemorate the 25th anniversary of Black July. In the 
exhibit, Tamils who feel they constitute a ‘suffering community’ in Sri Lanka became 
‘survivors’ in their lives after migration, producing knowledge about violence for 
Canadian audiences. The second exhibit was titled “Call of the Conscience,” and was 
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organized by a dissenting Tamil activist who wished to present a history of the war. I 
argue that diaspora Tamil activists share a desire to alleviate and end Tamil suffering in 
Sri Lanka. In my synthesis and engagement with theories of spectatorship and 
humanitarian action in response to suffering, I suggest that Tamil activists were neither 
distant spectators, nor immediate sufferers, but diasporic intermediaries whose past 
experiences of violence in Sri Lanka and recent distresses shaped their actions to end the 
war. The second part of the chapter describes and analyzes the ways in which activists in 
Canada and India publicly invoked and performed suffering to mobilize public action 
against the war, and explores some limits to these mobilizations. 
The war ended on May 18, 2009 with the Sri Lankan government’s 
announcement of the military defeat of the LTTE. This dissertation concludes with 
reflections on the end of the war, and its aftermath in protests that continued in Toronto 
and other diasporic locations. I highlight the possibilities and limits of “the Tamil 
diaspora” as a subject of political action in Sri Lanka. An epilogue follows, in which I 
briefly describe the situation of post-war Sri Lanka, new trends in Tamil migration, and 
the reappearance of “the Tamil refugee” across international waters and borders. 
	   44	  
 
Chapter 1 
Tamil Migrations and Diasporic Locations 
 
Everywhere 
losing life and claiming comfort, 
we are human debris; 
Is our land 
In perennial autumn, 
a lifeless tree? 
 
My son in Jaffna, 
my wife in Colombo, 
my father in Vanni 
my mother in Tamil Nadu, 
relatives in Frankfurt, 
my sister in France, 
 
me, 
a lost camel in Alaska, 
in Oslo, 
our families, 
a pillow’s feathers, 
flung in the air 
by a primate fate? 
 
(in Kanaganayakam, ed. 2009: 83-84).  
 
The above poem, “Autumn Thoughts” by V. I. S. Jayapalan, renders the pain of 
displacement and dispersion experienced by so many of Sri Lanka’s Tamil people over 
the last three decades. Jayapalan—himself a displaced Sri Lankan Tamil living in 
Chennai at the time—writes of a land that has become “a lifeless tree,” shed of its leaves 
in a “perennial autumn,” its people now “human debris” whose families are divided and 
randomly “flung” around the world. 
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Jayapalan’s poetry provides a fitting epigraph for the contents of this chapter, 
which examines the historical and socio-cultural experience of migration and 
displacement for Sri Lanka’s Tamils. This chapter sketches out the contours of my 
ethnographic field, “the Tamil diaspora,” and my primary objects of analysis through the 
lens of migration. I hone in on two different trajectories of Tamil migration involving 
multiple scales of mobility and habitation. The first section of the chapter maps the global 
dispersion of Tamils from Sri Lanka before and after the anti-Tamil violence of 1983; in 
the latter sections, I ethnographically describe historical and social processes of migration 
to Toronto, Canada and Tamil Nadu, India. Throughout, I elucidate the cultural and 
political significance of these migrations and mobilities, setting the stage for the chapters 
that follow. 
A Century of Tamil Migration 
Tamil migration to and from Sri Lanka has a long history, and can be 
characterized by multiple phases in the modern period. Each of these phases contributes 
to the many layers of today’s Tamil diaspora. 
Twentieth-century migration to Sri Lanka was primarily from the subcontinent. 
For several decades of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Tamils from 
South India (primarily from the Madurai, Tirunelveli, and Ramanathapuram districts) 
were taken to labor on colonial plantations in the central, hilly regions of the island—an 
area known to Sri Lankans as “the Upcountry” or “Hill Country,” and in the Tamil 
language as malaiyakam.17 They traveled first, by boat, via Rameswaram to Talaimannar, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Bastiampillai (1996a), Daniel (1996), and Peebles (2001). Whatever their ethnic identity today, most 
of Sri Lanka’s people are the descendents of centuries of migrants to the island, most of whom were from 
Southern India. In the island’s modern history, two distinct groups of Tamils were identified as the Ceylon 
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and then were transported to Kurunegala to camps in the town of Matale.18 Ceylon also 
attracted the notice of merchants who settled primarily in the low-country region of the 
south, in Colombo. In this period, dozens of Ceylon Tamils traveled to India for higher 
education in Madras, and several scholars made trips back and forth across the Palk 
Straits.19  
British India was not the only territory of the Empire in which Ceylonese lived 
and traveled. In the first decades of the twentieth century, many of Ceylon’s urban 
political elites were educated in Britain. The Ceylon Tamil League and former CNC 
founder-president, Ponnambalam Arunachalam, and the country’s future prime ministers, 
D.S. Senanayake, Sir John Kotelawala, and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, had lived in Britain 
for several years before returning to the island to head their families’ estates and political 
dynasties.20 
In the 1930s and 1940s, English-educated upper-caste Ceylonese worked for the 
British civil service, largely as clerks and low-level administrators, in the colonies of 
Malaya (present-day Malaysia and Singapore) and Burma. These civil servants were 
often young men of Tamil origin who, after marrying, settled and supported their families 
in Jaffna while working abroad. Their remittances also aided local infrastructure projects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Tamils and Tamils of Indian Origin. The latter were also deemed “Plantation Tamils” or “Estate Tamils,” 
but today increasingly identify by their region as malaiyaka thamilar, or Hill-Country Tamils (sometimes 
noted as “Up-Country Tamils.”) As Bass (2013) notes, the distinction in ethnic nomenclature implicitly 
contributes to the social and political marginalization of these Tamils. For a recent discussion of 
community and identity among Hill-Country Tamils, see Jegathesan (2013). 
18 I discuss the importance of this route in Chapter 5 on Sri Lankan Tamils in India. 
19 The list of scholars includes C.W. Thamotharampillai and Arumuga Navalar. See Kailasapathy 
(1984[1979]) and Sivathamby (1995) for a discussion of scholarly exchanges. Scholars of Tamil literature 
during this period in India became known as “the Jaffna school.” 
20 See Jayawardena (2000) for a historical study of these wealthy families and their political ambitions. See 
especially Chapter 11, pp. 202-219, on the making of Colombo’s Tamil bourgeoisie and migration from 
Jaffna to the city. 
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and temples—leading one political writer, Pieter Keuneman, to dub Jaffna “a money-
order economy” (Philips 2007). At independence, some of these men stayed and their 
families migrated to Malaya, while others returned to work in Colombo and other areas 
of the island, returning to Jaffna on weekends or holidays.21 
Tamil migration abroad accelerated in response to political and legal changes in 
Ceylon. After independence in 1948, a wave of migration began in the mid-1950s and 
continued throughout the 1960s with the advent of legislation that made Sinhala the 
country’s only official language.22 Ceylonese professionals of all ethnicities who were not 
proficient in the Sinhala language migrated to Britain primarily, as well as Australia and 
Canada.23 Nevertheless, Ceylon Tamils, accustomed to seeking and finding advancement 
in and through the civil services and professions, continued to enter the two universities 
in Ceylon (Colombo and Peradeniya) in numbers that appeared disproportionate to their 
ratio in the island’s population as a whole. In the 1970s, middle-class Tamil youth went 
abroad to study in countries such as India, Russia, and the United Kingdom when 
university “standardization” policies created quotas for Tamils. In addition, thousands of 
young professionals left the island due to the continued implementation of Sinhala Only, 
new laws and constitutions that further marginalized minority groups, and ethnic tensions 
that increasingly led to violence. Some took short-term, one to three year leaves from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Although a fictional account, Ambalavanar Sivanandan’s novel, When Memory Dies depicts the manner 
in which some Jaffna Tamil men traveled to Colombo for work, returning to rest and spend time with their 
families in Jaffna on weekends. Others lived with their families in Colombo, the Hill-Country, Batticaloa, 
and Trincomalee, while working in the civil service, as accountants and teachers, or in private enterprise. 
22 I discuss The Official Language Act of 1956 and the “Sinhala Only” movement, as well as the other 
political events and laws described throughout this chapter in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
23 Tamil immigrants to Britain during the 1950s and 1960s are a part of the first phase of migration in E. 
Valentine Daniel’s 1996 study of Tamil migrants in the UK during the mid-1990s. Perera (2008) writes of 
how Sri Lankans (including Tamils) had to pass as “white” in order to gain entry to Australia during this 
time. 
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government service, in order to do contract work in Asia or southern and eastern Africa; 
others left permanently for the United Kingdom and North America. This period of Tamil 
migration had important consequences for the migrants who followed.24  
Tamil Migration after 1983 
While Tamils emigrated from Sri Lanka throughout the twentieth century, mass 
migration from the island began largely after the anti-Tamil violence of 1983 and the 
beginning of war between Tamil militant groups and Sri Lankan forces. The war with the 
state intensified through the mid-1980s and 1990s, prompting thousands of Tamils to 
depart every year.25 Most Sri Lankan Tamils went to India first—hundreds of thousands 
sought asylum during the decades of war—and for many, India was where they would 
remain. For others, India provided a brief respite where they could plan their route 
abroad, either on their own or through a broker, to Europe and North America. The 
broker was usually another Sri Lankan Tamil in Chennai, Trichy, Trivandrum or Kochi. 
Tamil migrants with some means headed to Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and 
the United States, which offered the possibility of citizenship.26 However, throughout the 
1990s, these Anglo-American countries enabled global flows of capital through free trade 
agreements and further entrenched neoliberal economic reforms, while passing more 
restrictive immigration policies, making it difficult for Tamils to enter as immigrants or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In addition to the links drawn in this chapter between migrants of the 1972-1983 period and post-1983 
migrants, Chapter 3 discusses the importance of this period of Tamil migration for the internationalization 
of ‘the Tamil national question’ and development of Tamil militancy. 
25 See Santhiapillai (1986) and Chandrahasan (1989) for figures on Tamil migration in the mid-to late 
1980s. 
26 See Sarah Wayland (2002, 2003) and Cheran (2003; 2007) on the Tamil diaspora in Canada; E. 
Valentine Daniel (1994, 1996) on immigrants and refugees to the UK. 
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refugees.27 Such policies generally favored so-called “economic immigrants.” Tamil 
migrants also made claims for asylum in Northern and Western Europe. West Germany 
was a prime destination for Tamils during the 1970s and the first few years of the war, as 
a gateway to the rest of Europe.28 Many of these Tamil migrants continue to live as 
undocumented immigrants or refugees in France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.29 Each of these countries has varying 
practices of asylum determination; for instance, in France, the majority of applicants were 
granted asylum, whereas after 1985, Germany only granted asylum to 1% of those who 
applied (Naidoo 1987).30  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Two policies were designed to restrict and deny asylum claims in the UK: The 1993 Asylum and 
Immigration Appeals Act, and the 1996 Immigration and Asylum Act. In the late 1990s, UK policy shifted 
with the Labour government in favor of “economic migration.” As of 2002, asylum-seekers are not 
permitted to work in the UK; moreover, their state benefits have been cut multiple times in legislation since 
1993. See Somerville, Sriskandarajah and Latorre (2009).  
In 1992, Paul Keating’s government changed Australia’s policy to require the detention of all people 
arriving without a valid visa. In the United States, the Immigration Act of 1990 increased total, overall 
immigration, but these changes privileged specific occupational categories, and included employer-
sponsored immigrants and immigrant investors. 
28 Migrants entered East Germany, and crossed the wall into West Germany, where they either lived 
undocumented or claimed asylum. Tamil asylum applications to Germany peaked at 17,340 applications in 
1985—the most applicants from Sri Lankan citizens to any country that year (UNHCR 2004). The same 
year, the Federal Administrative Court decided that Sri Lankan Tamils were not experiencing targeted 
persecution; applications decreased dramatically, as did acceptances. Tamils continued to migrate to 
Germany over the next two decades under difficult legal and labor restrictions, and thousands left to resettle 
in Canada, where permanent residence and citizenship could be acquired. 
29 For two monographs about Tamil asylum-seekers in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, see McDowell 
(1996) on Switzerland, and Fuglerud (1999) on Norway; see also Steen (1992) for a study of refugees in 
Denmark and Britain; Guha (2003) for an article on Tamils in Switzerland. 
30 See also Rodgers, who reports that in 1988—one year after the signing of the Indo-Lanka peace accord, 
and during the LTTE-IPKF war—over 40 percent of Tamils seeking asylum in France were given refugee 
status (1989: 32). 
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Table 1: Tamils from Sri Lanka, by the numbers (estimated)31 
 
Canada 200,000 – 300,000 
United States 20,000 – 30,000 
United Kingdom 100,000 – 150,000 
France 100,000 
Germany 60,000  
Switzerland 50,000 - 60,000 
Norway 6,000 – 10,000 
India 200,000 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This estimate includes all Tamils who have migrated from Sri Lanka, and draws on numbers from a 
range of sources. These sources include Van Hear and Rajasingham-Senanayake (2006), UNHCR (2004), 
the Government of Tamil Nadu’s Special Commissioner on Rehabilitation (2008, 2009), Sri Lanka’s 2012 
census, as well as interlocutors during my fieldwork. 
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Sri Lankan Tamils in India 
Tamil Migration to India After 1983  
They arrived in several phases after 198332 and throughout the war. Tamils fleeing 
violence in Sri Lanka often turned to India first, for obvious reasons: (1) The 
geographical proximity of India’s southern peninsula, via a series of islets named Adam’s 
Bridge in the Palk Straits, to their homeland and (2) the historical connections between 
Sri Lanka’s north and east with India’s southeastern state of Tamil Nadu, along with the 
shared language and cultural affinities of their peoples. Sri Lankan Tamils who arrived in 
India after 1983 may be divided into three categories:  
(1) Tamils who are registered to live in a camp set up by the state 
government of Tamil Nadu, often referred to as “camp refugees” by state 
officials and NGOs 
(2) Tamils from Sri Lanka who live among the local population in towns 
throughout the state are known as “non-camp refugees”  
(3) A more restricted population living in “special camps” created by the 
state to detain Sri Lankan Tamils who were identified as militants; 
officials refer to them as “inmates.”  
 
In this section of the chapter, I describe the journey and arrival of Tamils from Sri 
Lanka to India. My primary focus here and throughout the dissertation—when discussing 
refugees in India—is on Tamils living in government-administered camps. While Sri 
Lankan Tamils who fled to India after 1983 were referred to as “refugees” in state 
documents and the everyday talk of its officials—from police officers at the camps to 
senior bureaucrats in Chennai—Sri Lankan Tamils in India are not officially recognized 
as refugees under international law, as India is not a signatory to several agreements, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 “1983” has become shorthand for the events otherwise described as “July 1983” or “Black July” (in 
Tamil, karuppu joolai).  
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including the UN’s 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.33 Thus, this section also describes and examines the processes by which Tamils 
were temporarily settled and transformed into “refugees” in government-administered 
camps. After I describe the refugees’ journey, arrival and settlement, I chart four distinct 
periods of post-1983 Tamil migration from Sri Lanka to India, and two periods of 
organized return to the island.  
A Passage to India 
The majority of Tamil refugees in the camps arrived in India with their families 
and few belongings—whatever cash, jewelry, clothing, and other personal effects they 
could carry in overcrowded boats. When I asked why they had left the island, these 
families told me that they had to leave the country due to the ongoing war. 
Everyday there was bombing and shelling. We could not stay there 
anymore. 
The army came and rounded up all of the men in our village. We had to 
leave. It was too difficult to stay in Colombo, everything costs a lot of 
money. We could not afford it. There was nowhere for us to stay. 
The war imperiled Tamil life in the war zones of the north and east. Everyone had 
a story about the war’s violence, and all spoke of their fear for the physical safety of their 
loved ones and themselves. Colombo was considered to be an internal flight alternative—
by refugees and international organizations alike—but most of the internally displaced 
were poor villagers and fisher families who could not afford to resettle in the capital city 
where they had no social or economic connections. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Chapter 5 discusses in greater detail the implications of the term, “refugee,” as a form of state-centered 
subjectivity versus a legal nomenclature and status for Sri Lankan Tamils living in India. 
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Leaving Sri Lanka for India was a difficult and stressful experience for all of the 
refugees with whom I spoke. Nearly all refugees living in the camps had traveled by boat. 
In conversation, they spoke less of their lives in Sri Lanka, and focused instead on the 
journey to India: 
It was cold, and we were scared. We did not know if we would live to see 
land. 
I got into a boat with my mother, my sister, and our mama (mother’s 
brother). There were many boats at that time, and we paid Rs. 1000. It is 
not like today, where people pay lakhs.34 The boat went very slowly and 
was moving back and forth, up and down, I was worried we would fall 
into the water.  
 
In telling me about their journey, refugees focused not on what had been left 
behind, but the discomfort, the dangers, and the cost of the boat ride that took them away 
from the island. Most camp refugees had left Sri Lanka directly from the war-torn regions 
of the Northern and Eastern provinces by traveling to Talaimannar, as well as other 
departure points like Nachagudi, and to a much lesser extent, Trincomalee. From these 
points, they arranged and paid in full, in advance, for a boat ride from local fishermen 
across the Palk Straits to Dhanuskodi, near the temple town of Rameswaram. The 
distance across the strait at its narrowest point is less than 30 kilometers. The refugees’ 
route reverses the journey taken by over one million Indian Tamil men and women who 
were recruited between 1835 and 1950 to work as “coolies” on Ceylon’s railway, and its 
coffee, rubber and tea plantations. Their labor made the country’s tea plantations the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 If “lakhs” is an overestimation, it still speaks to the great difference between the price of the trip in the 
late 1980s/1990 and the time of fieldwork in 2008-9. The use of hyperbole indicates the near-impossibility 
of the figure and the magnitude of the cost for the average Tamil refugee. 
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largest sector of the island’s economy. Almost one third of the Sri Lankan camp refugees 
are descendants of these mainland Tamil laborers.35 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Chapter 3 discusses the policies that led to the disenfranchisement of the Tamils of Indian Origin in 
Ceylon, and the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of these Tamils to India. The descendents of the 
people who stayed in Ceylon are today known as Hill-Country Tamils. As I discuss in Chapter 5, Hill-
Country Tamils who were displaced by anti-Tamil violence in the 1970s and 1980s were resettled in 
northern Sri Lanka before they fled the island’s war. These Tamils cannot apply for Indian citizenship. 
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Figure 1.2: Map showing labor route from Tamil Nadu to central Sri Lanka 
(Source: Daniel 1996: 33, original adapted from D. Wesumperuma) 
Though a relatively short distance, the boats were small and overloaded when 
busy—when the war flared up—and the ride a physically arduous one. The journey began 
at night. The boats were simple fishing boats and catamarans owned by fishermen who 
turned to ferrying refugees and smuggling goods during the war; they moved slowly 
across the strait’s choppy waters. Up and down, up and down, the passengers bobbed, 
fearing all the while for their lives—often, without sufficient supplies of food and fresh 
water. Hundreds died each year when the boats capsized or ran out of supplies. In 
addition to being physically challenging, the journey by boat posed other dangers too. 
The fishermen took alternate routes to duck Sri Lankan and Indian Coast Guard and Navy 
patrols that aimed to find and stop the fishermen, and return their passengers. The Sri 
Lankan coast guard frequently patrolled the sea to intercept LTTE weapons smugglers. In 
some cases, Tamil refugees were brought back to the island after being picked up by the 
Sri Lankan Navy and charged before courts for leaving the country illegally. When the 
Indian government established a Naval Block in 2000, refugees who were dropped off on 
the sand dollars leading up to mainland were often stranded, as Indian fishermen were 
ordered to leave them, or risk being detained. With Sri Lanka’s return to war in 2006, 
however, the coast guard was usually responsible for bringing the refugees to shore.  
In contrast, Sri Lankan Tamils who traveled by plane to India’s towns and cities 
said little about their actual journey.36 The details of such trips accumulated slowly, 
across conversations with several different people. The journey was apparently simpler: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 International flights were usually from Colombo to Chennai or Tiruchirapalli in Tamilnadu, or less 
frequently, to Thiruvananthapuram in Kerala. 
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They left Sri Lanka for India, via Colombo and the international airport at Katunayake. 
Air travel was initially more expensive than travel by boat, and an option only available 
to the comfortably middle-class or upper-middle class Tamil.  
There were times when this distinction was not as straightforward as it would 
appear. As the war continued and would-be refugees found themselves in a desperate 
situation, the price of the boat journey skyrocketed. Refugees reported being charged 
750-1000 LKR in 1990; nine years later, in 1999, the price had increased to 15,000 and 
as much as 30,000 LKR (Suryanarayan and Sudarsen 2000; Paus 2005: 46). During my 
fieldwork, Tamil refugees reported selling every last item they owned in order to 
purchase passage for themselves and their kin, and as the woman quoted above notes, 
some paid as much as a lakh, or 100,000 LKR, during the war’s end.37 Many Tamils 
viewed the boat ride as a more feasible option, even though it could become just as 
expensive as a plane ticket, which typically cost 20,000 to 30,000 LKR. In the 1990s, 
Tamils in LTTE-controlled territory had to obtain permission from the Tigers to leave, 
and purchase an “exit pass.”38 Then, to reach the international airport, they had to travel a 
few hundred miles through war zones to the capital, where they had few connections, did 
not speak Sinhala, and could appear suspicious to security personnel. While staying in 
Colombo, they had to pay to stay in a “lodge”—temporary low-budget accommodations 
in the city—while they applied for a passport and visa.39 They also had to pay “fees” to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 In 2008, the equivalent of approximately $900 USD. 
38 For obvious reasons, purchasing an exit pass from the LTTE would not be an option for Tamils who were 
trying to escape the organization or avoid forced recruitment. 
39 “Lodges” housed Tamil migrants, as well as people who were hiding from the Tigers, workers en route to 
or returning from the Middle East, and those who were in Colombo to receive medical treatment or pursue 
educational and employment opportunities. Lodging also came with risks: Army and police officers 
regularly conducted security checks at these lodges, and arrested Tamils on suspicion of links to terrorism. 
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Colombo-based officials or brokers to ‘expedite’ and obtain their travel documents, and 
local police to avoid harassment or arbitrary arrest. Only after a few months of this costly 
and uncertain process, could they board a plane. Altogether, traveling to India via 
Colombo was always more expensive for Tamils. 
Arrival and Quarantine 
When Sri Lankan Tamil refugees reached India after a long boat journey, they 
were taken through several steps of a standardized intake procedure. First, each person 
was interrogated at Dhanuskodi by the police and a Q-Branch officer to ascertain whether 
she or he had any links to the LTTE. The officers asked new arrivals to tell their stories 
multiple times, to see whether they could find any discrepancies, leading to further 
questioning. Anyone assumed to be a militant during this or subsequent questionings was 
taken to be detained at the “Special Camps” at Tipu Mahal in Vellore, Chengalpattu, or 
Melur in Madurai district.40  
Next, refugees were taken to the Mandapam transit camp where they were asked 
similar questions as before. Once again, their journey mirrored that of Tamils recruited 
from India to Ceylon’s plantations: They were held in a separate section of the camp for 
recent arrivals dubbed “Quarantine.” Here, the refugees also underwent medical 
examinations and were photographed. Once their arrival was “processed,” they received 
refugee identity cards from the state government, and were able to live in the transit camp 
until they were transferred to another camp elsewhere in the state. The state government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
On a single day, June 7, 2007, Sri Lankan police evicted 376 Tamils who were staying in Colombo lodges, 
who were sent on buses to Vavuniya and Batticaloa. For one report of this event, see Reddy (2007). 
40 See below for a brief discussion of the creation of these special camps. 
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had reorganized the camps according to place of origin in 1993, and subsequently, efforts 
were made to reunite families in determining camp assignments (Rao 1993; Das 2005). 
When I visited the Mandapam camp in April 2009, a refugee working for an NGO 
in the camp suggested that I visit quarantine to interview refugees who were still being 
processed.41 These Tamils had just recently left Sri Lanka’s war zone and were thus 
suspected of having connections to the LTTE. The quarantine area of the camp had lines 
of one-room (concrete) structures with low-ceilings and one small barred window. A 
female police officer stood outside the door of one. She stepped aside and I entered this 
door, where I met a young woman seated and waiting impassively. Our interaction was 
awkward. I asked questions, and she complied, with short answers followed by long 
silences. I asked the questions I usually asked of long-time residents of the camps, 
wanting to know which part of Sri Lanka they had come from, why they had come to 
India, and so on. Worried that the officer could hear us, I avoided questions that would 
directly implicate anyone in militancy or political activity. After the first young woman, I 
spoke to a second. In each of these interactions, I realized that my questions still bore an 
unfortunate resemblance to an interrogation. My access to this section of the camp 
required some proximity to local authorities via a non-governmental organization 
(OfERR), and so, even though I explained that I was doing academic research, my 
interview felt like an interrogation. Although I was uncomfortable with continuing to 
interview people in this context, my NGO host insisted, saying that it was important to 
get the details directly from (neradiyaha) from the newly arrived. The “directness” that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 I visited Mandapam during daylight hours with two women from OfERR. We took a room in nearby 
Rameswaram, as visitors were not allowed to stay in the Mandapam camp after curfew. 
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my host valued was, however, belied by the bureaucratic context of my encounter with 
the young woman I was questioning.  
Outside the quarantine, I heard more complicated and compelling stories. These 
were stories that could not be told during an interrogation. At the other end of the camp at 
Mandapam, I spoke with a woman who had arrived within the last two months. She 
worked at a small tea shop within the camp. Her husband was a former LTTE cadre who 
left his post and escaped to India with her. The war was not going well, and he had lost 
confidence in the organization. He was among many hundreds—perhaps thousands—of 
low-level cadre who were living among civilians in the middle of the war. However, he 
could not tell his interrogators of his past connections to the LTTE—if he had done so, he 
would have been separated from his family and detained in a special camp. 
“Waves” of Migration 
The First Wave: July 1983-July 1987 
Sri Lankan Tamils began to flee to India in large numbers shortly after the anti-
Tamil violence of July 1983. In fact, the government of Tamil Nadu recorded refugee 
arrivals from the second day of the riots/pogrom, on July 24, 1983. According to their 
data, 134,053 Sri Lankan Tamils had sought refuge in Tamil Nadu by August 1987.42 
Those who arrived by boat were deemed “destitute” and given accommodations in 
“transit centers” at the Mandapam and Kottapattu transit camps, in the districts of 
Ramanathapuram and Trichy (Tiruchirappalli). By the end of this period, Sri Lankan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 This number was from G. Bhujanga Rao’s (1993) report, Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees in Tamil Nadu, 
India, written for the Directorate of Rehabilitation, September 9. All subsequent population numbers in this 
section that are not otherwise attributed are from this report. 
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Tamil refugees in the camps numbered 39,918 people from 11,601 families.43 District 
Collectors were instructed to set up temporary camps to accommodate these refugees.44 
They created 172 temporary camps throughout the state, excluding the city of Madras 
(Chennai) and the Nilgiris district. Refugees were housed in various kinds of publicly and 
privately-owned buildings, including regulated market committee buildings, cyclone 
shelters, old mills, theatres, wedding halls and schools.45 Refugees were then taken from 
the transit center to these camps by buses, where they were given inoculations, and issued 
a Refugee Identity Card with a photograph of each family member and their biographical 
details attached.46 Once identified, the state would provide them with an annual allotment 
of clothing, cooking vessels, mats and bedsheets.47  
The First Return: December 1987-March 1989 
In July 1987, India brokered and entered into a peace agreement with the 
Government of Sri Lanka and Tamil militants, also known as the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace 
Accord. An Indian Peace-Keeping Force was sent to the island to enforce the agreement, 
and bring “normalcy” to the war-zones of northern and eastern Sri Lanka. In India, Tamil 
Nadu District Collectors issued notifications to refugees living outside the camps, asking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 “Family” was used to refer to a refugee “household,” and did not refer to all of an individual’s kin who 
may be living in the same camp or elsewhere. I discuss individual and household life in further detail in 
Chapter 5. 
44 In India, each state is divided into smaller administrative units called districts. A District Collector is in 
charge of district administration and revenue collection. Each Sri Lankan refugee camp was assigned to an 
officer working under the Collector for the camp’s district. See Chapter 5 for an extended discussion of 
refugee camp administration in Tamil Nadu. 
45 A significant number of these camps were created in the following districts: Trichy, Madurai, Pudukottai, 
South Arcot, Chengalpattu-MGR, Thanjavur, Coimbatore, North Arcot-Ambedkar, Periyar. See Rao (1993: 
63); for statistics and brief descriptions of each of these camps as they existed in 1985, see Santhiapillai 
(1986: 108-187). 
46 The order of these actions differed from the process that occurred during my fieldwork, as described 
earlier in the chapter. 
47 Chapter 5 details the annual allotment received by refugees every two years. 
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them to register with the collector if they wished to return to Sri Lanka. They were then 
asked to report to the Special District Collector (of the Dept. of Rehabilitation) at 
Mandapam camp for their repatriation. 25,585 Tamil refugees returned to Sri Lanka by 
chartered ships during this period, and all of the state’s temporary camps were shut down. 
50 sailings were made over a period of 15 months between December 1987 and March 
1989, with an average of over 500 people taken to Sri Lanka on each trip.48 Almost 4 out 
of 5 of the refugees on these ships were from the camps. Other camp refugees either 
stayed in India by finding their own accommodations with the help of relatives and 
friends, or they returned later to Sri Lanka on their own, without government assistance.  
The second wave and Eelam War II 
Five months after the last ship of “reverse flow” refugees sailed from India to Sri 
Lanka, a second phase of migration began due to fighting between the IPKF and LTTE. 
The first group reached Indian shores on August 25, 1989.49 However, the mass “wave” 
did not begin until July 1990, when the Government and the LTTE resumed fighting each 
other following the IPKF’s withdrawal. This period marked the beginning of widespread 
and protracted displacements in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. In August 1990, the 
LTTE ordered the eviction of Muslims from the northern districts of Jaffna and Mannar. 
Most of these internally displaced people did not leave the country, however, and were 
sheltered in camps in the Puttalam district of northwestern Sri Lanka.50 By the end of 
April 1991, 122,078 refugees from Sri Lanka had arrived in Tamil Nadu. Temporary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 This number is drawn from a detailed list of sailings in Annexure VII of Rao (1993: 68-70). 
49 Rao (1993: 15) notes that by the end of June 1990, only 4,575 refugees had arrived. 
50 They had yet to be resettled during the ceasefire, and many continue to live in camps. See especially the 
third and fourth chapters of Thiranagama (2011), and Brun (2008).  
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camps were set up once again, in all districts except Madras and the Nilgiris. This time, 
camp refugees outnumbered by far those who lived outside the camps; in addition, many 
of the urban “non-camp” refugees of the first phase left India for Canada and Europe. 
115,680 people were admitted and found accommodations in the new camps, which 
peaked at 337 in number. In addition to the types of public and private buildings used to 
house refugees during the first wave of migration, state agencies constructed thatched 
huts in Thanjavur district, followed by 20,000 temporary brick and mud-walled huts 
across the other districts. When this construction was completed in 1992, refugees were 
shifted from some privately-owned buildings to these huts, and the number of camps 
were reduced to 132 by January 1993. 
The majority of my interlocutors arrived in India during this period. They 
believed at the time that their stay in India would be temporary. They were glad to be 
reunited with family members at the camps. Some recalled very tight and crowded living 
conditions, as hundreds of new “camps” were set up to accommodate them. 
The “special camps” were also created during this time. At the end of 1990, the 
government learned that militants and their sympathizers resided in the camps.51 Five 
special camps were set up at Puzhal (Chengai-MGR), Thammampatti (Salem), Borstal 
School (Pudukottai), Police Recruit School at Vellore (North Arcot-Ambedkar), and 
Saligramam in Virugambakkam (Madras).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 India’s relationship with Tamil militant groups has changed over the course of the conflict. I discuss this 
in more detail in Chapter 3. The special camps are out of bounds to most visitors. See People’s Union of 
Civil Liberties—Tamil Nadu & Pondicherry (2000) for a report on the conditions of one such camp at 
Vellore. 
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The Assassination and a Second Return, 1991-1993 
1991 was a pivotal year that changed irrevocably the lives of Tamil refugees in 
India. That year, Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India, was assassinated by a 
female suicide bomber while meeting the public at Sriperumbudur, 46 kilometers outside 
Chennai. The LTTE was blamed for the assassination.52 Gandhi was responsible for the 
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, and despite signing the agreement, Prabhakaran, the LTTE 
leader, was unhappy with the terms of the agreement. The LTTE had already fought the 
IPKF, using weapons supplied by their erstwhile enemy, the Sri Lankan government then 
led by Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa. Both forces had found common cause in 
ousting the Indian army. 
After the assassination, Indian public opinion turned against Sri Lanka’s Tamils, 
including refugees caught up in the fighting. The people of Tamil Nadu, where the 
militants had found training and political support for more than a decade, were also upset, 
and their goodwill toward refugees soured.53  India dissolved the Tamil Nadu state 
government, elections were held, and under a new Chief Minister Jayalalithaa54, who won 
on a platform of punishment for “anti-nationals,” the state decided that all Sri Lankan 
Tamil refugees should be returned to the island. The Government of India chartered two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The LTTE never officially responded to these allegations. When they held an international press 
conference in Kilinochchi after the signing of the CFA in 2002, Anton Balasingham expressed “regret” 
about the assassination, but did not confirm the allegations against the LTTE. 
53 Although the 21 accused included several Indian citizens, six of the accused were Sri Lankan Tamils 
living in Tamil Nadu as refugees. In Chapter 5, I discuss in more detail the effects of the assassination on 
refugee life, as it was enmeshed with discourses of security and protection under surveillance. 
54 Jayalalithaa was of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), which ousted 
“Kalaignar” Mu. Karunanidhi of the DMK, who was a known supporter of the militant struggle for Tamil 
Eelam. In particular, Karunanidhi had supported TELO, and formed the Tamil Eelam Supporters 
Organization in an attempt to create unity among the Tamil militant groups in 1985. See Karunanidhi (n.d.) 
for an appeal he wrote around this time titled, Eelath thamilarkale onrupattu poraadunkal! (Eelam Tamils: 
Unite and Fight!) 
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Indian vessels, M.V. Akbar and M.V. Ramanujam, to transport refugees from Madras 
Fort to Trincomalee, in the case of the former, and from Rameswaram to Talaimannar, in 
the case of the latter. Refugees were also transported by plane from Madras to 
Trincomalee. 
To encourage these returns, the Department of Rehabilitation gave refugees a 
pamphlet listing the facilities that would be provided to returnee refugees by the Sri 
Lankan government; these included a “settling-in” allowance of LKR 2,000 per family, 
three months of dry rations, a modest housing grant of LKR 15,000 to low-income 
families with damaged or destroyed housing, housing loans, and compensation for death 
or injury due to “terrorist violence.”55 Returnees were asked to sign a form indicating 
their willingness to return to Sri Lanka. This form was provided to them in English only 
at first, but after protest, the Government of India asked the state government to obtain 
refugees’ assent in Tamil and English. District collectors also screened videos provided 
by the Sri Lankan government, depicting the conditions to which refugees had previously 
returned. By October 1992, 29,102 Tamil refugees had returned to Sri Lanka.  
The large number of involuntary returns during 1992-1993 resulted in the 
establishment of a small UNHCR office in Chennai to oversee the paperwork for 
“voluntary” returns. The government did not allow the UNHCR any oversight of the Sri 
Lankan refugee camps in Tamil Nadu, or the conditions of life therein. 
Refugees living outside the camps were required to register with the closest police 
station. Registration was announced in daily newspapers. Within three weeks, 26,363 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See Government of Sri Lanka (1992), for details on the reception of Sri Lankan returnee refugees and the 
limited assistance provided to them by the Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and Social Welfare. 
Also see Annexure XIV in Rao (1993). 
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people had registered themselves (Rao 1993: 26). The vast majority, however, did not. 
The police searched houses in neighborhoods where Sri Lankan Tamils were known to 
live, and picked up almost 1800 unregistered Tamils under the Foreigners Act of 1946. 
They were joined by Tamils who had subsequently arrived by plane on forged travel 
documents. New special camps were created to detain these refugees and restrict their 
movement.56 They were permitted to leave once investigated and found to be “bonafide 
refugees” by the police, while inmates with no cases pending were allowed to leave for 
Sri Lanka, at their own cost or with government support. The state claimed that the 
detainees were willing to be repatriated. 
The Third Wave and Eelam War III 
Refugee repatriation to Sri Lanka continued on a smaller scale until May 1995, 
when military operations between the SLA and LTTE in “The Battle for Jaffna” grew 
heated. On October 30, 1995, this resulted in an event known to Sri Lankan Tamils as 
“the Exodus”: the mass displacement of more than half a million people—more than two-
thirds of the Jaffna peninsula’s population—on account of LTTE orders, leading to the 
Sri Lankan government’s control of Jaffna.57 Hundreds of thousands traveled eastward on 
foot, with many following the LTTE south of the peninsula. The LTTE set up new 
headquarters in Kilinochchi, and recruited primarily among internally-displaced and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 The refugees who were arrested did not necessarily have militant links, but were among the tens of 
thousands who had not registered with the police. The political rationality of the state’s decision to restrict 
these refugees’ mobility is unclear, but reveals the exercise of state power over bare life. 
57 For a human rights report of the Exodus from Jaffna, see University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) 
1995. UTHR(J) describes this period as a new “war without borders” in which the Tigers relied on civlians, 
rather than sentries, for information about enemy movements, thus placing civilians in greater danger. The 
Exodus in this way prefigured the use of civilians as shields at the end of war in 2009. In the days that 
followed October 30, the LTTE denied that it had issued the order. 
A personal account of this event from a Tamil nationalist perspective appears in Chandrakanthan (2000), 
the afterword to Wilson (2000). 
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resettled Tamils in the Vanni region (UTHR(J) 1995) and the Eastern Province (Trawick 
2007). Intense fighting between the state’s forces and the Tigers continued in northern 
and eastern Sri Lanka, leading to significant hardships for the local population. Everyday 
hardships included harassment at army checkpoints, food scarcity, and an embargo on 
common items such as batteries and fuel; in lieu of electricity and gas, residents made do 
with kerosene oil to light their homes and drive the few working vehicles. Tamils of the 
north and east also lived in terror of armed robberies by pro-government paramilitaries, 
extrajudicial killings, disappearances, forced child recruitment into the LTTE’s ranks, 
and torture—a frequent tool of the army also used in the LTTE’s prison camps (UTHR(J) 
1992, 1994). 
The third wave of refugee migration to India began in August 1996, when Tamil 
civilians—most of them internally displaced persons—fled from Mannar and other areas 
of northern and eastern Sri Lanka (Das 2005: 50). Many of these refugees were crossing 
the straits to find refuge in India for the second and third time. Heavy patrolling by the 
Indian and Sri Lankan Navy and Coast Guards stayed the mobility of refugees by making 
it difficult for other vessels to traverse “their” waters.58 Nonetheless, 21,816 people 
arrived and sought refuge in Tamil Nadu camps between August 1996 and December 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Das (2005: 50-51) claims that the LTTE encouraged the movement of refugees to India at this time to 
attract the international community’s attention to the situation in Sri Lanka, but she provides no source. 
This assertion contradicts the organization’s recruitment goals, as well as reports that it was very difficult 
for civilians to move out of LTTE controlled-territory during this time. It is true that the LTTE increasingly 
turned to diaspora fundraising during the 1990s. What this suggests is that the LTTE encouraged the 
migration of some of its members, sympathizers, and their families, while restricting the mobility of most 
Tamils. Poor families, and particularly those of oppressed castes, were especially vulnerable to forcible 
recruitment.  
Das also claims that the LTTE seized local fishermen’s boats, limiting the number of vessels available to 
ferry refugees. This may explain, in part, why the rate per person increased dramatically, to LKR 10,000-
15,000 and up to LKR 30,000 in the years leading up to 2000. 
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2000.59 The next month, the Tigers announced a ceasefire, but the war continued until the 
CFA was signed in February 2002. 
Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada 
Sri Lankan Tamil migration to Canada largely occurred at the same time as the 
phases of migration to India, as described above. Tamils who migrated from Sri Lanka to 
Canada—in some cases, via third countries—could become permanent residents and 
citizens in their new country, in contrast to Tamils in India, who could only obtain 
provisional status as refugees, or as undocumented migrants. The following sections of 
the chapter draw on available reports, statistics, and ethnographic interviews, to examine 
how Tamil migration to Canada was fashioned out of political conflict and war in Sri 
Lanka, social and political differences among Tamils, and Canadian immigration 
policies.  
Tamil Migration to Canada After 1983 
While some Tamils had migrated to Canada from Jaffna and Colombo after the 
Sinhala Only legislation of 1956, and in the late 1960s and 1970s to study and work, they 
numbered fewer than 2,000 by 1983 (Vaitheespara 1999; Wayland 2004: 418).60 They 
were mainly ‘independent’ and ‘family-class’ immigrants. Black July set in motion 
events that would transform this small community into the largest Sri Lankan Tamil 
diaspora outside Asia. Tamil immigrants who had arrived before 1983 lobbied the federal 
government, which had only recently changed its immigration policy and law to offer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Department of Rehabilitation (2000) in Das (2005: 50). 
60 Aruliah (1994) and Rodgers (1989) report different figures. The latter refers to Canada’s IRB figures as 
approximately 8,000 Sri Lankan Tamils in the early 1980s. It is unclear whether this includes any post-
1983 migration. 
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asylum to those with “a legitimate fear of persecution.”61 They sought to open up and 
expedite the immigration process for Tamil refugee claimants from Sri Lanka, and those 
who could be sponsored by close relatives.62 The Government of Canada created a special 
refugee resettlement program, selecting people who were taken by boat from southern Sri 
Lanka to temporary camps in Jaffna, or who went across the Palk Strait to Tamil Nadu. 
That year, Canada’s resettlement program admitted nearly 1,800 Tamils to the country. In 
the years to come, tens of thousands of people would travel to Canada by air, land and 
sea routes to claim refugee status. As a result, nearly half of Canada’s estimated 200,000-
plus Tamils arrived as refugees. However, a significant number of refugee arrivals were 
not immediately after 1983, but in the years between 1991 and 2000; a large percentage 
of the remaining people were admitted through family reunification.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Canada began to admit refugees during the 1970s, beginning with Ugandans of South Asian origin who 
were banished during Idi Amin’s reign. Chilean and Vietnamese refugees followed. During the early 1980s, 
people fleeing political persecution and conflict would turn up at a port of Canadian entry and ask for 
asylum. Tamils from Sri Lanka were among those who did so, along with Somalis, Ethiopians and 
Eritreans, Iranians, Afghans, and Salvadoreans. 
62 Family reunification was a priority of the Canadian immigration system, and mostly took place through 
sponsorship, a form of immigration in which the applicant is financially underwritten by a permanent 
resident or citizen of Canada. At present, Section 130 of the Regulations to the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act of 2001 defines a sponsor as a Canadian citizen or permanent resident who has filed a 
sponsorship application of behalf of a member of the Family Class of Canadian immigration policy, or a 
spouse or common-law partner. 
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Figure 1.3: Tamil immigration to Canada: Before 1991, 1991-2000, 2000-2006  
(Source: Statistics Canada 2006) 
 
Table 2: Tamil arrivals according to 2006 Statistics Canada census 
 




Total number of immigrants and permanent 
residents 
105,670 
Non-permanent residents64 3,365 
 
Over the next two decades, Sri Lanka became a significant source of new 
immigrants to Canada. Between 1991 and 2001, Sri Lanka was the fifth largest source 
country of immigrants to Canada, sending 3.4% of Canada’s total immigrant population 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 This was primarily between 1983 and 1991, as discussed in this chapter.  
64 This figure refers to Tamils undergoing refugee claims processing and still without “landed” (permanent 
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during that period (Hyndman 2003: 264).65 Sri Lanka was also the second largest source 
of refugees to Canada during the latter part of this period, 1998-2000, when fighting 
peaked during the third Eelam war. In the year 1999, Sri Lanka was responsible for the 
largest group of refugee claimants in Canada (Hyndman 2003: 264). The vast majority of 
refugees and immigrants from Sri Lanka to Canada during this time were of Tamil 
ethnicity.66  
Populations and Politics	  
The current number of Tamils from Sri Lanka living in Canada—and Toronto 
more specifically—is often subject to dispute. Estimates range anywhere from 
approximately 105,000, according to Canada’s 2011 census figures on Tamil-speakers 
(Statistics Canada 2011), to estimates of 300,000 provided by community-based 
organizations. The figure is likely somewhere in-between, and 200,000 has been a 
widely-cited figure (Cheran 2003, Wayland 2002).67  
In its 2006 Census, the Canadian government agency, Statistics Canada 
(StatsCan), found that there were 114,896 immigrants from Sri Lanka to Canada between 
1983 to 2007, and 98,265 people in the Toronto area who claimed Tamil as their mother 
tongue. That not all Tamils would speak Tamil, are of Sri Lankan origin, or self-identify 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 To put this into perspective: Sri Lanka was ranked after China, India, The Philippines and Hong Kong—
the first two countries have populations numbering approximately 55 times that of Sri Lanka’s, but only 
2.5-3 times the number of immigrants. Put another way, Sri Lanka was responsible for approximately 18 to 
22 times as many refugee claims per capita than the two largest sources. Sri Lanka was only one-third of 
one percent of the world’s population at this time. 
66 Tamil is not a category of ethnicity on the census, but a category of language only. Below, I discuss the 
conflicts between state practices of enumeration, community activism, and personal identities. 
67 The 105,000 number is according to the strictest measure—those who reported Tamil to be their mother-
tongue in the 2011 Census. This measure is inadequate, as it only refers to those who report Tamil as their 
mother tongue. Not all persons who claim Tamil ethnicity will speak Tamil. Moreover, as discussed above, 
community organizations and scholars expressed concerns about lack of reporting. Their concerns warrant 
a reconsideration of Canadian census figures. 
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as Tamil when responding to a census question, complicates any interpretation of their 
assessment. StatsCan numbers were contested by community organizations and scholars 
who told me that new immigrants, particularly in Toronto, did not self-report to the 
Census because they often live in single-family homes (illegally) converted to multiple 
household dwellings. This issue of enumeration became a subject of public debate in 
reporting on the 2009 Tamil diaspora protests.68  
As a governmental technology for enumerating and classifying populations 
(Foucault 1991), the Census is one means by which state power simultaneously 
constitutes and recognizes a community of Tamils.69 Canadian Tamil organizations and 
associations have benefitted, organizationally and politically, from a wider—and in their 
understanding, more accurate—assessment of the population. Moreover, the communities 
these organizations claimed to represent would benefit if they could stake a greater claim 
upon the state’s resources for immigrant settlement, English-language classes, job 
training programs, for-credit Tamil classes in public schools, etc. Chapter 3 considers the 
historical importance of censuses in the making of a Tamil community and Tamil politics 
in Sri Lanka. For now, I point out here that diaspora politics in Canada is shaped by a 
longer history of political action to secure recognition and state power in Sri Lanka.  
At the time of my fieldwork, much was made of the declaration that more Sri 
Lankan Tamils lived in Toronto than in Jaffna, the largest city in the Tamil-majority 
areas of northern and eastern Sri Lanka. While Tamils are a numerical and political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See, Toronto Star, “The Truth about Tamil Statistics” 4 April 2009. The newspaper also suggested that 
the Canadian government’s 2006 designation of the LTTE as a terrorist group is another reason why some 
Tamils may have hesitated to identify themselves as Tamil-speakers—or at all—to Census officials. I 
discuss the 2006 proscription and the politics of “the ban” in Chapter 4.	  
69 For a discussion of such processes in India and South Asia, see Pandey (1990), Chatterjee (2004), 
Appadurai (2007). In Sri Lanka, see Rajasingham-Senanayake (2001a). 
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minority in Sri Lanka, where the Sinhalese constitute the majority community, in Canada, 
Tamils outnumber the Sinhala community—by as much as ten to one, according to some 
estimates. Even as Tamils remain a minority in Canada, many activists feel themselves to 
be part of a significant minority—a rhetorical move that parallels the claims by which 
Ceylon Tamil politicians of the last century argued that their community was one of the 
island’s two “major” communities.70 The ability to claim a numerical majority and 
dominance has clear political implications for diaspora Tamils, and especially the 
nationalist activists who seek to mobilize them. The claim of numerical significance has 
bolstered Tamil participation in Canadian politics at the municipal and federal levels, 
with Toronto voters electing the first Tamil Member of Parliament in Canada in 2010.71  
During my fieldwork, Tamils in Canada felt strongly about participating in the 
institutions of representative democracy from which they were excluded in Sri Lanka; 
they felt that Canada afforded them the opportunity to “exercise [their] rights and 
freedoms” and thus confirmed their ‘belief’ in the power of liberal democracy—in spite 
of many occasions for doubt.72 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 I discuss the history of Tamil politics and the making of majorities and minorities in Chapter 3. 
71 MP Rathika Sitsabaiesan of Canada’s New Democratic Party is representative for the riding of 
Scarborough-Rouge River. She emigrated with her family from Jaffna to Toronto at five years of age, and 
said of her election, “It’s very significant for me, but also the Diaspora” (Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation 2011). Prior to her election, Markham city councilor Logan Kanapathipillai was the only 
Tamil elected to any level of government in Canada. 
72 We might note that this liberal democratic affect (as the capacity to act and be acted upon) occurred in 
the context of (1) the Canadian state’s racism and policies of mosaic multiculturalism that simultaneously 
minoritizes immigrants and people of color and celebrates their contributions to ‘diversity’ and (2) the Sri 
Lankan state racism that birthed (3) the LTTE’s armed struggle for national liberation and authoritarian de 
facto state. Canadian Tamils live out the contradictions of life between these three different national and 
state formations, with many supporting the LTTE and/or its goal of a separate state while valuing the 
political processes of liberal democracy in Canada. I discuss this in greater depth in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. 
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Given the power of numbers, the Canadian Tamil Congress was one of several 
organizations encouraging Tamils of multiple generations to name their ethnic origin as 
simply “Tamil.” Names matter. Naming is a performative act that creates the very 
community that activists wanted to enumerate—what they wished to count and make 
count, or make significant.73  The number can also be thought of as a figure: a rhetorical 
device that is not reducible to what it appears to transparently communicate (i.e. “how 
many Tamils live in Canada.”) The figure is not only a discursive-textual signifier, but a 
visual one enrobed with affective intensities (Pinney 2004) as well. As we shall see in 
Chapters 2 and 4, this form of enumeration-as-community activism in relation to the 
multicultural state was important to the figuration of nationalist protests. It was a way of 
“making the community count” in Canada. 
Phases of Tamil Migration to Canada 
This section of the chapter draws on life histories and interviews with Tamil 
activists to describe phases of Tamil migration from Sri Lanka to Canada. In his research 
on Tamil refugees in Britain, Valentine Daniel (1994, 1996) writes of three phases of 
migration from Sri Lanka. Like Daniel, I found that my interlocutors’ personal histories 
revealed routes of migration that could be categorized into different phases. This was 
especially the case when seen against the backdrop of the official data cited above. This 
data, when combined with my ethnographic research, shows that Tamils immigrated to 
Canada in five phases differentiated by several factors: a person’s time of migration, 
immediate reason for departure, type of arrival, and other social differences, such as 
gender, caste, and class (particularly as these related to financial means and connections 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See Butler (1997) on performativity and the politics of naming. 
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abroad). The first phase (Phase 1) of Sri Lankan Tamil migration to Canada occurred pre-
war, and was followed by four phases (Phases 2-5) of migration during and after the war. 
This section of the chapter details the first four phases of migration (Phases 1-4).74  
Phase 1: Students and Young Professionals 
Tamil immigrants of the 1970s and early 1980s were mostly English-proficient 
undergraduate and post-graduate male students, professionals and their families.75 They 
were middle-class and of the dominant Vellala caste. Most had spent one to four years 
studying or working in Britain. In 1967, Canada switched to what was deemed a “non-
racial” immigrant selection process (Aruliah 1994). After 1976, these immigrants were 
admitted under the exacting social and economic criteria of Canada’s “points” system.76 
Tamils of Phase 1 felt that they could pursue educational and work opportunities abroad 
for a few years and wait until Sri Lanka’s “problems” (piraccinai) were settled, before 
returning to the country. They were mostly men and women in their late twenties and 
early thirties; at this time, the women were recently married to men who had migrated 
during the late 1960s and 1970s, and once landed, sponsored their spouses. One Jaffna 
Vellala woman explained to me that, at this time, it was difficult for a professional 
woman to find a suitable spouse, and that all the “good matches” were abroad.77 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 The fifth phase began after the war ended in 2009 and continues as of this writing. I discuss post-war 
emigration and asylum-seeking in the epilogue to this dissertation. 
75 Tamil professionals were often engineers, medical doctors and barristers.  
76 Canada’s “points system” admitted individual applicants to the “economic immigrant” category, allotting 
points according to their education, history of professional/skilled work, proficiency in English and French, 
connections to Canada, etc. The points system was created under the Immigration Act of 1976, and 
replaced by Bill C-11, or the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) of 2001. 
77 The woman who used this phrase was a Hindu and Vellala from Jaffna. The phrase “good match” is at 
times synonymous with the notion of coming from a “good family,” and implies not only a match of status 
in terms of profession, but also of caste according to the hierarchies of caste system in her region. Jaffna 
Tamil Vellalas who ascribe to this system would (unsurprisingly) claim their subcaste is “highest.” The 
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Consequently, marriage to a man abroad created a path for the transnational migration of 
Tamil women, many of whom had no prior plans to emigrate.78 Every one of my 
interlocutors of this phase told me that they had planned to return to Sri Lanka, but that 
the anti-Tamil violence of July 1983 created profound doubts among them. Though they 
still hoped to return one day, the door to their old home had begun to close.  
* Siva went to Toronto, Canada as a young man in 1966, where he completed his 
Masters in Architecture, after studying and working as a draughtsperson in the UK. He 
returned to Jaffna to get married to a cross-cousin, his mother’s brother’s daughter.79 He 
went back to Canada shortly after the engagement and wedding ceremonies, and 
sponsored his wife, who arrived in 1973. They had two daughters, and made regular trips 
to visit their family in a village near Tellippalai, Jaffna. He was known to many as the 
“father” of the Tamil community in Toronto, and was a founder of the Tamil Eelam 
Society of Canada, an organization that actively supported the Tamil nationalist struggle 
in Sri Lanka while providing settlement services to Tamil migrants to Canada. 
* Ganesan moved to Canada in 1981 at the age of 35, intending to pursue graduate 
studies, after working as a sociology lecturer in Jaffna. However, it was difficult to find 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
perniciousness of this claim can be observed in Tamil matrimonial ads in Sri Lanka and the diaspora. In 
addition to considerations of caste, kinship, region, profession, many Tamils consult astrologers and/or 
numerologists to assess whether two people are a “good match.” 
78 With the start of war, transnational marriages became the primary means for the migration of Tamil 
women in their twenties and thirties. For a study of this phenomenon during the late 1990s and 2000s, see 
Maunaguru 2009. These matches were—and continued to be—arranged through family networks and other 
“known people,” as well as local and Colombo-based brokers. Marriages between Tamil women living in 
Sri Lanka and men in the diaspora have also transformed the local practice of giving dowry.  
79 Bilateral cross-cousin marriage, or marrying within one’s sontham, is privileged among Sri Lankan 
Tamils. The marriage of a mother’s brother’s daughter and father’s sister’s son has historically been a 
desirable one in Tamil culture, but waned during the war. See Trautmann 1981 and Trawick 1990 on 
Dravidian (i.e. Tamil) kinship in south India, and Maunaguru and Van Hear 2012 on the 
transnationalization of Sri Lankan Tamil marriage practices. 
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work as a new immigrant and the economic realities of supporting a family in a new 
country led him further afield from his original plans. Ganesan worked as a security 
guard in Vancouver, where he lived for ten years, before he moved to Toronto in 1991. 
He is married to a Sinhala woman, and together, they have one daughter. Though he once 
worked with “alternative” Tamil organizations such as Thedakam (a Tamil resource 
library), he has increasingly moved towards organizing a multi-ethnic Sri Lankan 
community. 
* Vaitheki was raised in the politics of the Tamil left—her father was a well-known 
communist politician in Sri Lanka. She studied engineering, and after marriage, moved to 
Vancouver, Canada in 1982 to join her husband. Two years later, they moved to Toronto. 
As was the case for most Tamil professionals who migrated to Canada, it took time to 
continue her career in a new country-- she had to take exams and obtain new 
certifications to work in her field. When Tamils began to arrive on their own in large 
numbers from 1985 onward, she tried to help with the settlement of the new refugees. 
However, as she and others reported to me, this became difficult as independent efforts 
were co-opted or thwarted by members of the World Tamil Movement or TESOC. 
Vaitheki stepped back from community activism and focused on her personal life; her 
marriage was a difficult one, but she continued to live with her husband, even after their 
divorce in 1997. When he passed away in 2002, she again became more involved in Sri 
Lankan issues—this time, diaspora engagement in development in Sri Lanka, and peace 
activism in Toronto. 
Some parallels can be drawn between Phase 1 migrants to Toronto and “the Students” 
in Phase 2 of Daniel’s schema of Tamil immigrants to the UK. Both groups were highly 
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educated, students and young professionals, emigrating at roughly the same time. 
However, in Canada, Phase 1 Tamils were primarily middle-class, Vellala and from 
Jaffna. They had some financial resources to be able to migrate and were mostly young 
professionals; even the students were post-graduate professionals who had some work 
experience abroad and continued to work to complete their studies. They were the first in 
their families to move to Canada, and they saved enough to send some money back 
home. As noted above, Phase 1 Tamils’ migration arose from political and economic 
instability in Sri Lanka; they reported personal experiences of discrimination and a 
general sense of insecurity that motivated them to leave Sri Lanka temporarily. They also 
pursued opportunities that would allow them to return to Sri Lanka with economic and/or 
social capital. However, as Ganesan’s story shows, education and work experience in Sri 
Lanka did not always translate to professional opportunities in Canada, as employers 
required “Canadian experience.” Caught in a cycle of underemployment and financial 
instability, some immigrants of this phase experienced downward social mobility. Tamils 
in this phase generally did not have a history of political activism while living in Sri 
Lanka, but they became involved with community-based social work and/or political 
activism after 1983. 
Phase 2: Refugees, Resettled and Families At the Border, 1983-1990 
The events of July 1983 accelerated a deepening crisis of the state, and led to a full-
blown war between the Sri Lankan army and Tamil militant groups. As discussed above, 
during the first four years of war, many Tamil civilians sought refuge in neighboring 
India; as the war continued, greater numbers turned to Canada, which had begun to earn a 
reputation for its open immigration policies and path to citizenship. Tamil migration to 
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Canada during this phase was fueled by three events in the Sri Lankan war. First, 
civilians were targeted during the war: the Sri Lankan army rounded up entire villages in 
Jaffna, and held thousands of Tamil men in detention; beginning in 1984 and 1985, the 
Tigers planned and executed a number of bus bombings and civilian massacres in 
Anuradhapura and other “border areas.” Each attack on civilians led to an escalation of 
“revenge” attacks by the army. Secondly, in 1985 and 1986, Tamil militancy was plagued 
by internecine killings, which became a specialty of the LTTE. Tamils from the other 
militant groups went into exile abroad in order to survive. Third, civilians experienced a 
great deal of terror, violence and displacement when fighting broke out between the 
LTTE and the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) brought into Sri Lanka during the 
1987 Indo-Lanka peace accord. Few IPKF soldiers could speak Tamil, and the suspicions 
they harbored of the local population led to beatings, murders and sexual violence.80 
When the IPKF left the island in 1990, fighting the war between the government and 
LTTE resumed.  
Nearly all of my interlocutors who migrated to Canada during this period arrived 
between 1987 and 1990. More than 80% of them were Tamils from Jaffna. Most of these 
Tamils can be divided into the following subgroups: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 See UTHR(J) reports no. 1, 2 & 3 (1989a, 1989b, 1989c) for accounts of this period that refer to violence 
from other Tamil militant groups with the IPKF’s complicity, as well IPKF beatings and shootings of 
civilians, who were often suspected of helping the LTTE. Tamil youth were also forcibly conscripted into 
the Additional Citizens Volunteer Force (known colloquially as the Tamil National Army), per the directive 
of India’s RAW. For an insider’s discussion, see Loganathan 1996: 119-165, and on conscription, 
especially 154-155.  
The IPKF period has largely been omitted from popular and academic narratives about the Sri Lankan war. 
IPKF soldiers were never held accountable for the aforementioned crimes. Instead, in a turn of events 
indicative of the deliberate nature of this forgetting, Mahinda Rajapakse’s government unveiled a statue in 
2011 to memorialize IPKF soldiers’ contributions to Sri Lanka. 
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(1) Tamils who were directly affected by the violence of 1983 and/or political 
refugees, and admitted to Canada through a resettlement program or sponsored by 
an organization or institution (e.g. Amnesty International, the Methodist 
Church.)81 
(2) Those who were directly affected by the violence of July 1983 while living in the 
south and were taken by boat to resettle in Jaffna, after which point, they lived 
through the first few years of the war before leaving. 
(3) Tamils who arrived in Canada via a third country, where they were living either 
(a) before 1983, and with the outbreak of war, felt they could not return to Sri 
Lanka, or (b) who had fled to another country after 1983, but were not granted the 
protections of legal residence or citizenship. For example, a few of the activists I 
worked with had been students at a college or university in Tamil Nadu. In 
addition, several Tamils had been living and working in African countries such as 
Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia, and Lesotho, or were the children of these migrants.82  
(4) Tamils who were displaced from Jaffna during the war, and moved to Colombo 
before emigrating via a flight.83 Some in this group applied for and received a 
tourist visa to the United States, and then traveled by bus to the U.S.-Canada 
border where they made inland refugee claims. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 I discuss one such story of an activist below, and another in Chapter 3. 
82 In two cases during this period, the person and/or family went back to Sri Lanka temporarily and stayed 
in a Colombo lodge for a few months before beginning their journey to Canada. In this way, they could 
claim to have arrived directly from Sri Lanka. I note this to indicate how Tamils had to navigate laws and 
bureaucratic rules that required departure from their country of origin and a valid passport. This is not to 
diminish their claim for refuge in any way.  
83 Tamils displaced from the north and east lived in Colombo for several years—even decades—where they 
waited for a resolution to the war and/or prepared to migrate abroad. Tens of thousands still live in the city, 
where they constitute an internal diaspora, and typically have relatives living in the diaspora. 
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(5) Young men who left the other militant groups (TELO, PLOTE, EPRLF, and to a 
lesser extent, EROS) and/or their political affiliates (e.g. ENDLF) during internal 
fighting and political assassinations. 
Though some Tamils who arrived during this period were sponsored by relatives 
already in Canada, a large number of my interlocutors were refugees who either came on 
their own, with their family, or in the case of a few people, were resettled after being 
sponsored by a church.  
Tamils who had arrived during Phase 2 when they were seven to fifteen years old 
were sometimes dubbed the “1.5 generation”; they saw their lives and selves as being 
divided between two countries, and so were deemed as being between the group of adult 
immigrants to Canada identified as “first-generation Canadians,” and that generation’s 
children, who were “second-generation Canadians.” The 1.5 generation were adults by 
the time of my fieldwork, and as twentysomething activists, they were an important link 
between older activists, and the generation of youth born and raised in Canada, who were 
entering colleges and universities (and who would become active during Tamil protests 
against the war.) 
*Fr. Antony arrived in Canada at the end of 1983. During the Black July pogrom, he 
was tipped off about a threat against his life by a Sinhala policeman he had once 
counseled. Fr. Antony was ordained as a Catholic priest in 1956, and had worked in 
Jaffna and Mannar. In 1968, he heard another calling—that of family life—and decided 
to become an Anglican in order to marry. In 1970, he married a Sinhala woman, with 
whom he has three children, and at the same time, became increasingly involved in 
	   81	  
progressive movements in the South. He quickly gained a reputation as a “revolutionary” 
priest.  
Fr. Antony was no stranger to state violence, as a witness to the 1971 JVP 
insurrection and the state’s response, and as a survivor of the 1977 riots during his work 
with the Gandhiyam movement among Tamil plantation workers who had resettled near 
Vavuniya in the North.84 During the 1971 insurrection, he protected some JVP youth; 
shortly after, he learned that he was being watched by the police. In 1977, he was arrested 
by the army. Nevertheless, he continued his work, and lectured about counseling 
throughout the island.  
When the violence began in July 1983, Fr. Antony’s wife’s brother took the kids to a 
safe place during the riots. Fr. Antony was then arrested, questioned, and eventually, after 
several interventions on his behalf, released on house arrest. He told me, “I wanted to 
stay and help my people,” but the church had already told him to continue with his plans 
to attend an international conference on counseling. This was when he received the tip 
from the policeman about a hit. The World Council of Churches helped him find safety 
by ensuring his passage out of Sri Lanka to attend the conference. He flew to San 
Francisco, and then went to New Jersey. He then crossed the border into Ottawa, and met 
his wife and children in Montréal, the largest Tamil community at that time. Fr. Antony 
counseled Tamil refugees, and became the President of the Québec branch of the Tamil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Gandhiyam was an organization that worked with Hill-Country Tamils affected by anti-Tamil violence in 
1977, turning their refugee camp into a farm. It was founded by S.A. David and Dr. S. Rajasundaram that 
same year. In 1983, the founders were falsely accused of training militants and arrested; they were 
imprisoned at Welikada, where Rajasundaram was killed during the 1983 riots. David escaped, lived in 
exile in Chennai, and recently returned to Kilinochchi where he passed away in October 2015. For a recent 
interview with S.A. David, see Kolappan (2012). 
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Eelam Society of Canada. His family lived in Montréal for 13 years, before moving to 
Toronto in 1996. 
*Theepan was ten years old when he moved to Canada in 1989 with his family. They 
left Anaithivu (one of several islets east of Jaffna) for India in 1984. They lived in a 
rented house for a few years, then returned to Sri Lanka at the beginning of the Indo-
Lanka peace accord. When war returned—this time, between the IPKF and Tigers—they 
moved to Canada as refugees. After his family moved, Theepan’s relatives followed in 
the early 1990s, including some uncles who were living temporarily in Europe. Theepan 
says that he did not learn much about the history or politics of “the struggle” until he 
became involved with the Tamil Students’ Association at his university. Growing up in 
Toronto during violence between Tamil gangs in the 1990s, he volunteered with 
Canadian Tamil Youth Development (CanTYD), an organization that was created to 
address this violence, and based in Scarborough. He continued to work for them. Many of 
Theepan’s peers were of the “1.5 Generation” that migrated to Canada and settled in 
Toronto at this time—his wife, a youth counselor, moved to Canada in 1987 at the age of 
six, and several of his coworkers and activist colleagues, and friends had arrived in 
Canada with their families as children and teenagers during the latter half of this phase.    
Phase 3: Refugee Claims and Family Reunification, 1991-2001 
The largest number of Tamils migrated to Canada during the years between 1991 
and 2001. As noted above, Sri Lanka was the fifth largest source of immigrants to 
Canada during this period. While many more Tamils arrived in the years 1998 to 2000, 
most of my activist interlocutors arrived in the years 1994 to 1996. Phase 3 Tamils were 
often from the Jaffna districts of Vadamarachchi and Valigamam where war between the 
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state and Tigers led to mass displacement as the army took over large tracts of land and 
turned them into High Security Zones. The government built new army bases in these 
militarized zones, which were made off-limits to local Tamils. Soldiers looted and 
camped out in Tamil homes during their operations.  
 
Figure 1.4: Map of Jaffna High Security Zones and Military Camps  
(Source: Tamil Guardian) 
Under such conditions of insecurity and displacement, Phase 3 Tamils 
increasingly decided it was time to leave the country. They had lived through 10 to 15 
years of war or more, and were encouraged by relatives and friends already abroad to 
migrate. They were told that Canada was a good choice for immigration: It was easier to 
get in and become “landed,” a Canadian term for permanent residents. Canada offered a 
path to citizenship, which afforded them a much sought-after feeling of security and 
rights that were denied to them in Sri Lanka. As one woman—a Canadian Tamil social 
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activist who migrated during this phase—told me, “We felt that by moving [to Canada], 
we wouldn’t have to move and move anymore.”  
Phase 3 shared some of the forms of migration found in Phase 2: Many of the 
Tamils who arrived during this time were refugee claimants or family sponsorship 
applicants. A greater number of Tamils arrived via family sponsorship, as compared to 
the previous phase.85  A few activists among my interlocutors applied as refugees seeking 
political asylum, after being physically assaulted or threatened by the LTTE in Sri Lanka 
and in Europe. Most were, however, seeking refuge after facing government atrocities 
and did not mention the militants as a reason for their migration. In particular, those who 
had been activists in Sri Lanka or India believed that they would be detained and tortured 
again if returned to Sri Lanka. 
Also, as in Phase 2—though to a lesser extent during my research—a significant 
number of activists who arrived at this time were of the “1.5 generation.”  
*Nalini arrived in Toronto in 1994. She was sponsored by her husband, Satheesh, an 
activist and a former member of PLOTE, the militant group that was created by Uma 
Maheswaran following after he left the LTTE in 1979. The couple had met in Jaffna—
Satheesh was Nalini’s brother’s friend—and married before Satheesh left for Canada 
through an agent on a circuitous route that took him through Eastern Europe, South 
America, Mexico, and the United States. After reaching Toronto, Satheesh lived in a 
downtown rooming house with other young Tamil ex-militants who were critical of the 
LTTE. He became good friends with some of these men, and together, they formed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 This was also true, to some extent, for Tamil diaspora activists. Of the activists interviewed during my 
fieldwork in Toronto, 9 of 21 who arrived in Phase 2 were sponsored by a relative, while 10 of 18 in Phase 
3 were admitted through family sponsorship. 
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Tamil Resource Centre—a library and space for dissent—and alternative Tamil theatre 
groups. When Nalini arrived, she joined the theatre group, and grew interested in feminist 
activism. The couple moved to Scarborough, where most of their middle-aged circle now 
lives. Satheesh and Nalini have middle-class office jobs, but during my fieldwork, 
Satheesh had recently been laid off, and this was a source of stress for him. 
* Leena, like Nalini, moved to Toronto in 1994 after being sponsored by her husband. 
She arrived, however, via a third country: Germany. Leena left Sri Lanka after the 
women’s centre where she had lived and worked was overrun by the LTTE in 1990.86 She 
lived in a small German city as a refugee, and participated in Tamil groups that were 
critical of the LTTE. In 1993, she was physically beaten by LTTE activists. She decided 
it was time to start another life for herself in Canada, and focused instead on organizing 
Tamil workers in restaurants, laundries, and other service industries. 
*Nantha was raised on an island west of Jaffna, and moved to Canada in 1995 with 
his older sister when they were 16 and 19 years old. Like many Tamils during these 
years, Nantha’s parents worried that, at their age, the army would view their children as 
potential Tigers. The family was sponsored: Three of his mother’s siblings had already 
moved to Toronto between 1990 and 1992. His mother and 2 other siblings joined them 
in 1996, and his father moved in 1998. His parents’ other siblings lived in Holland, 
Switzerland and Germany. When they left Sri Lanka, after moving several times in Jaffna 
due to the war, the family decided to go to a country where they could have a “base”—to 
enter a good education system, work, and live “a stable life” with citizenship. By 1999 he 
became a citizen. He went to university, became involved in the TSA, the students’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See below and Chapter 4 for further discussion of the women’s centre. 
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branch of the WTM, and volunteered for CanTYD. Through his community involvement, 
he entered non-profit work and ran for public office. He continues to serve as a 
community spokesperson. He tells me, “The Tamils are a nation, even though we are a 
diaspora” and as such, “We are a community without a country.” 
*Rathan had lived in India and Switzerland before leaving for Canada. His wife and 
teenaged daughters entered the country as refugees several months before he did in 1998. 
He was detained for allegedly entering the country on a false name: his passport used his 
grandfather’s name. Rathan’s political work as a WTM activist was known to 
immigration authorities, and his status hung in the balance.87 Eventually, he was allowed 
to reside in Canada, but on the condition that he abstain from “political activities.” He 
obtained “landed” status toward the end of my fieldwork; his wife and children were 
awaiting citizenship. 
Phase 4: National Security and Tamil Migration during a Ceasefire, 2002-2008 
During Phase 4, Tamil migrants had to increasingly “prove” their need for refuge, 
as their claims were made upon a changing legal and discursive field. Those changes 
were: (1) After a boat of people from Fujian, China arrived off the coast of B.C. in 1999, 
state and public discourses on immigration made a distinction between “real refugees” 
and “economic refugees” (or “bogus refugees”)—a variation of the “deserving” and 
“undeserving” immigrant dichotomy that had characterized the previous decade (Mountz 
2010).88 According to political geographer Alison Mountz (2010), Canadian immigration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 The WTM was said to be a front organization for the LTTE. I discuss this relationship and how it shaped 
community activism in Toronto in Chapter 4. The leader of the WTM in Canada was arrested on criminal 
charges in 1995, and was subject to ongoing deportation proceedings when Rathan entered Canada. 
88 The boat was the Yuan Yee, which brought 123 Fujianese migrants to the coast of British Columbia. 
Mountz’s research among civil servants in Canada’s immigration bureaucracy reveals how the country 
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officials termed the policy changes that followed from this event “the long tunnel thesis” 
of Canadian bureaucracy. In this strategy of interception and containment, unwanted 
migrants who struggled to enter Canada became cases to be processed offshore, in 
interstitial spaces such as ports of entry, that were deemed “not Canada” but remained 
under the state’s jurisdiction (xiv). (2) The events of September 11, 2001 in the United 
States had global repercussions, which led to changes to Canada’s anti-terrorism and 
immigration laws (Bill C-11, which became Canada’s Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act of 2001). Canadian intelligence agencies brought greater scrutiny to bear 
on the LTTE, which was identified as a terrorist organization. (3) The following year, the 
2002 Ceasefire Agreement in Sri Lanka led Canada’s immigration regime to presume that 
the situation in Sri Lanka was “safe” for Tamils.89  
Far fewer Tamils were admitted to Canada between 2002 and 2008, and even 
fewer arrived to make refugee claims.90 Not surprisingly, only four of my interlocutors 
migrated to Canada during this time, and their reasons for migration and means were 
quite different when compared to activists of the previous phases. One was an immigrant 
who had attended college in the United States, where he had lived for over a decade and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
became a pioneer of “interdiction” by creating a network of immigration control officers overseas, 
particularly throughout Asia and Africa (2010: 136-137). The offshore containment of asylum-seekers 
constitutes what her informants termed a “long tunnel” to Canada. Her work illustrates how the 
securitization of migration makes vulnerable people in search of asylum and protection via the state’s 
diffusion of its borders and creation of zones of exception (Agamben 2005). 
89 An IRB judge noted the following in a 2006 decision on a sponsorship application, “However, there has 
been a ceasefire between the Tigers and the Sri Lanka government for about three years and the conditions 
that fuel suspicion of young Tamils by Sri Lankan authorities have abated.” See Shanmugathasan v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 CanLII 63909 (CA IRB), <http://canlii.ca/t/23w26>. Refugee 
claimants during this time were often denied on the basis that Colombo constituted a reasonable “internal 
flight alternative.” See, for example, X (Re), 2006 CanLII 62245 (CA IRB), <http://canlii.ca/t/1z8s3> and X 
(Re), 2006 CanLII 61422 (CA IRB), <http://canlii.ca/t/1w9w8> retrieved on 2015-08-21. 
90 The number of immigrants from Sri Lanka to Canada increased again in 2008, placing the country at the 
bottom of the list of top ten source countries. Of 4,744 immigrants admitted, only 28.4% were refugees, as 
compared to 43.9% in 2001. See Milan (2011) for Statistics Canada. 
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worked for pro-nationalist groups before marrying a Tamil woman in Toronto. The other 
three were Tamils who were admitted as refugees in need of protection from the LTTE. 
Aathi had worked with dissenting Tamils to research human rights violations in the north. 
Mano was an activist and journalist who was publicly critical of the LTTE. And Jeevani 
was a part of their network of activists critical of the parties to war, and a feminist activist 
whose personal experiences with violence had deeply affected her. All three of these 
activists had to leave northern Sri Lanka due to the LTTE in the 1990s. They lived in 
Colombo and Batticaloa, but during the ceasefire, they were threatened with violence and 
lived in safe houses until they could leave the country.   
*Jeevani was also a friend of Leena’s, the woman described in Phase 3. She was 
raised in a small village on the western end of the Jaffna peninsula with four brothers and 
two sisters. One brother and sister each died in the war. Her father could not afford her 
school fees, and she had to stay at home to help her mother. When she was 16, she was 
attacked by an LTTE cadre. With no support from her family, she decided to leave home. 
She lived in Jaffna, making frequent trips to the town hospital when she fell ill. During 
this time, a Catholic nun told her about a new centre for women. She moved to the centre, 
where she met Leena and was introduced to feminist activism. When the women’s centre 
was taken over by the LTTE, Jeevani left the north in 1991and never returned. A friend 
gave her Rs 500 to travel, and she moved to Colombo, where she worked with internally 
displaced Tamil and Muslim women. When some of these women were forcibly 
“returned” to an open field in Batticaloa, Jeevani and other members of her organization 
moved to work among them, and to combat growing incidences of violence. Jeevani had 
learned how to navigate conflicts with the SLA, the LTTE, the TVMP faction, and other 
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paramilitary groups that sought to control feminist anti-violence work. However, one day, 
she was abducted by a local LTTE leader. Although she was eventually released, 
Jeevani’s colleagues felt that her life was in danger. Friends in Sri Lanka and Toronto 
helped her apply to be admitted to Canada as a refugee; her application was approved, on 
grounds of persecution. She left the island reluctantly in 2006. Within a year, she 
received “landed” or permanent resident status. She missed her work in Sri Lanka, and 
after two years of living in Toronto, she did not know whether she would apply for 
Canadian citizenship. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has described two different trajectories of Sri Lankan Tamil 
migration and settlement that have resulted in large diaspora communities in Toronto, 
Canada and throughout Tamil Nadu, India. I began by describing the layered histories of 
Tamil movement and mobility across Asia that preceded wartime migrations, with a 
focus on the late colonial and post-independence periods. From this followed a mapping 
of the dispersal of Sri Lankan Tamils globally, since the anti-Tamil violence of 1983.  
 I showed how Sri Lankan Tamil migration to India was punctuated by two 
periods of primarily forced return, and proceeded in phases that corresponded to periods 
of intense fighting as well as political events connected to the war, such as the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Tamil migrants to India fled the country out of fear for 
their physical safety and survival, but this temporary situation became a protracted one as 
the war continued. Their liminal status as unofficial refugees and undocumented migrants 
made Sri Lankan Tamils perpetually unsettled and available for “return” to Sri Lanka. 
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As in India, Tamil migration to Canada, and Toronto in particular, proceeded in 
several phases. This chapter illustrated the ways in which Tamil migration was 
differentiated by several factors: a person’s time of migration, immediate reasons for 
departure, type of arrival, and other social differences, such as gender, caste, and class. 
Overall, I showed that pre-war immigrants were middle-class Jaffna Tamils seeking 
education and economic opportunity abroad, in the context of discrimination in Sri 
Lanka, who still hoped to return to the island. In contrast, refugees and immigrants during 
the periods between 1983 and 2000, moved largely in response to contingencies of 
political violence and war: the fear of physical violence threatened or experienced, 
imprisonment, and social and economic insecurity. These Tamils benefitted from 
resettlement programs (as in Phase 2), policies and refugee determination processes, and 
increasingly, family reunification (especially important in Phase 3). In the twenty-first 
century, however, fewer Tamils left Sri Lanka, and those who tried to migrate to Canada 
found it much more difficult after the ceasefire. The Canadian government viewed 
refugee claims based on Sri Lankan government or army persecution with increasing 
suspicion. Some Tamils continued to leave Sri Lanka after 2002, particularly dissidents 
and dissenting activists targeted by the LTTE.  
This chapter has argued for an understanding of Tamil migration as a social and 
political process that produces distinct forms of community in specific locations. While 
each diasporic location has its own distinctive formations of community, the later 
chapters of this dissertation point to a networked diaspora. Sri Lankan Tamil 
communities in Toronto and Tamil Nadu serve as nodal points in this diaspora and its 
circulation of Tamil political activisms and cultural productions. The next chapter turns 
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from Tamil migrations and diaspora formation to these practices, and the politics of Sri 
Lanka’s 2002 ceasefire and peace process, with a focus on two contrasting political 
movements in Canada and India. 
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Chapter 2 
Rise Up or Return? Tamil Activisms during the Ceasefire 
 
This chapter picks up at the point where the previous one ended. I explore how 
two different trajectories of migration—to India and Canada respectively—resulted in 
different forms of Tamil activism in each site, and distinct political movements with 
contrasting ends. Specifically, I examine two moments of Sri Lankan Tamil activism 
during Sri Lanka’s Ceasefire Agreement and peace process (2002-2008), and analyze the 
social and cultural meanings of these events for Tamils living in diaspora. First, I 
describe the political situation in Sri Lanka that led to the disintegration of the peace 
process and ceasefire before and during my fieldwork. Then, I turn to Sri Lankan Tamil 
political movements and activisms in Tamil Nadu, India and Toronto, Canada.  
In Tamil Nadu, refugees mobilized in the context of return, or “reverse migration” 
to Sri Lanka, when over six thousand refugees attempted to re-inhabit and resettle in their 
villages in the aftermath of violence. I consider the meaning of these movements of 
refugee return to Sri Lanka among those who decided to remain in India, whether for the 
time being or permanently. The chapter reveals how Tamil refugees imagined and 
negotiated the idea of “return” in the context of governmental practices of refugee 
management, rehabilitation, and international laws. In Toronto, I examine, Pongu Thamil 
(Tamil Uprising), an event that was part of a political-cultural movement of the same 
name, and I discuss the forms of activism the circulation of these events created. I track 
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this event from its performance in Jaffna, Sri Lanka, and subsequent diasporic iterations, 
to its performance in Toronto in 2004. Pongu Thamil was an unprecedented event in 
mobilizing the Tamil diaspora, in Canada and several countries around the world, nearly 
five years before diaspora protests at the end of the war. 
Ceasefire and Peace Process, 2002-2008 
A new kind of diasporic mobility emerged after the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement 
and peace process between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. During the peace 
process, Tamils who had migrated out of Sri Lanka as refugees/asylum-seekers and 
immigrants were able to return to the island. Their stays were motivated by different 
reasons, contingent on their migration trajectories and political statuses. In the sections 
below, I outline the political developments and discourses in Sri Lanka that enabled and 
constrained multiple forms of diasporic movement and mobility before turning to two 
different forms of “return” and the political movements that emerged from these 
returns—what one might call the unanticipated “dividends” of the peace process and its 
failures. 
Before the Ceasefire 
The LTTE was in a position of military strength when it unilaterally declared a 
ceasefire on December 24, 2000. The Government, on the other hand, was in disarray: 
The years of 1995 to 2000 were a time of political upheaval, economic instability, and 
violence in Sri Lanka. Eighteen years of UNP rule ended when President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga and her SLFP-led People’s Alliance was elected in November 1994 on a 
platform of peace. Peace, however, quickly gave way to a “war for peace,” and 
Kumaratunga’s ongoing attempts at a political solution through constitutional reforms 
	   94	  
consistently met opposition from the UNP, on the one hand, and studied indifference 
from the LTTE, on the other.91 Parliament was dissolved not once, but twice, in 2000 and 
2001—making for three parliamentary elections in less than three years. The economy 
had taken a nosedive, as investors and tourists stayed away after the LTTE bombed Sri 
Lanka’s Central Bank in 1996, its World Trade buildings, and the Bandaranaike 
International Airport in July 2001. On the war front, the army had also lost important, 
strategic battles to the LTTE, including the April 2000 battle of Elephant Pass.92 The 
LTTE was now in control of the entire Vanni region, and had entered the Peninsula as far 
as Chavakachcheri.  
Kumaratunga’s stalled devolution package—the foundation of the permanent 
peace her government sought to deliver—was eventually discarded, and the constitutional 
reforms bill incorporating its proposals was not brought to Parliament before the latter 
was dissolved in August 2000 and October 2001. The LTTE announced that it would join 
negotiations if the UNP was voted in. The United National Front, led by the UNP’s Ranil 
Wickremasinghe, came to power at the December 2001 parliamentary election, also on a 
platform of peace; the party promised to suspend hostilities with the LTTE and return to 
the negotiating table to find a ‘permanent solution,’ with the aid of Norway, which had 
spent the last year and a half visiting the country to broker peace.93 The election also saw 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 For the LTTE’s take on this period, see Balasingham (2004). Balasingham served as a political advisor to 
the LTTE delegation at these talks. 
92 Elephant Pass is an isthmus that connects the Jaffna Peninsula (then government-controlled) to the Vanni 
(under LTTE control at the time); it was the site of three pitched battles between the state and the LTTE. 
This second battle was codenamed Operation Unceasing Waves III by the LTTE, and the subject of a 
popular video the Tigers sold to diaspora Tamils. The recapture of Elephant Pass, as the “gateway to 
Jaffna,” was emotionally significant to the LTTE and its diasporic supporters.  
93 Norway’s involvement was reportedly with the support of the US Government, with the requirement that 
it keep the Government of India in the know. The US, EU, and Japan joined Norway as co-chairs of the 
donors circle of the process.  
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the formation of the Tamil National Alliance between some senior leaders of the TULF 
joining pro-LTTE factions of TELO, EPRLF, and the ACTC.  
The September 11 attacks on the United States and the start of a ‘Global War on 
Terror’ drove the LTTE to a new international political strategy. Prabhakaran and the 
LTTE asserted the political nature of the struggle at this time, drawing a distinction 
between “freedom struggles based on the right to self-determination and blind terrorist 
acts based on fanaticism” (Tamilnet.com 2001). At a press conference in Kilinochchi in 
April 2002, Anton Balasingham argued that a ban on the LTTE—at this time imposed by 
the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, in addition to India94—would impede a 
negotiated settlement by encouraging the Sri Lankan government to pursue military 
means. The ban, they argued, would have to be lifted as a precondition for talks with the 
Sri Lankan government. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 7, diaspora activists took up 
this argument and mobilized around it during the peace process and the war’s end. 
Talking peace, 2002-2004  
In 2002, the Government and the LTTE signed a formal Ceasefire Agreement. 
Shortly after the elections, Prime Minister Wickremasinghe relaxed an economic 
embargo, allowing the flow of essential goods and medical supplies into LTTE-controlled 
areas. Discussions and exchanges were organized between Tamil and Sinhala 
communities from the North and South by religious and civil society organizations.95 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 India was the first country to ban the LTTE in 1991, followed by the United States in 1996, 1999, and 
again in the State Department’s listing of October 5, 2001.  
95 Inter-ethnic activities were favored by international donors. In 2006, a friend and I attended a talk at the 
International Centre for Ethnic Studies in Colombo, at which an American INGO development professional 
argued for organizing exchanges between Tamil and Sinhala farmers, so that “they can see what they have 
in common.” My friend, a young Sri Lankan academic and activist, criticized the INGO professional for 
her naïvete about Sri Lankan politics and ignorance of recent interventions during the peace process. 
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Agreement and subsequent peace talks were facilitated by the Norwegian government as 
planned. Six rounds of talks were held between September 2002 and April 2003, in 
Thailand, Germany, Norway. In addition, the UNF gathered donors in Tokyo and 
Washington D.C. to pledge their financial assistance to the Sri Lankan peace process and 
rehabilitation projects in the war-affected areas. Crucially, the agreement also allowed the 
LTTE to open political offices in the island, leading to activities to mobilize Tamils 
behind the organization, and thus create and demonstrate “unity” among Tamils in the 
North and East. The new space for LTTE politics, however, also opened up a space for 
violence against the LTTE’s political opponents in Jaffna, Trincomalee and Batticaloa.96 
Sri Lankans of all ethnicities were tired of war and had high hopes for the new, 
internationally-mediated peace process. However, the euphoria of the first few months of 
the peace process quickly faded, as problems emerged. For one, the LTTE was unhappy 
with the government’s internationalization of the peace process through the donors 
conferences—they had been prevented from participating at the D.C. conference (being a 
banned organization in the U.S.), but would be responsible to its concerns about human 
rights and democracy.97 The six rounds of peace talks were mostly procedural discussions 
that did not lead to substantive agreements about the contours of a political solution. The 
LTTE submitted a proposal in October 2003 for their own interim administration in the 
north-east—the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA)—which they argued was 
necessary for meeting local needs and a return to ‘normalcy’ before a political settlement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96  Between February 2002 and December 2005, the LTTE, the Karuna group and other armed groups had 
committed 300 killings. The LTTE was directly implicated in at least 200 such killings, primarily of their 
opponents (Human Rights Watch 2006: 39-40). 
97 Critical observers of the peace process noted the shortcomings of liberal peacemaking based on elite 
negotiations and donor-funded neoliberal development without local political context.  See Stokke and 
Uyangoda 2011 for further discussion. 
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could be reached.98 The LTTE pulled out of the sixth round talks. Political conflicts in the 
south led to a lack of government commitment to the peace process. Mistrust between the 
two sides grew. By the end of 2003, with neither the government nor the LTTE observing 
the Ceasefire’s provisions, Norwegian facilitators suspended their role. The Norwegian-
led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission remained on the ground to document a growing 
number of violations.99  
The diaspora travels “back home” 
Thousands of Tamils living in diaspora returned to Sri Lanka as visitors, following 
the signing of the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement between the Government and the LTTE. 
Their visits lasted anywhere from a few weeks to months, and tended to occur during the 
summer and winter holidays in North America, the UK, Australia and Europe—the 
countries in which they currently resided, and held either citizenship (by naturalization or 
birth), or permanent residence. Most of these visitors were families who returned to visit 
kin they had not seen for years. In the case of some Jaffna Tamils who had gone abroad 
before the war or in its earliest years, the years had grown into decades. They visited their 
ur, if they could, and if they were lucky, stayed in a family home. Then, they might be 
visited by other distant relatives, or former neighbors. Once, they would have known 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The ISGA would have granted the LTTE executive and judiciary powers along the lines of the 
Palestinian Authority, without facing an election, for up to five years while negotiating the terms of a final 
settlement with the GoSL. 
99 The SLMM terminated its monitoring and left Sri Lanka on January 16, 2008, after the Sri Lankan 
government officially abrogated the ceasefire. An archive of the SLMM website and reports from 2007 
may be found at https://web.archive.org/web/20071225071016/http://www.slmm.lk/  On the fifth 
anniversary of the CFA’s signing, the Mission noted that nearly 4000 people were killed in fighting related 
to the conflict between November 2005 and February 2007, as compared to 130 deaths recorded during the 
first three years of the CFA. 
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everyone in this village. Now, they searched for familiar faces as they moved about the 
land, and the few they found had grown old.  
More often than not, they returned to Jaffna villages that were empty, and homes that 
were no longer inhabitable—riddled with bullet holes, crumbling, overgrown with 
grasses and other vegetation. Or they might find a family living amid the ruins, having 
been displaced years before. Instead, diaspora visitors could take a room at small hotels 
that had cropped up for this purpose, and take their meals at local mess halls. Some 
alumni found accommodations at the “colleges” where their secondary schooling was 
completed. During these visits, diaspora Tamils found out what, if anything, remained of 
the Jaffna and/or Sri Lanka they once knew.  
Tamil diaspora activists were also among the thousands of Tamils who visited Sri 
Lanka during this time. In addition to visiting their ur and kin, activists were involved in 
a range of activities to help people in their homeland, or to help those fighting for a 
separate homeland. Some gathered information about the war and peace process: For 
example, some Tamils from Toronto were part of a fact-finding team that conducted 
research for a Berghof Foundation report.100 Groups of Canadian Tamil students returned 
to volunteer their skills and time in areas that were devastated by the war. The Tamil 
Students’ Volunteer Project (TSVP) was one such effort, in which university students 
taught youth in Kilinochchi various subjects, including English as a Second Language, 
and computing and programming courses at VanniTech. The latter was also a diaspora 
effort, founded by three Tamils in the U.S. Early in the peace process, the TSVP’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 See, for example, Cheran (2003) for a report written from this research. 
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student-organizers had formed good relationships with the Government and the LTTE’s 
political wing, which allowed them to move and work with relative ease. 
Some diaspora activists contributed to the LTTE’s political efforts during the peace 
process. They were among the “experts” who helped the LTTE formulate its ISGA 
proposal. The World Tamil Movement coordinated trips that brought students and other 
diaspora activists to Kilinochchi, the headquarters of the Tigers’ de facto state. The 
students traveled throughout the district, and were shown the hallmarks of the LTTE’s 
would-be state: The discipline of its fighters, the LTTE’s police and courts, its modern 
administrative buildings and guesthouses. In conversations during my fieldwork, they 
noted how “safe” they felt in the LTTE-controlled areas, and that young women could 
travel alone without fear of harassment or sexual violence. They also met with the 
leadership, including the movement’s thalaivar, Prabhakaran, who had generally kept 
away from visitors before the peace process. He advised these students, asked questions 
of them, and listened to their replies. Out of Prabhakaran’s meetings with student leaders, 
the idea for a Tamil Youth Organization (TYO)101 was born. Later, they would recall 
these meetings while organizing and protesting in Toronto. 
Things fall apart, 2004-2006 
I visited Sri Lanka in May 2004, and began preliminary research among Toronto 
Tamils in early 2005. The glimmering hope of a peaceful end to over two decades of 
armed struggle and violence—for many, in the form of a negotiated end to war and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 The TYO recalls other student and youth organizations that were formed in the early years of Tamil 
militancy, such as GUYS, GUES, and SOLT. I discuss some of these organizations in Chapter 3. TYO has 
multiple chapters in Canada and Europe, and was an important part of community organizing in Toronto, 
which I discuss in Chapter 4.  
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international recognition of Tamil autonomy—was quickly receding from the collective 
horizon. Several events contributed to this situation. The Tigers and the GoSL had not 
been in talks for nearly a year. In April 2004, Colonel Karuna Amman, the Eastern 
Commander of the LTTE for Batticaloa-Amparai, split from the organization, claiming 
that the Vanni-based leadership discriminated against Eastern Tamils and disregarded 
their lives. The Karuna faction drew more than 6,000 cadres away from the LTTE’s rank-
and-file. The LTTE in Vanni countered that the grievances were false, and a deflection 
from the “truth” about Karuna’s departure: to avoid punishment for the scandal of 
misappropriation of funds, and to further his own politico-military career. Efforts to 
persuade Tamils in the east to remain with the LTTE were unsuccessful (e.g. Sivaram’s 
negotiations in Whitaker 2007). The Sri Lankan state was rumored to have engineered the 
split, and later reports showed evidence of collusion between the faction, now dubbed the 
TMVP (Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, or Tamil People’s Liberation Tigers) and the 
armed forces.102  The LTTE dubbed Karuna and the Eastern Tamil leaders who followed 
him thurogi, or “traitors” to the Tamil cause. The two groups battled each other in the 
East, despite the ceasefire.103 Once again, Tamils militants who had been fighting 
together in a war of “national liberation” to carve out a separate state of their own, were 
now fighting each other.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 This was not an uncommon pattern in the history of Tamil militancy, as political dissenters and armed 
groups have, at times, sought state protection from the LTTE to ensure their survival. Human Rights Watch 
(2007b) documents state collusion with the Karuna Group in abductions and child recruitment in the East. 
103 For reporting on the LTTE-TMVP split and violent clashes, see Jeyaraj (2004). He writes that “several 
people in Sri Lanka and abroad” worked to negotiate a deal to avoid protracted war between the two 
groups. This allowed for the disbanding and dispersal of nearly 4000 Eastern cadres. 
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On December 26, 2004, the Asian tsunami devastated two-thirds of the Sri 
Lankan coastline, from the Western Province to the South, and all the way around to the 
LTTE-controlled villages near Mullaithivu in the North-East. The tsunami’s destruction 
led many to hope that the two parties could come together to aid those who had survived 
a disaster that did not discriminate along ethnic lines. A joint administrative body, the 
Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) was set up, but provoked 
vehement opposition from Sinhala nationalists and threatened to bring down the 
government. Moreover, the government and the LTTE could not agree to the mechanisms 
for the distribution of aid. The LTTE had come up with their own proposal, in keeping 
with their efforts to establish a parallel state, while the Colombo government wanted to 
administer all aid. 
When the LTTE assassinated Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in 2005, 
the EU imposed a travel ban on the organization, ruling out subsequent negotiations in 
Europe. The LTTE banned Northern voters from the polls, leading the SLFP’s Mahinda 
Rajapaksa to a narrow victory against the UNF’s Ranil Wickramasinghe. Rajapaksa was 
a hardliner who had campaigned on a platform critical of the peace process. Finally, two 
and a half years after the last round of talks, the two sides met in Geneva in April 2006. 
Little came of these talks, which revealed the great mistrust between the two parties, 
which had already unofficially returned to war. 
The shadow war, 2006-2008 
The year 2006 marked the start of an “undeclared war” between the Government 
and the LTTE. The resumption of hostilities was evident in the LTTE’s use of Claymore 
mines against government forces and suicide attacks on the Navy, as well as a spate of 
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civilian massacres by both parties, in the “border zones” of the north and east.104 Tamil 
activists were particularly disturbed by army massacres of civilians in Mannar in April 
and May 2006, and the SLA bombing of students at Sencholai, an orphanage for young 
women and girls, in August 2006. The LTTE and the government continued to engage in 
killing their political opponents, which included several Sri Lankan Ministers and 
Members of Parliament, and hundreds of political activists.105  
Both parties returned to the battlefield in a dispute over water in the Eastern 
Province’s Trincomalee district in July-August 2006 after the LTTE closed the gate to the 
Maavil Aaru (meaning “great bow river”) reservoir in an area under their control.106 SLA 
air strikes to capture the sluice-gates and water led to LTTE attacks on targets in 
government-controlled Muttur, and battles there led to the displacement of thousands of 
Tamil and Muslim civilians. In the first week of August, the LTTE announced a ceasefire 
and consulted with Norway. Nevertheless, the “war for water” led to the escalation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See Human Rights Watch (2006, 2007). 
105 Many of the politicians killed between 2004 and 2008 were Tamils, including Lakshman Kadirgamar of 
the SLFP government (allegedly by the LTTE), T. Maheswaran of the UNP (allegedly by the Karuna group 
for the government) and three TNA MPs who were believed to be killed by the EPDP or TMVP/Karuna 
group on behalf of the government: Joseph Pararajasingham, Nadarajah Raviraj, and K. Sivanesan. Among 
the activists killed were several high-profile Tamils, including Kethesh Loganathan, Deputy Leader of the 
government’s Peace Secretariat (SCOPP) and ex-EPRLF, whose death was attributed to the LTTE, and 
Dharmaratnam Sivaram, the ex-PLOTE fighter and Tamil political journalist who co-created the popular 
website, Tamilnet.com, whose body was found in a government security zone. Neither the LTTE nor the 
government claimed any responsibility for their deaths.  
106 Maavil Aaru provided drinking and irrigation water to approximately 15,000 people living south of the 
reservoir. When the LTTE refused to open the sluice gates after several days of blockade and protests, the 
Army promised to open the gates through “Operation Watershed” a “limited military action” to obtain 
water for the farmers, and prevent 15,000 people from “becoming refugees,” according to government and 
military officials. 
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hostilities between the LTTE and government.107 The next day, the LTTE turned their 
sights to recapturing Jaffna.108  
Within days, the country had returned to war. The A9 highway, the main road 
connecting the North to the rest of the island—and as such, an important symbol of the 
peace process—was closed again, cutting off essential supplies and inhibiting the 
movement of people between the two regions. Even in Colombo, signs of war abounded, 
as army checkpoints returned to the city. Two months later, in late October 2006, a final 
round of peace talks were held again in Geneva. On the same day, an army offensive 
began against rebel territory. The LTTE’s attempt to enter Jaffna was ultimately 
unsuccessful, and resulted in hundreds of casualties.109 Both parties remained committed 
to the Ceasefire Agreement on paper, even as they battled in the North and East. By late 
2007, the war began to move toward the North, after the SLA gained control of all 
eastern territory.110 In January 2008, the government officially withdrew from the 
ceasefire, announcing an official return to war. 
Return of the Refugee 
In the previous chapter, I outlined three waves of migration from Sri Lanka to 
Tamil Nadu, India, and discussed two intervals of state-organized refugee return. The 
first phase of return followed the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and involved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 By the 10th of August, the gates were open again after 21 days of closure, but with opposing claims 
made as to who opened the gates. See Dinamina 9 Aug 2006, which reports the SLA opened the gates vs 
Tamilnet.com, which reports the LTTE’s claim to do so voluntarily. 
108 The battle began on August 11, near the SLA forward defence lines at Muhamalai and Kilali in 
Thenmaradchchi, was suspended after five days of fighting and heavy casualties, and started again on 
October 28. 
109 The number of civilians killed was not recorded. 
110 The government claimed victory on July 11, 2007. 
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four-fifths of the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees living in the camps. The second return may 
be split into two phases – the first, in 1992, was organized by the Tamil Nadu state 
government and constituted refoulement, or the forced return of refugees to their country 
of origin. The second phase of refugee return, in 1993-95, was done with some 
involvement from the UNHCR. In each of these periods, some refugees decided to return 
to Sri Lanka on their own, without government or international assistance. 
The goodwill expressed at the beginning of the 2002 ceasefire and peace process 
led many refugees to question whether they could return to re-establish their lives in Sri 
Lanka. They did not know whether their homes would be there when they returned, or 
whether the lands would be accessible, but the talk of peace fostered hopes for a political 
settlement that would result in conditions of safety and “normalcy.” Refugees who did 
not have relatives remaining in or near their lands (ur) would have to travel to find out for 
themselves. The question of return led to new forms of activism among refugees. The 
Organization for Eelam Refugees’ Rehabilitation (OfERR), in addition to its grassroots 
relief and rehabilitation efforts, decided to help refugees prepare for return—whether as a 
tangible outcome, or at the least, a future possibility. 
In what follows, I explore how this came to be, in an attempt to answer the 
following questions: Why did Tamils who fled Sri Lanka to survive the war then 
determine that their future lives and livelihoods depended on their return to the island? 
What institutional structures and socio-political discourses shaped decisions to organize 
refugee return en masse? What political affects and forms of moral community were 
created in Tamil refugees’ decisions to return—someday—to the homeland? Finally, how 
does the very notion of ‘return’ make possible new forms of social action in the country 
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of refuge? Before delving into the activism that emerged from the prospect of a return to 
Sri Lanka, it is important to consider how OfERR’s position on refugee return changed. 
Shifting Positions on Return  
In his report on Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, then-Director of Rehabilitation G. 
Bhujanga Rao claims that the assistance provided by NGOs, or “voluntary organizations” 
like OfERR was “negligible” when compared to the amount spent by the government (At 
its peak in 1991-2, Rs. 2.28 million according to Annexure XVI, p. 114). Rao’s report 
aims to make a case for refugee return, and his claims about OfERR must be read in this 
context. He alleges that representatives from OfERR and ProTEG (a related organization 
formed by several key figures in OfERR) used “adverse propaganda” to tell refugees that 
they should not return to Sri Lanka, and sent petitions against the Special Deputy 
Collector at Mandapam, who was responsible for refugee relief and return arrangements 
(1993: 44). Consequently, all voluntary organizations were banned from Sri Lankan 
refugee camps. Moreover, the Indian government blocked local agencies and 
organizations receiving foreign funding from working in the camps (Rao 1993: 45).111 
This prohibition was announced multiple times through instructions to government 
servants in 1991 through 1993. In spite of the ban, however, Rao writes that OfERR’s 
informal network among refugees allowed the organization to continue to dissuade 
refugee returns.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 These local organizations were spread throughout the state. Some of those noted include: CROP (The 
Community Rehabilitation Organization for Progress, Perambalur; READ (Rural Education and Action for 
Development); PERD (People’s Education for Rural Development, Madurai); KEDS (Kodaikanal 
Educational Development Society, Kodai), RUC (Rural Uplift Center, Tirunelveli).  
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 When the time came for a fourth round of refugee returns in 2002-4, however, 
OfERR’s position had changed. During the ceasefire, the organization encouraged camp 
refugees to envision their future return to Sri Lanka. OfERR also prepared for this return 
in the long-run. Moreover, those who wished to return immediately were prepared to do 
so in a number of ways. First, the organization assisted refugees who expressed a desire 
to return with the formalities of arranging such a return. As in the previous round of 
returns, UNHCR was involved. Second, OfERR obtained important documents for camp 
refugees. Many people lacked the correct documentation of their birth (in Sri Lanka, or in 
India to Sri Lankan-born parents), marriages, and/or death of kin. For some families, their 
only document was one valid only in Tamil Nadu—their “refugee identity card.” While 
assisting refugees who wished to return after the ceasefire, OfERR looked ahead to the 
possibility of a future phase of return, and the decision was made to regularize the 
documents of all Sri Lankan refugees. Third, not all Sri Lankan-born refugees held Sri 
Lankan citizenship, due to the disenfranchisement of Tamils and other people of Indian 
and Pakistani origin in 1948-49. OfERR worked with Sri Lanka’s Deputy High 
Commissioner and politicians from the Janata Vimukti Peramuna112 (JVP, or People’s 
Liberation Front) to obtain citizenship for all who had been excluded from previous 
agreements. The organization’s active involvement on this issue ensured that those who 
had fled to India for refuge would also receive citizenship, so that they could return to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 The JVP was a rural, almost entirely Sinhalese youth-based movement whose political ideology 
combined populist radicalism and Sinhala nationalism, leading to two insurrections against the state in 
1971 and 1988-1989. See Obeyesekere 1974 on the social background of the 1971 insurgents, and Moore 
1993 on the second insurrection; also see Alles 1990 for a historical narrative written by the head of 1971’s 
Criminal Justice Commission. Both uprisings were violently crushed by the government; during the latter, 
an estimated 100,000 youth were killed and/or “disappeared.” The movement entered formal politics during 
the 1994 parliamentary elections, and became part of the government as key coalition member of the UPFA 
in 2004.  
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island with dignity. The Deputy High Commissioner and JVP politicians met with 
OfERR staff and other refugees, and listened to their concerns, the problems they faced 
without citizenship, and their desire to return to the island one day. 
New visions and declarations 
At the start of the peace process, OfERR began what they called a “revisioning” 
process, with the help of a professional consultant who helped NGOs with this kind of 
process. Refugee staff and leaders were brought together in Chennai to review the history 
of the organization, learn more about the Sri Lankan peace process, and to discuss what 
they understood peace to mean. Brainstorming in smaller groups, they then presented 
their ideas to the larger group, which then held wider discussions about what refugees 
could expect from and contribute to the peace process. Out of these sessions, they came 
up with their own statements (Chennai and Trichy declarations).  
In February 2003, on the first anniversary of the signing of the MOU between the 
government and the LTTE, 70 members of OfERR’s regional staff—themselves 
refugees—met at the Nallayan Research Centre for Sustainable Development in 
Kancheepuram district for a workshop on the problems and prospects of returning to Sri 
Lanka. In this workshop, they identified risks of return, bureaucratic requirements, and 
entitlements they held in the process. In two dialogues, they shared their thoughts and 
concerns about the ongoing peace process. They also learned about the experiences of 
refugees returning to two other countries devastated by war and counterinsurgency—
Afghanistan and Guatemala. Out of these discussions, OfERR staff drafted a 
Memorandum of Concern linking the return of Ceylon Tamil refugees living in India to 
the peace process. The preamble of the document, also known as the “Nallayan 
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Declaration,” centered on refugees’ concerns about the peace process. It noted the 
following: 
Associated discussions have taken place between the two parties and 
concerned refugee agencies such as the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the resettlement and return of 
refugees, most recently in Kilinochchi in January 2003. These 
consultations followed an International Donors Conference in Oslo in 
December 2002, where considerable funds were pledged for the 
immediate reconstruction of North-East Ceylon.  
 
The return of refugees is generally seen by the international community 
as a signal of returning normalcy and stability. 
 
The last line of the excerpt above is particularly notable. At OfERR, refugee staff 
recognized that their return to Sri Lanka would be recognized by “the international 
community” of UN agencies, donors and other parties as “a signal”—a sign—“of 
returning normalcy and stability.” This, in turn, would lead to new signs and significant 
effects—namely, large-scale post-war reconstruction. However, Tamil refugees in India 
were unwilling to be fixed as a static sign for international interpreters seeking to fund 
their new projects. Whether working and living at OfERR, or living in the camps, Tamil 
refugees were dynamic interpreters of signs as well. They were avid readers and listeners 
of the news from Sri Lanka and diaspora outlets, and learned about the ground situation 
in the north and east from their relatives and friends. What they learned concerned them, 
and so they decided to proceed with caution. And from their previous experiences with 
return, they understood that “return” on their own terms was a complex process that 
involved more than a boat ride or a plane ticket to Sri Lanka. Talks about refugee return 
by international agencies thus provided camp refugees and OfERR with an opening to 
voice their own concerns and stake a claim to participation in the peace process. 
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In addition to opening up political space for refugees by staking a claim in the 
peace process, the Nallayan Declaration also lists several principles of return. The 
declaration collectively states the need for “a lasting peace” for refugees to be able to 
return to the island, and the need to democratize the peace process, creating an 
opportunity not only for refugees to participate, but many other Tamil political actors. 
Several other principles were also concerned with the logistics of refugee return, and 
demanded specific provisions be included in written accords to guarantee the rights, 
safety and security or returnees (#8) by involving refugees in the negotiation of accords 
(#9), attending to risks to physical safety such as uncleared land mines (#13) and 
bureaucratic obstacles to return, such as the recognition of identity, status, qualifications, 
and relationships afforded by documents (#14). In short, the Nallayan Declaration makes 
apparent what it proclaims: That “Refugees must play an active and informed part in the 
return process itself.” 
 One year later, Tamil refugees in India gathered again in February 2004—this 
time, the second anniversary of the MOU—to review the past year of the peace process 
and their work. These discussions were held in camps across Tamil Nadu, before 
representatives—camp thalaivars—met in the state’s capital with OfERR. They noted 
that little progress had been made towards peace in Sri Lanka—in part due to a lack of 
consensus among southern political parties, and the division of the LTTE into factions—
and that conditions in “North East Ceylon” remained “deeply uncertain.”113 Yet they also 
re-affirmed “their resolve and their right to return to return to their country” as part of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 OfERR, as an organization, was opposed to the 1972 name change of Ceylon to Sri Lanka, as the change 
was made without the consultation of Tamil political parties. The leadership always referred to the island as 
Ceylon in writing, and often in speech as well.  
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democratic peace process, and made a call for restorative justice by articulating the right 
of refugees to “the restoration of their social and material well-being” and the need for a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission to heal Sri Lankan society. OfERR made this 
stance known in a document titled, “The Chennai Call to Action: Challenging the 
obstacles to return of Ceylon Tamil refugees.” In addition, the document made general 
recommendations about the peace process—such as a National Convention on 
constitutional changes and oversight of the peace process—and supported the 
recommendations of other international actors that called for a link between progress in 
the peace talks and rehabilitation funding.114 
Finally, in 2007, OfERR issued a third statement titled, “Trichy Declaration: The 
Quest for Peace in Sri Lanka.” When this statement was made, 220,000 people were 
already displaced by fighting in the north and east, and 12,000 people—three-fifths of 
those who would be able to flee over the next three years—had left the country in 2006. 
As the declaration notes, “The CFA exists now in name only and the prospects for peace 
seem further away than ever” (1). In 2004, in response to the return of some refugees, 
OfERR opened new offices in Sri Lanka, in Colombo, Trincomalee, Vavuniya, and 
Jaffna. The offices also served over 50,000 internally displaced people. 
The Trichy Declaration correctly anticipates that Sri Lankan President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa’s government will turn to a war in northern Sri Lanka as a military solution to 
the conflict. The declaration reminds the government of the human and financial costs of 
war, and refers to the government’s own APRC proposals as a means for delivering a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 This was a demand at the 2003 Tokyo Donor Conference. 
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“durable” and “credible” political solution to end the conflict once and for all.115 It also 
argues that mechanisms should be created to consult local populations, and that Tamil 
refugees concerns should be included in the APRC’s report as well. These statements are 
clearly addressed to the Sri Lankan government, and in so doing, recognizes the 
sovereignty of the state over the lives on whose behalf the declaration speaks: Tamil 
refugees. Moreover, the document reuses the political language of counterinsurgency in 
its attempt to be “heard” by the government. Speaking of “Tamil hearts and minds,” the 
declaration concludes, “The struggle is not only for the soil of a territorial state but for 
the souls of its inhabitants” (4). This shift from statements that address a wider range of 
local, national and international actors to a declaration almost singularly addressed to the 
Sri Lankan government reveals how OfERR adjusted to a changed political terrain. This 
was a landscape in which the international community had come to a tacit consensus that 
allowed the Sri Lankan government to deal with an “internal threat” to state sovereignty 
by whatever means it deemed necessary. 
Pongu Thamil and the Performative Politics of Diaspora 
The political mobilization of Sri Lanka’s Tamil diaspora was at its height during 
the 2002 to 2008 ceasefire and peace process, and the socio-political movement known as 
Pongu Thamil (Tamil Uprising)116 was at the epicenter of this activism. Pongu Thamil 
was created as “a movement of self-discovery, self-expression, cultural celebration, and 
political awareness and activism” (Palihapitiya 2011: 90) that emerged from the work of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 The APRC was appointed by President Rajapaksa in July 2006 to devise a “homegrown solution” to the 
conflict. Its chairman, Tissa Vitharana (LSSP), submitted a report based on the committee’s deliberations to 
the government in 2010, but the proposals were not discussed or implemented. Many Tamils viewed the 
APRC as an insincere effort on the part of the SLFP government. 
116 Or, when read as an imperative, “Rise up, Tamil!” 
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the Jaffna-based Theatre Action Group (TAG) and its founder, the artist K. 
Sithamparanathan (also known as Sitham). The group was formed in 1990 in response to 
conditions of war that resumed between the govt and LTTE after the Indian peace accord. 
TAG’s company of artists and students led performance-based workshops and rituals that 
allowed people to express "suppressed feelings" and "build on their human resources" 
(87). In the late 1990s, Sitham organized "cultural caravans" of rural Tamils walking in 
groups through Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Colombo—all bi- and multi-ethnic cities 
with sizeable Tamil populations—to bridge information gaps between the Tamils and 
Sinhalese, and the Tamils and the international community (89). When his efforts were 
met with a lackluster response, Sitham decided to organize Tamils in the north and east 
more deliberately. He started with an assignment for his students at the University of 
Jaffna, challenging them to use performance to express "the burning in their hearts" (90); 
their efforts led to a performance called "Mission into the Soul." Afterwards, the show 
generated discussions between the actors and their audience. 
The first Pongu Thamil demonstration was organized in January 2001 by the 
Jaffna Students Union to urge the Government of Sri Lanka to reciprocate the LTTE’s 
declaration of a ceasefire (Tamilnet.com 2001). Thousands of university students and 
staff joined the rally at the University of Jaffna, while many people were turned away by 
Sri Lankan security forces through checkpoints and road blocks leading up to the campus 
(Tamil Times 2001).117 Subsequent iterations of the event enfolded Pongu Thamil into the 
political machines of the Tamil National Alliance—a parliamentary alliance of several 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Palihapitiya (2011) estimates between four and six thousand attendees, and notes that police threatened 
to shoot anyone entering the campus without the required identity card. 
	   113	  
Tamil political parties—and the LTTE political wing.118 Six events were held in Jaffna 
between 2001 and 2005, along with multiple events in other areas of northern and eastern 
Sri Lanka. 
Pongu Thamil also spread around the globe as diasporic, Tamil nationalist 
activists organized events in North America, Europe and Australia. Each diasporic Pongu 
Thamil event incited participants to “rise up” to demonstrate and advocate for the 
livelihoods and self-determination of their kin “back home,” and featured a mix of 
cultural performances and speeches from prominent community activists, local 
politicians, and Tamil politicians and activists in Sri Lanka.  
However, the event was also more than a declaration of support for people back 
home. As one informant named “Muthulingam” confided to me, “We don’t usually tell 
people this, but it’s a show of power.” He paused, adding: “It’s a show of unity.” When 
Muthulingam said me this, I wondered: Why characterize this event – or, series of events 
– as a representation of “unity?” And what does unity have to do with showing power?  
The first Pongu Thamil took place three days after Thai Pongal119, on January 17, 
2001 in Jaffna—a region that steadfast nationalists consider the cultural heartland of 
Tamils in Eelam. As a harvest festival in Tamil Nadu, India and Sri Lanka, Thai Pongal 
is known as a celebration of abundance and neighborliness exemplified by the habitual 
preparation of pongal. Pongal is a dish of rice and milk sweetened with jaggery. Water 
and milk are boiled together in a paanai, or clay pot. Only once the liquid mixture has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 The TNA acceded to the LTTE’s claim of “sole” representation of the Tamil people at this time and 
lacked independence. 
119 Thai is a month on the Tamil calendar that usually falls between January and February. Thai Pongal 
marks the beginning of this month and the celebration of Pongal. 
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reached its boiling point, and “spilled over” in excess, can the uncooked rice and other 
ingredients be added. The cultural significance of this holiday has led some diasporic 
Tamils refer to it as the “real” Tamil New Year, rather than that of the first day of the 
month of Cittirai.120 This dense, poetic structure – of spilling over, fertility, newness -- 
semiotically formed Pongu Thamil and its diasporic enactments, which indexically tether 
themselves to the annual event of Pongal as origin-point. This allowed the event, with 
several degrees of spatiotemporal proximity and distance in its circulation, to be 
variously glossed as a “Tamil Upsurge” by its organizers, and an Uprising, Revival, 
Renaissance, Resurgence Movement, Cultural Reawakening, or Pride by a range of Tamil 
and international media commentators.  Between February 2002 and September 2004, 
Pongu Thamil’s affective surge flowed through Sri Lanka and its diasporic channels, 
extending, accumulating and sedimenting Tamil national sentiments in the cities and 
towns of Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Mannar, Kilinochchi, and Vavuniya in Sri Lanka, and 
Australia, Paris, London, Geneva, and Oslo, along with smaller, allied events performed 
in other locations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 The Tamil month of Cittirai usually begins in mid-April on the Christian calendar. It is important to note 
that this new year’s day is celebrated by Tamil and Sinhala communities in Sri Lanka, and is the only 
national holiday they share. In Sinhala, the holiday is known as Avurudu. The dawn of the new year is 
celebrated with an initial meal of kiribath, or “milk rice,” a dish of boiled rice cooked with coconut milk 
which is usually prepared for an auspicious occasion. 
In Tamil Nadu, celebration of the Tamil New Year has become highly politicized and divided according to 
party lines, with the DMK celebrating it on Pongal, and the AIADMK celebrating it on Cittirai. In 2008, 
then Chief Minister Mu. Karunanidhi officially changed the date to that of Thai Pongal. The date was 
changed back to Cittirai when Jayalalithaa returned to power in 2011. Some have suggested that 
Karunanidhi wished to “secularize” the holiday. The DMK continues to celebrate the new year on Pongal, 
and DMK MP, MK Kanimozhi (also Karunanidhi’s daughter) defended the celebrations by saying that 
“Tamil people have been fighting and asking for this.” She referred not only to people in Tamil Nadu, but 
“Tamils around the world.” The DMK often claims to represent the World’s Tamils, but Kanimozhi’s 
statement may also reveal diasporic influences on the importance of Pongal in contemporary Tamil Nadu 
politics. See Stalin (2014). Karunanidhi’s decision was defended by a Toronto-based writer-activist, V. 
Thangavelu, and N. Satyendra in an editorial on his website, Tamilnation.com. 




Figure 2.1: Paanai overflowing with pongal and LTTE flags at Pongu Thamil in Geneva, 
Switzerland (Source: Tamilnet.com 2005) 
Pongu Thamil, 2002 
Canadian Tamils held the first Pongu Thamil event outside Sri Lanka on July 13, 
2002 in downtown Ottawa, Canada, at an outdoor theatre near Canada’s Parliament 
Hill.121 The Hill was a politically important location, as the home to Canada’s federal 
government—something that was noted and remarked upon by one organizer during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 The Astrolabe Theatre is on Nepean Point, just past the Pont Alexandra/Alexandra Bridge which crosses 
the Ottawa River to Quebec. The event took place three months after the second Pongu Thamil in Jaffna 
(held 4.17.2002), and only five months after the ceasefire began.     
	   116	  
event.122 Participants were thus arranged to imagine and feel that they were facing their 
government while asking for its active involvement in Sri Lanka’s newly-begun peace 
process. They listened to speeches about the Tamil national struggle, and watched Indian 
musicians and dancers perform to Tamil “freedom songs” (suthanthirap paadalkal). The 
event’s keynote speaker was Arul Mozhi, an Indian lawyer from Tamil Nadu, who spoke 
about the Government of India’s use of its Prevention of Terrorism Act against 
supporters of the LTTE and their fight for Tamil Eelam.  
The organizers of Ottawa’s Pongu Thamil also made several resolutions, which were 
read out to the crowd. The last three resolutions reveal the logic of representation in this 
event and its transnational politics.  
 Resolution #5: Tamils in SriLanka have accepted the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam as their sole representatives. Through this event, the Tamils 
of Ottawa are also proclaiming the LTTE as our sole representatives. 
Resolution #6: Since it is now a well established fact that the LTTE is the 
sole representatives of the Sri Lankan Tamils, to help the peace process, 
the ban on the LTTE should first be lifted in Sri Lanka and then in the rest 
of the world. 
Resolution #7: Canadian government has included the LTTE in the list of 
banned organizations due to missunderstandings [sic]. This event urges the 
Canadian government, on behalf of the 250,000 Tamil Canadians, that the 
ban on the LTTE should be lifted in order for the LTTE to fairly 
participate in the peace process as the legitimate representatives of the 
Tamils in Sri Lanka (Kanagasabapathy 2006: 50; World Tamil Movement 
2002). 
While urging an end to bans on the LTTE in Sri Lanka and Canada, each of these 
resolutions state that the LTTE are the “sole representatives” (Resolution 5 and 6) or 
“legitimate representatives” (Resolution 7) of “the Sri Lankan Tamils.” The Tigers’ claim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Mr. Kannan of the Ottawa Tamil Coordinating Committee, quoted in a Tamilcanadian.com article about 
the event. 
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of sole representation is also extended to “Tamils of Ottawa” (Resolution 5). Such 
statements presuppose a homogenous Tamil community—for many activists, a nation—
available for representation by the LTTE. In doing so, the Ottawa Pongu Thamil openly 
declared a representational logic that underlies the political cultures of pro-LTTE 
diasporic activism.123 In this logic, the LTTE’s claim of “sole representation” of the 
Tamils of Sri Lanka and activists’ assertion of the same LTTE claim over the diaspora 
triangulates the relationship between diaspora Tamils and the island’s Tamils (Fig. 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2: The triangular semiotic of the LTTE’s claim of “sole representation” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Other events reveal a similar logic. Manivillie Kanagasabapathy (2006: 49-54), writing on the 
significance of homeland politics on diasporic Tamil identity, discusses Ottawa’s Pongu Thamil and a 
protest organized by the LTTE the same year, in 2002, to oppose the prospect of a ban. Opposition to a ban 
extended beyond LTTE support, but did not refuse the group's claim to representation of all Tamils. As she 
writes of a Tamil Students Association meeting, 'The main message presented at this meeting was “don't do 
it [protest against the banning] for the LTTE, but for the oppression of the Tamil people by the SLA and the 
GoSL. Show them the strength of the Tamil population, and that we (the Tamil diaspora) will not stand by 
while groups discredit the Tamil people.” The ban was seen as a way of disempowering all Tamil people.' 
Such was the strength of identification between some Tamil youth activists and the LTTE. 
Kanagasabapathy notes that the protest’s organizers approached all Ontario universities and their Tamil 
associations. Students from this TSA decided to attend the protest, which did not materialize—the Bill that 
listed the group was passed on an earlier date. 
	   118	  
Yet, while claiming to be represented by the LTTE, Pongu Thamil’s organizers 
addressed their demands to the Canadian government. They stated that the ban should be 
lifted “in Sri Lanka and then the rest of the world” (Resolution #6), while urging the 
Canadian government to lift a ban on the LTTE “on behalf of the 250,000 Tamil 
Canadians” (Resolution #7).124 The ordering of these resolutions mimicked the flow of 
Tamil migration; from Sri Lanka to the rest of the world, they end in Canada, where 
activists’ demands called upon their Canadian citizenship to gain international 
recognition for the LTTE. 
 
Figure 2.3: The poster reads: We will bring out the feelings of the Eelam Tamils to the 
world! (Eelattamizharin unarvai ulagukku velipaduttuvom!) 
(Source: Tamilcanadian.com) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Chapter 4 of this dissertation explores in greater detail the political implications and social semiotics of 
bans on the LTTE and other organizations in Tamil Toronto and the wider diaspora. 
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Pongu Thamil, 2004 
The frenzy of Pongu Thamil events in 2001-2003 in Sri Lanka slowed to a lull by 
2004, as the peace process quickly unraveled. One event was organized in Batticaloa in 
January 2004, a mere few months before the Karuna split would lead to internal fighting. 
In April, Tamils living in Europe converged on Geneva, and led a procession to the 
United Nations. Seeing these events and the lack of progress in talks, Toronto students 
were mobilized to organize their own event.  
 Toronto’s Pongu Thamil was planned and spearheaded by students from the 
Canadian Tamil Students Association (CTSA), a group formed in the wake of a 
provisional, hoped-for peace in Sri Lanka. As discussed above, many Canadian Tamil 
students traveled on their own or with their friends or families to Sri Lanka between 2002 
and 2004 to visit their homeland and ur (home-village), see their relatives, and volunteer 
for organizations in Sri Lanka. Socially and politically active students connected with the 
movement via their Canadian leaders. The World Tamil Movement organized a “student 
orientation,” drawing participants from Tamil Students Associations at several Canadian 
universities.125 Upon their return to Canada, a few of these students maintained contact 
with the University of Jaffna’s Students Union; when they decided to organize their own 
Pongu Thamil in Toronto, they consulted their Jaffna peers. Why did they organize? As 
one student activist told me, Pongu Thamil was organized in less than two months as a 
response to the Government’s refusal to recognize the LTTE’s Interim Self-Governing 
Authority (ISGA) proposal. Neither party budged, and the stalemate revived prospects of 
a return to war. Toronto Tamil activists urged the Canadian government to get involved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 See, for example, Carleton University Tamil Students Association (n.d.) CUTSA—A Legacy.  
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in the peace process. The demand shaped the timing of their event. Whereas the inaugural 
Pongu Thamil in Jaffna was figured by its temporal proximity to Pongal, subsequent 
rallies, conventions and marches (with the exception of a one year anniversary) could be 
detached from this context, and were instead held in response to political events. The 
organizers of the Toronto event selected a date close to the United Nations’ International 
Day of Peace on September 21st. 
Toronto’s Pongu Thamil was held on Saturday, September 25, 2004, and made 
headlines and front-page news in Canada and beyond by attracting what was deemed a 
“record crowd” of 75,000 Canadian Tamils “of all ages,” including entire families of 
three or four generations. Participants rallied in front of a stage upon which students and 
various Canadian politicians gave political speeches in English and Tamil, and Tamil 
orations, songs, dance, and drama were performed—mostly by Tamils living in Canada. 
The event was hosted and emceed by a group of active students from the CTSA.  
The Toronto event was not for Toronto participants alone —media technologies 
were built into the planning of the event, which used interconnected forms of mass 
communication to construct a virtual transnational community. The festival was 
broadcast live by Canadian Tamil Radio, and was simulcast to viewers around the world 
through a video feed embedded on the event’s website, ponguthamil.ca. These networked 
technologies of communication also linked Tamil political leaders in Sri Lanka and other 
parts of the diaspora to Toronto Tamils. On two video screens propped up on either side 
of the stage, the students projected videotaped messages for the audience from Tamil 
parliamentarians, LTTE leaders, and members of the Canadian public-at-large. Members 
of the audience faced these speakers as listeners, and were not invited to speak on stage. 
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Serving as a backdrop to the staged event were the parliamentary buildings of Queen’s 
Park, home to Ontario’s provincial government—and a common site for public events 
and protests.126  
One speaker, Prof. V. Elagupillai, discussed the significance of the event’s 
location by asking the audience a rhetorical question: “Why is Pongu Thamil in 
Canada?” His answer, which was echoed by many of my interlocutors: “The population 
of the Tamil Canadians in this country is nearly 300,000. This is the single largest Sri 
Lankan Tamil population outside Sri Lanka.”127 In fact, in 2004, there were more Tamils 
living in Toronto than in Jaffna town, due to the displacement of Tamils from the 
peninsula and migration abroad. Prof. Elagupillai noted that he, like many Canadians, has 
friends and relatives still living in Sri Lanka. He described his worries about them, and 
when he worried, he said, he was unable to contribute fully to Canadian life. “Therefore,” 
he argued, “when lack of peace in Sri Lanka adversely affects more than 300,000 
Canadians, then it is a Canadian issue.” In the example above, knowledge of and empathy 
for Tamil suffering in Sri Lanka becomes diasporic suffering, which must then be 
addressed. For Elagupillai and some of my interlocutors, the presence of a large diaspora 
community and its suffering-by-proxy thus legitimized Canada’s involvement in Sri 
Lanka’s peace process.128  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 During fieldwork, I observed university student protests against tuition hikes, and a protest held by 
supporters of Palestinians against Israeli apartheid, at a corner of the park near the Royal Ontario Museum, 
which was publicizing an exhibit of Dead Sea scrolls. 
127 There may in fact be more Tamils from Sri Lanka in India, but most are not registered in the camps or 
with the police. 
128 To buttress his claim, Elagupillai provided statistics, comparing the population of Canadian Tamils to 
the populations of Ottawa (Canada’s capital), Prince Edward Island (a province with a population that 
numbers “only 50% of the Canadian Tamil population”), and Canada’s three northern territories (Yukon, 
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The above example also highlights the indexical significance of numbers in 
diaspora nationalists’ activisms, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Activists showed a 
frequent concern to demonstrate numerical superiority. Just as Tamil nationalists and the 
LTTE asserted a Tamil majority in the north and east of Sri Lanka in their quest for self-
rule, diaspora activists turned to numbers to indicate the political power of a Tamil 
community in Canada. The LTTE and community-based diaspora activists thus operated 
within the political rationality of the majoritarian state they opposed. Meaningful political 
power meant having large numbers of people supporting you. The larger the number, the 
greater the claim to “represent” a community. If the LTTE could not always demonstrate 
mass support in Jaffna, particularly after losing territory in 1995, it could claim cultural 
hegemony among Jaffna Tamils living abroad.129  
Toronto’s event was staged like other Pongu Thamil festivals in an open, public 
space. However, Queen’s Park is situated in the middle of a busy roundabout, visible yet 
contained within downtown Toronto and Canada’s largest university campus, the 
University of Toronto. In another poetic parallel to Pongal, participants in the event often 
noted the ‘overflowing’ crowd, too large to be contained by the park. Once the Toronto 
crowd “spilled over” the park, they had to disperse. Any attempt to commune outside the 
park was effectively foreclosed by its spatial limits: several lanes of hurtling automobiles 
and a campus with closed doors on weekends produced an enclosed oasis for public 
sociability. Pongu Thamil at Queen’s Park thus served as a dedicated space for the 
habituation of participants (cf. Bourdieu 1977). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Northwest Territory, and Nunavut, in order to argue that peace in Sri Lanka should be a “primary concern” 
to Canada because it affects a “sizeable proportion” of Canadians—more than one of Canada’s provinces. 
129 Chapter 4 discusses in greater detail the LTTE’s hegemony in Tamil community activism and cultural 
productions. 
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 Pongu Thamil’s organizers announced three objectives for holding the event in Canada: 
1. To urge the Canadian government to play a more active role in taking 
forward the peace talks between the LTTE and the GOSL which is now 
stalled.   
2. To bring pressure on the GOSL to hold peace talks on the basis of the 
Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) drawn with the help of the 
international community.  
3. To hold peace talks between the LTTE and the GOSL in Canada 
(Ponguthamil.ca 2004) 
 
Moreover, they asserted a broader role for Pongu Thamil, which, in its circulatory 
movement, became “a declaration of unity and solidarity with relations in Sri Lanka”: 
The Tamil Diaspora has held Pongu Tamil demonstrations as a method of 
telling their relatives in Sri Lanka that they are not alone. The Tamil 
Diaspora has made a commitment to educate their own governments about 
the suffering of Tamil people in their homeland. Through Pongu Tamil 
events held by international communities, the Tamil Diaspora has 
acknowledged that they have not forgotten about their brethren in Sri 
Lanka. (Ponguthamil.ca 2004, my emphasis) 
 
In the above statement, “the Tamil diaspora” turns to the Canadian government—and 
other governments in the countries in which Tamils reside—to “tell” their relatives in Sri 
Lanka that they are not alone. In addition to drawing on a generalized notion of kinship to 
imagine the nation-as-family, this declaration of solidarity positions the diaspora Tamil as 
a proxy speaker to communicate Tamil suffering in Sri Lanka to the Canadian 
government. As Mikhail Bakhtin writes, addressivity, “the quality of turning to someone, 
is a constitutive feature of the utterance; without it the utterance does not and cannot 
exist” (1971: 99). In this case, Pongu Thamil’s “declaration of unity and solidarity” 
existed—or, came into being—when the event’s speakers and participants addressed their 
grievances and demands to the state. 
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I argue, however, that the event was not only about unity and solidarity with 
relatives in Sri Lanka.130 The diasporic performance of Pongu Thamil also aspired to 
another ideological unity: a singular and united Tamil community in Canada. 
Declarations of unity between Tamils “here” and “there” presupposed that Tamils “here,” 
in Toronto, were united. These declarations served to remind audience members about 
the need for unity among Tamils in Toronto. 
 
Figure 2.4: Pongu Thamil 2004 at Queen’s Park (Tamilnet.com) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Within Sri Lanka, the event revealed some political differences. Some members of the TNA, like R. 
Sampanthan, focused on the peace process and the need to address Tamil grievances. Others directly 
mentioned or were supportive of the LTTE; they declared the organization to be the “sole representatives” 
of the Tamil people, and demanded the Sri Lankan government revoke the ban on the organization before 
peace talks. These differences in Tamil politics were elided in the Toronto event, as speakers consistently 
presented a pro-LTTE message that often equated Tamil national identity and the right to self-
determination with a separate state. 
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Figure 2.5: Prabhakaran and the crowd at Pongu Thamil 2004 (Tamilnet.com) 
 
One striking manifestation of Pongu Thamil’s image of diasporic “unity and 
solidarity” could be found in the ubiquitous presence of images of LTTE leader and self-
proclaimed national figurehead, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Photographs and video of the 
event framed the crowd against the backdrop of the parliamentary buildings at Queen’s 
Park (Figure 2.4).131 At the event, Canadian flags rippled distantly, miniaturized icons 
subdued to larger and bolder Tiger flags waved by members of the crowd.  A large sign 
proclaiming Pirabhakaran to be “Our Glorious Leader” was centered with the locus of 
provincial governmental power, while a statue of Sir John A. Macdonald, the “founding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Queen’s Park has been a site of disciplinary power (Foucault 1977) since the inauguration of the 
Canadian nation with Confederation in 1867. The building’s grounds were the original location of the 
(surrounding) University of Toronto, and an asylum for women prior to its current incarnation as the seat of 
parliamentary provincial government.  
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father” of the Canadian settler-nation, stands off to the side—in photographs of the event, 
relegated to the margins of the foreground. Still, Canada’s first prime minister remained 
within the frame as an indexical symbol to actualize and authorize the nationalist 
aspirations of “the Tamil people,” and Pirabhakaran as their head of state. 
Pirabhakaran’s photo did not only preside over the stage, or the text of the 
speakers, but appeared throughout the audience, in the form of mass-produced posters 
(Figure 2.5). These posters were not, in fact, unique to the Toronto Pongu Thamil, but 
featured a different aesthetic for each event. In Toronto, the presence of the Leader’s 
image against a backdrop of Tiger yellow and red blazed like wildfire throughout the 
crowd. At times, these signs obscured the faces of their carriers, the image of 
Pirabhakaran supplementing and supplanting the body of the would-be Tamil national in 
a curious mirroring constitutive of the autotelic public (Warner 2002: 68). Pirabhakaran’s 
visage is an indexical icon, regimenting multiple groupings of identification and 
difference into a social whole. Icons and indices assert nothing, but rather, are 
potentialities and declaratives (Peirce 1955); in this case, the potentiality of the Tamil 
nation was enacted by the repeated visibility of Pirabhakaran’s smiling, mustachioed 
face. Notably, in this instance of diasporic performativity, Pirabhakaran-as-idol had a 
much larger network of circulation, beyond the interiority of the event, as a few of my 
informants presented me with a few tokens of his type—including a 3-D image of their 
“glorious leader” in full military garb. The repetition of these posters—so surprising to 
non-Tamils—became familiar, as it gradually sedimented into a dispositif.132 
Pirabhakaran’s image was thus naturalized, becoming a self-evident doxa that secured 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 I draw this concept from Bourdieu (1977). 
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recognition from Pongu Thamil’s participants and viewers of the event without explicit 
argument. Instead, the event and its dissemination interpellated and inculcated a Tamil-
Canadian political subjectivity, avoiding argument to simply enact through indexical 
iconicity. 
This doxa, or what Arjun Appadurai (1996) terms the “culturalist” 
presuppositions of national movements mobilized in relation to the modern state, was 
also evident in the participants’ clothing and bodily comportment. While some young 
male activists described the scene as a “casual” affair in which participants could enter 
whenever and wear “whatever they wanted to be dressed in,” it was also noted that “a lot 
of [women] showed up in sarees” (Figure 5). Unlike previous Pongu Thamil events in Sri 
Lanka, however, male participants did not wear the verti, but pants with t-shirts and 
button-down shirts; forms of dress common, but not recognized as “national” dress in Sri 
Lanka.133 As Sitralega Maunaguru (1995) notes in her discussion of the gendering of 
Tamil nationalism, the iconic figure of the saree-clad woman has become an important 
means of signifying gender order within the LTTE during a war fought by both female 
and male cadres. As a form of dress authorized by the LTTE, the saree performs – and 
declares – a nationalized identity. This icon was replicated on stage in the form of dance 
and oration. In bharatanatyam, identically-dressed young women wearing half-sarees 
performed highly-regimented movements and postures to the Pongu Thamil audience.134 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 In Sri Lankan English, “national” dress for men refers to clothing worn on formal occasions: a long 
kurta-like shirt and the verti. The latter is approximately 4.5 meters of unstitched white cloth wrapped 
around the waist. 
134 See David (2012, 2007) and O’Shea (2001) on the politics of performance of bharata natyam in Sri 
Lankan Tamil diaspora communities in the United Kingdom and Canada respectively. 
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Their poetic expressions embodied and mirrored the unity to which the event, its 
organizers, and its audience aspired. 
Repetitive chanting and songs, interspersed between and throughout speeches on 
stage, also served to habituate the potential nation. One chorus sung by the performers on 
stage issued an imperative to the crowd as an already constituted community at the 
beginning: Pongu Thamilay, ne pongiyathay! (Rise up, Tamil! You have risen!) During 
this emphatic command and declaration, numerous audience members on the periphery 
sat and listened, waving flags while others stood closer to the stage. Students wearing 
red-and-black faced the crowd and led them in the following refrain, in Tamil: Emathu 
theysam enna? Tamil Ilam! Emathu thalaivan yaar? Pirabhakaran! (What is our nation? 
Tamil Eelam! Who is our leader? Pirabhakaran!) Ore kuralil collunga! (Tell in a one 
voice!) What appears here in text as a call-and-response was articulated by both 
‘speakers’ and ‘hearers’; the response an apparently simple declarative with an 
performative effects. Segments of a lengthy speech made by Theepan, Director of 
Communications of the Canadian Tamil Students Association responsible for organizing 
Pongu Thamil, also illustrate the performativity of the event:  
In our short history, we have made our community proud, our country 
proud, and our parents proud! Regardless of when or how we came here, 
one thing is certain: Canada is our home! And as Tamil-Canadians, we are 
also aware, that the Tamil homeland is the wellspring from which our 
values contribute to the diversity of Canada. 
… We, as Canadians, can help the Tamil people of Sri Lanka. 
…We will send our strong voice to the Tamils back home, to tell them that 
there is hope, that peace will be there! 
 
The metonymic substitution of this particular performative speech act produces one 
“strong voice” that can declare, with certainty, “We, as Canadians, can help the Tamil 
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people of Sri Lanka” (my emphasis). Deixis implies, instantiates, and identifies subjects 
in language. According to the linguist, Emile Benveniste, the singular usurps the plural, 
the verbal person in the plural expresses a diffused and amplified person as ‘“We” 
annexes an indistinct mass of other persons to “I”’ (1971: 203). “We” –- in this case, 
always the inclusive naam, rather than an exclusive naangal when spoken in Tamil135 – 
indexically presupposes and creatively entails a Tamil-Canadian public.136 
Conclusion 
As I have noted above, Sri Lanka’s internationally mediated peace process relied 
on a liberal consensus that assumed the promise of “economic dividends” from donor-
funded neoliberal economic development would seal a compromise between two central 
parties to the war. In this view, a negotiated peace would bring with it the means to 
develop Sri Lanka and properly integrate the island into the global economy. Six rounds 
of talks were held between the government and the LTTE. With each successive round, 
the parties grew further apart, even as donor countries tried to use the carrot of a billion 
dollars of aid (and the stick of withholding that aid) to pull the parties together for 
negotiations. 
This vision of a liberal peace was not to be. In less than two years, the process had 
come undone; the parties no longer held talks, and violations of the ceasefire abounded. 
International efforts at liberal peacebuilding, in linking aid to conflict resolution, failed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 In Jaffna Tamil, naangal (possessive engal) refers to the speaker and others to whom her/his words are 
addressed, in contrast to most Tamil dialects in India, which use the inclusive naam, possessive namma). 
Suseendirarajah (1999) notes that in Jaffna Tamil, “naam indicates very high respect for the addressed,” 
and was used in rural areas to address someone of a higher caste (224-225). He writes that, “With the 
progress of education and social reforms, the usage of naam is fast disappearing” (225). 
136 The notions of indexical presupposition and entailment are discussed in Silverstein (1976). 
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take into consideration local political context (Uyangoda and Stokke 2011; Holt 2011). 
Differences within the Southern polity and the internal politics of the LTTE, when 
combined, resulted in a new configuration of forces during this period; the factional 
splitting of the LTTE and a resurgent Sinhala nationalism converged to bring the country 
back to war. 
Instead of peace, the peace process produced dividends of an entirely different 
kind. As if to supplement the high-level negotiations of the LTTE and the government, 
Sri Lankan Tamils living outside the country mobilized to intervene in the peace process. 
This chapter has shown how those efforts diverged from one another, depending on the 
diasporic locations of the activists and participants involved.  I have shown how Tamil 
refugees in India mobilized around a politics of return—whether actual or potential—to 
imagine their political futures on the island. Tamil refugees’ actions and declarations thus 
attempted to intervene in the making of that future. I have also discussed how Tamils in 
Toronto mobilized to “rise up” as citizens demanding Canada’s involvement in the 
internationalized peace process, and to secure recognition for the LTTE and its goals. 
They used distinctive cultural and political forms of action—from language and oratory, 
to dress and comportment—that signified their (diasporic) Tamilness, rather than 
demonstrating as unmarked Canadian citizens. In so doing, I argue that participants were 
engaged in a performative politics that enacted an emergent form of diasporic community 
for the first time in public space: a Tamil-Canadian public. 
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Chapter 3 
‘Our Historic Struggle’: Tamil Politics and Diaspora Histories 
 
This chapter argues for the ethnographic utility of historical narrative and 
historiography in this dissertation’s analysis of diaspora politics and community 
formation. History is a frequent subject of contention in modern Sri Lanka. The writing 
of history has been a critical part of the making of Sinhala and Tamil communities, and 
the conflict itself. As Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam writes about the fusion of myth 
and history in the politics of the Tamil past,  
The past has been reinterpreted in a way that enables its acceptance as 
truth or otherwise vital for the survival of the community. That is why 
history will not let go, and why it seems to have led to a spiral of death 
and destruction. […] Preexisting differences were reinterpreted in a new 
fashion that emphasized antagonism and hostility, instead of tolerance and 
exchange. (1990a: 118-119, emphasis added)  
This chapter, following the insights of Hellmann-Rajanayagam and others137, 
argues that an analysis of history is critical to understanding the central place of the 
concepts of “community” and “struggle” in Tamil political and everyday life. The chapter 
also considers the power of history and its diverse interpretations in Tamil claims to land, 
power, and recognition. 
The first part of this chapter outlines the political events that have typically 
defined Tamil politics in colonial Ceylon and postcolonial Sri Lanka. I begin with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 On the politics of the Tamil past, also see Cheran (1992, 2000) and Daniel (1990, 1996). See Whitaker 
(1990) for a discussion of the plurality of pasts in an east coast Tamil village. 
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synthesis of key historical and social scientific accounts of Tamil and Sri Lankan politics. 
As we shall see, this synthesis presents a broad consensus among scholars of Sri Lanka 
around the origins of a distinctly ‘Tamil’ politics and militancy; however, throughout 
these sections, I also discuss some differences in their interpretations of historical events. 
This narrative is followed in the second part of this chapter by a reading of political 
histories of Tamil nationalism written by scholars and activists during the war, with a 
focus on the widely disseminated work of the Sri Lankan Tamil political scientist, A. 
Jeyaratnam Wilson. In my analysis of these writings, I discuss four themes of nationalist 
discourse integral to the politics of Tamil militancy and diaspora activism. 
In the third and final part of the chapter, I supplement this historiography with the 
ethnographic insights of my fieldwork among diaspora Tamil activists from Sri Lanka. 
This portion of the dissertation examines the ways in which diaspora activists narrate 
their own histories of Tamil politics. In contrast with the linear and continuous historical 
narrative presented by individual nationalist writers and other activists, I juxtapose four 
activists’ narratives and the “critical events” (Das 1995) they invoke to construct a 
genealogy of the political conditions and contestations at the core of an emerging Tamil 
diaspora politics. In doing so, this section of the chapter reveals how the emergence of a 
specifically “Tamil” politics and the production of Tamil political identities in 
postcolonial Sri Lanka was displaced—figuratively and literally—in the parallel 
developments of Tamil separatist militancy and diaspora activism. I also briefly consider 
how these varied and intersecting trajectories of Tamil politics contribute to the concepts 
of “community” and “struggle” used by diaspora activists.     
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Tamil Politics in Ceylon & Sri Lanka 
In the early 1970s, Sri Lanka entered a period of great social and political 
instability, leading to the crisis of an ethnic conflict and a quarter-century long civil war. 
Consequently, and perhaps unsurprisingly, most recent scholarship of the island’s modern 
history grapples with the conflict.138 As the Sri Lankan historian Nira Wickramasinghe 
(2006) argues, liberal and Marxist scholars of the last few decades have tended to focus 
on the state’s failure to accommodate the needs and demands of the country’s 
minorities.139 Their scholarship is time and again a history of the nation-state, tracing the 
political administration and constitutional reforms of the colonial state to the electoral 
politics of a newly independent and postcolonial Ceylon governed by a Sinhala majority, 
and finally, a deepening crisis as tensions between majority and minority communities 
give way to conflict and war.  
Indeed, as the first part of this chapter shows, the history of state formation and 
reform in late colonial and post-independence Ceylon and Sri Lanka demonstrates a long 
and vexed engagement with the question of power-sharing among the island’s diverse 
ethnic, linguistic and religious communities. In particular, this history begins with the 
problem of defining community and the role of ‘minority representation’ in the political 
life of the state. In what follows, I provide a synthesis of the prevailing scholarship, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 See especially, the works of K.M. de Silva (1981, 1986, 1998), and A.J. Wilson (1979, 1988, 1994a, 
2000), as cited and discussed in this chapter, as well as C.R. de Silva (1987), James Jupp (1978), Robert 
Kearney (1973), James Manor (1984), and Howard Wriggins (1960), among others. 
139 While Wickramasinghe aims to write a general political history of twentieth-century Sri Lanka, her 
book, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities departs from conventional positivist 
histories in a few critical respects: 1) the author draws on a wide range of sources, including ethnographic 
and literary writing, as well as critical analyses of women and gender; 2) the author uses a thematic, rather 
than chronological approach to Sri Lankan history, and historicizes her categories of analysis, and 3) in 
doing the above, she aims to write a history that evokes “a reality that is differentially refracted through 
varying experiences and positionalities” (2006: xi), rather than a history of the nation-state. 
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referred to by Wickramasinghe and outlined above, and supplement this material with the 
observations and interpretations of social historians and anthropologists on the historical 
making of communities in Sri Lanka. The “official” or standard authoritative account of 
the origins of Tamil politics in Sri Lankan history provides context for my critical 
analysis of Tamil political histories that follows.  
Ethnicity and Community under Colonialism 
 When the British East India Company claimed control of Ceylon in 1796 and 
declared the island a Crown Colony in 1802, the territory was not entirely within its 
power (de Silva 1981). Ceylon was finally brought under unified rule with the defeat of 
the Kandyan resistance and the fall of the kingdom in 1815. The administrative and 
political unification of the island, however, took place through reforms well into the 
second half of the nineteenth century.140  
 Critical scholars have argued that British recognition of particular forms of social 
difference was built into the unification of the colonial state (Rogers 1994; Scott 1999). 
Communal representation was introduced into Ceylon’s Legislative Council with the 
liberal Colebrooke-Cameron reforms of 1833, which allowed elites from designated 
communities to represent their respective groups to the colonial government 
(Samaraweera 1973). In order to determine which groups required representation, the 
colonial government attempted to systematically classify the castes and ‘races’ of Ceylon, 
an endeavor begun with the first full Census of 1871. The first census recorded 78 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Mendis (1956) discusses many of these reforms in his introduction to an edited volume on the 
documents of British colonial policy during this time. Also see Samaraweera (1973) on the Colebrooke 
Cameron reforms of 1833, and Scott (1999: 23-52), for a discussion of these liberal reforms in Sri Lanka 
and an analysis of the political rationality of “colonial governmentality.” 
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‘nationalities’ and 24 ‘races’ resident in Ceylon: (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2001: 15; 
Cheran 2000: 58).141 Subsequently, with each decennial census the categories changed 
and narrowed, and as a result, the communities recognized by the British as being in need 
of representation also changed. The 1921 Census recognized ten principal “races” in 
Ceylon.142 By 1981, more than one hundred years after the first modern census, the 
communities of Ceylon were as follows: Sinhala, Tamil, Muslims and Others (Cheran 
2000: 59).143 These colonial constructions of identity rigidly defined the structure of state 
politics in Ceylon for more than a century (Nissan and Stirrat 1990; Rajasingham-
Senanayake 2001a). Moreover, the categories of the colonial state would shape the 
country’s politics for decades after it gained independence. 
 Sri Lankan anthropologist Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake sums it up the 
following: During the early years of colonial rule, “regional differences between groups 
speaking the same language… were more salient than those between the coastal Tamil 
and Sinhala groups” who were not perceived as distinct ethnic groups, but as members of 
a wide range of caste groups (2001a: 16). However, by the end of British rule, language 
had become the primary marker of difference used to consolidate modern ethno-racial 
identities. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Rajasingham-Senanayake (2001a) notes the incoherence in the census categories: “‘Sinhalese’ and 
‘Tamil’ were races as well as nationalities while the Kandyans were another nationality” (15). Sinhalese 
residents of the coastal Low-Country and the Kandyan highlands were each categorized as separate 
communities during most of colonial rule and were granted separate representation (Wickramasinghe 
1995). 
142 According to Wickramasinghe (2006: 48), these were as follows: Low Country Sinhalese, Kandyan 
Sinhalese, Ceylon Tamils, Indian Tamils, Ceylon Moors, Indian Moors, Burghers, Eurasians, Malays, 
Veddas. 
143 The contemporary category of “Muslim” includes those who were categorized in the colonial census as 
“Moor.” This community has, over the decades, assimilated diverse smaller ethnic groups, including 
Malays, Borahs, Sidis, etc, but some among these groups claim distinct identities today. 
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Constitutional reform and the movement for independence, 1919-1947. As with the 
island’s colonization, the official independence of Ceylon was a slow and gradual 
process. In 1919, the Ceylon National Congress (CNC) was a multi-ethnic compact 
formed by Ceylonese elites who were active in efforts to reform the constitution. They 
sought to: 1) Create a broad coalition of elites to secure the ‘Ceylonization’ of public 
services, 2) Increase the powers of the appointed Executive and Legislative Councils144 
(which included appointed Ceylonese representatives) and 3) Develop an ethnically-
balanced legislature. The latter goal became a point of contention, as the CNC became 
increasingly dominated by Sinhala leaders over the next two years. In conflict with the 
majoritarian interests of the Sinhala leaders, the CNC’s first President, Ponnambalam 
Arunachalam, a representative of the Tamil community, withdrew from the leadership.145  
Historians broadly agree that Ceylon’s independence movement was 
characterized less by mass mobilization and protest than reform schemes and backroom 
deals, as elite leaders worked within the political structures of the colonial administration 
(K.M. de Silva 1981; Wilson 1988; Wickramasinghe 1995; Wriggins 1960). However, an 
informal compact among Sinhala, Tamil, Moor, Malay, Burgher and European leaders 
dissolved as the question of ‘communal representation’ versus ‘territorial 
representation’146 instigated discord, and led to political divisions in the 1920s and 1930s 
(Russell 1982; Wickramasinghe 1995). The switch from communal representation to a 
purportedly more egalitarian territorial representation was ushered in with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Established in 1833 as a result of the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms. 
145 Arunachalam left the CNC amid disagreements with Sinhalese political leaders over the share of Ceylon 
Tamil representation in the legislature (Wilson 1994a: 11). Also see K.M. de Silva (1972). 
146 In Ceylon, “communal representation” referred to the assignment of political seats according to one’s 
membership within a particular ethnic or ethno-religious community, while “territorial representation” 
referred to a legislature organized according to administrative boundaries.  
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Donoughmore Constititution of 1931. With it came the introduction of universal 
franchise in Ceylon.147 In 1944, Arunachalam founded the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress 
(ACTC), marking the first time a party was formed around a Tamil ethnolinguistic 
identity in Ceylon. 
The Minority Question and Political Representation at Independence 
 The terms “minority” and “majority” were introduced to Ceylon during British 
colonial rule, and they have been subject to change and contestation since. As Ceylon’s 
independence loomed on the horizon, Ceylon Tamil political leaders were particularly 
conscious of the effects of constitutional reform on their standing as a ‘major’ community 
vis a vis the Sinhalese.148 Together, with the leaders of numerically smaller minority 
groups, they sought to be represented on an equal footing with the Sinhala political 
leadership. In 1944, the ACTC presented their case for a radically different conception of 
post-independence politics. Under the leadership of G.G. Ponnambalam, the case for 
‘50/50,’ or ‘balanced representation,’ was presented to the British Soulbury Commission 
tasked with the latest round of constitutional reforms—this time, in anticipation of a 
Ceylonese government. Under Ponnambalam’s scheme, 50% of the seats in the 
Legislature and the Executive ministries would go to Sinhala politicians, with the 
remaining 50% to be distributed among the various minoritized communities (Russell 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Prior to 1931, only 4% of the population had the ability to vote. Ceylon was the first British colony—
excluding the white settler colonies/Dominions—to be granted universal franchise, two years after Britain’s 
first general election under universal suffrage (de Silva 1998: 7). Arunachalam called for “manhood 
suffrage” in making the case for “responsible government” for Ceylon in 1919, as did A.E. Goonasinha in 
1923 (de Silva 1981: 400-401). 
148 By ‘major’ community, I refer to the way in which Ceylon Tamil leaders understood their community to 
be a distinct group deserving of political recognition on par with the ‘majority’ community—the latter 
being a numerical and political term. For one use and a discussion of the terms, ‘major’ and ‘minor,’ see 
Ismail (2005).   
	   138	  
1982; Wilson 1994a). The ACTC proposal reflected a general consensus among the 
leaders of the larger minorities—the Ceylon Tamils (as Tamils who had lived for 
centuries on the island were then called), Tamils of Indian Origin, and Moors (later 
known as Muslims)—about the need for minority safeguards in the new constitution.149 
  Despite a minority consensus, the British commissioners deemed the ACTC’s 
proposal unacceptable. Their disapproval hinged on the liberal notion of a ‘representative 
government’ that was now realized as territorial representation. This form of 
representation had favored Sinhala leaders who dominated the Councils, and they sought 
to preserve it. Ponnambalam was deemed a ‘communalist’ among the Sinhala leadership 
and sections of the colonial government. In other words, after 1931, there was no turning 
back from ‘One man, one vote.’ Britain’s Soulbury Constitution instead included a 
Section 29, which prohibited discrimination in legislation against any specific 
community:  
No … law shall … make persons of any community or religion liable to 
disabilities or restrictions to which any persons of other communities or 
religions are not made liable; or … confer on persons or any community 
or religion any privilege or advantage which is not conferred on persons of 
other communities or religions. [Section 29(2)] 
 
As with the earlier Donoughmore Constitution, the Soulbury Constitution of 1947 was a 
turning point in the island’s modern governance. The constitution was written by a 
British commission established to provide recommendations on the Ministers’ Draft 
Scheme, a draft constitution presented by the predominantly Sinhalese ministers in 
anticipation of self-government in Ceylon. For the first time, Ceylon’s (Sinhalese) elites 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 See Wilson (1988) on this point. Liberal historians (for example, Russell 1982) have typically viewed 
Ponnambalam’s proposals as an “extreme” demand; for an alternative reading, see Scott (1999) and Ismail 
(2005). 
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had the opportunity to conceptualize and inscribe the legal ground for the independent 
polity they would govern. On the other hand, British commissioners struggled with, in 
their words, “the most difficult of the many problems involved” in writing the new 
constitution: the relationship between the minorities and the majority community (Great 
Britain Colonial Office 1945: 38).150 
In this period of constitutional reforms immediately before and after independence, 
two major political parties were formed: the United National Party (UNP), which won the 
1947 elections, and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in 1951.151 Both parties became 
predominantly Sinhala. This political elite soon proved that, in spite of Section 29, the 
state could—and would—discriminate against minorities in defining the postcolonial 
nation. Their minority counterparts pursued multiple strategies to oppose state 
discrimination and secure a greater share of state power. 
Tamil Politics After Independence 
 Scholars of Tamil politics and those interested in the rapid growth of Tamil 
nationalism generally point to the emergence of political parties as a key development. 
These parties were formed in dynamic response to the mid-twentieth century creation of 
Sinhala-dominated national parties, as well as internal debates among Tamil political 
elites. Shortly before and after independence, Ceylon Tamil152 politicians and activists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Lord Soulbury also states this in his preface to Farmer (1963). 
151 See Wilson 1979: 125 on the political significance of the SLFP’s launch. While the LSSP was the first 
mass party formed in 1935, the SLFP formed a centre-left populist coalition of rural peasants, teachers, 
monks, and other non-elites that presented to the UNP’s electoral dominance. The Sri Lankan executive has 
since alternated between these two parties, with the exception of the years during which J.R. Jayawardene 
and R. Premadasa were elected into power (1977-1994).  
152 What I refer to as “Tamil politics” here primarily refers to Ceylon Tamil politics in the post-
independence period. As seen above, this at times involved policies around Tamils of Indian Origin. 
Throughout this dissertation, I use multiple terms—Ceylon Tamils/Jaffna Tamils, Tamils of Indian 
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banded together around several key concerns they had about the Sinhala-dominated state: 
citizenship and voting rights for Tamils of Indian Origin, language policies, state-aided 
‘colonization’ in the North and East of the island, and educational policies of 
‘standardization.’ Symbols such as the national flag and anthem were also debated. 
Language—central to education and employment opportunities—and territory, became 
key planks in the political struggle for Tamil rights. Scholars have questioned, however, 
the extent to which the 1950s and 1960s struggle for ‘Tamil’ rights was inclusive of all 
Tamil-speaking people, particularly with respect to caste and region (Pfaffenberger 1990; 
Sivathamby 1995). 
The Citizenship and Elections Acts. Ceylon gained official independence on February 4, 
1948. Shortly afterward, the UNP government of D.S. Senanayake passed three laws that 
would result in the statelessness and disenfranchisement of an entire community: The 
Ceylon Citizenship Act, No. 18 of 1948; the Immigrants and Emigrants Act, No. 20 of 
1948, the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, No. 3 of 1949; which were 
later followed by the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act, No. 48 of 1949. With 
these acts, nearly all Tamils of Indian Origin were taken off the electoral registers and 
denied citizenship.153 Tamils of Indian Origin living and working on the estates in central 
Sri Lanka were a significant voting bloc, and held great influence over 14 seats that had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Origin/Hill-Country Tamils, etc—that illustrate the heterogeneity of Tamil identities and political 
formations in Ceylon/Sri Lanka, and their socio-historical change over time. I also note the dominance of 
Jaffna Tamils (often referred to as Ceylon Tamils) in these formations. 
153 See Peebles (2001) and Jegathesan (2013) on the political framing of Indian Tamils’ as ‘transient’ and 
‘disinterested’ that underscored these acts. See also Kanapathipillai (2009: 44-45) on the gendered 
implications of these acts, which required either birth by registration or proof of descent from a father or 
paternal grandfather born in Ceylon. 
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returned Left parties in the 1947 general election.154 When the state disenfranchised 
Tamils of Indian Origin, the community lost seven weighted seats, delivering Sinhala-
dominated political parties an unassailable majority of 80 percent of seats in Ceylon’s 
Parliament.155 The Citizenship Acts set the stage for all subsequent elections, where the 
UNP and SLFP could engage in what the Sri Lankan political scientist Neil Devotta 
(2005) has called “ethnic outbidding.” In other words, the two parties could ignore 
minority voters and gain an absolute majority in the Parliament. 
 In protest over the collusion of Ponnambalam’s ACTC with Senanayake's 
government over the citizenship acts that disenfranchised Tamils of Indian Origin, S.J.V. 
Chelvanayakam left the Congress in 1949 to form the Federal Party (known in Tamil as 
the Ilangai Thamil Arasu Katchi). At its first party convention held in 1951, the Federal 
Party announced, “The Tamil-speaking people of Ceylon constitute a nation distinct from 
that of the Sinhalese by every fundamental test of nationhood” (K.M. de Silva 1981: 
513).156 
 Furthermore, successive postcolonial governments would have to contend with 
the questions raised by a population now made ‘stateless’ and without citizenship. Over 
the next two-and-a-half decades, various negotiations and pacts between the Indian and 
Ceylonese governments attempted to ‘resolve’ this question, often without the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 At their peak, the population of Tamils of Indian Origin, prior to the “return” of many to India, was 
approximately 12% of the country’s total population—equal to the number of Ceylon Tamils. In addition to 
obtaining seven of 95 seats in Parliament during the 1947 general election, Tamils of Indian Origin 
influenced twenty other constituencies by voting for the Left. Their disenfranchisement increased the 
Sinhala voting population to four-fifths of the total voter population.  
155 Parliament required a two-thirds majority, now easily won with no need for compromise with minority 
politicians amid conflicts over political rights and social and economic opportunity. 
156 The declarations of the Federal Party make repeated reference to the “Tamil-speaking people” of 
Ceylon. The party made a conscious effort to do so, believing it would unite minorities around their 
common language, Tamil, regardless of region and/or national origin (i.e. Hill-Country Tamils, or Tamils 
of recent Indian origin), or religious and ethnic identity (i.e. Muslims).  
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consultation of the Tamils of Indian Origin, who would subsequently come to call 
themselves malaiyaha thamilar, or Hill-Country Tamils.157	   
Language: The ‘Sinhala Only’ Act and Tamil Political Responses. In 1951, the year of 
the Federal Party’s first convention, the newly-appointed National Languages 
Commission began to probe the question of a transition from governance in English, the 
language of colonial administration, to the vernacular languages of Sinhala and Tamil. It 
first appeared that both languages would be used in government and education. Over the 
next few years, however, Sinhala nationalists mobilized to support a transition to only 
one language: Sinhala. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, supported by politically active Buddhist 
monks (bhikkus), formed a radical Sinhala nationalist coalition with a few smaller parties 
under the banner, Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP, or People’s United Front). This 
pushed the UNP government of Sir John Kotelawala to respond. Earlier proposals that 
would grant 'parity of status' to Tamil were sidelined in favor of what came to be known 
as a “Sinhala Only” policy for the SLFP. Parliament was dissolved and a new election 
fought with both parties on a “one language” platform. The language question thus 
quickly became the basis of the 1955 elections (K.M. de Silva 1981). The MEP won, 
confirming the popularity of their Sinhala nationalist and (in the aftermath of the Left’s 
hartal (strike) of 1953 organized by the Left) populist platform. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 In 1964, protracted negotiations between the Indian and Ceylonese governments lead to the first attempt 
to resolve the problem of citizenship for the Tamils of Indian Origin, now known as malaiyaha, or Hill-
Country Tamils. In the Sirimavo Bandaranaike-Lal Bahadur Shastri pact—named after the then Prime 
Ministers of Ceylon and India respectively—it was agreed that a substantial number of the 975,000 persons 
who had been rendered ‘stateless’ by the citizenship acts would be given citizenship rights within the 
island. A greater number, however, were repatriated to India in the years to come, leading to future 
negotiations between the two countries and two more agreements in 1967 and 1974. The problem of 
statelessness among this group of Tamils continued into the twenty-first century, as I discuss in Chapter 5 
on Tamil refugees living in India. For further reading, see Kanapathipillai (2009). 
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 Bandaranaike’s new Parliament passed the Official Language Act, No. 33 of 1956, 
in which Sinhala would be made the one and only official language of Ceylon. While the 
draft bill included provisions for the use of Tamil and English, the provisions were 
removed due to protests from hardline Sinhala nationalists who supported Bandaranaike’s 
rise. Thus, with no reference to the use of Tamil in administration, Tamil government 
servants would be required to pass examinations in Sinhala to continue to work.158  
Tamil leaders and their constituents were shocked and frustrated by discriminatory 
legislation passed without their input. The act quickly became known as the “Sinhala 
Only Act.” The Federal Party turned to extra-parliamentary methods in response. Party 
activists organized a Gandhian non-violent protest, or satyagraha, urging the 
Bandaranaike government to include Tamil in the act. The protesters were attacked by 
organized Sinhala mobs, which had planned simultaneous attacks on Tamils in Colombo 
and at the Gal Oya irrigation project, a state-organized settlement, or ‘colonization 
scheme’ in the Eastern Province (Peebles 2006: 110; Wilson 2000: 84). Later, a pāda 
yātra (“pilgrimage on foot”) to Trincomalee rallied thousands at the site of the declared 
capital of a future Tamil homeland. There, the Federal Party announced four demands: 
(1) a Federal constitution, (2) parity of status for Tamil and Sinhala, (3) citizenship for 
Tamils of Indian Origin; and (4) the end of colonization, or Sinhala settlements in Tamil-
majority areas (Wilson 2000: 82-84). The first demand of federalism entailed “…one or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 The passing of the 1956 Act held other implications: Government forms could not be obtained in the 
Tamil language; in most areas of the country, government services were provided in Sinhala only; students 
could not sit for exams in Tamil.  
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more Tamil linguistic state or states incorporating all geographically contiguous areas in 
which Tamil speaking people were numerically in a majority” (Wilson 2000: 85).159  
Growing ethnic tensions led Sinhalese and Tamil political leaders to enter 
negotiations to bring harmony to the communities. Bandaranaike delayed enforcement of 
the ‘Sinhala Only’ act as he attempted to quell ethnic tensions by gaining Tamil 
politicians’ support. Negotiations between the ruling coalition and the Federal Party led 
to compromise in the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957. By this pact, 
Chelvanayakam stepped down from federalism and total parity of status for Tamil, while 
Bandaranaike agreed to make provisions for Tamil and some power sharing within the 
unitary state.160 Tamil would be recognized as the language of administration in the 
predominantly Tamil-speaking North and East, with “no prejudice” to Sinhala as the 
official language, and subordinate law-making authority would be devolved to regional 
councils (Wilson 1988). These regional councils would handle agriculture, education, and 
the selection of colonists to reside in the state’s ‘colonization’ schemes. However, the 
Pact did not survive. Under pressure from the sangha and his Sinhala nationalist 
supporters, Bandaranaike scrapped the 1957 pact. 
Tensions between the communities came to a head once more in March 1958 when 
Federal Party activists blackened the Sinhala letter, “Sri,” that appeared on the new 
license plates of buses sent to the North and east, which they repaced with the equivalent 
letter in the Tamil script to register their protest against the continuing “Sinhala Only” 
policy. In Colombo, chauvinistic elements among the Sinhalese parties retaliated by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159Also cited in Wickramasinghe (2006: 271). 
160 The distinction between a “unitary state” with highly centralized powers and a “united” one comprising 
several political units has been important in modern Ceylonese and Sri Lankan politics.  
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painting the Sinhala ‘Sri’ on Tamil homes and deleted all signs in Tamil found on 
commercial and public buildings by brushing them over with black paint; when the FP 
responded by launching a non-violent direct action campaign, Sinhala nationalists beat 
the satyagrahis and organized island-wide riots (Wilson 2000: 88-89; for accounts, see 
Ponniah 1963; Vaithilingham 1962; Vittachi 1958). Thousands of Ceylon Tamils affected 
by the riots were taken to Jaffna by government ships. Amidst press censorship and 
curfews, Bandaranaike presented a much-delayed bill to provide for the “reasonable use 
of Tamil.” Under pressure once again, he eliminated the Regional Councils Bill and The 
Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958. However, Bandaranaike's criticism of 
the rioters and enactment of the provisions for limited use of Tamil earned the wrath of 
his own passionate supporters. He was assassinated by a bhikku (and former supporter) in 
September 1959 (Tambiah 1986). 
His wife, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, succeeded her husband as Prime Minister161 and 
pushed through the implementation of the Official Language Act on January 1, 1961, 
ignoring the special provisions act proposed by her late husband. The Language of the 
Courts Act of 1961 further enabled the replacement of English with Sinhala in all courts 
of law. Public officers appointed after 1956 were required to pass a proficiency 
examination in Sinhala to retain their jobs. This limited opportunities for Tamil-speakers 
in the public service. The Federal Party mounted civil disobedience campaigns and 
agitations; in response, the government declared a state of emergency to suppress their 
opposition (Ponniah 1963). As the satyagraha of 1961 continued, the government also 
stationed the army throughout Jaffna and the Northern Province. The Tamil language was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 With her election defeat of the country’s interim Prime Minister, Sirimavo Bandaranaike became known 
as the world’s first elected female head of state. 
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not recognized in legislation until a new UNP government under Dudley Senanayake 
passed the Tamil Language Regulations of 1966, a piece of “subordinate legislation” that 
was not implemented over the decades to come.162 
Territory: State-sponsored ‘colonization’ schemes. Ceylonese debates about national 
language(s) and policy changes were made in tandem with new economic policies and 
practices around the distribution of land. Tamil political leaders became especially 
concerned about state-organized land ‘colonization’ schemes, which were perceived by 
them as a form of Sinhala conquest (Wickramasinghe 2006: 268). Colonization in Sri 
Lanka referred to the creation of agricultural settlements in less-populated, interior 
regions of the island: namely, in sections of the Eastern Province, and the North-Central 
and Southern dry zones. These settlements required irrigation—Sri Lanka, facing a rice 
shortage, encouraged new settlers to grow paddy, which meant that vast tracts of land had 
to be flooded with water. The state engaged in public works projects, seeing this work as 
a revival of Lanka’s ancient “hydraulic civilization” (Peebles 1990; Tennekoon 1988).163 
Economic development projects thus benefitted peasant farmers recruited exclusively 
from the majority community. Moreover, the influx of Sinhala settlers was transforming 
the demographics of the Eastern Province.164 State-sponsored settlements begun in the 
mid-1950s continued to be a source of conflict.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 The Thirteenth Amendment to the 1978 Constitution, passed in 1987 under the terms of the Indo-Lanka 
Accord, notes in Chapter IV, Article 18, paragraph 2 that “Tamil shall also be an official language.” This 
was the first time that Tamil was “also” legally recognized as an “official language” of the state. However, 
no government has fully implemented the amendment in state administration. 
163 On the related “hydraulic society,” see also Leach (1959) and Gunawardena (1971). 
164 Tamil activists and some scholars have argued that the purpose of these schemes was to ‘Sinhalize’ 
areas that Tamils considered to be their “traditional homelands.” For a version of this argument, which 
connects the changing demography of the Eastern Province to electoral politics, see Manogaran 1994. 
Peebles 1990 contests this argument. For a historical study of the “traditional homelands” concept, see 
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In addition, the period between 1956 and 1977 was distinguished by the 
nationalization of the public sector, as well as the colonial plantations. When Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike was returned to power in 1968 on a platform of socialism and economic 
independence for Ceylon, land continued to be a central issue. One of the first acts of the 
new government introduced radical land reforms, which nationalized the once British-
owned plantations and estates, allowing excess lands to be distributed to the Sinhala 
population. Tamils of Indian Origin, Ceylon Tamils, and Muslims were discriminated 
against in land distribution, particularly in the Central and Eastern Provinces. The 
government continued to recruit villagers from crowded and impoverished villages in the 
southern ‘low-country’ to colonization schemes in the interior dry zones; patronage 
politics meant that, even in heterogenous villages, the settlers were Sinhala.165  
Scholars have argued that the politics of the state’s language policies and colonization 
schemes, and more importantly, the social and economic consequences of those policies, 
provided the material basis for Tamil separatism (Peebles 1990; Shastri 1990; 
Wickramasinghe 2006: 267-74).  
Education: National schools and ‘Standardization’ policies  
In 1970, the government introduced two systems of ‘standardization’ of marks for 
university admission. ‘Standardization’ meant that, according to the language of 
examination, Tamil students were required to achieve higher marks for admission to the 
same faculty (school) as Sinhala students. Moreover, K.M. de Silva writes that even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hellmann-Rajanayagam (1990b). See Peiris (1991) and K.M. de Silva (1995) for an appraisal and critiques 
of the concept. 
165 Predominantly Sinhalese settlers were often chosen through their connections to party supporters and 
local members of Parliament. 
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when Sinhala and Tamil students sat for an examination in English, Tamil students were 
still required to have higher qualifying marks than Sinhala students (1984 in Wilson 
2000, 103). The new policy was thus aimed at Tamil students, who were greatly affected 
by its implementation. The policy was later revised to include a ‘district quota system,’ 
which effectively reduced the number of admitted students from Jaffna and Colombo 
(Bastian 1984; C.R. de Silva 1974).166 The SLFP’s education reforms, on the basis of 
territorial quotas, drastically reduced the number of Tamils, particularly from the 
Northern Province, receiving admission to tertiary studies and coveted placements in the 
professional faculties such as medicine, engineering, and law. Many scholars have noted 
that Tamil grievances peaked as the effects of university ‘standardization’ throughout the 
1970s became apparent (Bastian 1984; C.R. de Silva 1998[1979]; K.M. de Silva 1984; 
Wilson 1988, 2000). 
State reform and devolution of power. Sri Lanka’s first constitution as an independent 
nation was written and passed in 1972, during the second prime ministership of Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike. The new constitution superseded The Ceylon Constitution Order in 
Council of 1946-7, otherwise known as the Soulbury Constitution, which was drafted by 
a Ceylonese lawyer, and finalized by appointed British commissioners; it also excised 
Ceylon’s remaining constitutional links to Britain. In so doing, architects of the 1972 
constitution eliminated the position of Governor General, who was the country’s 
ceremonial Head of State as the Queen’s representative in Ceylon, and more importantly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Colombo (and its environs) and the Jaffna peninsula had a high number of government and private 
schools. The former, though multi-ethnic, had a large population of Tamils, while the latter was 
predominantly Tamil. Middle-class Tamils, particularly those from Jaffna, had looked to education as a 
means to a secure livelihood, as farming was and continues to be a difficult occupation on the arid 
peninsula. The shift to district quotas impacted the educational trajectories of these Tamils most. Some 
have argued that the switch to district quotas may have benefitted minorities in the eastern regions, but little 
empirical research has been done to support this claim. 
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replaced the Privy Council as the ultimate source of appeal with the legal apparatus of the 
Supreme Court (Ponnambalam 1983).  
Ceylon was renamed the (Free, Sovereign and Independent) Republic of Sri Lanka, 
and was re-formed into a highly centralized unitary state. The 1972 republican 
constitution abolished the Senate, and accorded official recognition and ‘the foremost 
place’ to Buddhism which, as the republic’s major religion, became the state’s duty to 
foster and protect (Section 6).167 Moreover, Sinhala was again established as the official 
language, with Tamil mentioned as a “second language,” while provisions for the 
“reasonable use of Tamil” created to redress the problems of “Sinhala Only” were 
ignored once again. The entrenchment of Buddhism as the new republic’s religion, and 
Sinhala as its official language, upset Tamil political leaders and their communities. They 
felt that the first constitution of an independent Sri Lanka was written without minority 
consultation. The FP’s leader, Chelvanayakam, resigned his parliamentary seat in protest 
and announced he would run in a by-election against the government candidate to prove 
that the Ceylon Tamils did not support Mrs. Bandaranaike’s constitution. 
Six years later, Prime Minister J.R. Jayawardene and the UNP passed another 
republican constitution. The 1978 Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of 
Sri Lanka went beyond the republicanism of Sirimavo’s 1972 effort. Jayawardene 
scrapped the country’s Westminster-style parliamentarism for a Gaullist-type republic 
(Wilson 1980), creating an Executive Presidency, to which the Prime Minister became 
subordinate.  He named himself Executive President, extended his term to six years, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 For a study of this particular section of the 1972 Constitution, see Schonthal (2012). For a general 
discussion of the political symbolism of Buddhism in Sri Lanka at this time, see Phadnis (1976). 
	   150	  
made the UNP’s Ranasinghe Premadasa his Prime Minister, thus giving himself 
unprecedented powers in the history of independent Sri Lanka. These reforms further 
consolidated the highly centralized nature of Sri Lanka’s unitary state structure.168 
Tamil Politics: From Federalism to Militant Separatism 
 By 1973, the tide was turning from Tamil federalism to militancy. Ceylon Tamil 
politicians had spent twenty-five years engaged in parliamentary politics and non-violent 
protests of majoritarian policies with few results. They were under pressure from a 
militant younger generation inspired by student movements and youth revolts around the 
world and in Sri Lanka. 
In 1970, the Tamil Students’ Federation (mānavar pēravai) was formed by 
Sathiyaseelan and Sabalingam.169 The following year, in 1971, southern (predominantly 
Sinhala) youth of the People’s Liberation Front (Janata Vimukti Peramuna, or JVP) 
launched an insurrection.170 The JVP revolt was quashed by the state’s army and led the 
government to declare a national State of Emergency, which would remain in place over 
the next four decades. Tamil students and youth frustrated by the UF’s policies of 
standardization and state nationalization privileging the majority community backed the 
formation of a Tamil United Front (TUF) formed by several Tamil political parties in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Which, as discussed above, was a political and administrative structure bequeathed by British colonial 
rule, but has also been claimed by Sinhala Buddhist nationalists as indigenous in the form of pre-colonial 
kingdoms. This has made the concept of the “unitary state” a point of contention between Tamil and 
Sinhala political leaders in contemporary Sri Lanka. Those who support federalism among the former 
prefer a structure that devolves power to the provinces in a “united” state.   
169 Several activists discussed the mānavar pēravai as formative in their politicization, as seen in the final 
part of this chapter. See UTHR(J) 2005 for a reference to the founding of the group, in the context of the 
LTTE’s later killing of Sabalingam. 
170 This period of violent unrest is relatively understudied in Sri Lankan history and anthropology. See 
Hewage (2013) for a discussion of the 1971 insurrection and its political implications. Also see Jani de 
Silva (2005) for an ethnographic study of violence and masculinity in the aftermath of the second JVP 
insurrection of 1988-89. 
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1972, including the ACTC and the Ceylon Workers’ Congress of the Hill-Country 
Tamils.171 In 1973, the FP issued the Mallakam Resolution at its annual convention, in 
which it announced the Tamils to be “a separate Nation… with the right of self-
determination.”  
Over the next few years, militant youth planned targeted attacks on the state in the 
north, through bank heists and political murders, beginning with the assassination of 
Jaffna’s UNP mayor Alfred Durayappah in 1973. 
If Sri Lanka’s political reforms of the 1970s relegated minorities to second-class 
citizenship, Ceylon Tamils were also appalled by what they felt to be attacks on their 
linguistic and cultural heritage. Two highly charged events contributed to the 
mobilization of Tamil youth and their turn to militancy. In January 1974, police attacked 
crowds celebrating at the International Tamil Conference in Jaffna, leading to nine deaths 
by electrocution when a policeman’s bullet hit electric cables. Later, in December 1981, 
two state ministers instructed police to burn down the Jaffna Public Library. The library 
held ancient Tamil palm-leaf manuscripts (ōla), many of which were not duplicated and 
thus irreplaceable.172  
The TUF was renamed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1975, 
emphasizing its turn toward national liberation, as fought for by other movements around 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 The Ceylon Indian Congress was founded in 1939 and was renamed the Ceylon Workers Congress in 
1950, becoming the country’s largest trade union. Today, the CWC is a political party that represents the 
Hill-Country Tamils working on Ceylon’s tea estates. The CWC joined the TUF shortly after the plantation 
sector was nationalized. Its leader, S. Thondaman, recognizing that the Hill-Country Tamils inhabited a 
region that was not contiguous with the North and East, made it known that he was not bound to the 
TULF’s later demand for a separate state (Wilson 2000: 108). 
172 Some of these ancient manuscripts may also be found in Tamil Nadu, but there has been no 
comprehensive effort to track them down. Jaffna’s Public Library remained a burned-out shell until it was 
rebuilt during the ceasefire. It has slowly acquired a new collection through donations of contemporary 
materials from throughout Sri Lanka, India, and the diaspora.     
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the world. The TULF announced its intention to pursue a separate state for the Tamils of 
Eelam at its inaugural 1976 convention in northern Jaffna. The Vaddukoddai Resolution, 
as a call to the “Tamil Nation,” addressed “Tamil youth” in particular and proclaimed, 
This convention resolves that restoration and reconstitution of the Free, 
Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of TAMIL EELAM, based on the right 
of self-determination inherent to every nation, has become inevitable in 
order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this Country 
(DeVotta 2004: 141, full text in Appendix G). 
In 1977, the TULF headed to the polls, campaigning on the basis of their new resolution. 
Chelvanayakam, “the Father of the Tamils,” passed away the same year. The TULF’s 
new leader, Appadurai Amirthalingam, became the Leader of the Opposition—the first 
and only time a Tamil politician had become so in the country’s postcolonial history. 
Militant youth of the TULF’s Youth Front (ilaignar peravai) became a “military wing” 
which Amirthalingam used as political leverage in (unsuccessful) negotiations with 
President Jayawardene. 
The “Open Economy” and Anti-Tamil Violence, 1977-1983 
Shortly after Jayawardene’s election, mobs attacked Hill-Country Tamils in 
violence that spread quickly throughout central Sri Lanka. Estate workers’ line rooms 
were set on fire, and businesses destroyed. The violence displaced an estimated 100,000 
people, of whom half sought refuge in the Northern province (esp Mannar, Vavuniya and 
Kilinochchi districts). The Matale and Kandy regions were badly affected. Activists 
formed organizations like Gandhiyam to assist the displaced, creating farms up north to 
provide the newly resettled with sustenance and employment.  
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Meanwhile, news of the violence added fuel to the fire of militancy, as stories 
circulated about the brutality of the mobs, and youth observed the Colombo 
government’s indifference and inaction. Tamil militants ramped up their guerilla 
activities targeting the police and military outposts. Their actions were met with the 
state’s repressive apparatuses. On May 22, 1978, the Jayawardene government 
introduced a law to proscribe Tamil militancy for one year.173 Two months after the law 
was extended (for another two years), the government decided to replace it on July 11 
with a new one: The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act No. 48 of 
1979.174 That same day, the Cabinet announced a state of emergency in the Jaffna district, 
and the President invoked the Public Security Act, allowing the police and army to 
dispose of dead bodies without an inquest. Taken together, the state’s laws produced in 
Jaffna an exceptional zone for the torture, disappearance, and extrajudicial killing of 
Tamils suspected of militancy. Anti-Tamil violence targeted Tamils in the country’s east 
and south in July 1981, and Hill-Country Tamil estate workers again in August 1981.  
Reflecting upon these events in subsequent years, Sri Lankan scholars have 
argued that Jayawardene’s policies of economic liberalization exacerbated the potential 
for conflict between ethnic groups. Newton Gunasinghe (1984) has described the move 
from a state-regulated economy reliant on import substitution to an “open economy” 
designed for export-led growth, and analyzed how the new policy created contradictions 
among ethnic groups. While abolishing import controls on the market, the new policy 
eliminated special concessions obtained by mostly Sinhalese mid-level entrepreneurs in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 The full name of the law passed was the Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other 
Similar Organizations Law, No. 16 of 1978. 
174 This act was later followed by the Prevention of Terrorism (Special Provisions) No. 10 of 1982. 
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formerly protected domestic market. Tamil and Muslim businesses had not received such 
concessions, and were not affected to such an extent. In this context, a Sinhala chauvinist 
ideology emerged among mid-level traders were able to mobilize wide sections of the 
disenfranchised urban poor. Sinhala chauvinists blamed minorities, and “the Tamils” 
especially, for increasing economic disparities between different strata of their classes. 
 If 1977 marked “the point of no return” for Tamil militancy (Wilson 2000: 109), 
the anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983 made armed struggle and war seemingly inevitable. 
Tamils lost their remaining faith in the Sri Lankan state: The police and army had done 
little to stop the violence, and President Jayawardene all but blamed the Tamils for the 
violence visited upon them.175 Displaced Tamils resettled in the north and east, and 
thousands fled the country, leading to greater ethnic separation. The government’s 
collusion in the violence also led hundreds of youth to join extant militant organizations 
and travel abroad for training under India’s Research & Analysis Wing (RAW). In 
August 1983, the Sixth Amendment to the 1978 Constitution was used to expel from the 
government Tamil parliamentarians who refused to take an oath. Tamil political leaders 
then left the country for exile in India. This vacuum of political leadership created an 
opening for the leaders of militant youth who came to be known colloquially in Jaffna as 
“the boys” (podiyal). 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Jayawardene did not address the violence for several days, and then issued a “non-apology” during a 
television appearance on July 26. See Wilson (2000: 113-114, 1988: 137) on Jayawardene’s public 
response. Wilson volunteered to be an intermediary between the President and the TULF, and was with 
President Jayawardene during the early days of the riots, which he discusses in (1988: 140-174). 
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Histories of Tamil Nationalism 
Toronto, August 2008. I had just finished an interview with the then-president of 
the Canadian branch of the Tamils’ Rehabilitation Organization (TRO-Canada), who sat 
in front of a large Canadian flag as he spoke about the difficulties he faced with 
fundraising for the Tamil people in Eelam, in the aftermath of a 2006 ban on the Tigers. 
TRO was known to be close to the LTTE. The World Tamil Movement headquarters had 
recently been ransacked and their computers and files confiscated by the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) to be turned over to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
(CSIS).176 The leader was worried about the same fate for his organization. He told me 
that the funds were “solely for rehabilitation of Tamils affected by the war,” multiple 
times throughout the interview. However CSIS, following Colombo’s lead, suspected that 
TRO-Canada was “providing material support for terrorism,” as part of the LTTE’s 
support network. The organization’s Sri Lankan counterpart had already had its state 
bank-held assets frozen, and Mr. G was very frustrated. As we finished up our interview, 
his colleagues told me they could help me with any information I needed, emphasizing 
the importance of getting “the true story” out. One man pointed to a glass case, the kind 
used to display trophies and memorabilia. This one held photographs and a book. He 
picked up a paperback copy, and placed it in my hands as a gift, telling me, “This will tell 
you the story.”  
The book was The Untold Story of Ancient Tamils in Sri Lanka, by the Tamil 
climatologist and political geographer, Chelvadurai Manogaran. Published in 2000, The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 The RCMP is Canada’s federal police force and also enforces the law in Canada’s provinces and 
territories (with the major exceptions of Ontario and Québec), smaller municipalities, and aboriginal 
communities. CSIS is Canada’s national intelligence agency, and is responsible to the federal government’s 
Minister of Public Safety. 
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Untold Story begins with a brief introduction to the political history of post-independence 
Sri Lanka, before getting down to its primary purpose: making a historical justification 
for a traditional Tamil homeland on the island. Manogaran does this by looking to 
archaeological scholarship on the pre- and proto-historic peoples of South India and Sri 
Lanka, as well as historical studies of rock inscriptions using the vattezhuttu script.177 
Manogaran draws a line from “pre-Dravidian tribes” of the pre-historic past to “the 
Dravidians” and their migration to Lanka (Ilankai, or Eelam), to the creation of a Tamil 
kingdom in the 13th century, and finally, “the Tamil people” of present-day Sri Lanka. He 
argues that these sources and more “…demonstrate that Sri Lanka’s Tamils have 
inhabited the island from early historic times, throughout the island, long before the 
Sinhalese language, its script and the concept of Sinhalese-Buddhist came into existence” 
(2000: 22), and that Tamils were the continuous, historical inhabitants of the northern and 
eastern regions of Lanka in particular. In short, Manogaran claims that the Tamils were 
the first people of Sri Lanka, and must be guaranteed a separate territory in the face of 
Sinhalese-Buddhist hegemony and suppression. 
Receiving Manogaran’s book178 as a gift revealed to me the extent to which 
academic writers of history—whether historians by discipline, or scholars of other 
disciplines—were important to Tamil activists. History is a powerful discipline that could 
authorize and legitimate their claims. Why was it important for these Tamil activists to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Vattezhuttu (literally, “rounded letters”) was derived from the Grantha form of the Brahmi script—an 
alphasyllabary writing system that produced some of the earliest historical inscriptions in southern and 
central Asia—and is considered by Tamil scholars to be one of three alphabets developed to write a proto-
Tamil language. Sinhala and Tamil are two of the many languages that developed from Southern Brahmi. 
178 It may be noted that this short monograph was not printed by an American academic press (as his earlier 
book, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka was in 1987), but a small publisher in Chennai 
instead. However, The Untold Story… bears the mark of the writer’s scholarly reputation, as a Tamil 
geographer cited in many other academic works on identity in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. The book may be 
seen as a hybrid of scholarship and activist political writing. 
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present me with “the story”—this story—of the Tamils in ancient times? How does their 
(hi)story relate to other contemporary efforts to claim and inscribe a history for the Tamil 
people of Sri Lanka—a history that is often contrasted with a history of Sri Lanka taken 
to be a history of a Sinhalese nation? And who, in this process of making and writing a 
national history, are “the Tamils”? 
This section of the chapter analyzes the arguments of prominent and widely-
circulating English-language diasporic texts of and about Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka. 
These texts authorize Tamil separatist claims to a distinct national identity and have 
shaped how a diaspora of Tamil nationalist activists narrate their own histories of the 
nation and its struggle. I place these texts in the context of the writers’ other writing and 
political work and discuss how these histories interpenetrate and animate diaspora 
narratives of the nation. 
Writing the Nation 
The writing of Sri Lankan histories, and the genre of political history in particular, 
has largely been a national affair. It is a grand narrative of high politics among elites. In 
this narrative, Ceylon was a “model colony” and independence was gained through 
efficient and effective collaboration with colonial rulers, rather than a mass struggle for 
national independence (Wickramasinghe 1995). An ostensibly smooth transfer of power 
led many scholars and political observers to believe that Ceylon was a promising beacon 
of democracy in Asia (Wriggins 1960; K.M. de Silva 1981). However, subsequent events 
brought to the fore contestations and mobilizations on the basis of language, religion, 
class and caste, as the language of ‘communalism’ was revived, displacing the 
triumphalist narrative of a “model democracy” (Kearney 1967; Russell 1982). The 
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“problem” of communalism eventually gave way to scholarship on “the national 
question”: Was there one Sri Lankan nation, or two nations, Sinhalese and Tamil?  
Early studies of nationalism in Sri Lanka primarily centered on Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism, seeking to explain its emergence and significant trends (K.M. de Silva 1981; 
Roberts 1998[1979])179 or challenge its primordialist assumptions and exclusionary 
claims (Abeysekera and Gunasinghe 1987; Jayawardena 1985; Obeysekere 1984; SSA 
1984.) Several of these texts deconstructed the discursive formation of a Sinhalese-
Buddhist history as a resource for making claims about the present (Daniel 1996; 
Gunawardhana 1990, 1995; Tennekoon 1988, 1990).  
Histories of Tamil nationalism generally fall into one of two categories. The first 
type of history can be broadly construed as nationalist: it is the history of those who are 
writing the future nation-state they wish to see. It is a teleological history that begins and 
ends with “the Tamil nation”; this history’s chronology inevitably results in armed 
struggle to (1) “defend” the Tamil nation and (2) win a separate state to safeguard Tamil 
rights and secure their lives and livelihoods. The second type of history is less a history 
of Tamil nationalism as a total phenomenon than a critical analysis of ethnicity and 
nationalism. This scholarship on Tamil nationalism draws on the modes of criticism 
employed by scholarly analyses of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism cited above and, 
inspired by this literature, initially sought to address a lacuna in studies of its Tamil 
counterpart. Eventually, the rapid growth of militancy and the turn to war after July 1983 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 See also K.M. de Silva’s articles on the Ceylon National Congress (1967, 1972, 1973) and the impact of 
nationalism in Ceylon (1974) in the Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies, which he references in 
de Silva (1981). Roberts’s article focuses on the economic interests of the nationalist reformers who came 
to dominate Ceylon politics, rather than the socialists and radicals. 
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led to much greater academic interest in studying Tamil nationalism, its origins, and its 
political development and forms of cultural expression. 
The first type of history—Tamil nationalist history—is the focus of this chapter 
section, though I draw at times on the second type of history in my analysis. 
Before I turn to a reading of Tamil nationalist histories, this chapter warrants a 
brief discussion of the scholarship that studies and critically analyzes Tamil nationalism. 
This literature focuses less on the historical development of Tamil nationalism—which 
eventually became the primary mode of Tamil politics under the LTTE—than on 
deconstructing nationalist discourses and ideologies. One major contribution of this 
scholarship has been the critique of mythic origins, or namely, Tamil claims to being the 
island’s original population. These mytho-histories refer to a ‘noble’ Dravidian 
civilizational antiquity, and claim a ‘purity’ of language and racial origins, which serve as 
the historical antecedents of a Tamil nation, demonstrating the necessity of a separate 
state to preserve a unique indigenous language, ‘race’ or culture (Coomaraswamy 1987). 
Following from this, scholars have also pointed out the ways in which nationalism entails 
social exclusion and violent expulsions of difference to produce a ‘pure’ Tamil nation 
(Daniel 1996; Jeganathan and Ismail 1995; Manikkalingam 1995; Roberts 2005). 
A related concern has been attention to the treatment of social differences such as 
gender (Coomaraswamy and Perera-Rajasingham 2004; de Mel 1998; Maunaguru 1995; 
Sivamohan 2001) within Tamil nationalism. Such works have typically focused on 
women’s involvement in Tamil militancy (beginning with the EPRLF in 1985), and the 
‘ambivalent empowerment’ (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2001b) this radical change created 
within Jaffna’s gender order, or the anti-feminist politics of the LTTE (Sivamohan 
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2001).180  A few scholars have also written about class and caste (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 
1994a; Kailasapathy [1979]1984; Sivathamby [1979]1984) but have paid less attention to 
specific formations of these differences over the last four decades. The historian Ravi 
Vaitheespara (2006) argues that much of the writing and scholarship critical of LTTE-led 
Tamil nationalism fails to account for the structural, political-economic factors of caste 
and class that led to the rise of militancy and nationalism. Vaitheespara argues that the 
dominant trend in historical writing about contemporary Tamil nationalism has instead 
produced an ‘othering’ of Tamil militancy.181  
Finally, after growing numbers of Tamils fled Sri Lanka, scholars began to write 
about Tamil nationalism among expatriates in the mid-1980s (Coomaraswamy 1987) and 
diaspora populations of immigrants and refugees (Cheran 2000; Fuglerud 1999).  
In what follows, I highlight key themes and discursive features that dominate the 
history and historiography of Tamil nationalism. I focus on the political histories (and a 
political biography) written by the Sri Lankan Tamil political scientist, A. Jeyaratnam 
Wilson (1988, 1994a, 1994b, 2000), but draw parallels to other writings on “Sri Lankan” 
or “Eelam” Tamil nationalism—namely, monographs by S.J. Emmanuel (2004), 
Murugesar Gunasingam (1999, 2008), and V. Navaratnam (1991), among others.182 As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Adele Balasingham (1983) and Schalk (1992) present accounts that claim the liberation of Tamil women 
through their participation in the LTTE’s “Birds of Freedom” women’s unit. For a more general feminist 
discussion of gender in the social formation of Jaffna, see Thiruchandran (1997). Little work has analyzed 
the construction of masculinity in the LTTE or Tamil militancy, but for one brief attempt, see Ismail 
(1992). 
181 Vaitheespara’s point about insufficient attention paid to caste and class in writing about the political 
development of Tamil nationalism is well-taken. His focus on the UTHR(J), a human rights group, as 
exemplary of a tendency to “other” Tamil militancy in historical writing appears somewhat misplaced. 
182 Other nationalist histories written by exiled and diaspora authors but not addressed here include 
Rajasuriar (1993), Arudpragasam (1995), Gunasingam (2012) and the hybrid historical memoir of 
Sivanayagam (2004). For an interesting compilation of articles and memoir, about which I intend to write 
more, see Vaikuntavasan (1992). Finally, Cheran’s (2000) account makes a critical distinction between 
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the most prominent and authoritative academic example of (Sri Lankan) Tamil modern 
history, however, Wilson’s work on nationalism warrants a closer look and provides the 
frame for my analysis. 
A reactive and defensive nationalism. In his book, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, Wilson 
(2000) is concerned with tracing the origins and development of this nationalism 
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Wilson, like many scholars, argues that Tamil 
nationalism in Sri Lanka arose as a defensive reaction to political events on the island: 
namely, discrimination caused by the forces of Sinhalese majoritarianism and 
exclusivism (2000: 11, 82-112). Tamil nationalism does not, however, emerge from 
nowhere. The broad outlines of his argument are as follows:  
Wilson argues that the Ceylon Tamils held a “national awareness” of shared 
language, culture and territory and were “a community apart.” The separateness of this 
identity was, according to him, recognized in the Portuguese and Dutch colonial 
administrations of predominantly Tamil areas as a separate entity, and communal 
representation under the British. This “national awareness,” traced through linguistic, 
cultural and religious revivalist movements led by figures such as Arumuga Navalar and 
C.W. Thamotharam Pillai, was then transformed into a “national consciousness” in the 
years leading up to and following Ceylon’s independence in 1948, a result of the failure 
of successive attempts by Tamil political leaders—from G.G. Ponnambalam, to S.J.V 
Chelvanayakam—to negotiate more political power for Ceylon Tamils. Disaffected with 
older Tamil leaders who had made few gains through electoral politics, Tamil youth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“nationalist” and “liberationist” movements, to suggest the potential of the latter for opening up Tamil 
nationalism. 
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became increasingly militant, transforming the fight for political equality for “a 
community apart” in Sri Lanka to an armed struggle for a separate Tamil state. 
Wilson’s narrative is a popular one in two senses. First, other scholars have 
frequently cited his analysis of Tamil nationalism—perhaps as a result of the political 
scientist’s thorough research and adherence to scholarly protocols, as well as the general 
paucity of scholarship on Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism. Second, Wilson’s book has been 
read, referenced, and commented upon by Tamil political activists (in English), and his 
argument shares much with the predominant interpretations of Tamil political history 
among activists and protesters. This may be seen in Wilson’s description of Tamil 
nationalism as a “defensive reaction.” Similarly, the Catholic priest and activist, S.J. 
Emmanuel writes of a “self-defensive Tamil nationalism” (2004: 39-49). In Emmanuel’s 
view—a view shared by other nationalist writers183—Tamils are united by the shared 
experience of being targets of violence and the need to defend their lives, livelihoods and 
lands.  
Many scholars have taken issue with the interpretation of this period as one of 
‘reactive’ or ‘defensive’ nationalism in response to state exclusion. Dagmar Hellmann-
Rajanayagam (1990a) argues that Tamil nationalism was not simply ‘reactive,’ but also 
influenced by Tamil nationalism in South India, and that the particular contribution of 
Sinhala nationalism was to heighten the sense of being a “Jaffna Tamil,” instead of being 
part of a wider “Tamil” context. Cheran (1992, 2000) also critiques the notion of a 
‘defensive’ nationalism, but does so in the context of political developments within Tamil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 For example, the lawyer, activist and creator of Tamilnation.org, N. Satyendra, describes the Tamil 
nation as one “united in struggle and suffering.” 
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separatism. He argues that it became no longer possible to use the “defensive” label after 
the LTTE’s attacks on civilians and internecine fighting among Tamil militants. 
 Nira Wickramasinghe draws on Wilson’s account of the life and times of FP 
leader, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, to argue that two key events in Tamil mobilization point 
instead to what she calls a “strategic nationalism.” First, she writes that, on November 26, 
1947, Chelvanayakam asked Parliament, “…why the Tamils should not have the right to 
secede from the rest of the country if they desired to do so” (in Wilson 1994a: 25). 
Secondly, in 1953, the FP adopted a resolution to demand the establishment of a Tamil 
university in Trincomalee.  Noting Wilson’s claim that the FP “was seeking in advance to 
safeguard Tamil interests by asking for a Tamil university” (1994a: 46), Wickramasinghe 
argues, “Thus, the Tamil nationalism propounded by the Federal Party was pre-emptive 
and strategic, and motivated by fears that later events proved to be well founded” (2006: 
268). 
Tamil or Ceylon Tamil? The exclusive rhetoric of—Ceylon or Sri Lankan—Tamil 
nationalism is also reflected in the complex politics of naming the people on whose 
behalf a separate state is claimed and fought. There are many Tamil community 
formations on the island of Sri Lanka. Who are the ‘Tamils’ of Tamil nationalism? Tamil, 
as a term referring to an ethno-linguistic formation, contains greater and lesser degrees of 
specificity, depending on the referent. On occasion, “Tamil” has been used to refer to all 
Tamil-speaking people on the island, including those who identify as Muslim and speak 
Tamil.184 Typically, however, the term is used in a more restricted sense; this use of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Tamil-speaking Muslims identify as a separate community of Muslims, and wish to be recognized as 
such rather than subsumed under a general “Tamil” identity, as Ceylon Tamils outnumber and 
metonymically displace other minorities within this category. In the 20th century, Tamil politicians found it 
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“Tamil” refers to a specific group or groups of Tamils. “Tamils of Ceylon” or the 
“Ceylon Tamils,” and more specifically, “Jaffna Tamils,” would increasingly come to be 
referred to as simply “Tamils,” while groups with less social and political power, such as 
the “Plantation” or “Hill-Country Tamils” would be known by their region as much as 
their ethno-linguistic community. Likewise, during the 1930s-1970s, oppressed castes 
had to qualify their use of the word Tamil to describe their political formations—
referring to themselves as “Minority Tamils” and “Depressed Tamils”—to distinguish 
themselves from Vellala political elites who claimed to represent “the Tamils” 
(Pfaffenberger 1990).185 
Scholars did not always take for granted a unified category of “Tamils.” For 
example, Wilson, in an earlier article on the rise of the Federal Party, refers to a Tamil 
understanding of three types of Tamils: “the Jaffna man, the Batticaloa man, and the 
Colombo man” (Wilson 1994b, 2000: 14-16). These archetypes present regional 
differences as the basis for potential social and political schisms among Tamils. 
However, this presentation of regional difference also obscures other regions such as the 
Hill-Country, as well as internal social differentiations of caste, class and gender. The 
scholar recognizes and describes these differences—minus gender—when he presents an 
“ethnographic” account of the Tamil people (2000: 16-25). He argues, however, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
expedient to include Muslims within the category of “Tamil.” For example, the politician, P. Ramanathan 
(1915), turned to ethnology to argue that the “Moors” (as the Muslims were then known) were also Tamils. 
Sri Lankan Muslims have their own political associations and parties, and their own internal political 
struggles. On the Muslim revivalist movement in the late 19th century up to the 1915 Sinhala-Muslim riots, 
see Samaraweera (1998[1979]); for an ethnography of Muslims and Tamils on the east coast of Sri Lanka, 
see McGilvray (2008); finally, on Muslim politics in the 20th and 21st centuries, in the context of the ethnic 
conflict, see Haniffa (2009); Ismail (1995); McGilivray and Raheem (2007). 
185 Pfaffenberger (1990) examines the temple-entry movement of the 1960s, and builds on the insights of 
his 1982 book on caste and Vellala domination in Jaffna. See also the Depressed Tamils’ memorial of 1928 
and petition of 1930, cited in Gunasingam (2005). 
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Sinhala-majority government discrimination unified a diverse population into a people 
when he concludes that, “Thus a people, highly splintered for reasons of caste, region, 
religion (Hindus versus Christians), politics and class, closed ranks when faced with the 
threat of the Sinhala Only movement” (2000, 23, my emphasis). In an earlier work, 
Wilson (1988) also argued that regional differences, in particular, were neutralized by the 
violence experienced by many in 1983 and the war that followed. He remained doubtful 
of the LTTE’s claims to have dissolved caste ties and endogamy, arguing that the war had 
“eroded” the caste system but that social transformations would only modify an “in-built 
hierarchy” of Sri Lankan Tamil society, rather than eliminate it completely (2000: 24-25). 
Ancient kingdoms and traditional homelands. In nationalist histories, invocations of the 
ancient Tamil kingdom of Jaffna often lead to a discussion of what several writers have 
termed “the traditional homelands of the Tamils.” One such text is Rev. S.J. Emmanuel’s 
2004 essay collection, Agonies & Aspirations of the Tamil Struggle. In Emmanuel’s 
reading of the recent past, the post-colonial policies of successive Colombo-based 
governments lead Tamils to realize that their future safety and growth depend on 
“reclaiming their pre-colonial and traditional habitation again as their homeland” (2004: 
41) Emmanuel looks to the past for the Tamils’ political future by “reclaiming” a 
medieval polity as their modern homeland. He also links the “pre-colonial” kingdom to 
the Tamil’s “traditional habitation.” However, the Kingdom of Jaffna ruled over northern 
Sri Lanka, and was not connected to the eastern regions that would be claimed for the 
modern separate state of Tamil Eelam.  
Moreover, the notion of areas of “traditional habitation” excludes Tamils who live 
in the Hill-Country and Southern regions from belonging to the future separate state. This 
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physical exclusion was viewed as historically inevitable and necessary by most 
proponents of Tamil Eelam186, whose claim to a national territory relied on a political 
rationality of “indigeneity.” Hill-Country Tamils could not make this claim, given their 
relatively recent migration from India to Sri Lanka. Whereas some Tamil nationalists 
were willing to “write off” the Southern Tamil (Ismail 2000), Wilson (1988) reconciled 
this exclusion differently. He suggested that Tamils living outside the North and East 
would have to move to Tamil Eelam to avoid retaliatory violence in a Sinhala state. In 
Tamil Eelam, it was claimed, they would receive full citizenship and the protection of a 
Tamil state. 
The necessity of a separate state. Having claimed to establish a historical basis for a 
traditional Tamil homeland, separate and apart from the island’s Sinhalese majority, these 
texts all end with a call for separation. For example, in his book, The Fall and Rise of the 
Tamil Nation, V. Navaratnam, the former Federal Party Member of Parliament for Kayts, 
writes of his own realization of this trajectory, 
I came to the conclusion that there would be no lasting solution for the ills 
of the Tamils unless they separate from the Singhalese and establish their 
own government in the homeland territory of the ancient Tamil kingdom 
which roughly covers in modern times the Tamil Northern and Eastern 
provinces. There is no other solution (1991: 18). 
 
For Navaratnam, an ancient Tamil kingdom’s realm of power can be mapped onto the 
contemporary boundaries of predominantly Tamil provinces – lines drawn and reified by 
Ceylon’s successive colonial administrations. The claim to a traditional homeland 
territory provides justification for the postcolonial necessity of a separate state. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 The militant group EROS was a notable exception, as their maps of Tamil Eelam included districts in 
the Hill-Country region. For a document that draws the cartographic boundaries of the would-be state, see 
ex-surveyor Sinnatamby’s (1983) thamizh eezham naattu ellaikal (The Boundaries of Tamil Eelam). 
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Navaratnam’s monograph builds a case for separation by documenting his experiences in 
Sri Lankan politics. In this narrative, every time the Tamils protested, the protesters—
and, at times, non-protesters—were met with violence, organized by successive Sinhala-
dominated governments through unjust policies and pogroms. For Navaratnam, this 
violence had become inevitable, and made living together as fellow-citizens impossible. 
Sinhala violence had to be met with Tamil violence, in a “war of independence” (rather 
than a civil war), to secure a future state and the “resumption” of an earlier sovereignty 
for the Tamils of Eelam.  
Wilson’s writings, alongside Manogaran and Gunasingam’s texts, can thus be 
understood as the academic version of what Qadri Ismail calls, “the autobiography of 
Tamil nationalism”: the story of how an always-already existent Tamil nationalism came 
to be, as narrated and written by Tamil activists and scholars (2000, 2005: 105).187 These 
scholars’ academic writings buttress the work of their activist contemporaries like 
Navaratnam and Emmanuel. Tamil nationalist activists have, consequently, found in 
Wilson’s account authoritative support for their claims to a separate state. Reading 
Wilson, Ismail deems the political scientist’s later writings, beginning with The Break-Up 
of Sri Lanka in 1987, “his petition for a separate Tamil-majority state” (2005: 105).  
For Wilson, electoral politics is the primary field for an emerging Tamil national 
consciousness in the twentieth century. He finds this to be the case in the formation of 
new Tamil political parties (1944 and 1949-51), and later, in the coalitional politics of the 
“united fronts.”188 Wilson writes that two communities—the Tamils and Sinhalese—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
188 Although the TUF and TULF were performatively named “united fronts” there remained differences 
among the front’s constituents. 
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trusted one another enough in the first two decades of the twentieth century for two 
Ceylon Tamils (P. Arunachalam and P. Ramanathan) to be leaders of the Ceylon National 
Congress. The Tamils viewed themselves “equal partners” of the Sinhalese, and both as 
“the founding races” of the island, only for the latter mantle to be usurped by a Sinhalese-
majoritarian leadership: 
“However, problems began to surface with the extension of the 
franchise…” and as a result, “…from the early 1920s onwards the Ceylon 
Tamils found themselves on the periphery” of the island’s national politics 
(179).  
Wilson goes on to argue that leaders such as Arunachalam and Ramanathan then 
shifted from their stance of “all-island unity” to the “preservation of Ceylon Tamil 
interests.” Where Wilson finds “national consciousness” emerging in this period of the 
early 1920s, Gunasingam locates the conception and “the birth of Tamil nationalism” at 
this time. He finds this in the Manning reforms of 1921, the formation of the Tamil 
Mahajana Sabhai in Jaffna on August 15 of that year by ex-CNC leader, P. Arunachalam 
and colleagues, as well as Arunachalam’s founding of the Ceylon Tamil League in 1923 
(2008: 425-427). Wilson writes that with the sidelining of Ceylon Tamils in all-island 
politics, “Democracy had now come to be tantamount to rule by the ethnic majority…” 
(179-80).189 Ultimately, however, Wilson argues that the discriminatory policies of 
Sinhalese-dominated governments in general, and the Sirimavo Bandaranaike 
governments of 1960-65 and 1970-77 particular, led to the emergence of Tamil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189  Interestingly, Wilson does not examine whether the political rationality of liberal democracy itself 
might have contributed to majority rule. He instead implies that Sri Lankan democracy has deviated from a 
liberal democratic ideal in its handling of minorities’ concerns and rights.  
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nationalism in Sri Lanka as “a serious force” in the 1970s—and not before then (2000: 
83).190  
I contend that this seemingly straightforward history of Tamil and Sri Lankan 
politics elides the ways in which Tamil and Sinhala identities, as well as the distinct 
social and political identities of Muslims and the Malaiyaha or Hill-Country Tamils, have 
emerged within a changing and contested polity. Moreover, this form of writing history 
posits a unified and seamless identity among ethnic groups, such that the designation of a 
“Tamil” political identity makes sense across historical periods, whether in 1833, 1921 or 
1972. Such a history has focused on moments of ideological unity, rather than the 
differences and points of contention within those groups, such as caste and region. 
In spite of the above authors’ implicit claims to ‘objectively’ present ‘the facts,’ 
these are politically engaged histories that recognize the value of the past as a political 
resource for claims about the present and future. They hope that their understanding of 
how and why Tamil nationalism emerged will contribute to establishing Tamil political 
sovereignty on the island by demonstrating the historical evidence for a Tamil homeland 
(especially in the case of Manogaran), its political necessity (Wilson), or both 
(Gunasingam). Although they historicize “the rise of Tamil nationalism,” these authors 
also take this nation to be self-evident today (see, e.g. Gunasingam 2008: xiii-ix). Their 
historical explanations and justifications call forth the nation-state to-be. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 This is to say that although Wilson finds historical roots for the emergence of Tamil nationalism in the 
nineteenth century revival movements and the politics of late independence, he locates its political force in 
recent times. His argument stands in contrast to other nationalist writers like Gunasingam who locate a 
fully-formed nationalism in the early twentieth century, or Manogaran and activists like S.J. Emmanuel and 
V.N. Navaratnam who assert ancient origins for a Tamil national identity.   
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Histories of the state focus on moments critical to state formation—the events that 
consolidate or threaten the unity of state power.191 Although these events are important 
markers in some Tamil activists’ histories, they are invoked with reference to a struggle 
within and/or against the state, and as such, can be invested with very different social 
meanings. On the other hand, many nationalist activists narrate histories that culminate in 
the formation of their own state: Tamil Eelam. In doing so, their counter-histories partake 
of the same rhetoric as the official histories they aim to contest or expand. 
Indeed, the LTTE also wrote histories of the Tamil nation they sought to 
liberate.192 As the historian Steven Kemper notes (in a monograph otherwise dedicated to 
the presence of the past in Sinhala history), the LTTE increasingly used Tamil historical 
records to justify the existence of Tamil Eelam (1991: 108, 144). They prevented the 
teaching of Sri Lankan history in areas under their control, which included schools 
dependent on government funding.193 These histories were written to inculcate a sense of 
‘national feeling’ (thesiya pattru) among Tamil schoolchildren. LTTE cadre visited 
schools and delivered lectures on the nation and its history—a singular one, in their 
narrative. LTTE history in schools was patterned on the histories imparted to LTTE 
recruits during their political (re)education, from the beginnings of the organization. They 
also distributed to local teachers and principals exams on the history of the LTTE, and 
returned to collect them (Human Rights Watch 2004: 22-23). In this way, the LTTE 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 See Mayaram (2004) for further discussion of the politics of history and myth in South Asia. In the Sri 
Lankan context, see Hellmann-Rajanayagam (1990a), Kemper (1991) and Daniel (1996, 1990). 
192 For one English-language example of this history, see Towards Liberation. 
193 This was perhaps unsurprising, as the Sri Lankan government supplied schools with social studies 
textbooks that narrate a Sinhala nationalist history of Sri Lanka even in Tamil-language textbooks. In 
Sinhala-medium schools, textbooks celebrate Sinhala kings who vanquished Tamil enemies, and other 
negative images of minorities. 
	   171	  
enlisted Tamil children to believe in the righteousness of their struggle. More broadly, 
Tamils of the North and East—and as I discuss in the next chapter, many diaspora 
Tamils—were interpellated as the citizens of a Tamil nation and its future state 
(described by many as a de facto one).  
History had become such a powerful narrative that, in addition to managing its 
writing and dissemination within the territories they held, the LTTE also sought to 
control writers abroad. In May 1994, A. Sabalingam, a Paris-based writer and activist 
who had co-founded the mānavar peravai, was shot dead. He was known as a witness to 
the early years of Tamil militancy in the 1970s, and was said to be writing a history of 
this period. His killing was attributed to the LTTE. When the Toronto-based Tamil 
Resource Centre (TRC) mourned Sabalingam’s death with a public event in 1994, their 
offices and library (Thedakam) were burned down.194 This was the power of history in 
Tamil politics: A “spiral of death and destruction” as noted by Hellmann-Rajanayagam at 
the beginning of this chapter. As the Tamil writer, Taraki (Dharmaratnam Sivaram), 
wrote in a tribute to Sabalingam, in an article published in the Canadian Tamil journal, 
Thayagam (Motherland), “For the Tigers to assert a monopoly right over Tamil politics, 
they must logically affirm a monopoly over its history too” (cited in UTHR(J) 2005; see 
also Sivaram 1994). 
In contrast to this “monopoly” over history and politics, the next section of this 
chapter uses life histories to examine the ways in which Tamil activists—whether 
nationalist or dissenting—narrate their community’s political history through their 
personal experiences of militancy and activism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 This was the second time the TRC was targeted with arson. The first occurred in 1989. The TRC was 
formed by former militants (primarily from PLOTE and TELO) who were vocal critics of the LTTE.  
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Genealogies of Tamil Militancy and Diaspora Activism 
In writing about Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict and war, social scientists and 
journalists writing for a wider audience tend to focus on the period after 1983. While this 
may be preceded by a few notes on the political events that led to violence, neither the 
constitutional reforms and electoral politics of the post-independence period, nor the 
grassroots mobilization of the 1960s and 1970s figures in the emergence of militancy and 
war. Such accounts are less interested in the social, economic and political 
transformations that led to war than with apprehending violence (Jeganathan 2003) as an 
object apart from context.195 When violence has a context, culturalist explanations or 
descriptions of a charismatic leadership have prevailed.196 On the other hand, when 
scholars such as Wilson and Gunasingam write about Tamil politics, seeking to give 
historical context and understanding for the emergence of war, they do not historicize 
their categories, taking for granted notions of a unified “Tamil community” or “identity.” 
Tamil activists’ narratives supplement and, at times, challenge these authoritative 
historical accounts. Even as Tamil nationalist activists tell histories and personal stories 
that converge with scholarly nationalist histories, they at times present contradictory 
information, offering events and new insights left out by Tamil political histories. 
Moreover, dissenting activists offer a critical reading of such histories—whether the 
nationalist narratives of other Tamil activists, or scholarship—that confronts and 
questions some of the central assumptions of dominant Tamil political histories.  Taken 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Accounts of Sinhala violence are not immune to this approach. See, for example, Bruce Kapferer (1988) 
on a cultural ontology of violence among the Sinhalese. For critiques of this work, see especially Scott 
(1994), Daniel (1996) (as well as his 1989 American Anthropologist review) and Spencer (1990b). 
196 See, for example, Roberts (2005), and Roberts (1996) on ‘filial cults’ in Tamil martyrdom. 
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together, I argue that activist narratives create an alternate genealogy of the Tamil 
political post-1970 (the decade in which Tamil nationalism is said to emerge as a “serious 
force”), and one that allows us to historicize the very notions of a Tamil community and 
identity.  
The standard nationalist narrative of the rise of the LTTE focuses on the group’s 
military prowess, with the LTTE exemplifying commitment to the armed struggle and its 
goals, and thus maintaining leadership of the people, as compared to other militant 
organizations (Wilson 2000). The latter are deemed ‘quislings’ and ‘traitors’ to the nation 
(Thiranagama 2010).197 Tamil nationalist activists’ accounts follow this line of historical 
analysis—indeed, their ideological apparatus also shapes nationalist scholarly histories.  
This chapter is in general agreement with the approach of Sri Lankan historian, 
Nira Wickramasinghe who writes about the historiography of Tamil politics, nationalism, 
and armed struggle in her general history of the island, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A 
History of Contested Identities (2006). In “The Search for Sovereignty: Tamil 
Separatism/Nationalism,” Wickramasinghe writes that a reading of some of the main 
work on Tamil nationalism—Tamil scholars such as Wilson, Gunasingam, and Cheran, 
and many others—reveals two conventional treatments of the subject.198 The first, as 
discussed above, seeks to identify phases in a continuum of Tamil nationalism; 
Wickramasinghe suggests that this line of analysis looks for substance in the early 
twentieth century. Within this strand of national historiography, some scholars demarcate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 For one example of militant literature that addresses this accusation by the LTTE, see Premachandran 
(1993: 6). In this address, the EPRLF leader also describes “the real traitors to our cause” as those who 
ridiculed his organization’s perspective on India’s role in the conflict. The EPRLF split in 1999, and 
Premachandran’s faction, EPRLF-Suresh, left with most of the group’s funds and joined forces politically 
with the LTTE. 
198 Wickramasinghe also draws on Kearney (1967) and Tambiah (1986). 
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two successive phases of Tamil mobilization: political and military. The second line is 
concerned with the origins of militant separatism, finding it to be either 1) a crisis within 
Tamil society or 2) a reaction to state oppression (253). Neither of these arguments 
proves satisfactory on their own. Rather than take an either/or approach to the question of 
the origins of Tamil separatism, Wickramasinghe attempts a reading that includes dissent 
and multiple strands within Tamil nationalism, recognizing that contradictions within 
Tamil society compounded the state’s unfair treatment of minorities. In addition, I argue 
that paying attention to the distinctions of caste, class, gender, region and religion in 
Tamil society leads us to a fuller and more nuanced understanding of Sri Lankan and 
diaspora Tamil formations of political community and activism. 
Kanthan: The diaspora’s role 
I met Kanthan in Chennai while conducting fieldwork in Tamil Nadu, India, 
among refugees from Sri Lanka. Kanthan was good friends with Chandrahasan, the 
leader of OfERR, the organization discussed in Chapter 2. They knew each other from 
their activist work in the 1970s and 1980s; Chandrahasan was the son of S.J.V. 
Chelvanayagam, the leader of the Tamil Federal Party, and had once been a supporter of 
the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO). Kanthan, on the other hand, was with 
the more left-oriented Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS). He was 
visiting Chennai to participate in a conference on the Tamil national question. I had 
already met his daughter, a volunteer at OfERR, and had met a few of his relatives in 
Toronto. 
In February 2010, I traveled to the United Kingdom to follow up with some 
activists. I visited Kanthan at his home, in a suburb outside London. He had lived there 
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since 1965. In 1968, he became involved with the British Labour Party. His activism 
continued with Sri Lankan politics, as he became one of the early members of EROS. 
Kanthan remembers being one of the first Sri Lankans in this small city. “There 
were no families here,” he says. By 1977, however, he describes a “massive” number of 
young professionals moving to the area. Anti-Tamil riots had spurred the migration of 
some Tamils, while others were students unable to attend Sri Lankan universities due to 
‘standardization’ and were now studying in the UK, continental Europe, and the Soviet 
Union. At this time, some young men contacted Kanthan: 
One of those guys who was here had made some contact with 
organizations abroad to train Tamil youngsters [i.e. youth]. They needed a 
public face—someone who can go and talk to other people, to generate 
funds, and things like that, to set up that organization. And people said, 
“You’re the best guy, because you’re in politics, you know the politics. 
Second, you have got a face… within the Tamil community, I had 
integrity, as it were. People would trust me. Because all these things are 
going to work on trust. 
 
This, Kanthan tells me, is how he became involved with the setting up of 
EROS.199 Established in 1975 by Eliyathamby Ratnasabapathy in London and V. 
Balakumar in Madras, EROS had a leftist orientation to the Tamil question, and was less 
concerned with separatism than mobilizing a people’s revolution against the Sri Lankan 
state.200 Before the Tigers had established a presence abroad—a presence that would 
grow into a global network—EROS was the first group to mobilize Tamil students, exiles 
and expatriates in the UK. In 1977, the group set up GUES, the General Union of Eelam 
Students, which provided a forum for students to engage with the Tamil national question 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 The group was also sometimes known as the Eelam Revolutionary Organizers. 
200 Wilson (1988) notes that the organization “specializes in economic warfare.” Other scholarly accounts 
make reference to group’s efforts in political education. 
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in their universities, hold debates, and participate in an annual conference. Student 
activists in GUES also recruited enthusiastic youth to train abroad and return to Sri Lanka 
to fight for the cause of Eelam. Kanthan describes the symbiotic and formative 
relationship between diaspora politics and Tamil militancy on the island at this time: 
Everyone had enough trust, enough commitment. I mean, in Sri Lanka 
these guys who were going to England were coming back here to carry on 
the resistance movement, so that motivated the guys on the ground, and at 
the same time encouraged them to go into these areas [?]. Same thing, the 
guys here, they wanted to do something back home, and they went back. 
These two gelled together. 
The youth who came to EROS were more involved with nationalism than the leftist 
politics of the 1950s and 1960s that had formed Kanthan’s political life.  
We tried to open their eyes and say, “Look, this is not a war against the 
Sinhalese. The state is the problem we have, not the Sinhala people.” 
 
EROS made contact with Khalil al-Wazir201 of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, and through such connections, they were able to send some young Tamil 
men to PLO camps in Lebanon for firearms training. These militants went on to train 
other recruits in Sri Lanka (and eventually, India).202 At the same time, the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, hereafter used interchangeably with Tigers) were 
emerging in Jaffna as a formidable foe of the state. Whereas the Tigers focused on 
guerrilla operations against the Sri Lankan army, police, and banks, EROS felt it was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 al-Wazir was also known as Abu Jihad, or “Father of the Struggle,” and was a co-founder of the secular 
nationalist Palestinian political movement and guerrilla organization, Two parallels can be drawn to EROS: 
Fatah was also formed by students and professionals in the diaspora ,and both groups set up parallel 
students’ unions. Yasser Arafat was a one-time head of the General Union of Palestinian Students at Cairo 
University, a union that EROS emulated in setting up GUES. 
202 EROS militants eventually trained the early LTTE and PLOTE members as well. 
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more important for their members to “move within the community” and in doing so, 
“mobilize the people to liberate themselves.” 
The TULF continued to do parliamentary politics—becoming the first and only 
Tamil political party in Opposition—while young Tamils became impatient with a 
politics that, in their view, had failed to ensure their rights and safety.203 EROS eventually 
determined that the TULF could not carry forward the Tamil struggle; this conclusion 
was shared by many Tamil youth at the time. They decided to work separately from the 
TULF. With the unofficial sanction of the TULF, the LTTE was operating throughout the 
North.204 EROS then decided to work in the East. The organization needed someone to 
represent the youth internationally, and this became Kanthan’s role. 
EROS set up another organization in parallel with GUES. Kanthan notes that after 
the 1977 riots, expatriate Tamils felt that they needed a strong organization to help the 
Tamils ‘back home.’ That year, EROS also established the Standing Committee of 
Tamils (SCOT), an umbrella group for over twenty Tamil organizations in the UK.205 
Unlike the students of GUES and their peers, few UK residents intended to return to Sri 
Lanka. Instead, they focused their efforts on providing aid to displaced Tamils throughout 
the island. SCOT attracted professionals who primarily raised funds for Tamil refugees’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 At this time, the state was becoming increasingly authoritarian under J.R. Jayawardene, who had 
become the country’s first Executive President after his government’s 1978 Constitution made him so 
204 Amirthalingam’s connection to “the boys” was not admitted publicly, but allowed him to deal with 
Colombo as a “moderate” by comparison (Narayan Swamy 1994: 62). 
205 The committee was led by three medical doctors in the UK, including Dr. K Arumugam of EROS, and 
Dr. C. J. Thamotheram. 
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rehabilitation in Sri Lanka after the 1977 riots, as well as those affected by the violence 
that followed in 1981 and 1983.206 
Kanthan argues that the diaspora—“the expats,” as he alternately refers to Tamils 
living outside Sri Lanka at this time—were at the helm of the next phase of the struggle. 
Once the TULF declared their aims for a sovereign state of Tamil Eelam at 
Vaddukoddai207, politicized youth made connections to Tamils abroad, seeking their help 
to mobilize funds and political support to help the cause. Their migration as students and 
young professionals created the beginning of a network that would continue to 
internationalize the Tamil struggle; with the LTTE’s domination of the struggle by 1990, 
a networked diaspora would also provide the financial means to keep the war going in the 
decades to come. 
Kanthan’s story about how he got involved in Sri Lankan politics and ‘the Tamil 
national question’ reveals several important things. First, as someone who was part of the 
first group of post-independence migrants to the Britain, Kanthan complicates Daniel’s 
tripartite schema of phases of Tamil immigration to Britain (1996: 154-193), being of 
neither the group of Phase 1 elite professionals, nor of the students of Phase 2. The first 
phase of multiethnic elites arrived during the 1950s and 1960s, and coped with “the 
unavailableness of the nation” by remaining distant from politics and recent Tamil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 SCOT, now the Standing Committee of Tamil-Speaking People, is still active today as a registered UK 
charity. They provide financial scholarships to Tamil children and youth, and conduct medical camps in 
various regions of the island, with a recent focus on the post-war Northern Province. They write, “We feel 
that the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora continues to be a powerful force for good, that has both a great 
opportunity and responsibility to help those Tamils in need of assistance in Sri Lanka. There is enormous 
compassion and willingness amongst our community to make a positive contribution to the reconstruction 
the civil society of a post-war Sri Lanka” (SCOT, 2012, About). 
207 As discussed above, the TULF demand for a separate state was influenced by the increasingly militant 
politics of its Youth Front. 
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migrants; instead, they nationalized their past by ‘recovering’ a Tamil and Hindu cultural 
heritage (156-7, 173-5). Unlike this group, Kanthan, though from a comfortable family, 
became actively involved in the British left and Sri Lankan Tamil politics; he was at ease 
among the Phase 2 immigrants and students with whom he organized in the late 1970s. 
Second, Kanthan’s story presents a counternarrative to scholarly histories of the 
Sri Lankan war. According to these writers, Tamil militancy emerged entirely within Sri 
Lanka, and was later ‘exported’ to Tamil immigrants and refugees living in large diaspora 
communities established after the anti-Tamil violence of July 1983.  They cite July 
1983—in which the Sri Lankan government demonstrated a callous disregard for Tamil 
lives, and which was later revealed to be state-organized208—as the beginning of the war. 
Thousands of youth flocked to already-existing militant organizations to fight the state, 
and new organizations were created. As discussed in the previous chapter, while some 
Tamils left the country shortly after 1983, the vast majority of Tamil migrants left Sri 
Lanka during the late 1980s and 1990s. This, it is said, is the period during which 
diaspora nationalism became increasingly crucial to funding and politically supporting 
the war.   
Instead, Kanthan suggests that an early group of expatriates—many of whom now 
see themselves as part of a diaspora—were involved with militancy from the beginnings 
of the Tamil nationalist struggle against the Sri Lankan state. “Militancy” here refers to 
both political militancy and armed actions against the state, much of which was located in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Wilson (1988) raises the question of whether the violence was “pre-planned.” He cites a letter from 
George Immerwahr of the UN, who wrote of a friend who, as a Sri Lankan civil servant, helped plan the 
riots on the orders of his superiors. For another contemporary account, see Committee on Rational 
Development 1984. Also see Siriwardene and Perera-Rajasingham (2003) for essays reflecting on the 
violence of Black July. 
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Jaffna in the 1970s. The expatriates/diaspora to whom he refers belonged to organizations 
that were sidelined as the LTTE took over the Tamil struggle by eliminating their rivals.  
Kanthan asserts that the LTTE had little support from Tamil expatriates at the 
beginning of the struggle. He finds there were several reasons for this. First, the LTTE 
was more concerned with a military struggle against the state than a political one, and 
focused its efforts on Jaffna. Second, at this early stage of militancy, the LTTE’s focus on 
military strength at the expense of politics was not compelling to an earlier generation of 
Tamil immigrants who had come to Britain in the 1950s and 1960s. These immigrants 
had left Ceylon during the non-violent satyagraha of the Federal Party, and were less 
disposed toward the Tigers’ brand of militaristic Tamil nationalism. A third related point 
is that these immigrants were of upper-middle and middle-class, upper caste vellala 
backgrounds, while the LTTE leadership was primarily petty-bourgeois and of the 
karaiyar, a seafaring caste (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994a).209 
Thus, it was not until the 1990s, when the LTTE had taken over the struggle in Sri 
Lanka, that the organization turned primarily to the diaspora for fundraising, and 
increasingly, political support to internationalize their fight for a separate state of Tamil 
Eelam. By this time, Jaffna Tamils who had lived through the war and the army’s 
occupation of their lands had migrated abroad.  
David: former political prisoner and Canadian Tamil activist 
 When I began fieldwork in Toronto, I met with Aravind, a member of the CTSA 
who was one of the first people I had met while doing research on the Pongu Thamil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 There are variations in the castes and forms of hierarchy among Tamils in Sri Lanka. On caste in Jaffna, 
see Banks (1960), David (1977), Pfaffenberger (1982) and Sivathamby (1995). In Batticaloa, see Whitaker 
(1999) on caati, and McGilvray 2007. 
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(Tamil Uprising) event in 2004. He asked if I was interested in meeting “different kinds 
of people,” and suggested I meet with David, the spokesperson of the Canadian Tamil 
Congress (CTC), a national organization that claims to represent the “unified voice of 
Canadian Tamils.” Aravind told me that David was willing to talk to anyone; when a 
national security reporter wrote about the Tamil struggle and the CTC in a negative light, 
David invited him to lunch “to explain and persuade him to understand our side of the 
story.” He was very committed to his role as a national spokesperson. Aravind described 
David as “different” from other community activists he knew for two reasons: David was 
from Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province, while most Toronto Tamils hailed from Jaffna, and 
his activism was strongly influenced by his personal experiences with state violence.   
 When we first met, I asked David a question that many Tamils ask of one another: 
“Where are you from [in Sri Lanka]?”210 David explained that he was born and raised in 
Periyakallai, a small village on the outskirts of Batticaloa in the Eastern Province, where 
he was born in 1956 to a Tamil Methodist family. He calls Canada his adopted land. 
Next, I asked him what I thought would be a simple question: “Have you lived anywhere 
else in Sri Lanka?” Where?” I quickly learned that this question, though intended to ease 
us into a discussion of politics, was already a political one: David explained that he had 
worked for two years in Colombo. Then he paused, and revised his answer: When he was 
taken into detention, he stayed in several different parts of the country. 
I asked David if he knew why he had been detained: 
I don’t know why I was detained. For three years of my life, I was put 
behind bars. So in the course of my life, they traveled me, this was not my 
choice. They took me around all of Sri Lanka. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Ningal entha ur? A more literal translation could be, “Which home-village are you?” 
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David’s use of the word “travel” in a transitive form indicates his lack of control over the 
situation – he was held and moved against his will from location to location. His narrative 
of “traveling” around Sri Lanka stands in marked contrast to the “all-island tours” 
university students enjoyed before embarking on their adult lives and professional 
careers. Unlike those tours, organized by/for an earlier generation of multi-ethnic 
Ceylonese students, David’s “tour” was of state jails filled with young Tamil men.  
Again, I asked if he was given any kind of “reason” for his arrest and detention: 
 
They didn’t give any reason. In 1979…. (aside) You know in Sri Lanka, 
they change the constitution like we change a car’s tires here! (laughs) It’s 
very sad to see that—they could have changed the constitution to address 
the Tamil grievances, but they didn’t do that, they do that for other things. 
 
David briefly outlined Sri Lanka’s constitutional changes in 1972 and 1978, 
which were made without consulting Tamil political leaders. He then described 
the events that led to his arrest: 
So, in September 1979, they [the government] wanted to celebrate [the 
second Republic’s first anniversary] as an important day, so Tamils in 
North and East, youth leaders of the TULF came, addressed the gathering, 
told [us] how it’s bad for us, and [on the] second day, they issued 
pamphlets, condemning the celebrations. Police came and arrested them, 
just for issuing pamphlets. Can you imagine, whether that could happen 
anywhere here?  
I was a youth at this time, I was witnessing this incident with other youth, 
I thought it was an injustice, just for issuing pamphlets, police were taking 
someone into custody. So, I went around town and asked shopkeepers to 
close their shops to protest this. And they did, they did listen to me, to our 
argument, so they did it. For doing this, I was taken in! The next one year, 
that was it, I mean, I was [unclear] they filed a case, they—they say that 
it’s a conspiracy. I was committing an anti-government conspiracy. What 
kind of conspiracy is that, asking people to protest in a democratic way? 
Then they charged us, and filed a case, after one year, I was able to come 
out, finally it was thrown out, the judge ridiculed it. 
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In 1979, Jayawardene’s government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). The 
PTA allowed the government to hold prisoners indefinitely without trial, and was deemed 
necessary for national security.  
After David was released in 1980, he completed his studies and started a job, only 
to learn in 1981 that the police were looking for him again. This second arrest led to his 
imprisonment in several jails around the country. David learned about the events of 1983, 
and the start of the war, while he was in prison. In 1985, he was almost beaten to death by 
the guards. 
David’s release from jail was just as arbitrary as his detention. Thousands of 
political prisoners and detainees were released under the terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord 
in 1987. David was one of them. His wife had moved to Jaffna, and he tried to find work. 
When the war started again, he decided he had finally had enough, and that his life could 
be in danger once again. David and his family left Sri Lanka for Canada in 1990.   
 He spent the next several years reestablishing his life in Canada. Finding work 
was difficult at first. “Canada humbles you,” he tells me, when relating his career path. 
His first job as a security guard eventually led to a managerial role. Once he felt “settled,” 
David got involved with community activism and politics once more. He joined the 
Canadian Tamil Congress, an organization founded in 2000 to be a “community voice” 
that advocates for Tamils in Canada. He took on a leading role within the organization, 
and became its National Spokesperson. The CTC dealt with many issues specific to the 
lives of Tamils in Canada (issues which I discuss in Chapter 4), but connected to these 
was its approach to “the situation back home.” In his work as a CTC spokesperson, David 
worked with other activists to get Canada more involved in the Sri Lankan peace process 
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of 2002-2004, and to take a stronger stand against the Sri Lankan government; he and the 
CTC felt that Canada’s federal government blamed the LTTE for the violence, and that a 
subsequent ban on the organization would embolden the Sri Lankan government to fight 
the LTTE to the finish. The CTC as an organization did not publicly express support for 
either party to the conflict, but in personal conversations among Tamils, David was not 
afraid to make his views known: To him, the LTTE were leading the Tamils in a struggle 
for national liberation. 
Rathan: The political thalaivar 
Rathan was born in the port town of Kankesanthurai (KKS), at the northernmost 
tip of the Jaffna peninsula, in 1960. At the age of nine or ten, he says, he started to 
become interested in politics. He was an avid reader of the Tamil newspapers, and had 
learned that the SLFP government was discriminating against Tamils by implementing a 
“standardization” policy throughout the universities. Tamil politics was everywhere in 
KKS. Rathan recalls listening to Federal Party speeches in his hometown, and the 
demands made in the party’s campaigns for Tamil rights. He also remembers seeing the 
crowds of people who had come from all over the island to campaign for Chelvanayakam 
in the by-election of 1972, after the FP leader had resigned his seat to protest the lack of 
Tamil consultation on the republican constitution of that year. As he became older, 
Rathan joined the TULF’s Ilaignar Peravai (Youth Front). However he, like many 
radical youth at the time, became impatient with the Tamil MPs, who were often 
described as “Tamil moderates.”211 “They aren’t getting our rights, just our votes,” He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 The phrase, Tamil moderates, was used to describe those who disavowed militancy. The TULF under 
the leadership of Amirthalingam made a strategic (though flawed) use of this discourse of moderation: The 
Youth Front and Tamil militants shared overlapping leaderships, but in Parliament, Amirthalingam and his 
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recalled. The force of the state loomed large in Rathan’s youth in KKS– the Palaly 
military camp was nearby, and “they had the police, the army, the navy… and we had 
nothing. But at the same time, we had… we were very influenced by our language and 
‘national feelings’ from a very young age.” 
In 1975, when he was fifteen, Rathan met Velupillai Prabhakaran, the now-
infamous leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Prabhakaran had come to live 
with his family for three months while in hiding. During this time, Rathan had several 
opportunities to talk with Prabhakaran. Even though Rathan was a chinna podiyan (“little 
boy,” or just a boy), Prabhakaran could see that he was interested in politics. They 
discussed the use of ahimsa (non-violence) in Indian anti-colonial nationalist struggle for 
independence from British rule, and Prabhakaran encouraged Rathan to read about 
Bhagat Singh’s role in that freedom struggle (suthantira porāttam).212 They also 
discussed the other ‘struggle’ that was taking place in their time: the Cold War conflict 
between democracy and communism. Rathan introduced other people to Prabhakaran, 
while maintaining the secrecy needed to associate with a fugitive wanted by the state. He 
notes that at this time, Prabhakaran was very much a Tamil nationalist, while he and 
others were left-oriented and tried to influence his thinking on those lines. 
After the events of 1983, Rathan became “fully involved” in propaganda for the 
national struggle (thēciya porāttam), holding meetings, issuing posters, pamphlets and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
MPs denied any links between the TULF and militancy. See Wilson (2000) and Narayan Swamy (1994). 
The binary distinction between “Tamil militants” and “Tamil moderates” continued throughout the war, 
and holds sway even today.  
212 Bhagat Singh was an Indian socialist revolutionary whose use of violence in the Indian independence 
movement contrasted starkly with Gandhi’s non-violent methods. He was involved in the murder of a 
British police officer—an act of revenge for the death of another revolutionary, Lala Lajpat Rai. His 
hanging, at the age of 23, drew many youth to the fight for independence. 
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books. Rathan was arrested for over six months. He recalled being handcuffed to other 
Tamil prisoners and tortured during interrogations, until he was released. 
Rathan’s next arrest took place when he was twenty-four years old, just as he was 
preparing to go to university to study math, physics and chemistry. He remembered the 
exact date: May 25, 1984. Instead, he was arrested by the Sri Lankan army. He had been 
married for two years, and his wife was seven months pregnant. He was held for thirty-
one months without charge. When he was finally charged, for “failing to provide 
information about terrorism,” he received a token three-week sentence. Rathan’s arrest 
was a defining moment for him, and many Tamil activists of his age. Young men were 
especially susceptible to arrest, but as I discuss in later stories and interactions, women of 
this generation were also arrested.  
Upon his release at the end of 1986, Rathan decided to join the political wing of 
the movement. The Sri Lankan Army had just started “Operation Liberation.” One week 
after Rathan returned to Jaffna with his family, Prabhakaran returned from Madras. When 
the two met, Rathan said he wanted to work for the struggle. Prabhakaran told him to “Go 
outside and work.” Rathan took a boat to Madras, where he met Anton and Adele 
Balasingam. In August of that year, the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed, and Rathan was 
anxious to know the situation in Jaffna. His return, like the accord’s ceasefire, was short-
lived. Prabhakaran asked him to return to Madras in October. Rathan worked with the 
LTTE’s Kittu to publish exposés of the IPKF’s atrocities, network with local activists, 
and organize public discussions and campaigns to demand that India’s government 
withdraw its forces and support “the people’s real aspirations.” Eventually, the Tamil 
Nadu government held him under house arrest. In 1989, Rathan left India via a flight 
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from Kathmandu, Nepal, to France and Germany, crossed the border into Switzerland, 
and sought asylum. In 1990, he became the head coordinator (poruppālar) of the Swiss 
Tamil Coordinating Committee. He lived there for eight years, until he was forced to step 
down from his position, and decided to move to Canada (as discussed in Chapter 1).213  
Taken together, the stories of David and Rathan illustrate several commonalities I 
found among Tamil activists who came of age in the early years of militancy. Both men 
were introduced to political action through the Ilaignar Pēravai. Like David, Rathan was 
one of the thousands of young Tamil men arrested under the draconian PTA, for which 
no clear charge was required, let alone a trial. He was also moved around the island, from 
jail to jail, for the duration of thirty-one months in prison. Both activists experienced 
significant delays to their life plans—for education, employment, and creating a family—
as a result of discrimination and their arrests. 
There are also some crucial differences between their stories. David was arrested 
for protesting a local injustice—the arrests of other youth who were exercising their 
democratic rights. Unlike David, Rathan had a personal connection to the LTTE’s leader, 
and entered politics by assisting them with small tasks. After 1983, he became more 
directly involved with the organization by making and distributing their political 
propaganda. David left for Canada after two attempts to start over in Sri Lanka after his 
arrests, and spent the next few years re-establishing a life for himself and his family 
before getting involved with politics again. Rathan, on the other hand, left Sri Lanka at 
Prabhakaran’s request to work for the LTTE-led struggle—first to India, then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Rathan claimed that he volunteered to step down after rumors spread that he had an affair with a woman 
in the organization. He denied the rumor, but understood that the organization was conservative and 
differences emerged over his leadership. The story also circulated among activists in Toronto. 
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Switzerland, and finally to Canada, where he had to renounce his past connections with 
the organization in order to claim asylum (and thus avoid detention and deportation). 
Their stories present two types of migration found among male Tamil activists who came 
of age during the early years of Tamil militancy and war: First, in men who left Sri Lanka 
hoping to create a better life for themselves and their families, and in their resettlement, 
became more involved with Tamil activism, and second, a smaller number of men who 
left Sri Lanka as activists to work for the Movement. 
Ragavan: the early LTTE and political dissent 
Ragavan presents us with another story: He left Sri Lanka to escape the 
Movement. Ragavan is still known by his nom de guerre, acquired during his youth as a 
founding member of the LTTE. He left the movement in 1984 over the organization’s 
authoritarian structure and internal political killings, and currently lives in exile in 
London, with his partner, Nirmala, (an ex-supporter of the LTTE whom he met in India) 
who had also been politically involved with the movement (iyakkam) and shared many of 
his objections.214 Ragavan came from a middle-class Vellala family in the village of 
Punnalaikkadduvan, in northern Jaffna. He left home and school in his teens to join the 
movement, which became “a kind of second home” to him.  
Ragavan was born in 1956, the year of the Sinhala Only Act. He recalled 
becoming interested in Tamil nationalism as a young man. He regularly read newspapers 
such as Suthanthiran (“Freedom,” the newspaper of the Federal Party) and Viduthalai 
(“Liberation”), and remembered seeing posters and pamphlets around Jaffna that 
reinforced an emerging nationalist ideology.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Nirmala was the first woman arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.  
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In 1970, the Students Front (mānavar pēravai), led by Sathiyaseelan, organized a 
march in Jaffna to protest university standardization. Most of the protesters were doing 
their GCEs and A-levels, and therefore would be most immediately affected by the 
government’s standardization policy. Ragavan was in his Ninth Standard, but joined them 
when asked. While he was not personally affected, Ragavan felt that the injustice of the 
policy was one of the reasons why he became involved with nationalist politics. He 
recognized the value of an education to Jaffna Tamils, which was still seen as a pathway 
to stable employment and a secure life. The importance of the latter was clear in his 
father’s fondness for a particular Tamil proverb: kozhi meinthallum governmentil 
meikavendum (Even if you raise chickens, you should do it in the government.) A 
university education was a ticket to government employment in the professions, whether 
as a clerk, teacher, doctor, lawyer or engineer. Ragavan’s parents hoped he would 
become an engineer. He had other plans.  
Ragavan turned to political activism and militancy instead. He joined the mānavar 
pēravai, through which he made contacts with militants and other activists. The front was 
“not very tight or properly organized,” which made it easy for the Sri Lankan police and 
their spies to gather information about its members. The front collapsed in 1972 when the 
police arrested many of its members. However, the members of mānavar pēravai went on 
to form their own militant groups. Ragavan described them as “the pioneer organization 
for armed violence.”  
In addition to his early exposure to Tamil protests over standardization, a second 
event influenced and inspired Ragavan’s activism. In 1974, the International Tamil 
Conference was held in Jaffna. The state had tried to block the conference from being 
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held on the island at all, and then insisted it be held in Colombo. Jaffna was held by its 
residents to be the cultural heartland of Tamil Sri Lanka and, to them, the conference’s 
location choice recognized their community’s contributions to Tamil literature and 
scholarship. Ultimately, the conference was allowed to proceed in Jaffna, but it remained 
a highly charged, symbolic event. The state’s attempt to block the festival galvanized the 
TULF and its Youth Front, who mobilized to support the conference and denounced the 
state. Ragavan was one of many youth who organized a celebration of the conference in 
their villages; it was an atmosphere he likened to a temple festival. However, at an 
outdoor town hall on Tamil literature on the final day of the conference, Sri Lankan 
police shot into the crowd, and severed an electrical cable, which electrocuted and killed 
nine people.215 The violence angered many Tamils in Jaffna, who felt it was not only a 
physical attack on individuals, or a collective, but the culmination of a state assault on 
Tamil cultural heritage and pride. It also upset Ragavan: “It made me think twice... and 
[think] to do something against the state.”216  
When Chetti, an early leader of the Tamil New Tigers (TNT)—a militant 
organization formed in 1972217—hid in his village, Ragavan started to help the militants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Some accounts describe this as an accident, while others claim that the police intended to use violence 
against the protesters. The LTTE’s future leader was not at the conference, as he was in Tamil Nadu, to 
which he would return several times while on the run over the next decade. 
216 Ragavan also noted that he learned of Ponnuthurai Sivakumaran’s plan to assassinate Mayor Duraiappah 
and was inspired by that—“I also wanted to do something. They were looking for people to get together.’ 
Sivakumaran was part of the volunteer group that organized the Tamil conference, and sought vengeance 
for the mayor’s role in calling the police. After one of these attempts, Sivakumaran was caught and 
tortured. Worried that he would become an informer if tortured again, he carried a cyanide capsule with 
him, which he used to end his life when captured by the Sri Lankan police on June 5, 1974. He is widely 
recognized as being the first Tamil martyr, and his cyanide capsule was incorporated into the LTTE 
movement.  
217 Several different dates are attributed to the founding of the Tigers. The earliest date is 1970, the year 
maanavar peravai was formed, while others date the Tamil New Tigers’ origins to as late as 1974. The 
most commonly cited year is 1972. 
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by taking them to safe houses on his bicycle. The early Tigers were a small group of 
seven to ten members, all men.  In 1974, when Ragavan was 18 years old, Chetti visited 
with a young man named Prabhakaran, who spoke of the need for a separate state for 
Tamils.  The young man became the TNT’s leader after the Sri Lankan police caught and 
detained Chetti that year.218 Shortly thereafter, Ragavan met the new leader again when 
the latter was on the run and looking for a safe house. Prabhakaran wanted to stay at 
Ragavan’s grandmother’s house. Ragavan decided to help Prabhakaran hide, despite 
knowing he was wanted (and fearing his own rule-abiding father’s displeasure). 
Prabhakaran invited Ragavan to join the organization. The next year, 1975, the TNT 
made news with the assassination of Jaffna’s SLFP mayor, Alfred Duraiappah, whom 
they blamed for the Tamil conference deaths.219 Duraiappah was also portrayed as a 
traitor for siding with the Sri Lankan government during this period of unrest. At the 
time, Ragavan felt glad that a ‘traitor’ had been eliminated.220 He later learned that 
Prabhakaran was responsible for the assassination. 
Ragavan’s covert activities for the Tigers led to a more spectacular operation. The 
militant groups, unlike the TULF, did not have funds to pursue their goals, and were 
robbing state cooperatives and banks to fund their operations. Ragavan participated in the 
Puttur bank robbery of 1976, and became a wanted man. He fled to India, via the Tigers’ 
smuggling contacts in Valvettithurai, to hide in one the militants’ safe houses until he 
could return. During this time, the TNT changed its name and became the Liberation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Chetti was detained and tortured until he gave the names of key leaders in the TNT. Prabhakaran was 
relatively unknown, and so was made leader. See Hellmann-Rajanayagam (1994a). 
219 Duraiappa banned outdoor assembly at the conference, but a large crowd gathered in front of the town 
hall anyway. The police were called in to disperse the crowd (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994a: 11). 
220 Ragavan also wrote about this in a 2009 memoir-like article published one week after the end of the war.  
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Tigers of Tamil Eelam on May 5, 1976. That same month, on May 14, the Federal Party 
leader, Chelvanayakam, would announce the struggle for a separate state of Tamil Eelam 
at the TULF convention in Vaddukoddai.221  
The armed groups that were descendents of maanavar peravai shared the goal of 
eliminating those whom they saw as traitors—any Tamil who was working with or for 
the Sri Lankan state. 
According to Ragavan, in these first few years of militancy, Tamil students were less 
concerned with organizing a movement to fight the state than creating “Tamil unity”—a 
unified front that would be able to fight for their political goal of a separate state. One 
means by which they did this was to identify and target “traitors” to the cause: 
What the important thing was to eliminate the traitors. So whoever was the 
traitor, you should eliminate them then only people have a unity. That 
was, in a certain sense, the TULF propaganda... also the youth talked 
[like] that... So the traitor first, and then whoever, the police officers, the 
spies who try to inform.  
However, the distinction between “traitors” and state “informers” was blurred:  
Traitors and informers, there's no clear line. You know, the informer is-- 
the traitor is seen as an informer against Tamils, because he's working 
with the state. For instance, if you are an SLFPer or a UNPer, you will be 
a traitor, because you are not with us, you are with the state, or the Sinhala 
government. You are supporting the southern authority. Therefore you are 
an informer as a traitor. As far as the police... they were specially targeted. 
Not necessarily the police officers, but within the police, there is a CID. 
The whole investigation bureau... its members. They were particularly 
looking at those culprits who are involved with this. So... so, the first one 
was the [Tamil] informer/traitor, and then once you started targeting these 
traitor/informers, then obviously the police will try to catch you... so it's 
kind of linked.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 This was the Vaddukoddai Resolution, as discussed in the previous sections. 
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Ragavan eventually saw where this was heading, and decided that he had to leave the 
LTTE once and for all. Though he had left the organization before, only to be persuaded 
to re-join, this would be the last time. 
In spite of several attempts to unify their respective organizations and ideologies 
into a single political front, Tamil militants remained divided throughout the war. The 
last public assertion of Tamil political unity took place in July 1985 during peace talks 
with the Sri Lankan government in Bhutan.222 Representatives of the TELO, LTTE, 
PLOTE, EROS, EPRLF, and TULF participated in the Tamil delegation.223 Together, 
they rejected the Sri Lankan government’s proposal issued the Thimpu Declaration of 
1985. The declaration stated the following: 
It is our considered view that any meaningful solution to the Tamil 
national question must be based on the following four cardinal principles: 
 
• recognition of the Tamils of Ceylon as a nation 
• recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils 
of Ceylon 
• recognition of the right of self determination of the Tamil nation 
• recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all 
Tamils of Ceylon224 
 
The Sri Lankan government rejected the first three principles, on the grounds that they 
violated Sri Lankan sovereignty. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 The Indian government initiated the Thimpu talks, which took place over two rounds from July 8-July 
13, 1985 and August 12-August 17, 1985.  
223 Four of the five militant groups present—the LTTE, EPRLF, EROS, and TELO—were constituents of 
the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF), which was formed by the three latter groups in 1984. The 
LTTE joined the front in April 1985. See Loganathan 1996 for further discussion of the political dynamics 
of these talks. Loganathan (known as Kethesh) was a participant with the EPRLF, and later left the 
organization. During the 2002 ceasefire, he joined the Government of Sri Lanka’s Secretariat for 
Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP). For his efforts, he was killed by the LTTE in 2006. 
224 For the full text of the declaration and one insider’s account, see Sivanayagam, n.d. (1985?) 
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In spite of the above declaration of shared principles, the following year, “the 
boys” turned on one another like never before. Dissension grew within the ranks of 
militant organizations, and differences emerged between them.225 The LTTE was 
particularly adept at these killings, starting with the murder of over four hundred TELO 
cadres and the group’s leader in late April and May 1986.226 
The accusation of being a ‘traitor’ continued to have deadly consequences for 
Tamils within and outside these militant groups in the decades to come. 
Community, nation, struggle 
Taken together, an analysis of these four activist narratives provides insight into 
the historical emergence of Tamil militancy, both as a new form of Tamil political 
practice, and as an armed movement. All four activists’ accounts referred to anti-Tamil 
violence, and especially the riots/pogrom of July 1983. The latter event appeared as a 
defining moment, whether personally (David), as a historical turning point in the armed 
movement (Kanthan), or a time for action that called upon them to redouble their efforts 
(Rathan, Ragavan). However, as much as 1983 signaled a turning point, these activists 
narrated the event as part of a historical continuum, rather than a clear “break” with the 
past. The violence of 1983 and the growth of Tamil militancy was not an “end” to 
politics, nor was it the clear beginning of an “ethnic conflict” or “civil war.” Instead, the 
events of 1983 marked a new phase of an ongoing struggle. (In Tamil, pōrāttam, a word 
with an etymological root meaning “war.”) July 1983, in this narration, was part of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 TELO was led by Sri Sabaratnam at this time, and split into multiple factions. The group was supported 
by India, and received significant expatriate support. 
226 The LTTE justified its actions, as it believed that TELO was being used by India to infiltrate the Eelam 
struggle. Prabhakaran also believed that India would have him killed. 
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chain of events that constitute a contemporary history of Tamil politics. This becomes 
clear in the recurrence of violence throughout activists’ personal histories.  
In addition to the events of July 1983, Tamil activists remembered other events 
that, if mentioned at all, do not feature as prominently in the scholarship on Sri Lanka’s 
ethnic conflict or work on Tamil nationalism. Ragavan recalled the significance of 1974 
for his political life, while the 1977 riots led to intense political organizing by Kanthan 
and his group, EROS. David, on the other hand, remembered 1979, and how protests on 
the first anniversary of the second Republic, along with the events that followed from 
those protests, led to his first arrest shortly after Sri Lanka passed its Prevention of 
Terrorism Act. Each of the above narratives makes visible moments of profound crisis in 
the history of post-colonial Sri Lanka. Anti-Tamil violence was an especially important 
feature of the narratives of nationalist activists. In our conversations, I was reminded on 
several occasions of the riots and massacres that took place after independence, when an 
activist would list each event, indexed by the year of its occurrence: 1956, 1958, 1961, 
1974, 1977, 1981, 1983. The list stopped with 1983227, which was understood to be the 
end of large-scale riots because, as more than one nationalist activist explained to me, 
“After 1983, we went to war, and the Tigers were there to defend the Tamil people.” In 
this reading, a military formation acted as a strong deterrent to one form of anti-Tamil 
violence. However, as the narratives of dissidents like Raghavan and events post-Thimpu 
show, this violence was transformed. Internal dissension among the groups at war with 
the state resulted in conflict and violence among the Tamils. The tensions marked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 However, an activist would occasionally mentioned 2000, when Tamil political prisoners were 
massacred at the Bindunuwewa detention centre in central Sri Lanka.  
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throughout these narratives—between Tamil unity and dissent, militancy and non-
violence, and reform and struggle—would continue throughout the next two decades. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided a critical synthesis of historical and social 
scientific scholarship on Sri Lankan politics and nationalism, in order to trace the 
emergence of a specifically “Tamil” identity and politics. Conventional political histories 
characterize Tamil militancy as a radical break from politics, which is discussed with 
respect to elections, parliamentary debates, legislation and constitutional reforms. 
Histories of Tamil nationalism often share this conceit about the “end” of Tamil politics, 
when they describe how an older generation of parliamentarians were forced to vacate 
their seats and thus made ‘irrelevant.’ In contrast, I have endeavored to show that the 
growth of Tamil militancy creates a new form of oppositional political activity among 
youth in the 1970s. In addition, these narratives reveal the parallel emergence of 
militancy and diaspora activism in a field228 of transnational Tamil political engagement.  
In the next chapter, I discuss the diasporic politics of Tamil protest and dissent in 
Toronto, home to the largest population of Sri Lankan Tamils outside Asia, and a city in 
which many activists and former militants have settled. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 I use the term “field” here in the sense of Bourdieu (1993), as a system of relational social positions 
structured by power relations, within which cultural life and production are situated. 
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Chapter 4 
Mobilizing Diaspora in Tamil Toronto: Activism and the Politics of 
Community under Multiculturalism 
 
Community formations and organizations 
When I began fieldwork in Tamil Toronto in 2008, activists and organizers often 
questioned the purpose of my research, wondering whether it would harm or benefit their 
work and whether it had any use to “the community.” Indeed, a broad spectrum of 
diasporic Tamil activists referred to Toronto Tamils as “the community.” This was a 
group to which many claimed and asserted their belonging, but one which they also 
spoke of apart from their own selves, as an entity to be mobilized. They often took for 
granted the bounded nature of this community, directing me to organizations that were 
felt to be “representative” of “the community” and its needs. These organizations then 
provide a starting point for my inquiry into Tamil diasporic activism, and the moral and 
political practices of those who mobilize against Sri Lanka’s war. In this section, I briefly 
outline the organizations and associations that form a local and transnational community 
of Tamils in Toronto. This outline of community formation is preceded by a discussion of 
the multiple valences of the term, “community,” as it was used by Toronto Tamil 
activists.   
“Community” was frequently the subject of social activism in Tamil Toronto. One 
of my first interviews was held with a small group of Tamil-Canadian women who 
worked in non-profits and schools to provide social services to Tamil youth. The women, 
in their twenties and early thirties, all migrated from Jaffna and Colombo during the late 
1980s, and were part of the “1.5 generation” of Toronto Tamils.  Toward the end of our 
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interview about their work among Toronto Tamils, they told me they rarely heard the 
English word “diaspora” among Tamils to describe their collective. Instead, they spoke of 
the “Tamil community.” For these activists, “diaspora” was an academic term, while 
“community” was a common way to refer to their collective life as Tamils. 
 “Community outreach” had become a common line of work for Tamil activists 
who were employed as social workers and service providers to other Tamils. These 
activists, like the young women above, spoke of their satisfaction at assisting people in 
the Tamil language to find employment or housing, or of providing culturally-competent 
counseling to newcomers. Moreover, they had experienced similar difficulties when 
settling in Canada, and wanted to share their knowledge with their clients. Such people 
were described as being “community-oriented,” in contrast to those who were “selfish” 
and had “turned their backs on the community.” Such a distinction was sometimes made 
by youth of the 1.5 generation between themselves and the 2nd generation that had been 
born and raised in Canada. In other instances, however, those who were “selfish” were 
those who disagreed politically with LTTE supporters in Toronto, and thus found 
themselves at odds with “the community” as these activists had defined it.  
Some activists spoke of feeling “outside the community”—even those who 
participated in the work of organizations that mobilized this community. One young man, 
in describing the generational dynamics above, told me he felt apart from other Tamils in 
Toronto because of the way he dressed, spoke, and carried himself. The young man had 
grown up in the United States, to parents of Indian descent. Those who dissented from 
the Tigers, the WTM and mainstream Tamil organizations like the CTC described 
	   199	  
themselves as “being outside” or “living apart” from the community, even as they formed 
small groups of their own. 
“The community” was also the subject of political action, as activists who spoke 
supportively of, critically about, or in opposition to the LTTE made generalizing 
statements about the political stance of Toronto Tamils. Activists frequently asserted that 
the community was supportive of “the struggle,” in the words of supporters, or “the 
LTTE,” as identified by some of its critics and detractors. In general, those who 
supported the LTTE and/or did not criticize the organization were less likely to name the 
organization than those who publicly criticized or opposed it. In other words, Tamil 
activists who were excluded from the community in public by their political dissent 
brought the notion of a “Tamil community” into stark relief in their speech. Some of 
these activists wanted to ensure that I spoke to activists in organizations like the CTC and 
WTM. They felt this would give me a firsthand look at the social dynamics they 
described. Activists from Tamil community organizations, on the other hand, did not 
encourage me to speak with dissenting activists. 
Mapping Toronto’s Tamil community 
Political organizations 
Two organizations figured most prominently in the Tamil community during my 
research: The World Tamil Movement and the Canadian Tamil Congress. These two 
organizations had different primary aims: The former centered on homeland politics, as 
well as cultural and social activities that supported that politics, while the latter was 
primarily concerned with the social and political issues of Tamils living in Canada—a 
mandate that also allowed activists to organize around Sri Lanka’s ongoing war. 
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Unsurprisingly, many Tamil activists of different generations suggested that I 
begin my research by talking to the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC), an organization 
that called itself “the unified voice of Canadian Tamils.”229  Some of my first 
interlocutors were students who had participated in the Pongu Thamil movement in 2004, 
and had since become more involved with the CTC.  
The Canadian Tamil Congress is a non-profit organization headquartered in 
Toronto, with chapters in major cities throughout Canada and an elected board of 
directors.230 It describes itself as “the community’s spokesperson on the municipal, 
provincial, federal and international levels.”  The CTC was founded in 2000, and served 
as an umbrella for smaller groups, activists, professionals, artists and students who 
moved across many different projects and initiatives in Tamil Toronto. Secondly, and 
importantly, the CTC’s efforts to foster Tamil civic engagement and develop connections 
with politicians at all levels of government made the organization function as a “caucus” 
representing Tamil interests in Canada. As such, they also worked with and consulted 
similarly organized ethnocultural groups, like the Canadian Jewish Congress. Finally, 
through such intra- and inter-community efforts, the CTC positioned itself as an 
international advocate for Tamils in Sri Lanka, and organized its diasporic membership to 
raise awareness of Tamil suffering in their homeland to bring an end to the civil war. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 This was changed to “Voice of Tamil Canadians” on their latest website. I discuss the debates and 
implications around these namings for Toronto Tamil activists in a later section of this chapter.  
Throughout my fieldwork, Tamil activists debated the merits of different identifications – some preferred 
Canadian Tamil, others Tamil Canadians, with or without a hyphen. Still others referred to themselves as 
simply Tamil, and very few preferred to identify as Canadian only. This was dramatized in an exercise at 
the In Search of Roots conference for Tamil youth in July 2008. 
230 The CTC has had up to 11 chapters throughout Canada, with the most active in Toronto, Montreal and 
Vancouver. 
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These three areas of focus – connecting Tamils in Canada by serving as an 
umbrella for many different organizations, fostering local and national engagement, and 
international advocacy about the Sri Lankan war – often overlapped in the CTC’s work, 
which ranged from collecting information about barriers to work for immigrant 
professionals, to blood drives and walk-a-thons raising funds for local hospitals, to 
educating its membership about candidates in upcoming elections, to organizing rallies 
and exhibits commemorating the anniversary of anti-Tamil violence in Sri Lanka and 
writing press releases condemning the Government of Sri Lanka’s conduct of the war. 
While the CTC focused on civic engagement, the Ulaga Thamilar Iyakkam, or 
World Tamil Movement, functioned as a community group that offered settlement 
services, vocational training and organized "cultural shows" and sports leagues for 
Tamils from Sri Lanka. The organization was founded as a non-profit organization in 
1986, and was said to be staffed and funded entirely by volunteers. The WTM’s Canadian 
headquarters were located in a squat, brick building tucked away in an industrial section 
of southeast Scarborough. There, the WTM also housed a small library with over 16,000 
publications in English and Tamil.  Most importantly, among Tamils, the WTM (or “the 
Movement”) served as a hub for diaspora political organizing in support of the LTTE’s 
armed struggle for a separate state. 
In addition to political community-based organizations like the CTC and WTM, 
Toronto Tamils participated in several other kinds of social and cultural associations that 
were supportive of these organizations’ political goals. 
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Home village and alumni associations 
 Home village associations (HVAs) and alumni associations (AAs) have been at 
the heart of community organizing in Tamil Toronto. There are approximately 300 HVAs 
and AAs in Canada (Cheran 2007: 135), of which the majority are in the Greater Toronto 
Area. As Cheran (2007) writes, these organizations are transnational in their social 
organization and operation, and diasporic. For Cheran, the latter refers to the fact that 
“most of their members left their places of origin as refugees.” As true as this may be, I 
suggest that home village and alumni associations are also diasporic because, through 
these associations, members create imaginative and social links with the places they 
remember as “home” and the space of a “homeland.” Home village and alumni 
associations have both allowed diaspora Tamils to fund and provide skills toward the 
reconstruction and development of villages and schools in northern Sri Lanka. 
The home village association (in Tamil, ur sangam) was initially formed as a kind 
of “social club” for people of the same village (ur aatkal) in Sri Lanka. HVAs anchored 
new immigrants and provided a way for long-time residents, now dispersed throughout a 
large metropolitan region, to stay connected to each other. In addition, these associations 
were voluntary organizations that maintained communication with their villages back 
home. During the war, HVAs collected funds from members for the relief and 
rehabilitation of displaced residents in their villages in Sri Lanka, and limited 
reconstruction. They consulted with local leaders and operated independently from the 
state and local and international NGOs, allowing them to bypass bureaucratic hurdles and 
overhead costs of development work. After the signing of the 2002 ceasefire, HVAs 
became active in post-conflict reconstruction and small-scale development projects; the 
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average cost of these projects ranged from $8,000 to $20,000 CDN (Cheran 2007: 137). 
Most HVAs have focused on the reconstruction and expansion of educational institutions, 
hospital facilities, and village infrastructure such as wells. Some activists also told me 
members’ efforts to reconstruct and renovate Jaffna temples and churches, and the 
building of new ones, but these were often separate efforts.231  
Home village social networks were also central to political mobilizing in Toronto. 
Activists within these associations contacted each of their members to encourage them to 
attend protests, and as a result, some associations were a visible presence at these events. 
For example, when the 2008 Pongu Thamil event was organized in a matter of days in 
response to the Canadian government’s ban on the WTM, home village associations 
mobilized hundreds of Tamils. They displayed their affiliations proudly on totem-like 
poles covered in banners of the sponsoring HVAs.  
Alumni associations were also colloquially known as old students’ associations.232 
Like HVAs, they provided members with a venue for Tamil sociality, where dispersed 
Tamils could reconnect with old schoolmates and form new relationships. They were 
primarily focused on the reconstruction of their schools, and funded nutritional programs 
for school children, scholarships and bursaries, English-language training, and computer 
technologies and training. Several alumni associations produced annual publications to 
update their members on the school and its alumni’s achievements; they also organized 
sports meets, math contests, and annual entertainment programs in which alumni and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Tamils abroad honored their deceased relatives by making a donation to their local temple or church to 
build an addition named after their relative. However, solicitations for temple-building in Jaffna were a 
source of incessant irritation among some diaspora Tamils, who explained that the funds could be better 
used to assist the displaced in Jaffna or develop other kinds of local institutions. 
232 The associations for sex-segregated schools are referred to as “old boys” and “old girls” associations–
e.g. the St. John’s Old Boys and Chundukuli Old Girls Associations. 
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their children participated by acting in plays, singing, dancing, holding quiz shows, and 
handing out awards. Entire families attended these shows, with ticket sales benefitting 
their alma mater in Jaffna. Schools in northern Sri Lanka often relied on these funds to 
maintain and expand their facilities. Cheran (2010, 2003) notes that the Canada and UK 
alumni associations of Mahajana College in Tellipalai pledged nearly USD $4 million 
(LKR 43 million) at an international conference organized in Colombo in April 2003.233  
Student and youth organizations 
 Tamil youth formed their own organizations. Unlike their parents, home village 
associations were not central to their social networks; they attended ur sangam picnics 
but also believed these associations would fade over the next generation. The Tamil 
Students’ Association (TSA) was one important form of youth organization separate from 
their parents’ forms of sociality. Young men began to form these associations at colleges 
and universities in southern Ontario in the 1990s. They were joined by students of the 
“1.5 generation”—Tamil youth who migrated to Canada at a young age, but were old 
enough to remember life in Sri Lanka, and were typically six to fifteen years old when 
they entered the Canadian school system. These students were active participants in 
Tamil community life. When I spoke to activists in their twenties and thirties, they 
discussed how important the TSA had been to their politicization. Their time in the TSA 
marked a period when they began to learn (some for the first time) about the Tamil 
struggle in Sri Lanka.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 A May 2012 meeting with the principal of Mahajana College in Tellipalai confirmed the significance of 
diaspora alumni networks and fundraising for Jaffna schools. Mahajana’s principal had just returned to take 
leadership of the school after several years of living and working in Australia, and was meeting with 
diaspora alumni throughout the day. When we met, he first showed me a table of donations from alumni 
associations and individuals for the previous year. Nearly all of the donations were from Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, and Colombo. 
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 TSAs began to coordinate with each other after the 2002 Ceasefire. They formed 
the Canadian Tamil Students’ Association, a national umbrella group whose members 
were the primary organizers of the 2004 Pongu Thamil in Toronto.  
Most of the students who were involved in the TSAs at the time of my long-term 
fieldwork were, however, second-generation students. Unlike the earlier generation of 
first and 1.5 generation TSA students, however, they were considered to be more “social” 
than “political.” A few were already politically active and members of other 
organizations, such as the Tamil Youth Organization, and these students began to 
introduce pro-LTTE political education into their associations. They have been subject to 
controversy at times for the nature of this politics.234  
During my fieldwork, I began to notice that TSA leaders often went on to join 
other pro-LTTE community organizations. Two youth activists eventually explained to 
me—on two separate occasions—that the TSAs of that time were subject to the political 
mandate of other community organizations, and more specifically, the WTM in Canada. 
This influence did not, however, determine the politics or subsequent political 
engagements of their members. For example, of the aforementioned activists, the first 
was a young man who had migrated to Canada when he was seventeen, held a leadership 
role in his university TSA in the 1990s, and went on to join an alternative Tamil network. 
The other activist was a second-generation diaspora Tamil who had been a member of his 
high school and university TSAs in the mid-to-late 2000s. In the case of another student 
activist who had been actively involved in the TSA in the late 1990s, his unwavering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 In 2009, for example, when the York University TSA held the Tamil Eelam national flag created by the 
LTTE. The flag bears the Liberation Tigers’ emblem. I discuss the social semiotics and politics of the 
“Tiger flag” later in this chapter, and in Chapter 7. 
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support of the LTTE was interrupted a few years later by questions about the group’s 
local operations in Toronto, when diasporic LTTE activists wanted to control (and when 
he refused, tried to sabotage) his fundraising for Tamil rehabilitation in Sri Lanka.235 
 The Tamil Youth Organization (TYO) was another important network of 
organizations for Tamil youth in Canada. The Canadian branch, TYO-Canada, provided a 
venue for socialization of Tamil youth and mobilized them politically. TYO and TYO-
Canada were formed in 2003, during the Ceasefire, after a group of Tamil diaspora youth 
from several countries traveled to visit northern Sri Lanka. Their stay was organized by 
diaspora Tamil activists, who connected them to the LTTE. These diaspora youth were 
housed in the LTTE’s headquarters in Kilinochchi, and taken around to see its de facto 
state. In interviews, several activists remarked to me about the “modern buildings” and 
the “efficient” policing and courts; young women (and some men) also spoke of their 
ability to walk outside at night without fear, as compared to their time in Colombo, or 
their childhood memories of wartime Jaffna.236 They also met with the LTTE leadership, 
including the thalaivar, Prabhakaran, with whom they had a group discussion. 
Prabhakaran suggested they create a youth organization in their countries of residence. 
The young activists were impressed by their visit to Kilinochchi; on their return to 
Canada, they established a TYO chapter with the help of their activist elders. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 This activist was one of several Tamil diaspora activists who had met the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran. He 
noted that during his meeting, he raised questions and felt that his ideas were respected, in contrast to his 
subsequent interactions with local activists in Toronto. This encounter and Prabhakaran’s willingness to 
hear out a diasporic Tamil activist perhaps also speaks to the social power of the Tamil diaspora, whose 
funds were critical to the LTTE’s operations (as I discuss below). 
236 See also Kanagasabapathy (2006) for a more detailed discussion of diasporic youth views on the 
LTTE’s de facto state. 
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If the memberships of the TYO-Canada and high school and university TSAs 
overlapped, TYO-Canada was more explicitly connected to the WTM. TYO members 
provided support to the WTM at Tamil events such as Maaveerar Naal or protests, where 
they handed out flags and signs, or acted as basic security. TYO-Canada also produced a 
monthly magazine that has published the writings of Tamil youth on a variety of issues, 
ranging from the nature of Tamil-Canadian identity, to sports and popular culture, to 
creative and political writing about the war in Eelam. 
 The Tamil Students Volunteer Project (TSVP) was another type of organization 
that emerged during the Ceasefire. The founder of the TSVP was a student of the 
University of Toronto who had been an active leader within his campus’s TSA. When the 
Ceasefire was signed, he traveled to Sri Lanka to find out what he could do. When he 
returned, he recruited other TSA members and activists to organize groups of Tamil 
university students to travel to Sri Lanka for several weeks each summer, where they 
could contribute skills to their homeland. TSVP volunteers did so in a variety of ways, 
including teaching English as a second language classes and computing classes at 
VanniTech (a technology institute founded by diaspora Tamils living in the US), 
providing medical services, and building local infrastructure.237 When non-Tamils 
showed interest and joined these groups, the organizers decided to rename TSVP by 
replacing “Tamil” with “The”—i.e. The Students Volunteer Project. The change upset 
other community activists, and led to tensions between members. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Kanagasabapathy (2006) documents these activities and relations between diaspora youth volunteers and 
locals during the ceasefire. 
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Relief and rehabilitation organizations 
Toronto Tamil activists regularly mobilized around relief, rehabilitation, 
reconstruction and development work in Sri Lanka. This work was widely carried out by 
the home village and alumni associations, as well as the independent diaspora networks 
and organizations like TSVP and Tamil Diaspora Network for Development. The largest 
organization, however, was the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization of Canada (TRO-
Canada), which was part of a larger transnational network of organizations under the 
auspices of the LTTE. TRO-Canada held fundraisers and made appeals on Tamil radio 
for funds to rehabilitate Tamils displaced, injured and impoverished by the war. The 
organization was also alleged to be a front for the LTTE. Given the ban on outright 
fundraising for the LTTE, some Tamils questioned whether donations were being 
redirected to the Tigers’ war effort (or local fundraisers’ pockets) instead. For this reason, 
they preferred to work through their home village network when they could, on localized 
projects with “known people” whom they felt were trustworthy and accountable. 
Another notable effort during my fieldwork was the creation of a “Canada 
village” in northern Sri Lanka, through a project called Nivaaranam (meaning, “relief”), 
which constructed homes for internally displaced Tamils. These houses were funded by 
over one hundred individual and community group donors.  
Social services and community development 
 Several organizations provide services to Tamils who are new immigrants to 
Canada, as well as those who are part of populations with specific needs. 
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The Tamil Eelam Society of Canada (TESOC) was founded in 1976 as a cultural 
organization that provided a sense of community to a small group of pre-1983 
immigrants. The society’s founder was discussed in Chapter 1 as part of the first phase of 
Tamil migration to Canada. He and his wife explained that their home had served as a 
hub where young men who were new immigrants could meet other Tamils and have a 
home-cooked, Jaffna-style meal. There were no Tamil grocery stores in Toronto at this 
time, so the family brought back tightly-packed spices from their annual trips back home. 
In the mid-1980s, TESOC became more formally involved in the settlement and 
integration of new immigrants and refugees.238 The Society became a non-profit 
organization based in southwest Scarborough, and delivered a wide range of social 
services to Tamils, including English-language classes, social assistance and immigration 
application help, job search assistance, citizenship classes, family counseling, and a 
women’s group. During my fieldwork, the organization was funded by Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada and the City of Toronto. In 2006, TESOC’s mandate expanded 
beyond Tamils to serve immigrants in 12 different languages.239 The organization also 
later changed its name to TESOC Multicultural Settlement Services.240   
 Vasantham is a non-profit wellness centre for Tamil seniors in downtown 
Toronto. Vasantham offers its residents—mostly elderly women—a place to socialize, 
participate in group activities, and learn new skills, as well as education and referrals for 
physical and mental health services. As a generation of older immigrants ages, Tamils 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Most programs are available to permanent residents and convention refugees only. 
239 TESOC provides settlement services in the following languages: Arabic, Azerbaijani, Dari, English, 
Farsi, French, Pashto, Russian, Sinhala, Tamil, Turkish and Urdu (http://www.tesoc.org/Settlement/) 
240 This was likely due to the political import of the earlier name in the context of Canada’s 2006 listing of 
the LTTE, and the organization’s expanded audience. 
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have increasingly realized the need for elder-care facilities. The Canadian anthropologist, 
Glynis George (2011), has written of a similar place called Harmony Hall. 
 Middle-class Tamil activists often spoke of “two communities” to me during my 
fieldwork. The “first” community was made up of Tamils who, in spite of their struggles 
in settling down in Canada, were able to secure jobs with middle-class salaries, and 
eventually bought their own homes; their children went to universities and were earning 
comfortable salaries of their own. The “second” Tamil community worked in factories, 
and as food servers and cleaners; they were working-class, sometimes working second 
and third jobs, and their children were not going to university, or dropping out of high 
school. These youth were perceived as being “in danger” or “at-risk.” 
 Before this tale of two Tamil communities, Toronto Tamils had faced another 
crisis of “at-risk” youth during a spate of gang violence in the 1990s. Young men of rival 
gangs, such as “AK-Kannan” and the “VVT gang” were shooting and killing each other. 
Moreover, Toronto’s media connected the violence to the LTTE’s armed struggle, via 
drug-running for the LTTE, and a “culture” that glorified gun violence.     
 Tamil activists—among them, leaders at the WTM and local TSAs—decided it 
was important to rein in the violence. A group of young Tamil researchers produced a 
report, Toronto Tamil Youth: Some Realities (Balasingham et al 2000), and on the basis 
of such research, activists decide to create a new organization. Canadian Tamil Youth 
Development (CanTYD) was formed to provide Tamil youth with an alternative to 
violent gangs. Activists felt that Tamil youth needed community spaces to socialize, to 
talk about their problems, and to learn life and leadership skills. Volunteers provided 
mentorship to youth—many of whom were said to be young men living in Canada on 
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their own, or with struggling parents. As the community grew, CanTYD’s mandate 
expanded to providing mentorship to young Tamil women through Selvy’s Circle, and 
helping immigrant youth navigate secondary schools. 
Finally, in addition to the above Tamil-run organizations, several Toronto social 
service providers hired Tamil community-based social workers, lawyers, and translators, 
and recruited volunteers to provide outreach to various segments within Toronto’s Tamil 
community. Such organizations included: the South Asian Women’s Centre, Legal Aid 
Ontario, Youth Link, Malvern Youth Development. At this time, the Executive Director 
of the Council of Agencies Serving South Asians (CASSA) was also a Canadian Tamil 
whose activism spanned several of the organizations discussed in the pages above. 
Media, arts and culture, business 
The Tamil Academy for Arts, Culture and Technology (TACT, also known as  
Tamil Academy) was founded in 1992, and provides Tamil language classes for children 
and teens, as well as classes in Carnatic music and Bharatanatyam dance and, since 1999, 
a bachelors degree in Tamil Studies through the Manonmaniam Sunaranar University of 
Tamil Nadu (Canadian Tamil Academy 2012). 
The WTM’s arts and culture group (maththi toronto thamilar kalai panpaadu 
kazhagam) and the women’s wing (thamil mahalir) organized “cultural shows” that 
showcased plays (naadagam) and dances (natyam) that presented the LTTE in a heroic 
light, and glorified the Tamil struggle, which was typically depicted as being against the 
“Sinhala oppressors” of the Sri Lankan army, politicians, and aggressive Buddhist 
monks.  
	   212	  
Toronto Tamils also had a thriving theatre and film scene that featured the works 
of several independent groups, including annual performances from Arangadal, the 
Karumaiyam theatre group, and the Canadian Tamil film festival. 
It was a rare occasion to enter a Tamil home in Toronto without seeing or hearing 
at least one form of Tamil mass media: newspapers, radio, and television channels. 
Toronto boasted approximately two dozen Tamil newspapers, including: Ulaga Thamilar 
(published by the WTM), Muzhakkam, Eelamurasu, and (the English-language) Tamil 
Mirror. Most were free, through advertisements from Tamil businesses.241 Radio stations 
included the Canadian Tamil Broadcasting Corporation (CTBC), Canadian Tamil Radio 
(CTR), and Geethavaani. To listen to these channels, one had to purchase a specially-
configured shortwave radio, sold at many Tamil stores; eventually, these stations were 
streamed online as well. Canadian Multicultural Radio (CMR 101.3 FM), a Tamil-owned 
station, also aired a large amount of Tamil programming.242 Television channels like 
TamilOne and TVI were ubiquitous in Toronto Tamil homes. TVI, in particular, featured 
a significant amount of local diaspora-produced programming. Several activists hosted 
shows on TVI, and the network regularly covered local Tamil events and protests. One 
could also purchase Tamil-language cable packages to watch entertainment-driven Indian 
networks like Sun, Jaya, Makkal and Vijay TV.  
The Canadian Tamil Chamber of Commerce (CTCC) gathered together a large 
community of small businesses. TVI also organized Kondaattam, an annual business 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 This was not the case for the WTM newspaper, which in 2008 cost $1 at local Tamil shops. 
242 Tamil-language radio stations were especially popular with older Tamils, who listened to their radios 
from morning until night. Some programs featured local call-in shows. See Bernard 2008 for a discussion 
of two shows produced by Toronto’s Tamil radio stations. 
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trade show that combined entertainment with the consumption of products created by 
local and international Tamil businesses. The festival-like atmosphere drew thousands of 
Tamil attendees over two days at a convention center. 
Alternative and dissenting groups 
 In addition to the organizations and associations outlined above, there were 
several other groups formed by Tamils as alternatives to the major community 
organizations, and often, by dissenting activists who were critical of the LTTE. 
Alternative Tamil groups and dissenting activists were fewer in number, in terms of the 
membership they could claim, but did not make claims to represent the Tamil 
community. These activists and groups frequently had experience with other forms of 
politics in Sri Lanka, including trade unionism, the Sri Lankan and Tamil left, civil rights 
movements, human rights and feminist activisms. Some activists were ex-militants from 
organizations other than the LTTE, or ex-supporters, and remained sympathetic to some 
forms of Tamil nationalism, while others were avowedly critical of all forms of Tamil 
nationalism, and in diaspora, engaged with questions of caste, class, regionalism, and to a 
lesser extent, gender. 
 Thedakam was one such group, formed mostly by Tamil ex-militants in the late 
1980s. Also known as the Tamil Resource Centre, Thedakam constructed a library in 
Toronto, and remained independent from LTTE politics. In 1990, the library was 
firebombed. The group stayed dormant for several years, but re-emerged during my 
fieldwork to organize some events. Other organizations included: the Canadian-Sri 
Lankan Women’s Action Network (CSLWAN), Canadians for Peace (CfP), the 
Karumaiyam theatre group (which was affiliated with CfP, and had branched off from the 
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Manaveli theatre group), the Sri Lanka Democracy Forum (SLDF, a network of diaspora 
activists mainly in North America, the UK and Europe, which was founded in Toronto in 
2004), and the Canadian Democratic Tamil Cultural Association (CDTCA), among 
others. Many of these groups were multi-ethnic or aimed at forging such connections, 
even when they were predominantly Tamil. They were comprised of activists with 
heterogeneous backgrounds who often disagreed with one another’s political stances and 
tactics. They shared one thing in common: Their work was aimed at challenging 
Toronto’s Tamil diaspora to address oppressive dynamics within their community. 
To this end, Tamil journalists were often at the forefront of such questioning. 
Unable to publish their critical reporting and opinion pieces in LTTE-controlled 
publications, they founded their own newspapers, such as D.B.S. Jeyaraj’s Muncharie, 
George Ckrhushchev’s Thayagam, and in 2007-2008, the short-lived Vaikarai. During 
the 1990s and early 2000s, many of these Tamil writers were subject to a great deal of 
intimidation by LTTE activists. For example, in 1993, when Jeyaraj, a veteran journalist 
in Sri Lanka and Canada, refused to stop publishing articles that were critical of the 
Tigers, he was beaten up in a Scarborough parking lot after leaving a Tamil film with his 
wife (Nallainathan 2007). 
Many alternative and dissenting activists also participated in literary circles and 
wrote for alternative publications. They wrote poetry, short fiction and opinionated prose 
that challenged diaspora Tamils around issues of caste and sexuality for magazines such 
as Kalam (Time) and Mattrathu (Another Thing), which were published in Toronto. 
Poets such as Cheliyan published books of poetry through Chennai presses such as 
Kalaichchuvadu, They held literary and political discussions at an annual Ilakkiya 
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Santhippu (Literary Meeting), as well as the Penngal Santhippu (Women’s Meeting). 
These events were held in a different diasporic location each year. The women’s meeting 
was held for the first time in Toronto in 2008, and brought together a diverse group of 
(mostly Sri Lankan) Tamil women writers and activists from Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, Sri Lanka, India and Canada.  
The LTTE and Tamil diaspora politics 
As noted in a previous chapter of this dissertation, Sri Lanka’s growing Tamil 
diaspora became an important source of financing and political support for Tamil 
militancy, and eventually, the LTTE’s continuing war with the state. Any study of the 
political activism of Tamils from Sri Lanka must thus examine the central, though 
intensely contested place of the LTTE in the making of diasporic life and politics. When 
the LTTE rose to dominance in the north and east of Sri Lanka through internecine 
warfare with rival militant groups, the organization also consolidated its political power 
in the diaspora. The LTTE became the dominant force among Toronto Tamils during the 
late 1980s and 1990s in the following ways: (1) by violently intimidating and eliminating 
its rivals and dissenters, (2) by appropriating successful community projects, and (3) 
through the creation of an overseas network responsible for coordinating its fundraising 
activities and commercial enterprises, arms procurement, political propaganda, and 
community-based organizing. These activities – particularly fundraising, political 
propaganda, and community-based organizing – overlapped at many crucial points, but 
appeared to maintain separate operations to ensure the integrity of the network.  
However, the LTTE’s domination and hegemony among diasporic Tamils was by 
no means assured. For now, I bracket a discussion of practices of dissent among Tamils 
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in Toronto as, in the next sections/chapter, I write more closely of the ways in which 
dissenting activists and diasporic Tamils experienced intimidation and its effects on 
diasporic political subjectivities. In what follows, I provide a brief sketch of the dense 
nodes and mobile networks through which LTTE activities were organized and made 
significant in diaspora communities. This context provides the basis for understanding 
how and why Tamil community activists mobilized against the 2006 ban on the LTTE 
with the return to war in northern Sri Lanka in 2008.  
Fundraising overseas 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the LTTE created a sophisticated network 
linking their overseas offices to commercial enterprises, small businesses, informal 
banking, global shipping, aid and human rights organizations, arms dealers and foreign 
mercenaries.243 Fundraising was an important activity of this overseas network, allowing 
the Tigers to acquire material resources – from weapons to satellite phones to food -- 
necessary to continue their war with the Sri Lankan government. Much of these funds 
were collected from Tamil diasporic communities. 
Indeed, the LTTE’s overseas network functioned primarily within countries of 
diaspora settlement. By the mid-1990s, the LTTE’s international funding had become 
more important than ever. The Tigers increasingly turned to the growing Tamil diaspora 
after heavy fighting with the Sri Lankan Army in Jaffna in 1990-1995 led to the decline 
of its taxation base due to Tamil civilian deaths, internal displacement and out-migration. 
One Canadian intelligence analyst claimed that overseas sources—both diaspora 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 For a discussion of the LTTE’s global network with a focus on these activities in South and Southeast 
Asia, see Davis (1996). Also see Sakhuja (2006) for a report produced for the Delhi-based Observer 
Research Foundation on the organization’s shipping activities and their centrality to its global operations. 
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contributions, and income from international businesses and investments-- accounted for 
80-90 percent of the LTTE’s military budget (Chalk 2000). However, it remains unclear 
how much of this can be attributed to individually-solicited contributions. By May 1998, 
the Tigers were said to have an organized presence in 54 countries, though the largest and 
wealthiest of these were Western states with large Tamil communities, such as Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Switzerland, the United States and the United Kingdom.244 
Estimates of the Tigers’ annual earnings have ranged from USD $100-200 million to $1.5 
billion.245 
The Tigers’ overseas network raised funds through multiple activities. This 
involved various forms of licit activity, such as donations and investments (prior to laws 
that would criminalize all funding), and illicit activity, including narcotics, credit card 
fraud, piracy and arms dealing, as well as passport forgery and human smuggling.246 
Some of these funds were re-invested by the Tigers, who provided start-up funds for 
diaspora small businesses. These included gold jewelry stores, cinema theatres, 
restaurants, groceries, real estate agencies, money transfer businesses, and even—
according to rumors circulated among several of my interlocutors—franchises of popular 
coffee and fast-food chains in Canada. In turn, business owners had to contribute 
percentages of their profits. Some Tamil businesses were happy—even eager—to donate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Southeast Asian countries, including Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore were important for the organization’s arms dealing and exchange in gold; indeed, at the very end 
of war, the group’s main arms-dealer was appointed by LTTE leader Prabhakaran as Head of International 
Relations. This region also became a transit point for migration through LTTE-organized channels.  
245 The lower end of this range is attributed to the U.S. Treasury Department as cited in International Crisis 
Group (2010: 6). This same report notes that Tamils close to the organization estimate their earnings to be 
as high as $1.5 billion. Davis (1996) provides a more modest estimate of $2 million per month in 1996, 
prior to the LTTE’s peak fundraising. At the time of my research, one military report estimated the LTTE’s 
revenue at USD 200-300 million per annum (Karmi 2007). 
246 For a discussion and documentation of these activities, see Becker (2006a) and Davis (1996). 
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to the Tigers; financial contributions were one way to support the movement and 
demonstrate concern for Tamils “back home” in Sri Lanka. Additionally, showing 
support to the Tigers/the struggle was viewed as being “good for business.” Others 
complained quietly, when when low profits and high “taxes” made it difficult. However, 
few dared to refuse. The LTTE also reportedly made significant inroads into the overseas 
distribution and DVD rights of Indian-produced Tamil films.247  
Organized crime and business investments were not the only means by which the 
Tigers raised funds in diasporic communities. They held collections at temples and 
churches frequented by Toronto Tamils, organized fundraisers, and performed cultural 
programmes to commemorate fallen martyrs and dramatically re-enact a militant history 
of Tamil struggle for audiences. At such events, and in Tamil stores, they displayed 
photos of the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, and sold publications, song compilations, flags 
and videos of the battlefront (at first, on VHS, and later, on VCD and DVD). They 
solicited funds to rehabilitate civilians affected by the war, though it is often claimed that 
a significant amount of these funds – raised for the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization -- 
were redirected to the military wing of the organization (cf. HRW). In the Toronto area, 
where over forty Hindu temples were founded and attended by diaspora Tamils, temples, 
as places of worship, serve as important sites of sociality and community organizing. 
Although dismissed by some community activists as “a big business,” places of worship 
were another means by which the LTTE exerted its influence in Tamil community life – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 In August 2009, Sri Lanka's Resettlement and Disaster Relief Services Minister Abdul Rishad 
Bathiudeen alleged that Tamil film superstar Rajnikanth’s films were funded by the LTTE, channeled via a 
Tamil based in London. A senior police official in Tamil Nadu stated that they had not come across 
evidence to corroborate the allegation, but noted that "The overseas Tamil diaspora is a too huge a market 
for any film producer to ignore” (Times of India 2009).  
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not only by exacting “taxes,” holding collections and selling LTTE media, but by taking 
over temples outright by threat of force.248  The most controversial of the Tigers’ 
fundraising practices, however, and a practice that garnered international attention, was 
the means by which it solicited funds from individuals and independent Tamil-owned 
businesses. 
Door-to-door solicitation 
As many diaspora activists told me – whether claiming membership in the 
community, or dissenting from it – many Tamils have willingly contributed money to the 
LTTE throughout the years of war. However, as the diaspora grew, so did the needs of 
the LTTE’s war chest. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, many Tamils were still recent 
immigrants to Canada, and had significant expenses associated with their settlement. This 
included new expenses that came to be typical, such as: utility bills, winter clothing and 
heating, cars or public transportation, rent (or if they had saved enough, new mortgages), 
as well as delayed expenses such as dowry and wedding costs (especially in the case of 
young men who had migrated and waited to get married) and costs generated by 
migration itself, such as remittances to support family in Sri Lanka, immigration fees to 
sponsor relatives, or agents fees to bring them to Canada as undocumented migrants. As 
several of my interlocutors reminded me (echoing a sentiment I would hear in India too), 
“Here, everything is cash” (inge ellame kasu).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 For example, the director and secretary of a Hindu temple in London were detained by the LTTE for 
several weeks while visiting northern Sri Lanka, until they agreed to hand over control of the temple to a 
group aligned with the LTTE. For a discussion of this and other examples, see the Human Rights Watch 
report by Becker (2006a: 21-24). 
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The above economic pressures on newly-settled Tamils were at odds with the 
LTTE’s increasing reliance on the diaspora to finance the war. Families and households 
were asked to contribute regularly, in larger and larger amounts, with the largest 
diasporic communities expected to yield the highest sums. In 1996, Canada—mostly 
Toronto, where more than 90% of the Tamil population lived—was estimated to 
contribute approximately CDN $730,000 monthly, or $8.76 million annually—to the 
Tigers (Davis 1996). These funds – which included money from individual families and 
businesses, and returns on investments -- provided the LTTE with almost 37% of its 
estimated income, the largest of any Tamil diasporic community in the world.  
Over the next five years, Canada’s Tamil population grew by 38 percent, making 
Tamils the fastest growing ethnic group in Canada (Hyndman 2003; Zunzer 2004); now 
they were expected to contribute even greater sums to the struggle. The movement kept 
records of the names, phone numbers, and addresses of Tamils living in Toronto, noting 
who had pledged and paid, and how much. It kept close tabs on entrepreneurs, and new 
arrivals, through public records and information from its supporters. Eventually, by the 
early 2000s, the movement encouraged individual contributors to authorize monthly bank 
deductions for amounts ranging from $25 to $80 per month– saving them from the hassle 
of being repeatedly asked, and making the process more efficient for the organization. 
After the 2002 ceasefire agreement, fundraising dipped as Tamils in Toronto and 
elsewhere as the diaspora became less inclined to send money to the Tigers during the 
peace process. After the 2004 Asian tsunami, which devastated coastal regions in 
government and LTTE-held areas, the Tamils Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) – a 
non-profit formed to assist civilians affected by war, and with connections to the LTTE – 
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collected donations in the diaspora and received funding from international and UN 
agencies for tsunami relief and reconstruction. Some of the money was allegedly used by 
the LTTE to rebuild its arsenal for the coming “final” war. It may be noted that the 
TRO’s work in these regions was conducted with agreement from the Government of Sri 
Lanka; however, in September 2006, with a new president and an unofficial return to war 
the government froze the organization’s bank accounts, amounting to nearly $750,000 
USD. In a press release to appeal the government’s actions, the TRO noted that 40% of 
its funds came from diasporic contributions, with the remaining majority from 
international agencies (TRO 2006). 
By late 2005 and early 2006, the LTTE ramped up its diaspora fundraising efforts 
as it prepared for a return to war. In Toronto, individual families were now reportedly 
asked to pay a lump sum between CDN $2,500 and $5,000, while business owners were 
asked for sums ranging from CDN $25,000 to $100,000, and one Hindu temple reported 
being asked for CDN $1 million (Becker 2006a: 25).249 These large sums were difficiult 
for most people. Those who said they were unable to pay were told to borrow the money, 
use a credit card, or in a few instances, re-mortgage their homes (Becker 2006a: 32). 
LTTE representatives would ask for these contributions outright, variously identifying 
themselves as with the movement (iyakkam) – which could mean the LTTE or the WTM 
– or would explicitly identify themselves with one of the two aforementioned 
organizations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 This information was collected by Human Rights Watch in interviews with Tamils in London and 
Toronto. Becker’s report for HRW was the subject of great controversy among diaspora activists. 
Community activists adamantly denied the report’s claims at a “community launch” event held in 
Scarborough, and in the local and national media. Dissenting activists largely affirmed the report’s contents 
as being accurate. 
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When visiting homes, LTTE representatives returned repeatedly, or stayed for an 
hour or two during their visit, until they received a pledge or a check. Many Tamils—
those who did not want to donate, and/or could not afford to do so—did their best to 
avoid answering the door. Tamils who refused to donate were subject to repeated visits, 
subtle harassment, and sometimes explicitly threatened – usually with unnamed 
consequences to their family in Toronto, or parents and siblings in Sri Lanka.250  
Political support 
Political structure for fundraising. Fundraising was a critical part of the LTTE’s political 
structure in the diaspora, as the migration of Tamils and their greater foreign exchange 
became a crucial revenue source for the growing militant organization in Sri Lanka. The 
organizational forms and leadership positions created by the LTTE’s increasing reliance 
on and leveraging of fundraising abroad crucially shaped the political dynamics of 
diaspora engagement. It led to diaspora-based positions in the LTTE’s political hierarchy, 
with the establishment of a new “wing” of Overseas Affairs. The organization created a 
list of Top-Level Contributing Countries, and selected country co-ordinators 
(poruppālar) in each designated country of the Tamil diaspora to coordinate the activities 
of their collectors, oversee their fundraising objectives and ensure they were met. These 
activities were coordinated globally through the World Tamil Coordinating Committee, 
and in Canada, through the World Tamil Movement (ulaka thamilar iyakkam). These 
poruppaalar were selected by the LTTE leadership. Similarly, the goals set were 
reportedly directives from the organization’s highest leadership. In a letter signed by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 Becker (2006a) provides examples of such threats. During my fieldwork, I heard several stories 
regarding fundraising, but lack the space to delve into them here. 
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iconic LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, Canada alone was made responsible for $3 million 
dollars (National Post 2008). 
Propaganda. Further, the sites in which LTTE fundraising operations were the most 
extensive and labored also became critical to its international propaganda. Throughout 
the late 1990s, its “sophisticated publicity machine” and transnational network was 
widely acknowledged, and just as often, described as a problem for the Sri Lankan 
government.251 What I suggest here is that representations of this network—and not just 
the financial transactions through which it was manifest—posed a threat. The migration 
of Tamils from Sri Lanka itself was treated as the source of this threat. 
Media. A number of country-wide umbrella organizations coordinated the activities of 
sympathetic groups and media outlets to create a Tamil public sphere and ‘manufacture 
consent’ among its diasporas. The WTM sold its own newspaper, Ulaga Thamilar 
(Tamils of the World) in local Tamil shops and businesses, while Toronto Tamil 
newspapers such as Eelamurasu and Muzhakkam, and the English-language Tamil 
Mirror, were known to write with an LTTE nationalist slant. In addition to print media, 
however, broadcast television, radio and digital media were important venues for the 
Tigers and their supporters. As discussed above, community television stations such as 
TVI and Tamil One aired programs ranging from dramatic Tamil serials produced in 
Madras to Toronto-based call-in shows. In addition, local channels showed or covered 
WTM-organized events, and nationalist activists had multiple venues to share and discuss 
their views. Moreover, iyakkam videos and documentaries were sometimes played during 
the late night hours. Throughout my fieldwork, TVI and less commonly, Tamil One, were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 See, for example, The Island, “To Catch a Tiger.” 
	   224	  
frequently on in people’s homes. Several activists hosted their own shows, whether on 
TVI or on one of the Tamil radio stations. 
Cultural and social life 
 Fundraising for the LTTE was accompanied by everyday social practices 
and cultural activities (dance, drama, video and film screenings, etc) that secured the 
LTTE’s hegemony in diasporic communities. When the LTTE was powerful in the north 
and east of Sri Lanka, and held control of Jaffna between 1990 and 1995, they 
consolidated their social domination and hegemony throughout the diaspora.  
The organization took control of temples to support its fundraising goals and 
influence community life by holding nationalist events. Several dissenting activists spoke 
to me of how they took over local temples.252 The most prominent of these temples was 
the Canada Kandasamy Kovil in the middle of Scarborough. Other temples built and 
frequented by Sri Lankan Tamils included: Sri Durka Hindu Temple, Sri Varasiththi 
Vinayagar, Periya Sivan Kovil, and even an Ayyapan temple in Markham.253 
 The WTM was the heart of the LTTE’s cultural activities; at the same time, it was 
an important community organization to many Tamils. The WTM created Tamil-
language curricula for classes they implemented through Tamil schools. Their arts & 
culture groups produced “cultural shows” and dramas (nādagam) for Tamil-speaking 
audiences. Through their cultural shows, Tamil youth had opportunities to perform music 
and dance bharata natyam, the latter being a South Indian classical dance that many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Becker (2006a) also documents this phenomenon in Toronto and London. 
253 My fieldwork documented 18 temples built by and for Tamils from Sri Lanka in the Greater Toronto 
Area. The inclusion of a list of frequented temples here does not necessarily mean that these specific 
temples were owned by the LTTE or its supporters. 
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parents were encouraging their daughters to learn, to hold onto their Tamil “cultural 
roots.”254 These art forms were newly claimed in a diasporic setting, as few of these 
Tamil parents—especially Jaffna Tamils—would have studied Carnatic music or danced 
bharata natyam in Sri Lanka. 
One such event was Nādaga Kōpuram, a cultural show organized by the WTM’s 
Central Toronto Arts and Culture Group. Since Tamil community groups did not have a 
large theatre of their own, the show was performed at a local Armenian community 
center.255 WTM activists and their children wrote and staged plays that would resonate 
with a diasporic audience. In one play, set in Jaffna, a mother and her brother (the girl’s 
māmā) try to arrange a marriage for their daughter to a man in Canada. She does not wish 
to, telling her mother and uncle that it is not the time to get married to someone outside. 
She wants to live an independent life. “This is wartime (pōrkālam), this is a new age 
(puthukālam).” When she meets her intended groom, she asks him, 
It has been fifteen years since you went to Canada. Do you know what 
happens in this country? 
She continues, 
This is not the old society… There will be an end to this war. Then your 
people abroad will come back. But there will be a war between your 
outside culture, and our culture.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 I discuss the use of these cultural forms in greater detail in the sections below.  
For a discussion of bharata natyam in LTTE performances, see David (2012). The cultural revival of 
bharata natyam is not limited to the post-’83 diaspora, and middle-to-upper class Jaffna Tamils or 
“Ceylonese” in Malaysia turned to these forms too. For a history and ethnography of bharata natyam as a 
gendered practice of ethnic identity in Colombo, Sri Lanka, see Satkunaratnam (2009). 
255 Tamil community activists hoped to establish a center like this for Tamils. Activists spoke of a 
community center as a resource as well as a benchmark of their community’s success in multicultural 
Canada. 
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This drama presented irreconcilable differences between a diaspora long-settled outside 
Jaffna and the culture of those who remain and fight for a future Eelam. It implies that the 
diaspora must stay connected to a homeland in order to maintain a cultural connection 
and be able to return one day.  
Other plays and dances reinforced the diaspora’s desire to connect and identify 
with Tamil Eelam by dramatizing past and present battles and wartime atrocities. One 
play depicted battles during the early years of war, showing Sinhala-speaking soldiers 
(played by diaspora Tamils) beating and throwing around Tamil civilians. In the next 
scene, old and young people together proclaim that “India will bring our freedom!” The 
Sinhala soldiers are replaced by two turban-wearing soldiers, who dance bhangra across 
the stage. “People, we have come to give you your freedom!” The celebratory scene gives 
way to violence, as the soldiers slash and kill civilians. The survivors cry and throw their 
hands up to the sky. This theme is repeated in a subsequent scene, when one actor enters 
as Prime Minister Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, accompanied by a soldier, and 
once again, promises the people their freedom. As the scene gives way to more violence, 
the message to the audience is clear: These promises have failed the Tamil people. “We 
will all fight!” one man proclaims, and together, they break their chains, led in their 
struggle by a woman in an energetic bharatanatyam dance. Dramatic plays such as this 
one are heavily critical of the role India played in the Sri Lankan war, and often depict a 
history of failed agreements and brutal violence in representing the Sinhala state—a 
history that culminates in the Tamil people being led by the LTTE in struggle. The 
audience witnesses a transformation, as the passive civilian-victims become active, 
warrior-heroes. 
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In addition to plays such as the ones described above, the Arts and Culture Group 
screened documentary-style videos. One such screening of a film called The Road to 
Liberation narrated a history of the Tamil diaspora to the audience. Beginning with 
definitions of the words “diaspora” and “genocide,” the film showed the audience images 
of maimed bodies and video footage of the 1995 Exodus from Jaffna, before narrating a 
history that spanned Indus civilization—claimed by the filmmakers as the ancestors of 
the Tamil people—and a map of Lemuria, the long-lost continent claimed by Dravidian 
nationalists256, to nineteenth century labor diasporas in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, 
through to the present-day. The film concludes with the following words and a montage: 
Today, more than fifty million Tamils live in many different lands across 
the distant seas.  
There is no state without a Tamil, but there is no state for the Tamils. 
(montage of images of Prabhakaran and protests) They are the people 
who are willing to do anything for their people. Eelam is getting ready for 
liberation. 
This pro-LTTE documentary narrates a series of heterogenous migrations, 
dispersions and settlements, and presents them as part of the history of a unified “Tamil” 
diaspora. With the above title cards, and images of protests at the end of the Sri Lankan 
war, and the LTTE leader, the film presents a familiar refrain among Tamil nationalists—
that Tamils who live in many states around the world do not have a state of their own—to 
justify the LTTE’s war for national liberation and a separate state. Taken together, the 
film, along with the plays, songs, dances and other videos presented at the WTM’s 
cultural shows make an affective appeal to its diasporic audience to support the LTTE 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 For a scholarly study of Tamil nationalists’ claims to this lost continent, also known as kumari kandam, 
see Ramaswamy (2006). 
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cause as a diasporic nation in need of a state. In so doing they inculcate the notion that 
supporting the Tigers provides an effective defense to counter state violence against the 
long-suffering Tamils, and encouage diaspora Tamils to identify the Tamils’ political 
struggle with the LTTE. 
When LTTE leaders were killed, whether in battle or during government air 
strikes, the WTM organized memorials to them, often in the same venues as their cultural 
shows. In May 2008, when the LTTE’s frontline commander, senior strategist and second 
in command, Brigadier Balraj, died of a heart attack at Puthukudiyiruppu in the 
Mullaithivu district, the LTTE declared a three day period of national mourning on May 
21-23. In Canada, the WTM followed suit, and organized memorials for Balraj at a 
church in downtown Toronto and at one school and two Tamil-owned banquet halls 
throughout the city. The event began with an introduction, and the raising of the 
Canadian flag to Canada’s national anthem, followed by the Tamil Eelam flag and 
anthem, and one minute of silence. A larger-than-life garlanded portrait of Balraj, in 
three-quarter profile, faced a long line of solemn mourners. A song for Balraj played 
while families streamed by to pay their respects by pausing and bowing their heads, 
raising their hands to their heads in prayer, and leaving a carnation or lighting a tealight 
at the shrine. Thousands of Tamils attended these events, which were also broadcast on 
Tamil Vision. 
Every year, the WTM also organized the largest event in Toronto’s Tamil 
community: Maaveerar Naal, or Great Heroes Day, to commemorate all of the LTTE 
fighters who were killed in the national liberation struggle. The LTTE declared 
November 27, the day Lt. Shankar became the first Tiger who died in combat. In the late 
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1990s and early 2000s, Maaveerar Naal drew upwards of 7,000 to 10,000 Toronto-area 
Tamils to a memorial service held in large event spaces like the Coliseum of the 
Canadian National Exhibition.257 In this space, organizers displayed the pictures of nearly 
2,000 fighters who were killed in battle. Many of the attendees were relatives of one or 
more dead fighters. One elderly woman who was active in the community, spoke to me 
of her daughter, who ran away to join the LTTE while her family was preparing to move 
to Toronto in the mid-1990s. She did not hear from her daughter again; she died in battle 
for Elephant Pass. An ardent supporter of the LTTE struggle, this woman writer attended 
the Heroes Day memorial every year, in spite of her ailing health. For maaveerar families 
like hers, the memorial provided a space for her to mourn and remember her daughter’s 
life and sacrifice. Tamil activists and other supporters of the cause also attended and 
paused to remember others who were killed during the war. 
Smaller events were organized throughout the week to commemorate the LTTE’s 
dead in venues throughout the city. Tamil Students’ Associations, in particular, held their 
own Maaveerar Naal ceremonies, as did TYO-Canada. 
As CSIS and the Toronto police brought greater scrutiny to bear on LTTE events 
in Toronto, however, Maaveerar Naal moved from the city centre to venues in the 
suburbs, and at times, did not attract as large a crowd. By the mid-2000s, Tamil 
participants worried about the Canadian state’s surveillance of the event, and feared they 
would be accused of supporting terrorism. As the war returned to northern Sri Lanka, 
however, Tamils attended the event in larger numbers. The nature of the event changed. 
No LTTE flags were visible at these events. Instead of portraits of each fighter, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 For one report of this event, see McAndrew (1998).  
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memorial focused on one symbol. There was no time to linger before the photo of a 
deceased loved one, or leave something behind. After quickly visiting the display, 
attendees were directed into a hall to watch pro-LTTE performances of dance, music and 
drama, and listen to speeches. In 2009, one activist told me of how the police watched 
and photographed the line of attendees that snaked around the building. The LTTE 
videotaped the event for its own records, and that year, the young activist’s friend even 
offered to share the videotape, to get the police to stop filming and photographic the 
attendees as they waited. The tactic apparently worked.258 
 Social service provision was another important way in which the LTTE 
established hegemony among Toronto Tamils. Early efforts to provide basic services—
like shelter and food-—to Tamil newcomers during the mid-1980s were increasingly 
appropriated and then controlled by LTTE supporters abroad.259 One activist described 
this as being especially prominent during efforts to assist Tamil refugees who had arrived 
on a boat off the coast of Newfoundland in August 1986.260 Eventually, only those who 
supported—or, at least assented to—the Tigers were able to access municipal, provincial 
and federal funds to provide much-needed social services to new Tamil refugees and 
immigrants. The Tamil Eelam Society of Canada became foremost among organizations 
that provided settlement assistance to these “newcomers” to Canada. These important 
services were usually provided in Tamil, and included job training and employment 
searches, credential assessment, computer literacy and information technology training, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 I do not know whether the videotape was later shared with the Toronto police, RCMP or CSIS. 
259 This took place at a time when the LTTE fought rival militant groups for control over northern Sri 
Lanka, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
260 Those seeking asylum were mostly men who had claimed to travel directly from Sri Lanka. It was later 
learned that the boat had left Germany, but in contrast to recent discourses around refugee arrivals, they 
were welcomed. 
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and English-language classes. Eventually, they were able to add youth and women’s 
groups, to address specific needs among Tamil newcomers.  
Political support for the Tigers was thus intertwined with cultural and social life, 
as supporters participated in the everyday lives of Tamil refugees and immigrants, and 
cultivated friendships and a sense of community among them, while alienating and 
excluding dissenters. In this way, Tamil migrants from Sri Lanka were reintroduced to 
the politics of the LTTE by its supporters in a diasporic context, through practices of 
social service provision and cultural heritage management in the multicultural 
governmental state. The Tigers, as known through diasporic supporters, were not only 
distant figures fighting a war that Toronto’s Tamils had left behind. They actively 
participated in the creation of that community in Canada, helping Tamils settle into their 
new country and reminding them of their duty to help their relatives back home.261  
The ban on the LTTE 
On April 8, 2006, the Government of Canada proscribed the LTTE, under the 
Criminal Code of Canada, as amended by The Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C.2001, c. 41.262 
Also known as Bill C-36, Canada's anti-terrorism act was ushered in the wake of the 
September 11 al-Qaeda attacks in the United States, and contained measures similar to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 This does not mean that all Tamil community formations in Toronto were the direct result of Tiger 
politics. 
262 In addition to the Criminal Code of Canada, the Anti-Terrorism Act amended several other acts, 
including Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act, 
and enacted the Registration of Charities (Security Information) Act. The listing of the LTTE occurred on 
April 8, 2006; it was subsequently reviewed and extended on December 22, 2010, eighteen months after the 
end of war, and again on November 20, 2012. A federal website listing proscribed organizations includes 
the following lines at the end of a revised paragraph about the LTTE: “The LTTE has also had an extensive 
network of fundraisers, political and propaganda officers, and arms procurers operating in Sri Lanka and 
within the Tamil diaspora. Although the LTTE was militarily defeated in May 2009, subversion, 
destabilization, and fundraising continue, particularly in the diaspora” (Public Safety Canada 2011).  
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the latter government's Patriot Act. Canada’s Act expanded the federal government's 
powers of surveillance and security to act against perceived terrorist threats, including 
provisions for preemptive detentions, non-disclosure of evidence, and secret trials. With 
this, the federal government created a list of entities deemed to be a threat to Canadian 
security. The proscription of the LTTE allowed the government to prosecute individuals 
who mobilized financial support to the organization. Anyone who knowingly provided 
financial support to the LTTE could be jailed for up to 10 years, while those who 
fundraised or “facilitated” the work of the LTTE faced up to 14 years in prison. At the 
press conference, the Minister urged Tamils in Canada to call a newly-established, 
dedicated “hotline” to report LTTE activists to the state (Toronto Star 2008). 
Though presented as legislation that “protects the safety, security and 
fundamental rights of Canadians,” critics pointed to the bill's incompatibility with the 
civil and political rights enshrined in the country's Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(particularly, with respect to positive freedoms of assembly, association and expression).  
Canada decided to proscribe the LTTE following a long international campaign 
by the Sri Lankan government. Sri Lanka had first banned the organization in 1978. That 
ban was removed during the peace process to allow negotiations to move forward; even 
so, Sri Lanka’s then Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, continued to argue for a 
ban against the organization in several countries, until his assassination, allegedly by the 
LTTE, in 2005. Kadirgamar focused on Western countries with large diasporic 
populations.  
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Outside Sri Lanka, the organization was first proscribed in India, in 1992, after 
the assassination of the country's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi the previous year. The 
United States listed the LTTE as a terrorist organization in 1997, followed by the UK and 
Australia, among others. While Canada’s security agencies considered the group to be a 
terrorist organization, the federal government was reluctant to impose a total ban. Instead, 
in November 2001, Canada’s Liberals added the LTTE to a list of 83 groups and 
individuals whose property could be frozen and reported to Canadian authorities. This 
was the “ban” against which Tamils protested at Pongu Thamil in Ottawa in 2002. This 
time, the 2006 proscription entailed a complete ban on the LTTE, and was among the 
first actions taken when Stephen Harper’s Conservatives formed a minority government 
in the next election on a neoliberal, pro-business and anti-terrorism national security 
platform.263 Shortly after Canada proscribed the Tigers—and, unlike in 2001, promised 
judicial action against those who provided them with financial support—the EU followed 
suit.  
Responses to the ban: Community activists 
The proscription of the LTTE upset Tamil community activists. Many had been 
wary of the Anti-Terrorism Act, but few mobilized against its enactment until the 2006 
election of the Conservative government. The latter had publicized its plans to proscribe 
the LTTE at a time when the Sri Lankan government and the Tigers were returning to 
war. In response, pro-LTTE activists threatened court action to fight the designation. 
They argued that the LTTE’s activities were limited to a war with the Sri Lankan state, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 The Conservative party campaigned on the issue in the federal elections, which were forced through by 
a parliamentary crisis in the wake of a corruption scandal.  The Conservatives accused incumbent Liberals 
of being soft on terrorism, and promised stringent action, including a ban on the LTTE. 
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and posed no threat to Canadian security, as implied by the listing. Further, they argued 
that the ban infringed upon the rights of Tamils as Canadian citizens to political 
expression. Supporters of the LTTE argued that many Tamils in Canada voluntarily 
donated to demonstrate their political support for the LTTE; only “criminal” elements 
who misused the organization’s name could be responsible for alleged cases of extortion, 
(if such cases did exist) and could be punished under existing Canadian criminal law. 
These activists argued that it was within their democratic right to demonstrate support for 
the LTTE, whether by holding a sign at a rally, or donating money to the Tigers.  
One prominent community activist who was often invited to speak at Tamil 
events made this argument at a public meeting about Sri Lankan politics since July 1983. 
The event was organized by a Tamil leftist who was trying to make links to community 
activists. The audience was predominantly Tamil, but included a smattering of people 
who were not of Sri Lankan origin. Everyone spoke in English. Nantha had no problem 
declaring his support for the LTTE, but carefully stated that his support for the 
organization did not make him a Tiger. In making this statement, Nantha not only 
declared his support, he actively demonstrated it—he exercised the liberal democratic 
right to free expression about which he spoke. Declaring one’s support was a disarmingly 
simple performative act that required less interpretive work than other signs of political 
support within the community. A public declaration of support did not require “inside” 
knowledge or context to determine whether one was in support (aatharavu), or 
opposition (ethirppu). Nantha’s statement of support was a verbal challenge to the 
Canadian government’s proscription of the LTTE, which had now become the condition 
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of possibility for new forms of political speech. On the other hand, N’s statement that he 
was not a Tiger did not automatically make it so. 
Accordingly, given the political climate in which the ban was enacted, very few 
Tamil activists took such a stand in front of a wider Canadian public. Those who 
supported the LTTE’s struggle for Tamil Eelam in fact avoided mentioning the Tigers in 
statements that voiced their concerns about their “rights and freedoms” as Canadians. 
Instead, they focused on the ban’s effects on “the community.” With the announcement 
of the ban, they perceived and presented themselves as a Tamil community under attack. 
Activists from the Canadian Tamil Congress and other organizations argued that the 
Canadian media contributed to the problem by focusing on the LTTE to the exclusion of 
all other stories about the community, resulting in an unfairly negative portrayal of Tamil 
life in Canada.264 The CTC’s media relations responded to newspaper editorials, and 
organized media advocacy workshops for youth. At one such workshop in 2008, I joined 
a small group of young Tamil women in their late teens and early twenties in a training 
on how to identify and strategically respond to bias in media coverage of the Tamil 
Canadian community. We were encouraged to become resources to journalists, and 
develop a lasting relationship with them to encourage them to write more “balanced” 
stories. CTC activists also countered negative media images by constructing their own 
positive representations to construct a narrative of Canadian Tamils as immigrants who 
survived violence and oppression in Sri Lanka to create new lives as a successful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 This was a frequent complaint among community activists, particularly during the late 1990s, and was 
itself the subject of at least one story in The Toronto Star, “Tamils frustrated by image of violence.” For a 
discussion of media representations of gang violence in report on Toronto Tamil youth produced for 
CanTYD, see Balasingham et al, (2000).  
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community that makes significant social, cultural and economic contributions to 
Canadian society.265   
Responses to the ban: Dissenting activists 
From the perspective of some dissenting activists, however, the 2006 ban on the 
LTTE was a response to violence organized and inflicted by those who claimed to 
represent Tamils as a community in Canada. As described above, local agents were 
tasked with gathering contributions from Tamil families in Canada. While activists who 
supported the Tigers asserted that these contributions were “voluntary” or “freely given,” 
dissenters characterized these economic relationships as “extractive,” “coercive,” and 
“extortionist.”266 Collectors were said to carry lists of Tamil households, drawn from 
public events, community organizations, home village associations, phone book listings, 
and even—as some claimed—electoral lists drawn from the offices of local officials 
(Becker 2006; La 2004; Toronto Star 2008). These lists, compiled and maintained by 
overseas activists, were shared with the leadership back home. During the ceasefire, the 
Tigers, like the Sri Lankan army, established “checkpoints” in the areas under their 
control; for example, outside Vavuniya town, on the road toward Omanthai in northern 
Sri Lanka, visiting diaspora Tamils were stopped, scrutinized and asked to register their 
passports (Becker 2004). The Tigers were aware of the transnational social ties 
maintained by Tamils living abroad. Those who did not wish to give could be threatened 
with harm to their relatives in Sri Lanka. Just as often, however, the threat did not have to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 In Chapter 5, I discuss a CTC-produced exhibit on Tamils who migrated to Canada after Black July. The 
exhibit aimed, in part, to familiarize other Canadians with the Tamil community in Canada by presenting 
narratives of Tamil migration as a result of Sri Lankan state violence.  
266 To be sure, most Tamils understood that fundraising involved both sets of relationships, and was 
oftentimes more complex than “freely given” donations or “extortion.” 
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be made explicitly—it was enough for a collector in Toronto to inquire about a family 
member.267 Tamils, after decades of political violence, internecine fighting, and war, had 
become deft interpreters of the unsaid.  
However, alternative and dissenting activists were divided over the ban. On the 
one hand, these activists hoped the new law would cut the LTTE off from resources used 
to fight the war. Some also felt the ban would open up more political space for dissent by 
placing limits on intimidation within the community. Activists like Jeevani’s friend, NP, 
made public their criticisms of the LTTE in Canadian national media outlets and 
published in Tamil. On the other hand, some said they felt no safer in voicing dissent and 
shied away from public confrontations; they felt the police cared less about ensuring their 
personal safety than appearing to put an end to LTTE fundraising. In general, dissenting 
activists tended to articulate advantages to the ban, while alternative Tamil groups had 
more reservations.  
A few dissenters shared with community activists concerns about racial profiling 
in the name of Canada’s national security. Middle-aged and older male activists cited 
their own experiences in Sri Lanka, under the country’s 1979 Prevention of Terrorism 
Act, which gave rise to detentions, arrests, and torture. They left Sri Lanka because they 
were misrecognized as being militants—i.e. Tigers—and were consequently deemed 
“terrorists” who could be arrested and tortured; if not, they anticipated this 
misrecognition and were encouraged to migrate to safety.268 The ban, they argued, would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 For example, one woman described being asked about her sister, followed by the statement, “We hope 
no misfortune will come her way.” 
268 While I spoke with more than one activist who had been or was involved with the LTTE politically, 
these activists drew a distinction between those who engaged in politics, and those who carried arms and 
engaged in military actions.  
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not reduce violent intimidation within the Tamil community; it would, in fact, create new 
possibilities for violation under the guise of law and order by giving Toronto police 
officers a reason to stop and search Tamils on grounds of “suspicion” for links to 
terrorism.269 Several of these stories involved street policing, wherein officers tried to 
discern signs of “political support” for the LTTE among young Tamil men.  
Community activists shared stories about their own and others’ experiences with 
local police to illustrate this point. They told me of a young man who was searched for 
having a stuffed Tiger visible in the rear window his car, and others who were perceived 
to be gang members, recalling the moral panic around Tamil gangs rumored to be run by 
the LTTE in 1990s Toronto. The irony was that even activists who publicly criticized the 
LTTE and faced community censure for it could be (mis)recognized and identified as 
potential Tigers by the police during these stop and searches. Two sisters who were part 
of a group of mostly Tamil, Sri Lankan-origin feminists told me about the ban’s effect on 
their family and their political organizing during a longer conversation at their home 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
These activists and others were not sure how to interpret the ATA’s use of the word “facilitated” with 
reference to a listed terrorist organization. What it meant to “support” a group or to “facilitate” its work was 
an open question, not only in Canada and the United States, but Sri Lanka as well, and had a serious 
bearing on refugee determination cases.  
269 Toronto’s police force is predominantly White, but has recruited heavily in immigrant communities over 
the last decade to facilitate such operations. This kind of recruitment by police and security agencies 
contributed to mistrust among Tamil activists and Tamils in general, as I discuss later in this chapter. 
During protests in 2009, I encountered one Tamil police officer who also acted as a translator and 
interpreter in community-police interactions.  
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Tamil women’s activisms: Between community and dissent 
Subasini and Tanuja are young feminist activists, writers and performers who 
were involved with local and transnational Tamil literary-political circles270 that were 
critical of the LTTE; their father had been involved in EROS’s political party, the Eelavar 
Democratic Front, before leaving Sri Lanka after being tortured by the SLA. While their 
grandparents were from Jaffna, their parents were raised in the Vanni, where they were 
born and raised before being displaced to Colombo. They felt distanced from Jaffna-
centric community events and organizations. Still, the sisters were interested in 
understanding what other diaspora Tamils felt toward the Tigers, and felt that dissenting 
activists’ public criticisms of the LTTE—namely, the group’s human rights violations, 
militarism, and lack of democracy—were alienated from Toronto’s Tamil community. 
They shared many of the dissenters’ concerns, but wanted to do grassroots work to 
support civilians in the war zones.  
As we discussed their work with a network of women activists, and their take on 
Sri Lankan Tamil and diaspora politics, the issue of the ban came up. They explained to 
me how the ban affected their everyday lives and experiences with racism in Toronto. 
The sisters told me of how their mother feared for their two brothers, who couldn’t stay 
out in public with friends without attracting attention—and suspicion. One night, their 
15-year-old brother was with some friends, sitting and talking in their car, parked in front 
of one of their homes. The police came and questioned the boys, and took them to a local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 Thiruchandran (2006) includes translations of Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora women writers involved in 
these circles, including the annual Penngal Santhippu literary meeting, and discusses the social politics of 
their writing. 
	   240	  
station, claiming the boys were part of a Tamil gang. It would cost the family almost one 
thousand dollars to get their son home. 
 The subject of community-based activism also drew out differences among 
Tamils, which led the sisters to draw a parallel between the way that all Canadian Tamils 
were stereotyped after the ban and how Jaffna-origin Tamils stereotyped other Tamils in 
Toronto. Subasini and Tanuja identified strongly with the Vanni, a region of northern Sri 
Lanka controlled by the Tigers and the site of its headquarters since “the fall of Jaffna” in 
1995. Earlier, Tanuja had told me about how many in the diaspora attribute the LTTE’s 
mistakes to “Vanni pulikal” who were described disparagingly by some Jaffna Tamils as 
“uneducated” and “illiterates.” Some of these Tamils also used the phrase “Vanni people” 
to refer to Tiger cadres. For Tanuja, this equated Tamils who lived in the region with the 
those who were Tigers. Tanuja was understandably angry about these statements, her 
voice rising as we talked. Such remarks implicitly assumed that only those who could 
read, or were intellectuals, were capable of being political or politically effective.  “I 
don’t see it that way,” she told me. “It is not because they are from the Vanni. All the 
(Tamil) people are making these mistakes.” In addition, she said of those who could not 
read, “They may not read. They’re not academics. But Vanni people are people! They 
know what they need.”  
It’s like when the LTTE was banned in Canada. The majority—the rest of 
the communities [thought] that Tamil people are terrorists. You know, that 
brown people, Sri Lankans, are terrorists. You fight against it, you say, 
“How can you call us terrorists when you only call the LTTE terrorists? 
We’re not LTTE.” When they attack you [Jaffna Tamils], when they name 
you, you fight back. But you don’t take a second to name others [Vanni 
Tamils]. 
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In the above, Subasini describes how other ethnic and racial groups in Canada exclude 
Tamils from a Canadian national community by labeling them as “terrorists.” She points 
out the dissonance in activisms that object to this exclusion through the labeling of 
“Tamils” in general, only to reinscribe stereotypes and establish social hierarchies among 
Tamils (i.e. Jaffna vs Vanni). In so doing, she switches from her earlier use of “we” 
(indicating her belonging to the women’s network), to “you” when referring to a Tamil 
community of mostly Jaffna Tamils. Nevertheless, Subasini and Tanuja continued to be 
active among other Tamils. As Tanuja put it, “Even though I’m not part of them [Jaffna 
Tamils], even though I feel isolated from them, I want to be a part of them, because I 
want to talk about my history.” By telling their stories as “Tamils,” the sisters joined 
others in creating new formations of Tamil community in Toronto. 
Three months after the ban, violence escalated between the government and the 
LTTE in August 2006 (as discussed in Chapter 2), leading to the closure of the A9 
Highway, a vital link between the Jaffna Peninsula and the rest of the island. Subasini 
and Tanuja joined other women, including Jeevani and Leena (introduced in Chapter 1), 
and formed a group, the Canadian Sri Lankan Women’s Action Network, to protest the 
closure and violence. The women’s network organized a protest in front of the Sri 
Lankan embassy, asking the Government of Sri Lanka to reopen the A9. Subasini 
explained the group’s reasoning behind this action: 
You know, you [the Government of Sri Lanka] say the Tigers are 
terrorists. We can’t ask them, so we’re here to ask you. We want the A9 to 
be open. We want the ceasefire of 2002 to be followed. 
 
Similarly, the women’s group demanded Canada’s active involvement in the peace 
process, as had been promised. As Subasini put it, 
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And we can’t even go and ask the Tigers, or LTTE, because you [the 
Government of Canada] have already banned them, saying they’re 
terrorists. Why would we go ask the terrorists? We have to ask you, 
because you’re the government. You’re responsible. 
 
Subasini’s narrative uses a collective voice—a “we”—to describe how the women’s 
group formed around protesting the A9 closure, but she also illustrates the politics of the 
ban in Tamil activisms, including those that resist LTTE hegemony. Whether addressing 
the Sri Lankan government, which had initially banned the LTTE under its Prevention of 
Terrorism Act, or the Canadian government, which had recently banned the organization, 
Subasini is making a demand of them both by referencing the other party to the war, the 
LTTE, which they have placed outside the law. In naming the ban, the women’s group’s 
recognition of each state’s sovereign power allowed them to address their claims to 
government officials as subjects of that power, on behalf of Tamils in Sri Lanka.   
The women’s group thus strategically used the ban and their gendered national 
and ethnic identities as “Sri Lankan women” and “Sinhala, Burgher, Muslim and Tamil 
women” to address the Canadian and Sri Lankan governments, and to demonstrate their 
concern for Tamil civilians in the North—of whom, as their literature noted, more than 
three-quarters were women and children. For their efforts, Jeevani explained that they 
were called LTTE supporters online by activists she described as “old Leftists.” These 
men were now connected to the EPDP, and—in the case of at least one of WAN’s known 
detractors—hoped to influence Rajapaksa’s SLFP government to provide a political 
solution for the Tamils alongside a military defeat of the LTTE. In contrast to the reasons 
Subasini gave for addressing the Sri Lankan government, these activists were upset by 
WAN’s criticisms of the government’s actions and wanted to see more criticisms of the 
LTTE’s wrongdoing during the ceasefire. 
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Between the two public stances of support for the LTTE and opposition to it —
ātharavu and ethirppu, or in other words, being ‘pro-LTTE’ and ‘anti-LTTE’—the ban as 
a legal utterance and a form of action was often murkier and less clearcut than a position 
for or against the Tigers. While hard-line sympathizers and their opponents held staunch 
positions to repeal and celebrate the ban, respectively, many Tamils and some activists 
did not wish to take either position. Their membership in the Tamil community was 
shaped by deep ambivalences. A story from Tharini, a community-based social service 
provider and feminist, illustrates the gendered politics of community-organizing amid 
rumblings of dissent during the ban. 
Tharini belonged to a group of Tamil women service providers who were 
organizing a community event to celebrate “the strength of Tamil women” on 
International Women’s Day. As service providers and social activists, the group shared a 
common interest in issues facing Tamil women in Toronto, ranging from intimate partner 
violence to elderly neglect. However, a few of the group’s core members had links to 
other political organizations in the community. These connections led to a new sponsor 
for the event in 2008: The Canadian Tamil Congress. 
Driving back home from a meeting with the group, Tharini was upset about the 
CTC’s involvement: They had put out a press release to the mainstream media, making 
the event appear to be theirs; in an email chain to others, they did not mention the work 
of the women providers group. Tharini felt that the work of women like her was being 
appropriated: “They like to take credit! They’re all men, but the women are doing all the 
work!” She explained further, noting that “the men” (i.e. the CTC) just put their name on 
the event, by sending PR, without consulting the women organizers. “That’s how it is in 
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all of these organizations—they are all connected to the Tigers, through the WTM, and 
this is how they work!” 
Tharini suddenly stopped talking. For one quiet minute, her eyes narrowed, 
focusing on the road ahead. “I don’t have a problem with them (CTC) working with those 
organizations,” she told me. She has explained to me before that she remains 
independent, to be able to “work with everybody,” and indeed, she was one of the few 
activists I knew who continued to work this way—but sometimes the people she worked 
with maintained a distance from her. As we talked, she reminded me of where we first 
met—a CTC annual gala dinner to celebrate Thai Pongal. For the first time, they awarded 
funds to three community-based service organizations. Tharini believed that the CTC was 
doing this “because of the ban on the LTTE,” and its fallout for the WTM. “It is good that 
they are getting involved with community needs, but not this way.” She asserted that the 
CTC, the WTM, and the old students’ and home village associations, as well as the 
alternative and dissenting groups were all typically run by men and, in their focus on 
public and political life, these groups were not in touch with the “real needs” of the 
community. 
Indeed, as Subasini and Tanuja, and Tharini’s narratives show, even some Tamils 
who wanted to reduce the social dominance of the Tigers in diaspora life also worried 
that the ban would stigmatize their communities, as the (non-Tamil) Canadian public, 
steeped in governmental and media discourses, learned to identify the Tamils with the 
Tigers. At the heart of this indistinction between the Tiger and the Tamil was, 
paradoxically, the Tigers’ claim to sole representation of the Tamil people in the 
homeland and the diaspora. Thus, even as Tamil nationalist and community activists 
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claimed that many Tamils supported the Tigers as their political representatives, so this 
claim to total representation bound them to a stigmatized identity in public.  
Youth who were sometimes privately critical of such dynamics among 
community activists also recounted being (mis)recognized as Tigers for their community 
work.271 Young professionals were denied jobs, while others were shut out from 
interviewing for financial jobs, which they speculated was due to the Tamil gangs and 
Tigers’ links to credit card fraud. Tamils who perceived themselves as hard-working272 
were now viewed by such employers as untrustworthy and disloyal.  
Thivya’s calendar 
 Four months into my fieldwork in Toronto, in April 2008, I had started to become 
friends with Jeevani, the feminist activist and recent refugee whose story I had introduced 
in Chapter 1. She wanted me to meet her friend Thivya. Jeevani and Thivya were friends 
who had lived together at Poorani Women’s Centre, a shelter in Jaffna for women and 
girls during the war.273 The centre was founded by members of the Women’s Study Circle 
of the University of Jaffna, and run independently of the parties to war—the government, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 See Jo Becker 2006b for a paper presented to a policy symposium which summarizes follow-up research 
after the Human Rights Watch report on diaspora fundraising, Canada’s proscription of the LTTE, and a 
return to war between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. In October 2006, Tamils reported 
employment-based discrimination and harassment, including instances in which employees were called 
“terrorists,” faced demotion and dismissal. Many felt that the government had not made sufficient 
distinctions between the LTTE  and Tamils in Canada, and should have spoken out explicitly against anti-
Tamil bias. 
272 I note here that the self-perception of “Tamils” as hard workers also draws on common colonial 
stereotypes that distinguished between “industrious” and “docile” Tamil workers (not only on the 
plantations, but in civil service), and “lazy” but “hospitable” Sinhalese. See Daniel 1996 for a discussion of 
these stereotypes. 
273 For a short history of Poorani as a space of women’s resistance to militarism, see Rajasingham-Perera 
(2007); see also Sornarajah (2004) for an article in Lines written by the activist Nirmala Rajasingham under 
a nom de plume, and Coomaraswamy and Rajasingham-Perera (2009). 
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the LTTE, other armed Tamil groups, and at that time, the IPKF.274 At Poorani, activists 
highlighted and addressed women’s suffering by attending to the intersections between 
political violence and domestic and sexual violence against women. Moreover, as a 
feminist space, Poorani encouraged and allowed Tamil women to question and challenge 
the gender order of Jaffna society and the gendered, culturalist norms and militarized 
politics of the LTTE and Sri Lankan Army.275 As the war continued, however, Poorani 
women were harassed by these armies, and eventually driven out by the LTTE, which 
had taken over what was left of the Centre in 1991.276  
 Thivya lived in a public housing project in Regent Park, a low-income immigrant 
neighborhood in downtown Toronto. As dark descended on Toronto, Jeevani and I tried 
to navigate the alleys of the housing project to find the right entrance, only to find 
ourselves a little lost. We were warned the apartment would be difficult to find. We 
called Thivya, and her son bounded out of one exit; inside, he led us through fluorescent-
lit hallways to their home.  
Thivya has lived in this apartment for fourteen years—since 1994, when she 
migrated to Canada to join her husband after their marriage. She was in her mid-twenties 
then. He works in a Tamil-owned factory, and earns some extra income through 
piecework sewing, while taking care of their home and three children. Pink paint peels 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 The Women’s Study Circle was a group of feminist activists and lecturers who met regularly to discuss 
women’s issues.  
275 See Maunaguru (1995), Thiruchandran (1997), de Mel (2001), and Sivamohan (2001). 
276 The centre continued for a few years as a shelter for wounded LTTE combatants, under the LTTE-run 
development organization, TRO, and was later abandoned. According to one person, during this time, some 
of the women who had been sheltered at Poorani after surviving rape by the SLA or IPKF later joined the 
Black Tigers, an elite group of cadre recruited for suicide-bombing missions. See Neloufer de Mel (1998, 
2001) and Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake (2001b) for discussion of the ideological framing of rape 
survivors that underpinned this recruitment.  
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from the walls, on which the youngest child has scribbled with pencil and crayon. Thivya 
and her husband hope to buy their own home soon—like many working-class Tamils, 
they aspire to join the ranks of the sixty percent of Canada’s Tamil community who are 
homeowners. We sat and chatted amiably for a while before getting down to the main 
reason for our visit: Thivya had arranged for us to speak with two fundraisers for the 
iyakkam—a married couple who live in the same complex, and are also Tamil-language 
teachers.  
Thivya had told the teachers that I wanted to interview them for research; she 
called them to confirm that we could visit. A woman in her early 40s with a soft, rounded 
face answered, smiling as she showed us in. The apartment was similar to Thivya’s, but 
slightly more furnished, and with a bigger television blaring Tamil Vision news. The 
woman, Kanthi, asked her husband, Vignesh, to put the television on mute. Vignesh 
continued to sit on the sofa, scowling at the disruption, while we sat at a table behind 
him. Next to this table was a chalkboard easel, on which several letters and simple words 
were written in Tamil: A – Amma; Aa – Aanil.277 Their young daughter played nearby. 
 I was about to explain the purpose of my research, when V stood up, and the 
interview began – with an accusation, and an interview of me. The husband, his lips 
slightly curled, expressed doubts about the purpose of our conversation and asked, “Why 
should we speak to you? You could be a spy, you know this CSIS, they are targeting our 
people, and they always get Tamils to do their work for them.” As he said this, his gaze 
shifted, from me to Jeevani and back. I explained that I hoped that my research would, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 These words, meaning “mother” and “squirrel” respectively, are commonly used to teach basic words in 
Tamil language primers for children in Sri Lanka. 
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the long-run, be of some benefit to the community, by giving Tamils an opportunity to 
reflect on their own community, and allowing others to better understand their lives and 
aspirations.  The interview continued, with most of the answers from Kanthi, but I was 
nervous after such a rocky start.   
With this interview, as in others, I had anticipated being careful, as always, to 
follow the social cues of my interlocutors and avoid subjects that I sensed would derail 
our discussion. I did not expect, however, after going through a mutual acquaintance, to 
be accused of being a spy. Our conversation revealed the level of mistrust among 
Tamils—not only the mistrust felt toward and expressed to me and Jeevani, as friends of 
a neighbor friend—but which we also felt toward the couple, and Vignesh in particular.  
When we returned from speaking with the Tamil teachers, Jeevani and Thivya 
began to reminisce about their days together at Poorani. They remembered their peers, 
and the boldness of their actions—Jeevani recalls wearing shorts and cropped hair, and 
doing physical labor—and how scared they were at other times. Other members of the 
women’s group were living in Toronto, and they remained in touch – but it wasn’t always 
an easygoing relationship.  
As we sat on the couch, Jeevani noticed something we had not seen before: A 
daily tear-away calendar for 2008. A large image dwarfs the square calendar: It is 
Velupillai Prabhakaran, leader of the Tigers, dressed in military fatigues. In the photo, he 
stands with the upright bearing of a soldier, but his face sports chubby cheeks and a 
friendly smile. The calendar was “sold,” or given in exchange for a one-time donation of 
$40. In spite of the proscription of the LTTE, these calendars, as well as flags, posters, 
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and other paraphernalia continued to be sold by fundraisers for the World Tamil 
Movement. 
As she caught sight of the calendar, Jeevani’s eyes grew wider, and she gasped. 
“Why did you buy that?” she says, pointing to where our gazes have turned. She was 
more animated than I have seen in months—no longer subdued with fear, as she was 
while we spoke to the fundraisers/teachers. After leaving their home, we admitted our 
fear to one another, and continued to speak in whispers on the way back to Thivya’s. 
Now, upon seeing the calendar, Jeevani could hardly contain the frustration and anger 
about the war that she carries with her, but rarely lets out. To Thivya, she said,  
You know what they are doing with that [money]. How could you give 
[money] to them to kill our children over there? 
 
I held my breath. Thivya, who has known Jeevani on-and-off for 15 years, appeared 
taken aback by her directness. In Toronto, community activists denied the Tigers’ use of 
child recruitment, and laid blame for casualties at the army’s door.278 Thivya, however, 
did not contradict Jeevani’s statement. Instead, she replied, 
I know, but what can I do? What is to be done? They will come and ask 
every time. 
 
They, she explains, are not only the Tamil teachers from the Movement, with whom she 
has become a little familiar—friendly, even—but pairs of young men who remind her of 
the war she left behind, and the suffering and sacrifice of others just like them. When 
reminded of those who were willing to make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives for the 
nationalist struggle, diaspora Tamils like Thivya feel the guilt of having left.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 See Human Rights Watch (2004) for discussion of child recruitment by the LTTE; see also HRW 
(2007b) for discussion of state collusion with the Karuna group in this. 
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Not once are the Tigers explicitly mentioned in the above exchange. Members of 
the community know who “they” are, and typically do not refer to them—indeed, 
sometimes cannot refer to them. For example, when S Anna wouldn’t say “LTTE” or 
“Tigers” when talking about how Balraj’s memorial week cancelled a planned CTBC 
interview about the Karumaiyam performance. After the performances, he told me that 
attendance was down, and he believed it was due to the polarized atmosphere—many 
Tamils who were on the fence felt compelled to go along with the Tigers, or at least not 
appear to oppose them, in the face of a Sri Lankan government offensive that was killing 
Tamils. In such an environment, opposing the Tigers could appear to others as being 
supportive of the Sri Lankan government’s actions. 
 LTTE fundraising was not just an accrual of material resources for the cause; 
donations also created and maintained social relationships between Tamils, and as such, 
contributed not only to the LTTE or its struggle, but to the making and unmaking of a 
diasporic community. Donations were, in this sense, a gift. As anthropologists have 
shown, following Mauss, a gift appears to be voluntary, but entails an obligation. In this 
case, the social obligation was to support the struggle, as defined by the LTTE. The 
movement encouraged young Tamils in Eelam to make the ultimate gift of their lives for 
the future Tamil Eelam. LTTE poetry speaks to this idea, using images of the Tamil 
fighter’s blood mingling with the soil and giving birth to the future nation. In such 
poems, thatkolai (“self-death,” or suicide) becomes thatkodai (gift of the self) 
(Hellmann-Rajanayagam 2005; Roberts 1996). LTTE martyrs lives were a gift that could 
never be reciprocated by diaspora Tamils, who instead donated funds and mobilized 
collectively in lieu of self-sacrifice.   
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After the ban, however, the social obligations that marked an apparently “free” 
gift were reconfigured for fundraising to continue. Instead of a “donation,” fundraisers 
“sold” items to Tamils door-to-door. What was once a “gift” exchange became an 
informal market transaction, as the donor had to be given something immediately in 
exchange.  
The LTTE had clearly not stopped fundraising in Toronto. The Movement had 
sold calendars and other items before, but such activities became more central, as they 
could no longer rely on donations through pre-authorized bank deductions, or sell items 
at WTM-organized public events and Tamil stores. Large sums of money would appear 
suspect to Canadian authorities, who were monitoring WTM-affiliated activists. As a 
dissenting activist and colleague of Jeevani’s said, “Maybe they don’t ask for money at 
the doorstep, but they sell the calendars instead.” This man was known among Toronto 
Tamil activists for publicly critiquing the movement; nevertheless, fundraisers visited his 
doorstep too. In their understanding, anyone who could be identified as a Tamil was 
obligated to give. The gift was made under the guise of a commodity, a reification of the 
LTTE and its leader’s power.  
Thivya’s calendar sits on a wall in front of the doorway. It greets—along with 
whoever answers the door—every person at the threshold to her home. When another 
round of fundraisers comes by, they too will see the Leader smiling down from her wall; 
when they ask for her contribution, she will direct their attention to the wall behind her. 
Turning her body away from the questioning canvasser and toward the calendar, she 
shows that she has already done her part for the cause. This year. With three children to 
feed on one wage, and her piecework, it is all that she can really do. 
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Figure 4.1: WTM calendar in a Tamil home in suburban Toronto, August 2009 
(Photograph by author.) 
 
 
Each day, one page is torn off, and with it, a fact about LTTE history, a red or 
blue monochrome image of an important political event or cadre associated with 
battlefield glory. In the LTTE calendar, time begins and ends with the movement. What 
remains constant throughout is the figure of Prabhakaran, who appears above the 
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calendar, everyday, smiling beatifically from the household’s wall. Prabhakaran thus 
seems to transcend time itself. Every year, his image is replaced—or, renewed—with 
another calendar, and another image of himself.  His image appears on the wall across 
from the shrines of Hindu worshippers, facing Murugan, Lakshmi and Saraswati, and in 
Christian homes, next to images of Jesus and the crucifixion. Prabhakaran’s photo even 
graces the walls of atheist Tamil Rationalists who inveigh against the religious fervor of 
their fellow Tamils in favor of a “pure Tamil” culture. As we view the image, each day, 
the image also views us. It solicits us to think of the struggle (led by the LTTE) and to 
contribute in some way to that which we, as a diaspora, have left behind. 
Questions of diaspora complicity in the ongoing war were raised again and again 
throughout my fieldwork, as revealed by Jeevani’s reaction to Thivya’s calendar, and 
discussions about fundraising. Given the extent to which the Tigers’ network pervaded 
diasporic economic, social and political space: Was there any way to be a “Tamil” in 
Canada without contributing in some way to the LTTE and its war for a separate state? It 
seemed practically impossible. This point was driven home to me once by Jeevani who 
was strongly committed to peace and social justice, and who, like other dissenters, was 
critical of the Tigers for creating suffering among the Tamils. Jeevani made great 
sacrifices to stand by her beliefs. However, the weight of exile—from Sri Lanka, from 
other Tamils and a sense of community—bore heavily on her at times. When we met for 
lunch in Scarborough one day, Jeevani took me to a well-known restaurant off Kennedy 
Rd. Our first meal together was at her home, and we had later eaten at other friends’ 
houses, but this time, she wanted to eat lamprais—a Sri Lankan meal in which rice, 
various vegetable and meat curries and a boiled egg, are wrapped together in a banana 
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leaf parcel and steamed together. On the way, she lamented the restaurant’s connections 
to the movement—the restaurant was one of several Jaffna-style, Sri Lankan restaurants 
and Tamil-owned franchises.279 It was said to have received LTTE investment funds. She 
named a few other places we could go, but they were no less complicit. Jeevani paused 
before opening the door. Then she said, “We should go anyway. It is a taste of home.” 
The WTM listing 
On June 16, 2008, Canada’s federal Public Safety Minister, Stockwell Day, held 
an outdoor press conference in downtown Toronto, where he made an unprecedented 
public announcement: The Canadian government had officially added the World Tamil 
Movement to a list of “terrorist organizations” proscribed under the Criminal Code of 
Canada. He claimed that the federal government had evidence that the WTM had been 
raising funds for the LTTE. The government’s decision had been in the making for over a 
decade. Manickavasagam Suresh had moved from Sri Lanka to Canada in 1990 to 
become the head coordinator of the WTM in Canada. In the mid-1990s, staffers of the 
WTM were investigated for alleged money laundering for the LTTE. Suresh was arrested 
in 1995 on an immigration order, and deemed a “potential terrorist threat” by the Federal 
Court. For years, community activists organized marches and rallies demanding the 
WTM activist’s release while he awaited deportation.280 CSIS investigations of Tamil 
organizations in Canada continued, and by the end of the 1990s, the agency determined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 Popular restaurants during my fieldwork included Rashnaa on Parliament St in downtown Toronto, and 
Hopper Hut, Babu Catering, and Elephant Pass in Scarborough. The latter was named after the iconic 
battleground that the LTTE captured in 2000, and promises customers “the taste of Tamil Eelam.” Many 
stores also sold freshly-made idiappam and there were dozens of small home-based businesses catering to 
busy families and single workers.  
280 For example, a crowd of 1,500 (by police estimates) attended a candlelight vigil co-sponsored by the 
Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils to mark the second anniversary of the WTM activist’s 
detention and protest his deportation. See Josey (1997) for The Toronto Star. 
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that several non-profits and commercial enterprises were fronts for the LTTE, including 
the WTM.281 After the passing of the Anti-Terrorism Act, Canada’s federal law 
enforcement agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), began an 
investigation of the WTM in 2002—the year that marked the start of Sri Lanka’s peace 
process.  
When the LTTE was banned in 2006, the WTM came under much greater 
scrutiny and surveillance in the name of national security. Two days after the ban on the 
LTTE, the RCMP raided the WTM’s Montreal offices. One week later, they also raided 
the Scarborough and Toronto offices of the group. Officers carried out boxes of 
documents and surrounded the building with yellow tape, signaling the locations as the 
scene of a criminal investigation. Documents that were subsequently leaked to the 
Canadian media showed that the WTM ran a program to make pre-authorized 
withdrawals from Canadian bank accounts, which added up to $763,000 a year (National 
Post 2008). The RCMP froze the WTM’s bank accounts, as well as those held by some of 
its officers.  The organization’s smaller Montreal outfit was shut down; eventually, the 
Scarborough-based main headquarters followed suit.  
The Canadian government’s decision to list the WTM sent shockwaves 
throughout activist networks in Toronto’s Tamil community. The WTM was the first 
non-combatant group to be listed under the ATA of 2001. This iteration of the ban was 
more concrete for many Tamils, when compared to the general proscription of the LTTE 
in 2006. The WTM was present in the lives of many Tamils in ways they did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 It may be noted here that CSIS frequently recommended the proscription of the LTTE, and while the 
organization was proscribed by the Liberals in 2002, after 9/11 under ATA, this did not formally describe 
the organization as “terrorist.”   
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immediately connect with the LTTE, and was understood to be a “community 
organization,” even as they knew that its activities supported the Tigers. WTM activists 
continued to organize the diaspora community through cultural shows, memorials for 
Tiger martyrs, and commemorative ceremonies of the kind described earlier in this 
chapter. Toronto Tamils wondered whether they, too, would be targeted as individuals 
and organizations under the "material support" provisions of Canada's Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 2001. 
Supporters quickly regrouped to organize against the ban. The Canadian Tamil 
Congress joined the WTM in condemning the decision (CTC 2008a). Activists argued 
that the state had not presented any evidence of the WTM raising funds, and that 
allegations of extortion in the community were unfounded, as the RCMP had not 
prosecuted any cases. The Movement's former president, Sitha Sittampalam, also issued a 
press release, during which he made the following statement: 
"It's no secret that the World Tamil Movement supports the right of the 
Tamil people to self-determination in the Northern and Eastern part of Sri 
Lanka. This is a political position – perhaps one that not everyone will 
agree with, but one that we are constitutionally entitled to hold.” 
(Tamilnet.com 2008) 
Later, in an interview with The Toronto Star, Sittampalam stated that the listing was,  
"the first step on a slippery slope, where all of our fundamental rights and 
freedoms can be eroded. We see the listing as a political move intended to 
silence a voice within the Tamil diaspora.” (Loriggio 2008) 
The above statements take issue with the listing as “a political move” that limits the 
“fundamental rights and freedoms” to which all Canadians are “constitutionally entitled.” 
The metaphor of a “voice” being silenced contributes to the activist’s reframing of the 
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issue as one of political persecution, rather than the RCMP probe into criminalized 
fundraising and extortion that was used by the government to justify its decision.  
Community activists like Sittampalam felt they were unfairly targeted by the 
federal government’s new listing. WTM activists were especially upset that their work 
was suspended on account of the listing, which labeled them as terrorists. They anxiously 
awaited charges—whether against them personally, or the Movement—which they 
planned to disprove in court. Publicly, when addressing non-Tamils, they denied or 
avoided being connected to the LTTE. And yet, at the same time, WTM and other 
community activists admitted privately what Tamils already knew: That funds had been 
raised. There was nothing wrong with raising that money, they hastened to add: It was 
done before the 2006 ban on the Tigers.282  
Citizenship, Diversity and Heritage in Multicultural Canada 
A brief history of Canadian multiculturalism 
 Multiculturalism is central to Canada’s national image and public policy today. 
Canada has projected the following image, to itself and others around the world, over the 
last five decades: Canada, a prosperous and dynamic nation where people of diverse 
ethnic, religious and cultural origins live peacefully together; Canada, a “middle-power” 
country that values tolerance, fairness, and political equality; Canada, “a nation of 
immigrants,” where ethnic identities are preserved, enhanced, and celebrated as part of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 I note this claim to demonstrate community activists’ concern to appear to stay within the rule of law, 
and not as a pronouncement on the legality (or illegality) of such actions. WTM activists did not discuss 
fundraising that continued in 2008 (e.g. calendar sales discussed in a section above). Dissenting activists 
alleged that money was still being channeled to the LTTE. 
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the nation’s multicultural “mosaic.” How has this idea of a multicultural Canada come to 
be? 
In contrast to the United States, where multiculturalism emerged out of the 
identity politics of new social movements, Canadian multiculturalism began as an official 
policy of the federal government. 
 Canadian multiculturalism developed as a way for the state to manage emerging 
tensions and conflicts through policies of cultural recognition and social 
“accommodation” in the 1960s. Two concerns, in particular, led to the development of 
multiculturalism as an official state policy. First was the growth of Québecois 
nationalism, and new separatist movements, which culminated in 1969’s “October 
Crisis.”283 In 1963, the government set up a Royal Commission on Biculturalism and 
Bilingualism in response to Francophone grievances. The Commission’s notions of 
“biculturalism” and “bilingualism” referred to the cultures and languages of Canada’s 
two “founding nations”—Britain and France—and thus excluded Aboriginal peoples. 
Canadians of other “ethnic” groups also demanded recognition, leading the Commission 
to consider “the cultural contributions of other ethnic groups” to Canada in one of its 
publications (Canada 1970), and the first official use of the term “multiculturalism” in 
1965 (Bennett 1998: 2).284 Second, the “liberalization” of Canada’s immigration policy in 
1967 led to the arrival of new immigrants from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean—regions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 For an anthropological study of Québecois nationalism, see Handler (1988). 
284 Paul Yuzyk, a Senator of Ukrainian descent, sparked a national debate by describing Canada as “a 
multicultural nation” in a 1964 speech—one year after the Commission began. This points to the influence 
of descendants of non-British, non-French European immigrants—the majority of Canadians at this time—
on the emergence of multiculturalism in Canada. 
	   259	  
that had been previously excluded from “open” immigration to Canada.285 The new 
policy was part of a long history of Canadian immigration driven by the political-
economic imperatives of settler colonization.286 Post-1967 immigrants were racialized as 
“visible minorities,” whose ethnic and cultural backgrounds (and phenotypes) were 
presumed to be at odds with the predominantly European origins of prior generations of 
immigrants. As Canada’s demographics began to change, the state sought to avoid “racial 
conflict,” and determined that new policies would be necessary to facilitate the 
harmonious “integration” of these new populations into Canadian society. In sum, 
Canada’s policy of multiculturalism was instituted as a way of accommodating difference 
through the management of “diversity” amid demographic changes in “Anglo” Canada 
and separatist nationalism in Québec. 
On October 8, 1971, Canada became the first country in the world to create an 
official policy of multiculturalism, when the Liberal Prime Minister, Pierre Elliot 
Trudeau, announced the state’s new policy in the House of Commons.287 Trudeau 
announced “a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework,” as two years 
before, the government had declared English and French as the country’s official 
languages in the Official Languages Act of 1969. The 1971 policy led to the appointment 
of a Minister of Multiculturalism, but in these early stages, multiculturalism was largely a 
symbolic recognition of cultural diversity rather than a substantive change in government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 Of course, this system was not truly open, and Canada’s Immigration Act of 1971 created a “points 
system” to limit immigration to highly-skilled professionalized immigrants, contributing to the “brain 
drain” of medical, engineering and other technical professionals from postcolonial countries. 
286 For a history that examines the use of Canadian immigration in settler colonialism, see Day 2000. Also 
see Bannerji (2000) and Mackey (2002) for a discussion of this in relation to state multiculturalism. 
287 In Canada’s parliamentary system, elected Members of Parliament sit in the House of Commons, while 
the Senate is for appointees. 
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policy (Moodley 1983; Abu-Laban 2002). Few resources were directed towards 
multicultural initiatives, which were not often in tune with minority groups’ concerns—
particularly those who were deemed “visible minorities” and concerned with racial 
discrimination and economic inequality. 
Official multiculturalism as a discourse and institutional practice emerged from 
two additional moments in the 1980s. First, in 1982, the Canadian constitution was 
patriated, and with it, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms replaced the 
Canadian Bill of Rights. Section 27 of the Charter was widely held to be an affirmation 
of Canadian multiculturalism. It reads, “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of 
Canadians.” Then, three years later, the government began a process that would see the 
passage of Bill C-93, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1985.288 With the Act, 
Canada’s policy of multiculturalism became law, and received Royal Assent on July 21, 
1988.  
Subsequent policies, acts and proclamations contributed to the making of a Canadian 
multicultural state, including policies that continue to transform local and national 
media.289 However, official and elite discourses of multiculturalism emerged from the 
three moments cited above, and the statements and documents the state generated during 
this time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Canadian Multiculturalism Act R.S.C., 1985, c. 24 (4th Supp.), available at: http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-18.7/, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-18.7.pdf 
289 Of particular note is the Broadcasting Act of 1991, which asserts that Canadian broadcasting should 
reflect the diversity of cultures in Canada, and was followed by a CRTC Ethnic Broadcasting Policy in 
1999, which led to a profusion of “ethnic” broadcasting in the following decade. 
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Today, the Canadian state and its citizens speak of multiculturalism in a doubled 
sense. On the one hand, multiculturalism is understood to be a social fact, and the term 
itself describes a multitude of cultures, and racial, ethnic and religious identities that 
constitute the country. On the other hand, multiculturalism also refers to a prescriptive, 
political ideology, and a discourse, with its own state institutions and techniques of 
government. By the 1990s and 2000s, many Canadians had come to view 
multiculturalism in both these senses as a fundamental part of their national identity and 
heritage.  
Yet, by the mid-2000s, the value of multiculturalism was up for debate. Media 
outlets questioned the value of Canadian policies of multiculturalism in light of American 
and European debates about the “failure of multiculturalism” (Banting and Kymlicka 
2010) and the growth of national security state after the September 11 attacks on the 
United States (Abu-Laban and Stanslius). Public commentators framed their concerns in 
liberal terms that acknowledged Canada’s diverse population of “immigrants,” but 
asserted a racially unmarked, core “Canadian national identity,” revealing a tolerance of 
“cultural difference” defined in relation to the desires of the White descendants of 
Canada’s settlers, and liberalism’s normative limits of toleration (cf. Brown 2006; 
Markell 2003; Povinelli 2002).  This has led, in Canada and other liberal democratic 
states, to the notion of “we” who are tolerant of difference, in contrast to “others” who 
are not. 
Critiques of multiculturalism 
In addition to the right-wing backlash noted above, multiculturalism as a set of 
policies, institutions and discourses has been subject to numerous criticisms from 
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scholars on the left and liberal-left. These scholars link the history of colonialism to the 
contemporary rational-bureaucratic management of populations through state policies of 
multiculturalism in Canada (Bannerji 2000; Day 2000). Critical scholars of 
multiculturalism have tended to make four major assertions in this respect. First, they 
have criticized the “culturalism,” or cultural essentialism of multiculturalism, which tends 
to reify and exoticize cultures as immutable entities possessing inherent differences, 
rather than attending to difference as a social relation (Bennett 1998; Abu-Laban 2002). 
This has led to the practice of multiculturalism as a form of cultural display, making 
Canada what Eva Mackey (2002) calls “the house of difference,” in which difference 
from an unmarked norm of “Anglo” whiteness is fetishized through the performance and 
consumption of the Other’s national dress, dances, and foods; this dynamic also lends 
itself to what political scientists Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Christina Gabriel (2002) term 
“the selling of diversity” in the context of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s, which makes 
Canada’s ethnic minorities “representatives” for their countries of origin in order to 
justify liberal immigration policies as a boon for Canada’s international trade and 
diplomacy.290  
Second, scholars have critically examined the value of “tolerance,” in which 
cultural difference becomes something to be endured by a majority community, which 
remains the arbiter of the liberal multicultural nation’s fundamental moral values 
(Povinelli 2002; see also Brown 2006). In this form of politics, relations between 
different cultures must ‘managed’ so that “their” ethnic difference does not change “our” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 The notion of culture as a saleable commodity also appears in earlier formulations of Canadian state 
multiculturalism. Moodley (1983) cites the government’s minister as referring to culture as “the 
handmaiden to the economy.”  
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national identity and cultural heritage. Third, Canadian sociologists have pointed out that 
multiculturalism as state policy and elite discourse obscures histories of settler 
colonialism, and the systemic hierarchies of race and class that produce inequality of 
opportunity among citizens (Bannerji 2000; Moodley 1983) which cannot be addressed 
by cultural recognition alone (as proposed by Taylor 1995 and Kymlicka 1997).291 
Multiculturalism in Canadian history marks an apparent shift from a policy of racial 
assimilation to the cultural integration of immigrants (Day 2000). However, Rita 
Dhamoon (2010) draws on anthropological critiques of the culture concept (Scott 2003) 
to suggest that under Canada’s regime of liberal multiculturalism, “culture” has become a 
proxy for “race,” allowing for public discussions of identity and difference without 
talking about power. Official and elite discourses of multiculturalism therefore sidestep 
the problem of justice (Young 1990). The fourth concern is a related to the third, and is 
especially critical for this study: That cultural recognition in a multicultural nation 
replaces (or at the very least, inhibits) substantive citizenship, in which minority subjects 
actively participate in the political and economic affairs of the nation-state (Abu-Laban 
and Gabriel 2002; Bannerji 2000; Dhamoon 2009; Mackey 2002); in other words, the 
state’s mandate to preserve and promote certain forms of cultural difference inhibits 
socio-structural change. 
In spite of these critiques, the power of multicultural discourse is such that most 
critical scholars of multiculturalism are reluctant to withdraw from its terms entirely. 
Consequently, these writers have sought to differentiate between what they term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 It is interesting to note that sociologists of South Asian and/or African origin like Kogila Moodley and 
Himani Bannerji cited above, have been early and persistent critics of multiculturalism in Canada. 
Moodley’s (1983) article was the first critical analysis of multiculturalism in Canadian social science. 
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“official,” “state,” or “elite multiculturalism” (Bannerji 2000; Mackey 2002) and 
“popular multiculturalism,” (Bannerji 2000) “everyday multiculturalism” (Wise and 
Selvaraj 2009) or the possibility of multiculturalism as a “radical imaginary” (Day 2000: 
222-227). Indeed, multicultural governmentality has become so integral to Canadian 
citizenship that it appears impossible among many immigrants and racialized minorities 
to discuss “community” and “culture” in Canada today apart from discourses of 
multiculturalism. In other words, multiculturalism is the discursive terrain upon which 
diasporas of immigrant citizens and their transnational networks—including Tamils in 
Toronto—must engage with the Canadian state. The following section illustrates the 
entanglements of community, culture, citizenship and the state that arise from Canadian 
multiculturalism as a discourse and social imaginary. 
Contradictions of multicultural citizenship 
 A closer look at a conversation with one of my interlocutors reveals the 
ambivalences Tamil activists felt about mobilizing diaspora demonstrations at the start of 
war, and the complex social meanings of “culture,” “community” and “citizenship” for 
Tamils in multicultural Canada. Two interrelated concerns appeared throughout our 
conversation, as they did in discussions that I had with other activists: (1) the question of 
community, or how to mobilize practical and effective action as an “ethnic” minority in 
relation to the governmental state, and (2) the question of citizenship, its social meanings, 
practices and demands in a multicultural polity. In the wake of a ban on the LTTE, Tamil 
activists grappled with the problem of how to mobilize other Tamils in public, as a 
community and as Canadian citizens, to change state policy and thus garner international 
support for the militant struggle. 
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Theepan was born in 1979, on Anaithivu, an islet off the coast of Jaffna. His 
father had left Sri Lanka in the 1960s to work on a ship, and then worked in Switzerland 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Theepan’s family left for India in 1985, where they 
lived in the Porur neighborhood of Madras for four years. The family reunited in Canada, 
where they were admitted as refugees in 1989, and settled in Mississauga, in a middle-
class neighborhood with a growing Tamil community. Several of Theepan’s relatives—
his grandmother and two uncles in Europe—followed in the 1990s, and today, most of his 
family lives in the Toronto area. 
Living among a Tamil diaspora community was important to Theepan. “I didn’t 
lose my identity, I was able to understand who I was.” Thousands of Tamils were moving 
to Toronto in the late 1980s, and as a result of this “support,” Theepan explained that he 
was able to identify as “Tamil” and become “Canadian” at the same time:  
We didn't lose our culture, you still spoke Tamil at home. In that way, I 
was glad that I was able to hold onto both of them: my identity and my 
language. And as well, growing up here, becoming more Canadian.  
Community, in this instance, derived from identity and language, and was culturally 
distinct from a parallel process that he referred to as “becoming more Canadian.” Culture 
was something that already formed him, and which could be lost through migration and 
resettlement, without active practice such as speaking Tamil at home. 
 In university, Theepan joined his TSA, and became actively involved in the Tamil 
community. During this time, he and his peers developed an interest in learning about the 
Tamil political struggle—a subject his parents generally did not discuss. After 
graduation, Theepan traveled with two friends to Sri Lanka to visit their home-villages in 
Jaffna, and to see the Vanni. It was the summer after he graduated from university, in the 
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middle of the ceasefire, and he had not been back to his homeland in eighteen years. He 
felt “culture-shock” while visiting his ur on Anaithivu. “It’s funny to say that it’s culture-
shock,” he says, “because it’s [my] culture, right?” Upon his return, Theepan joined other 
students to organize Pongu Thamil 2004 in Toronto where, as we saw in Chapter 2, he 
gave a speech about the role of Canadian Tamils in the struggle “back home.” Over the 
years, he continued to attend community events and public demonstrations.  He felt it was 
important to attend these events in order to be a part of the Tamil community.  
Theepan was a youth outreach worker in a working-class immigrant 
neighborhood with a large Tamil community at the time of my fieldwork. He mentored 
Tamil high school students, and in his spare time, he volunteered with youth-oriented 
Tamil organizations such as CanTYD and TYO-Canada. Several of his friends were 
involved with the CTC. He was, in many ways, at the centre of community activism in 
Toronto. He also enjoyed thinking and talking about Tamil community and identity in 
Canada. 
Theepan, like many Tamils of his age, insisted that he was both Tamil and 
Canadian. Theepan spoke of this as a practice of multiculturalism: “I believe, as a 
Canadian, if I don't hold onto my identity, I'm not really contributing to the principles of 
this country and that principle is multiculturalism.” If he moved to Canada, only to lose 
his identity, how was he contributing to the broader society in which he lived, he asked 
rhetorically. In this statement, Theepan values his ethnic and cultural identity as the 
foundation of a multicultural citizenship. He highlights a critical tension within liberal 
multiculturalism: the notion outlined above that culture, while valued as ‘heritage,’ also 
presents “barriers to full participation in Canadian society” and citizenship. He spoke 
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extensively of the need for Tamils to participate in Canadian society, and to “be part of 
Canada as a nation.” However, he did so in the register of “community.” 
Theepan was also critical of some aspects of official multiculturalism in Canada. 
He bristled at the spectacles of culture that make up “the house of difference” (Mackey 
2002) in standard versions of Canadian multiculturalism. Getting up on a stage and 
dancing was not really a celebration of multiculture, he pointed out, because it did not 
require any “exchange.” Community action could be one form of exchange in a 
multicultural society, as would lobbying that informs the government about human rights 
violations in Sri Lanka. He wanted to fully participate in Canadian society, and to “be 
part of Canada as a nation.” And yet he still desired to be part of a Tamil community, and 
to “hold onto [his] identity.” For Theepan and many young Tamils, this was not a 
contradiction; it is the best of what Canada has to offer. In his view of multiculturalism, it 
ought to be possible to be Tamil and Canadian at once. Theepan’s views were widely 
shared by many Tamils, and second-generation youth especially, who came to identify 
themselves as “Canadian Tamils.” 
And yet, there were (and are) practical social limitations to the ideal of full-
fledged participation in multicultural citizenship, as espoused by liberal philosophers like 
Kymlicka and Taylor. Within the framework of liberal multiculturalism, Tamils and other 
“ethnic” groups remain minorities with limited political power. They receive instead a 
generalizing, state-defined form of cultural recognition (Taylor 1994) and a few group-
differentiated rights (Kymlicka 1995). These “ethnic” subjects cannot claim 
“representativeness” of the nation. “Their” issues, as Tamils, are not “our” issues, as 
Canadians. For Canadian Tamils, their situation mimics to some extent the political limits 
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they had faced in Sri Lanka—a country that is, not coincidentally, also governed as a 
liberal democracy, and has frequently proclaimed its multiethnic and multireligious 
character over the last two decades. 
Consequently, Theepan was also aware that some critics of multiculturalism 
feared the “political baggage” of those lobbying on behalf of their ethnic community’s 
interests at the expense of the unmarked Canadian good—what is posed in theories of 
liberalism and liberal nationalism as a conflict between minority rights and democratic 
citizenship (Kymlicka 1995). These critics would point to diaspora public events as a 
“security threat”—which is exactly how Canada’s mainstream media covered Tamil 
protests and other events that demonstrated political support for the LTTE.292 This led 
Theepan to express doubts about the efficacy of protest as a form of political action and 
civic engagement. The way forward, as Theepan saw it, was a long and slow process that 
would require civic engagement and involvement in Canada's national political parties. 
“Us making a big āthiri-pūthiri293, is that going to make any difference?”  
Instead of public protest, Theepan felt that Canadian Tamils would be better 
served by engaging with the Canadian state on its terms: participating in Canada’s 
political process, lobbying the government, and creating a more “inclusive” and 
“successful community” through social work. Taken together, Tamil action “at a higher 
level” of Canadian politics would yield gradual changes, with better results for the 
struggle “back home.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 For example, as part of the national security beat of newspaper reporters like the National Post’s Stewart 
Bell. 
293 This phrase may be translated as “show of support” (ātharavu, meaning support) and uses a suffix 
without literal meaning. This kind of rhyming is a rhetorical device used in Tamil for emphasis, and in this 
context, confers a sense of ridicule.  
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The latter notion of a “successful community” was central to Theepan’s strategic 
assertion of multicultural citizenship in a context of economic inequality in Canada. He 
spoke of a phenomenon referred to earlier in this chapter as “two communities” among 
Toronto Tamils: One community that was educated, and educating its kids, and the other 
comprised of “new immigrants” whose children were becoming “dropouts, being kicked 
out of school” and “falling into the cracks.” The economic divide among Tamils 
produced a community of new immigrant and working-class Tamils as the object of 
governmental interventions of social reform, to be helped by a community of middle-
class Jaffna-origin Tamils who now work within the state’s multicultural apparatuses as 
community social workers, counselors, teachers, and so on. Theepan’s desire to create a 
“successful community” reflects the political ideology of official multiculturalism as a 
formula for unity (Moodley 1983), making “two communities” of Tamils into one 
community whose successes and overall social and political integration will aid the Tamil 
struggle in Sri Lanka. In this way, the ideological presuppositions of state 
multiculturalism and Tamil nationalism converged. 
Pongu Thamil 2008 
 Weeks after Canada’s listing of the WTM, activists revived Pongu Thamil in 
Toronto, and in diasporic locations across four continents.294 Toronto’s event was held on 
Saturday, July 5, 2008—four days after Canada Day celebrations—at Downsview Park, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 As the war intensified in Sri Lanka’s north, these events were held over a period of three weeks in the 
following locations: Auckland, New Zealand; Oslo, Norway; Copenhagen, Denmark; Italy; Durban, South 
Africa; Paris, France; Sydney, Australia; London, UK and Canada. With the exception of South Africa, all 
of the events were held in countries with a Tamil diaspora from Sri Lanka. South African Tamils are mostly 
descendents of those who had migrated from India as indentured laborers, merchants and professionals in 
the British colony. Some were involved in anti-apartheid struggles and drew parallels to the LTTE’s 
freedom struggle. WTM and TYO activists in Canada were in communication with these pro-Eelam 
activists in Durban and other cities. 
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former military base in the northwestern corner of North York, a suburb of Toronto. Tens 
of thousands of Tamils attended the event with their families, friends, and home-village 
associations. Young men and women from the TYO circulated throughout the crowd, 
distributing vibrantly colored posters that protested Canada’s ban on the LTTE.  
 Pongu Thamil was the event that Theepan had helped organize in 2004, and the 
kind of spectacular mass demonstration that he later felt was “useless” in creating policy 
change. He was not alone, among community activists, in questioning the event’s 
political efficacy. Why, then, did Tamil community activists return to protest through 
public demonstrations? Theepan felt that such events were effective in another important 
way: They brought people together. Joining together to protest created a sense of 
community among Tamils who were otherwise dispersed throughout the city. One of his 
colleagues Nantha, who had publicly declared his support for the LTTE, agreed. He was 
one of several speakers at the July 5 event. 
Glaring red eyes and an angry, snarling face: Pongu Thamil’s new logo signaled a 
changed political situation. Sri Lanka was at war, and peace, the concern of the previous 
event in Toronto, was not an immediate prospect. Organizers were upset about the ban, 
which helped the Sri Lankan government’s war effort by cutting off one of the Tigers’ 
largest sources of funding. While the LTTE and government forces fought in the island's 
northern districts, diaspora activists mobilized Tamils to demonstrate their political 
grievances and support for the Tigers. The event was organized quietly and quickly; its 
location was not announced until two days before it was held. Activists relied on trusted 
community networks to disseminate information about the event, including Tamil-
language radio, home village associations, and among youth, text messages and 
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Facebook. In the week leading up to the event, a few activists had told me that another 
Pongu Thamil “might” be organized, but they could not tell me when or where. I learned 
about the event through a text message from A., the youth activist who had been involved 
with organizing the 2004 event in Toronto.  
When another Tamil friend and I arrived at Downsview on that sunny Saturday 
afternoon, we were met with a stunning, carnivalesque sight: Poppy red and canary 
yellow balloons in grand arches marked a stage erected in the middle of a vast field 
(Figure 4.2). Red and yellow, the colors featured at all Pongu Thamil events, flooded the 
field; two of the four colors on the Tigers’ national flag of Tamil Eelam, and the colors of 
their national flower, the flame-like gloriosa lily (karthigaipoo, Figure 4.3).295 Tamils 
arrived wearing these fiery hues, on everything from pre-printed Pongu Thamil t-shirts to 
women's sarees, and umbrellas used to shade families from the hot, July sun, to the 
basketball jerseys and rubber bracelets of teenagers. A young child nearby carried a 
hockey stick, to which he had tied a shred of silky cloth, a band of red and yellow that 
formed a makeshift Tamil Eelam flag. In this way, Toronto Tamils creatively signaled to 
each other and themselves a national identity by iconically indexing the Tigers without 
holding the symbols of an organization banned by the Canadian government. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 The LTTE designated the national flower in November 2003 during Heroes Week, and Tamils in LTTE 
controlled areas were asked to plant the vine in their homes, businesses, educational institutions, and public 
places, and wear it during functions of “national significance” (Tamilnet 2004). 
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Figure 4.3: National Flower of Tamil Eelam, Gloriosa superba (karthigaipoo)  
(Source: Tamilnet 2004) 
 
Some members of the audience participated in ways that would be controversial 
to outsiders. One young man seated ahead of me wore a t-shirt with a drawing of a tiger 
on the back, and the words, “Canadian Tiger and proud of it!” A few young men unfurled 
the Tamil Eelam flag; others held small paper Eelam flags, at times alongside the 
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Canadian flag, as they had done in 2004. The face of the Tiger on each flag was 
unmistakeable, jumping out at the viewer in photographs and videos of the event that 
were shared. 
In contrast to the event in 2004, few people held images of the LTTE leader, 
Prabhakaran. This image, as discussed in Chapter 2, was repeated throughout the crowd 
in 2004. Prabhakaran’s face iconically unified the crowd into a national body, represented 
by the Leader, the politico-military commander of the LTTE’s struggle for national 
liberation. In 2008, however, this image was not widely distributed to the crowd. Only a 
few protesters used both arms to hoist placards featuring the National Leader’s photo into 
the air. For most participants, Prabhakaran’s image remained on posters and calendars 
hanging on the walls inside their homes, available for darshan in private viewing and 
shielded from public glare. What unified large numbers of people into a crowd was their 
use of iconically ‘Eelam Tamil’ colors, their proximity to each other in public space, and 
their participation in the event. They stood with attention, facing in the direction of the 
stage, listening to speeches, applauding and cheering statements with which they agreed, 
and answering call-and-response chants.  
“The community,” became a subject with agentive possibilities through collective 
actions and events like Pongu Thamil. Aravind, the activist who had texted me about the 
event, was glad to see a large crowd. “It’s good to see the community out together like 
this again,” he told me. Aravind had taken a back seat on organizing for a while to focus 
on his professional goals, but remained in the loop through his friendships with and 
connections to other activists. Pongu Thamil served as a reminder of a community to 
which he felt he belonged; in fact, it was one of many events and actions that created it. 
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This was corroborated in a different way by R., a dissenting activist who told me, “The 
community is nothing but events (nikazhcci).”  
This time, “the community” of Pongu Thamil’s diasporic public not only called 
for the Canadian government to “take action” to end suffering and violence in Sri Lanka 
by recognizing the Tamils as a “nation” with a homeland and a right to self-
determination; activists and participants also demonstrated against the ban on the LTTE 
and the WTM, and demanded that the Canadian government reverse these decisions. One 
sign, which was printed and distributed to participants, addressed the Canadian 
government in the form of the national anthem, “O Canada.” “Tamil Eelam MUST BE 
FREE, it says. The sign juxtaposes images of protesters, and Martin Niemoller’s poem, 
“They Came For,” with a statement that Canada had outlawed “our feelings and our 
representatives” and declared that participants obeyed the country’s “law and order.” 
Implicit to this statement was the notion of the LTTE and the WTM as the representatives 
of protesters, as a community, within the federation of a multicultural Canada.  
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Figure 4.4: Poster from Pongu Thamil 2008. O Canada: You have ban(ne)d [sic] our 
feelings and our representatives; we obay [sic] law and order. (Scanned by author.) 
 
Another sign invokes the ban to make an affective appeal to the Canadian 
government and national public. “Canada, you have forbidden the entire Tamil 
community… is this what you call Human Rights?” asks the poster. The text is wrapped 
around a graphically designed image: Silhouettes of protesters behind barricades; one of 
the image’s demonstrators carries a sign, which reads, “Welfare not Warfare.” In this 
image, the notion of the Canadian welfare state is juxtaposed with Canada’s national 
image as a protector of human rights globally. The poster implicitly connects two 
different agendas of the Conservative government: the first, anti-terrorism, overlooks the 
Sri Lankan government’s warfare and human rights violations while banning the LTTE, 
and the second, continued neoliberal reforms that gut social welfare programs of 
particular importance to impoverished and racialized new immigrant communities. This 
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poster, like others that remind the Canadian government of a “responsibility” to protect 
human rights, carries a signature: “Tamil Diaspora, June 2008.” 
However, the demonstration did not only reveal a concern for the public national 
“feelings” of a Tamil diaspora invoked by activists on behalf of the LTTE. Brian 
Seneviratne, a Sinhalese activist who speaks regularly to diasporic Tamil audiences, was 
invited to address the audience at Pongu Thamil 2008. He asked the crowd, “Is the 
Canadian government going to feed the people in Tamil Eelam?” “No!” the crowd shouts 
back in response. “Then we should be able to send them money! But you cannot, as 
though it is a crime.” Seneviratne’s appeal frames these transactions in terms that connote 
a humanitarian response (who will feed the starving people in need?) and remittance (to 
our kith and kin, our Tamil people), an important form of economic and affective 
exchange between Tamil families outside Sri Lanka and their relatives living in the 
island.  
“To the young people here— 
To our brothers and sisters  
Are we ready to challenge the Canadian government... on the LTTE ban?  
Are we ready to challenge the WTM listing?  
Are we ready to demand our rights?  
Are we ready to free Tamil Eelam? 
 
After each question, the audience cheers and applauds in response. Each one begins with 
“Are we ready…” inviting the audience to reply affirmatively to challenge the LTTE ban, 
the WTM listing, to demand our rights, and finally, to free Tamil Eelam. Taken together, 
the posters, speeches, and questions posed by the event emcees were part of a larger 
discourse that understood political and financial support to the LTTE as a right of a 
“Tamil Diaspora” of Canadian citizens transacting in a legal regime to which they 
claimed compliance. 
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The contentious politics of fundraising was not a minor point of debate, but a key 
form of action among the LTTE, community activists, and diaspora protesters. For this 
community, the ban on the LTTE and WTM criminalized this form of political-economic 
activity. The rhetorical question of “Who will feed the people of Tamil Eelam?” brought 
into sharp relief the life-or-death stakes of war and abandonment for Tamils in northern 
Sri Lanka. Through the ban, nationalist Tamil activists felt attacked in a way they 
perceived as analogous to the war’s existential threat to Tamil lives and struggles for 
political autonomy and recognition. Protest, in the form of Pongu Thamil, became a way 
for activists to “do something,” by rallying “the community.”  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined the cultural, social and political formation of a Tamil 
community in multicultural Canada. The first part of the chapter built upon Chapter 1’s 
study of Tamil migration to Canada by outlining the political and cultural organizations, 
social associations, social service providers, media, and businesses that comprise Tamil 
Toronto, as well as the alternative and dissenting groups among this community. Then I 
examined the ways in which the LTTE and its overseas network mobilized this 
community as a critical node of "the Tamil diaspora” to provide financial and political 
support for its struggle and war for national liberation.  
The second part of the chapter considered the multiple meanings of the Canadian 
government’s proscription of the LTTE and WTM for Tamil activists in Toronto. I 
argued that community activists mobilized against these bans as an assertion of Tamil 
identity and citizenship in Canada as they expressed their support for the LTTE. In 
examining the relationship between “community” and “citizenship” for Toronto Tamils, I 
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argued that the ideologies of Canadian multiculturalism and Tamil nationalism converged 
in public actions such as Pongu Thamil to create the appearance of a “unified” Tamil 
community that rallied around the LTTE as their “sole representatives.” At the same 
time, alternative and dissenting activists created new political spaces to express—
privately and publicly—their criticisms of the LTTE’s nationalist politics. However, their 
shared opposition to the LTTE did not bridge the many social and political differences 
among them, and they remained fragmented, apart from each other and the community. 
Finally, in a community where the vocation of “politics” was frequently controlled by 
men, Tamil feminists and their actions were subjected to the demands of the politics of 
community and dissent. Overall, Toronto Tamil activists’ responses to the ban and its 
effects on “the war back home” revealed political conflicts and growing polarization 
among them. 
As the war spread throughout northern Sri Lanka, Tamils started to organize 
protests. The next chapter shifts the discussion to Tamil refugees living in camps and 
cities throughout India. While Tamils living in the camps performatively identified their 
plight as "refugees" to oppose war and make claims upon 'home' and 'host' states, Tamils 
in the city deployed 'strategies of invisibility' (Kibreab 1999; Agier 2002) while waiting 
to leave for a foreign land. As we shall see, both forms of action responded to what Tamil 
refugees described as the unlivable conditions that beset their lives in Sri Lanka and the 
denial of citizenship as a substantive practice of social membership and subjective 
belonging.   
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Chapter 5 
Camp Life and Refugee Politics in Tamil India 
 
“Can they protest the government that is sheltering and feeding them? Is it right?”  
Constantin, a refugee and NGO case-worker, asked me this question less than two 
weeks into my fieldwork in Tamil Nadu. We were sitting at his desk in the Chennai 
headquarters of the Organization for Eelam Refugees’ Rehabilitation (OfERR), a non-
governmental organization created by refugees to look after their relief and rehabilitation 
needs after 1983. That morning, OfERR leaders had learned that four refugee camps were 
fasting to protest the war. At the heart of these protests were two demands: Camp 
refugees were asking the Indian government to stop providing military assistance to Sri 
Lanka, and an end to a war that was killing civilians. This information was not directly 
related to OfERR—a reporter from an English-language newspaper, The Hindu, 
happened to be at one of these camps.  
Why were Sri Lankan Tamil refugees protesting in their camps? And why was 
Constantin so upset about these protests? Why did he question whether it was “right” for 
refugees to protest a government providing for their most basic needs? In fact, Constantin 
was not the only person who was troubled by the protesters. The founder of the 
organization and local camp leaders were also concerned. In spite of their concerns, some 
OfERR staff who resided in the camps participated in these protests and other actions 
against the war. Why were these actions disconcerting to OfERR leaders, when they had 
already encouraged refugees to organize during the 2002-2006 peace process?  
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This chapter attempts to address these questions and others through an 
examination of Tamil refugee social and political life in southern India. I begin with a 
thick description of social life in the camps, and their architecture and adminstration by 
the state government and local NGOs. Then, I briefly discuss India and Tamil Nadu’s 
relationship to the Sri Lankan war, with a focus on Tamil Nadu’s political parties. I do so 
to provide some necessary context for my discussion of camp refugees’ actions of protest 
and commemoration. This part of the chapter also includes a discussion of how 
anthropologists and philosophers have differently studied and theorized refugees. 
The second part of the chapter examines camp refugees’ actions against the war. I 
examine three facets of refugee mobilization. First, I show how camp residents who 
demonstrated against the war understood their actions as a continuation of their 
engagements that followed the 2002 ceasefire and peace process. As I explored in 
Chapter 2, refugees were encouraged by a refugee-run NGO, OfERR, to “speak up” and 
to discuss and debate the contents and contours of a peace process from which they were 
formally excluded by their exile. With the return to war, refugees sought to revive 
prospects for a negotiated peace through camp-based actions they construed as 
“peaceful.” These actions were, however, a source of political anxiety for leaders of the 
NGO that attended to refugee relief and rehabilitation. Second, I consider the ways in 
which opposition to collective action – and camp protests in particular – was framed and 
mobilized by refugees at different levels of the organization. Even as some camp leaders 
and fieldworkers participated in protest, others questioned the motivations, morality, and 
efficacy of such actions, a stance bolstered by the head office's discouragement of 
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popular politics. Finally, I discuss limits to collective action as a result of state policing 
and surveillance of the camps.  
Camps as (invisible) partitions 
Sri Lankan refugee camps are scattered throughout the state of Tamil Nadu. 
During my fieldwork, 73,387 Sri Lankan Tamils were registered as refugees with the 
state government, and living in 118 camps in 25 districts. Most of these camps have 
existed in one form or another since the early 1990s. Fourteen camps were newly 
established between April 2006 and September 2008 when fighting resumed in northern 
Sri Lanka, resulting in new refugee arrivals.296  
In spite of their existence for the last thirty-three years, Sri Lankan Tamil refugee 
camps cannot be found on any official geographic or political map of Tamil Nadu. 
Instead, the map that indicates their location appears to be a terra incognita, an unknown 
land of blank spaces inhabited by no one else. Even as most of these camps take their 
names from nearby villages, they cannot be imaged by the same cartographic 
imagination; the camps and villages do not occupy the same map. That they are not of the 
same ‘place’ is evident in the fact that a letter must be addressed not to the name of the 
village, but that name, as a proximate location, followed by “Sri Lankan refugee camp” 
or simply, “SLR camp.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 32 camps were newly created at the peak of arrivals in 2006. These camps were eventually consolidated. 
By the time of my fieldwork, there were 14 ‘new’ camps in addition to 101 already-existing camps and 2 
special camps, for a total of 118 camps. The number of refugees is drawn from figures gathered by OfERR 
and the Department of Rehabilitation as of October 1, 2008. 
	   282	  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Map of Sri Lankan refugee camps in Tamil Nadu 
(Source: OfERR) 
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The cities and villages of Tamil Nadu appear on a “political map” that holds the 
same shape at its edges, but bears far greater detail than the map of the camps (Figure 
4.1). The former is a map of land meant to be traversed, communicating information 
about topography, distance between cities, districts of governance, etc. The latter, on the 
other hand, uses black spots and numbers to indicate zones of partition and social 
control.297  
On the ground, few local, Indian Tamils will find themselves in the vicinity of 
these camps, let alone enter them, as many are located beyond the edges of the village. 
These areas, deemed ur-kaadu, are inhospitable lands that are not the home-village (ur), 
but nevertheless exist in relation to them. Kaadu, or forests, were uncleared borderlands 
between villages, whose lands were places of habitation and cultivation. In contrast, the 
kaadu is viewed as a rough, wild, and generally unsuitable place for human habitation. As 
such, they were historically sites of banishment in the Tamil lands, as well as places for 
the self-willed renunciation of wandering ascetics. In other words, only two types of 
people would live in such places: Those who had done wrong and were to be exiled from 
the polity, and those who had willingly removed themselves from society. 
These are the sites in which Sri Lankan Tamil refugees are housed. Other camps 
were located in defunct buildings, including mills, schools, cyclone shelters, and even 
warehouses. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 And indeed, as they are lived, few local Tamils will find themselves in their vicinity of these camps, let 
alone enter them, as they are often located beyond the edges of the village. These areas, deemed ur-kaadu, 
are inhospitable lands that are not the home-village, but nevertheless exist in relation to them. Kaadu, or 
forests, were sites of banishment, as well as self-willed renunciation for the wandering ascetic.   
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Why have Sri Lankan Tamil refugees and their camps been physically separated 
from local Tamils in India? Although there is a longer history of Tamils crossing the Palk 
Strait in ancient and modern times—whether as fisherpeople, seafaring merchants, 
worshippers, or students—India and Sri Lanka exist today as separate nation-states. This 
is a historical, social, and political fact, and not one simply determined by Sri Lanka’s 
island geography, as some have argued. The Sri Lankan-British historian, Sujit 
Sivasundaram (2013) presents a compelling counter to such claims. He argues that the 
political unification of Ceylon (known today as Sri Lanka), which had been previously 
ruled by three separate kingdoms, and the governance of the island as a Crown Colony 
under British rule must be understood as a process of “islanding” that involved 
“partitioning” colonial Ceylon from the mainland of peninsular India. The political 
separation of the region has continued since.  
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, the consolidation of these borders after 
independence resulted in the making of stateless Tamils from the island’s central Hill-
Country region. Hill-Country Tamils (malaiyaha thamizhar) were the descendants of 
Tamils from India who were recruited between 1850 and 1920 by British planters to labor 
on Sri Lanka’s tea plantations. In Chapters 1 and 3, I discussed how this group of Tamils 
was subject to several agreements between the postcolonial states of India and Ceylon, in 
which they would be divided into two populations distributed across the Palk Strait 
“border.” However, with each agreement, some people were left to remain stateless, their 
status to be decided at a future time. At the time of my fieldwork, one-third of the people 
living in Sri Lankan refugee camps in Tamil Nadu were Hill-Country Tamils; as many as 
one-fifth of this group were estimated to be without citizenship in any nation-state. 
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Tamil refugees fleeing Sri Lanka—whether of “Indian” or “Ceylon" descent—
were crossing an international border from the perspective of the Indian state. In the 
context of the war, they were viewed as a potential threat to state security, especially after 
the LTTE’s assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. The state did not recognize the claims to 
Indian origin made by some of these refugees, who were viewed as “Indian Tamils” by 
other Sri Lankans. After making the reverse journey of their ancestors, the postcolonial 
descendants of plantation laborers were now viewed as “Sri Lankan” in India. 
This chapter describes and analyzes refugee camps as an extension of these 
processes of discipline, regulation, and securitization, as well as sites of community 
formation and political activity for Tamils living in the camps. One of the arguments I 
present here is as follows: Tamil Nadu’s camps reinscribe and re-establish the 
geopolitical borders that divide India and Sri Lanka as sovereign nation-states, by 
partitioning people in geographic space and territory. They physically separate Sri 
Lanka’s Tamil refugees from India’s Tamils, and in doing so, socially reproduce within 
India the modern geopolitical division of lands that were once connected by religious, 
cultural and political exchanges. In doing so, however, the camps and their practices of 
policing and surveillance also generate new forms of sociality and political action. 
The refugee-staffed organization, OfERR, maintained a presence in all of the 
camps, and its offices were divided into four regions (as indicated in Figure 4.1): Chennai 
(where the head office and its workers’ quarters were also located), Erode, Nellai 
(Tirunelveli), and Trichy (Tiruchirappalli). In the next section, I describe a camp from the 
Nellai region, and juxtapose this somewhat “typical” camp with four other camps of 
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various sizes and regions. Taken together, these camps present contrasting physical 
settings that constitute the same form of life: Tamil refugee camp life in India. 
The camps in social space 
On the outskirts of a village in southern Tamil Nadu, about 50 km from each 
coast, an old godown298—a colonial storehouse—sits next to an abandoned cement 
factory. The building appears to be a ruin. Two columns leading up to the veranda are 
plastered over by an advertisement, juxtaposing contemporary consumerist aspirations 
with the colonial past. An adjacent building, painted a pale robin’s egg blue, is 
emblazoned with the word “Aarokkiya”—meaning, health—the name of a local brand of 
milk. On the main building of the godown, however, the paint has peeled from eroded 
walls, leaving traces of cream and chalky blue, now covered with rust-colored dust. The 
walls are in such disrepair that an extension of the building’s second floor has lost its roof 
entirely.  
The factory remains unused. The godown now serves as the living quarters for 
Tamil refugees. On one side of the building, houses have been built out of concrete walls 
and sheet roofing. Those who arrived in 1990 live here. On the other side, behind a 
crumbling façade, broken walls line a dimly-lit hallway to form a row of separate living 
areas. More recent arrivals have found shelter here. Their rooms are less than ten by ten 
feet squared, with each one divided by thin fabric hanging from electric cables above. A 
single light bulb dangles from a long cable to provide the only light in these rooms. Over 
400 families live in this building. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 From the Portuguese word, gudão, and in Tamil, kiṭaṅku. 
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Figure 5.2: Camp in a colonial storehouse, February 2009 (Photograph by author) 
Behind the godown, some refugee families have built one and two-room mud huts 
with clay from the earth surrounding this area. These huts afford families more privacy 
than the storehouse, with openings for windows curtained by a frayed grass mat or a sheet 
of discarded tarpaulin. Their roofs are covered with thatch woven from dried palm leaves. 
Living so exposed to the elements, they have raised floors or built a step before the 
entrance to block rainwater; a small hole at the back of the hut allows water to drain in 
times of flooding.  Narrow by-lanes of patted-down earth divide rows of these huts. Some 
of these huts were once painted and sections of the mint-green paint remain, hinting at 
attempts to make this housing on government land more like a home. Metal and plastic 
vessels sit at the front of the house, picked up and brought back with drinking water from 
a bore well constructed by an NGO. Women sit out here, washing dishes and clothing in 
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a small plastic basin; in the space between their homes, they cook daily meals over the 
open fires of shared kitchens. 
In this camp, I meet a woman from the village nearby. She now lives in the camp. 
Her husband is a Tamil refugee from Sri Lanka. Theirs was a “love marriage,” and after 
their nuptials, she moved into the camp.299 She is an Indian citizen. Her two young 
children are also citizens. When I ask why they live in the camps, she tells me that in the 
village, it is also difficult to find work to survive. Whether we are inside the camp or 
outside it, she asks me, “What is the difference?” 
There are dozens of other camps like this one. Sometimes, their names reveal 
their former industrial lives: “Metal Shop” and “Spinning Mill.” Others are named after 
the ur, kuppam, patti, pettai, or nagar in which they were established.300 
Erumaipatti301, located in the middle of a verdant district in central Tamil Nadu, 
was a very different type of camp. It was set up in the 1960s for Tamil plantation laborers 
who were repatriated from Sri Lanka to India under the 1964 Sirimavo-Shastri 
agreement. The state’s Department of Rehabilitation built colonial-style dwellings in the 
form of line houses, recreating the houses constructed for Tamil laborers on Sri Lanka’s 
plantation’s estates. Line houses were long, concrete structures subdivided into several 
two-room houses; two rows of housing faced each other, creating a lane in-between. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 Most Tamils in India are patrilocal, while among Tamils in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, the groom 
tends to move into his wife’s family’s home/village. The latter pattern is changing, as Sri Lankan Tamil 
refugees marry refugees living in other camps, Tamils living abroad in the diaspora, and Indian citizens. 
See Maunaguru 2009. 
300 These are all words used as suffixes for settlements of various sizes, ranging from home-village (ūr) and 
fishing hamlet (kuppam) to city (nagar).  
301 I visited and stayed in this camp during Pongal, as described in the Introduction. 
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Erumaipatti consisted of five lanes of nearly 40 families of Hindus and Christians302 who 
were mostly from the Mannar district; among them were Hill-Country Tamils who had 
resettled in the north after the 1977 anti-Tamil riots. The camp was close to a village, and 
children from the camp and the village attended the same school and became friends. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Line houses in the Sri Lankan refugee camp at Erumaipatti during Pongal, 
January 2009 (Photograph by author) 
 
Bhavani Sagar, also located in central Tamil Nadu, was one of the largest camps 
in the state, with approximately 3500 inhabitants. The camp was located on the outskirts 
of a panchayat town. Housing varied widely in this camp, which was home to some of 
OfERR’s regional staff. Mathi Anna, an OfERR health worker and former TELO activist, 
moved here in 1986, and has lived here for the last 12 years with his wife and two India-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 The latter lived in a separate lane, and held their own church services in one of the line rooms. 
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born sons. The family’s house burned down due to a fire the previous year, and was 
rebuilt a few months later. Mathi took out a loan of 50000 rupees ($1,157 USD303), which 
he was still paying back, to rebuild the house; he also added a concrete extension to the 
structure, creating a large front room, approximately 20 by 10 feet, for entertaining 
visitors and watching television.304 Visitors commented that the room simulated the 
veranda at the front as it was customary to do in houses in Jaffna. Other staff remarked 
upon the room approvingly as they enjoyed its spaciousness, relative to others in the 
camp, where provisional huts and concrete houses alike were under 250 square feet. 
Kummidipettai was as large as Bhavani Sagar, but was located within an hour of a 
large city. Several OfERR workers resided in this camp—they slept in the office five 
nights a week, and returned home for Sunday—or they had relatives who lived in the 
camp. The dusty lanes that separate sections of the camp are fenced with palm thatch—
another Jaffna custom of boundary-making; the thatch also covers and protects the houses 
and huts in this camp. The camp is highly organized, but also divided politically between 
refugees who support OfERR’s approach to refugee issues and politics, and those who 
did not.  
When the war began again in 2006, the large number of refugees arriving put 
pressure on the existing camps. New camp sites were found. In 2008 and 2009, the state 
government also built new housing to accommodate long-time camp residents. 
Gangaipuram was built under one such initiative. Unlike most of the state’s refugee 
camps, these new houses were built with brick, concrete, and had whitewashed plaster 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 At the time of the loan in April 2007. 
304 Some refugees had televisions that were donated to people throughout the state through a Chief 
Minister’s scheme. Mass gifts of this kind were a common tactic before elections.  
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walls, and were approximately 200 square feet. Many more homes have been repaired or 
newly built with the help of NGOs, including OfERR, CRS, ADRA India, and others. 
Refugees were employed in the construction of some of these projects.305  
 
Figure 5.4: New refugee camp housing at Gangaipuram, February 2009  
(Photograph by author) 
Refugee welfare: the government 
 Camp refugees receive a monthly allowance and basic rations from the Tamil 
Nadu state government. This allowance—or “dole” as it is officially termed—is crucial to 
their everyday survival. The allowance for the head of household was Rs. 400, plus an 
additional Rs. 288 for other adults, Rs. 180 for the first child under 12 years of age, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 For an account of a recent housing project, see Ramakrishnan (2012) for The Hindu. 
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Rs. 90 for each additional child.306 A household of two adults and two children under 12 
years would thus receive Rs. 958 per month, or the equivalent of $20 USD (at the start of 
fieldwork in October 2008). In addition, each household receives up to 20 kilograms of 
rice, and a ration card to purchase other basic items—namely, maida (wheat flour), rava 
(semolina), dal, sugar, palm oil, and kerosene—at concession rates. 
Additionally, each person is given free clothing once a year, and blankets and aluminum 
utensils are distributed to each household once every two years through government co-
operative stores: 
 
Table 3: Clothing and Household Items Provided in Sri Lankan Refugee Camps 
 
Recipient Clothing Item Number 
Dhoti 2 Male Adult 
Vests 2 
Half Trousers 2 
Inner Garments (vests) 1 
Male Child 









Every Family Towels 2 
Every Adult Mat 1 
Every Adult (1 x 2 years) Blanket 1 
Rice boiling utensils  
(5 Litres capacity) 
1 Every Family (1 x 2 years) 
 
State’s total cost for kitchen Sambar, curry utensils 1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 The monthly dole amount was increased to these amounts on August 1, 2006, which remained the same 
until the end of my fieldwork in India in May 2009. Previously, the monthly dole was half this amount, or 
Rs. 200, Rs. 144, Rs. 90 and Rs. 45 respectively. According to OfERR’s website, the current amounts are 
as follows: Head of household Rs. 1000, Rs. 750 for each additional member of the household above 12 
years old, and Rs. 450 for those under 12 years. 
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(2 Litres capacity) 1 
Large spoon 2 
Dining plates 2 
utensils: Rs. 250 / family 
Tumblers 2 
 
G.O. No. 2 Public (RH.II) Department, 3.1.2001; G.O. No. 947, Public (RH.II) 
Department, 18.6.1998. 
 
(Sources: Government of Tamil Nadu Rehabilitation Department 2008, 2009) 
 
Every household received free electricity under a scheme created in 1985 by then-
Chief Minister MGR. Tamil camp refugees also receive free healthcare in Tamil Nadu’s 
government hospitals. However, treatment here was viewed as less effective than the 
private care they could not afford. Female children and women in the camps are eligible 
for government programs to ensure that they complete secondary or tertiary schooling 
before marriage, and in programs implemented in 2006 and 2007, they may access 
additional resources and services to stay healthy during pregnancy.307 
All children in the camps receive a public school education and free school 
supplies, up to and including Plus 2 (i.e., the equivalent of grades 11 and 12), the higher 
secondary studies required for admission to colleges and universities in India. OfERR 
estimated that approximately 21,500 students were enrolled in local schools. Sri Lankan 
Tamil refugees have avidly pursued education as a means to future opportunities, whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 According to OfERR, the education schemes are as follows: Girl Child Protection Scheme (Rs.75,000), 
Moovalur Ramamirtham Ammaiyar Memorial Marriage Assistance Scheme for girls at enhanced rate 
(Rs.50,000 with four gram gold for graduates and diploma holders, whereas Rs.25,000 with four gram gold 
for SSLC holders), Dr.Muthulakshmi scheme (Rs.12,000) and Janani Suraksha Scheme (Rs.700). The 
pregnancy schemes include the Dr. Muthu Lakshmi Reddy Maternity Financial Assistance Scheme of the 
Government of Tamil Nadu (G.O. 118 Women and Family Welfare Department—Government Assistance 
Scheme 21, dated 05.04.2007). 
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in India, upon their return to Sri Lanka, or abroad.308 The state government has allowed 
them to pursue Arts & Sciences seats after general admission, and under an open quota 
for Engineering schools and faculties. This access to government-run colleges was 
withdrawn after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi—one of many punitive measures 
undertaken by the Jayalalithaa’s AIADMK government at that time—and was restored 
when Karunanidhi’s DMK returned to power, after requests from OfERR. Under specific 
circumstances, refugee students at government colleges may be able to avail themselves 
of a tuition fee waiver.309 
Camp administration 
 Sri Lankan refugee camps were overseen by administrators and officials of the 
Tamil Nadu state government and thus enfolded into local structures and units of 
administration. The units are noted here in ascending order: village, taluk, district and 
state. The camps were assigned their own officers, however, as exceptional spaces that 
were mostly segregated from Tamil Nadu’s villages and cities. At the most basic level, 
each camp had its own Village Administrative Officer and a Special Revenue Inspector. 
The Village Administrative Officer was known as “the chief and primary guardian of all 
the refugee camps situated within the area of his/her competence” (Department of 
Rehabilitation 2008: 2) and was tasked with visiting the camps once a week, listening to 
camp grievances, and registering births and deaths. The Special Revenue Inspector’s 
duties required knowing families within the camp in order to conduct a monthly roll-call 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 OfERR’s education programs recall Jaffna Tamils’ pursuit of education as a means to opportunity and 
social mobility; they also recall a well-habituated tradition among the island’s Tamils of traveling across 
the Palk Straits to the Madras Presidency for higher education. 
309 According to OfERR, “Tuition fee waiver has been granted to the first professional graduates who 
secure admission through single window system for the first generational graduates from the families 
(families without graduates).” OfERR website, http://oferr.org. 
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and create lists for the monthly dole distribution to follow. The inspector was also 
responsible for forwarding recommendations to address camp residents’ grievances, and 
coordinated with the administrative officer and the district on other administrative work.  
At the next administrative level, the Taluk Tahsildar distributed the cash dole on 
the fifth day of the month among other intermediary duties, while the Special Tahsildar 
(Camp) oversaw welfare activities from the district headquarters, conducted weekly 
inspections of the camps in the district, and was responsible for receiving refugees’ 
petitions and demands. Camps within a state district were assigned a District Collector, 
and his/her Personal Assistant, while the transit camps at Mandapam and Kottapattu had 
their own Special District Collector. The collector was vested with the authority to admit 
and transfer refugees to other camps, and also issued an “Exit Permit” to camp and non-
camp refugees who returned to Sri Lanka or traveled to another country. In addition, each 
of the state government’s departments—from Public Welfare to Law & Order—were 
assigned various responsibilities toward the refugees. Law & Order was especially 
involved, as each camp was assigned to a local police officer and an officer of the Q 
Branch, India’s high security police. However, most other duties were managed and 
overseen by Tamil Nadu’s Department of Rehabilitation. The Department was created in 
1946 to provide relief to Tamils (of Indian origin) who were repatriated from Burma and 
Malaya at the end of World War II, and in the decades to follow, assisted repatriates from 
Sri Lanka. In sum, the state government assigned refugees to camps, provided them 
housing and certain benefits/entitlements, and maintained ‘law and order’ through 
surveillance and policing. 
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 Everything else was left to internationally-funded NGOs, which looked after 
social and economic development in the neoliberal state. These organizations 
supplemented inadequate government facilities, mainly through repairs to government 
housing, supplementing education with tutoring programs, and health care through 
clinics, public health workshops and counseling. They also provided refugees with the 
resources for infrastructure and services not provided by the state, such as water tanks, 
toilets, nursery schools and tutoring rooms. NGOs were crucial intermediaries, observing 
camp living conditions and collecting and communicating camp refugees’ grievances to 
the state.  
Refugee welfare: OfERR 
Non-governmental organizations were officially banned from Sri Lankan refugee 
camps after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1991—a year that also marked the beginning 
of the liberalization of India’s economic policies.310 Although several organizations were 
granted access in the following years, they were not allowed full access for another 
fifteen years. In 2006, the Tamil Nadu government approved four organizations that 
continue to work in the state’s refugee camps: the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the 
Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA), Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), and the 
Organization for Eelam Refugees’ Rehabilitation (OfERR). Of these groups, the first 
three are international aid and development agencies with higher-level international staff 
and local workers. OfERR, though reliant on international funding for its programs, is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 These policies followed an IMF bailout from a Balance of Payments crisis, and led to market 
deregulation, lower taxes and import tariffs, and a marked increase in private and Foreign Direct 
Investments, which receive an array of incentives from the state. The most controversial incentive has been 
the creation of Special Economic Zones since 2000. On the latter, see http://www.sezindia.nic.in for more 
information. 
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only local organization, is staffed entirely by Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka, and 
maintains a presence in all of the camps. OfERR has worked in Tamil Nadu’s Sri Lankan 
refugee camps since 1990. 
OfERR was created “for refugees, by refugees” in the aftermath of Black July. 
The Founder and Treasurer, S.C. Chandrahasan, was a Colombo-based human rights 
lawyer and the son of the Federal Party founder and leader, S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, 
whose critical role in Tamil politics in Sri Lanka was discussed in Chapter 3. 
Chandrahasan, like many Tamil activists of this time, was known to be a supporter of one 
of the Tamil militant groups, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization.311 He fled to 
Madras in 1983, following death threats and a tip from a policeman about plans to abduct 
him. As refugees continued to arrive in Tamil Nadu, Chandrahasan worked with other 
activists and concerned individuals to identify and address the refugees’ needs in a new 
land. He founded OfERR with others engaged in relief efforts—including his personal 
secretary, Ms. Sooriyakumary, and the Tamil activist, Mr. Arul Gopalan (formerly of the 
original Nam Thamilar, or “We Tamils” movement312)—to assist the refugees. From the 
beginning, OfERR has focused on Tamil refugees in the camps and securing their access 
to all levels of education.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311 Chapter 3 discusses the formation of this and other Tamil militant organizations in the 1970s, and their 
politics pre- and post-1983. 
312 Nam Thamilar was a Tamil nationalist movement founded by S.P. Adithanar, the founder of the Tamil-
language newspaper, Thina Thanthi (“The Daily Wire”). The movement favored secession from India, and 
later merged with the DMK. It was revived by the Tamil film director, Seeman, in 2009 to protest the war 
and demonstrate support for the LTTE and Tamil Eelam.   
As Krishna (2000: 92-93) notes, the DMK were outspoken about Sri Lanka’s disenfranchisement of Tamils 
of Indian Origin, and during turning points in the 1950s and 1960s, encouraged the Indian government to 
pressure Sri Lanka’s government to change its policies toward Tamils. At the time, the FP was well aware 
of secessionist currents in Dravidian politics, but maintained no political links with these groups 
(Arasaratnam 1979; Cheran 1992). It was not until 1970 that Chelvanayakam, Amirthalingam and others 
met with the DMK in Tamil Nadu, during Karunanidhi’s first term as Chief Minister.   
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The organization has several interconnected aims. In its own words, 
OfERR’s mission is to improve and develop the life and well being of 
refugees in India by building the capacity of refugees, empowering them 
to make a significant contribution to their social and economic 
development and to rebuilding their homeland.313 
 
In pursuit of these goals, OfERR grew from a small group of seven volunteers who drew 
on their personal resources in 1984 to over 640 Sri Lankan Tamil refugee volunteers by 
2006. The organization has grown in other ways. First, with the start of the peace process 
in Sri Lanka, the NGO registered a new branch, OfERR Ceylon, to assist refugees 
returning to the island with their resettlement. Second, OfERR extended its work in 2005 
to assist tsunami-affected villages along Tamil Nadu’s coastline, and added 120 Indian 
volunteers from the affected areas to its ranks.  
OfERR supplements government assistance to refugees to ensure basic 
improvements to the camps. These projects have included: bore wells and other points of 
access to clean drinking water, sanitation and drainage, electricity and power generation, 
common sheds and community centers, housing repairs, and more. Throughout my 
fieldwork, OfERR facilitated the construction of hundreds of new toilets and unveiled 
solar-powered lighting in the camp bathrooms. Such work addresses years and decades of 
disrepair that followed after initial government assistance in the 1990s, and in doing so, 
makes what were intended to be “temporary” camps more livable.  
Moreover, OfERR created camp, district and regional-level committees to 
identify camp refugees’ social and development needs; they also linked these committees 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 OfERR India. Of, by, for refugees. Undated brochure. This brochure title recalls the phrase, 
“government of, by, and for the people” in Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. 
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to government officials and NGO professionals to address the needs identified. OfeRR 
estimated that 90% of the camp-level coordination committees held monthly meetings, 
and that approximately 1,700 meetings were held each year.314 For OfERR, the regular 
activity of these groups points to the desire of refugees to “participate in their own 
development.”315 District and regional steering committees have allowed members of 
several camp committees to gather together to identify and discuss issues affecting 
refugees across the state. These groups meet once every two months, depending on the 
urgency of a particular issue, and have lobbied state and national governments, as well as 
NGOs, on issues related refugee rehabilitation and development.  
Tamil refugee as “coolie” 
 Camp residents experienced significant obstacles to their ability to find and 
maintain regular employment. Paid work was necessary for their survival. The monthly 
dole and camp rations—though welcomed—were not enough to sustain most households, 
let alone secure access to the educations many parents and caregivers believed would 
create social mobility and personal security in their children’s futures. The social and 
financial insecurity of life as a refugee pervaded every conversation I had with Tamils 
living in the camps.  
Most male residents engaged in what they and their female relatives called kūli 
vēlai, or “coolie labor.”316 For refugees, this meant manual labor for substandard wages. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Personal communication, November 2008. 
315Personal communication with S.C. Chandrahasan, and OfERR staff, and as noted in the organization’s 
internal reports. 
316 The word coolie is derived from the Tamil word, kūli, which refers to daily wages in grain or cash, 
depending on the type of labor. The term for the wage was later applied to the laborer, and spread globally 
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They worked hard for long hours and had no guarantee of regular employment. They 
broke rocks, tarred roads, did construction, laid bricks and concrete, and painted 
buildings and houses. Tamils who leave the camps to work must obtain permission. To 
obtain permission to go outside the camps, however, involves days of waiting for the 
wheels of bureaucracy to turn, as refugees fill out forms and get bumped from office to 
office in search of the right official. Moreover, camp residents who work outside the 
camps were still required to observe the state-wide curfew, and could only work and 
travel outside during the hours of 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. The curfew limited their ability to 
travel further away from their homes for work. Some refugees have secured permissions 
to work and live outside the camps, but this required underwriting by an employer. 
The jobs referred to as “coolie labor” gave refugee households kai kaasu, or 
pocket money—literally “hand cash”—between dole distributions. With this cash, they 
could meet regular or unexpected expenses, and if there was anything left over, they 
could try to save for large future expenses—typically, home repairs or a child’s college 
tuition fees. By and large, however, these expenses were too high for most refugee 
families in the camps. 
Adults were not the only ones who worked. In some camps, children stayed home 
from school to work in textile industries, knotting threads to create fringed bedsheets for 
Rs. 20-30 per day (in 2009 USD, approximately 50 to 75 cents per day); they also did 
piecework sewing and embroidery for garment factories exporting clothing to the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
through the colonial indenture of south Indian workers. See Daniel (2008) for an ethnographically-
informed epic poem about “the coolie” on Ceylon’s tea plantations. 
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Kingdom.317 In the poorest of households, older children were pulled out of school before 
completing their secondary studies—a phenomenon that troubled OfERR staff, who 
encouraged refugees to acquire educational qualifications and skills that could be used to 
build their homeland upon their return.  
In interviews, Tamil refugees in and outside the camps often complained of not 
being able to find work commensurate to their expectations. Young women and men who 
were raised and educated in India spoke to me of their professional aspirations. They 
noted that, even after completing tertiary studies—whether undergraduate or post-
graduate degrees, diplomas, or training certificates—they were unable to secure 
employment that matched their qualifications. India’s large public sector was closed to 
refugees, as non-citizens could not sit for the administrative or civil service exams. 
Private employers were also reluctant to hire them. They explained that once it became 
clear that they were refugees from Sri Lanka, they went no further in the application 
process.  
The inability to find office employment combined with a desire to develop their 
communities led some college-educated refugees to work for OfERR. In Trichy, “Shoba” 
told me that she had completed her law degree, but was unable to work in her profession. 
Her colleagues were employed as magistrates; she was the only graduate who was not. 
She joined OfERR, and works in the Advocacy department on peace education among 
camp refugees. Like “Shoba,” other young staff at OfERR had completed or were in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 See, for example, The Observer and the BBC’s investigation into British fast-fashion retailer, Primark, 
McDougall (2008), “The Hidden Face of Primark Fashion,” The Guardian, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/india.humanrights  
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process of finishing undergraduate and graduate degrees in sociology, social work, and 
the arts. 
“Self-help” groups and empowerment 
Economic activities were central to OfERR’s social work in the camps, given the 
pervasive unemployment and underemployment described above. The organization 
recognized that the government dole was not enough to meet refugees’ everyday 
expenses, let alone fees for higher education. In lieu of a regular income from steady 
employment, or access to land or sea to engage in traditional occupations of agriculture 
or fishing, OfERR provided camp refugees with vocational training and apprenticeship 
opportunities, including: sewing and tailoring; typing and computer applications; 
construction skills such as carpentry, masonry and electrical wiring. The latter was 
deemed especially important, “Since most of the buildings in the Tamil homeland from 
where refugees come from (sic) need to be rebuilt or built anew....” (OfERR n.d.: 21).  
Women, in particular, were encouraged to participate in income generation 
activities within their camps. OfERR assumed that women would save any extra money 
for future family expenses. OfERR’s Women’s Empowerment wing organized trainings 
in the camps to build participants’ self-confidence (thannampikai, or “self-belief”). 
Women at these one and two-day trainings engaged in physical activity to strengthen 
their bodies and learned self-defense; they listened to motivational speakers who led them 
to chant, “I can do it!” (ennale mudiyum). In addition, microfinance discourses resonated 
with values of “self-reliance” at OfERR, leading to the installation of women’s self-help 
groups in camps throughout the state. Members of these groups pooled small amounts of 
money into a bank account and made small business loans to members, who repaid the 
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fund. Their income generation activities included: Small businesses serving (mostly) 
camp refugees such as bicycle repair, phone booths, tea and cool drinks’ shops, jam and 
pickle making, vegetable shops and community canteens, mushroom farming, spirulina 
cultivation, poultry rearing. These groups exemplified neoliberal approaches to 
international development work in Sri Lanka among the internally displaced and women 
who were widowed during the war, and reflected broader trends throughout South 
Asia.318 
India, Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka’s War 
By October 2008, Sri Lanka’s “Eelam War IV” had become a prime subject of 
public debate and action, coinciding with the start of my fieldwork in India.319 Splashy 
headlines in the morning and evening dailies, and television news, brought political jousts 
and protests—and along with them, the war—into the everyday spaces of Tamil Nadu. 
Sri Lanka’s war had become the topic of conversation from streets and colleges to 
teashops and households. It was not the first time. In 1983, thousands of people marched 
on the streets to protest state-organized violence against Tamils in Sri Lanka.320 Twenty-
five years later, contemporary protests reminded Tamil Nadu activists of the events they 
had organized and joined in response to July 1983. 
Shortly after the riots of 1983, the government of India covertly established 
training camps for several militant groups through an intelligence agency called the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 See, for example, Karim (2011) for an ethnographic study of microfinance and debt among women in 
Bangladesh. 
319 Eelam War IV is how the Sri Lankan government and press pundits in India referred to the war. The 
other three wars refer to periods of war in 1983-1987, 1990-1993, and 1994-2001. Tamil refugees did not 
refer to the war in this way. 
320 Personal communication with historian V. Geetha, and discussed by several activists. For reporting on 
this event see Tamil Times (1983). 
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Research & Analysis Wing, or RAW (Narayan Swamy 1994). The LTTE also found a 
patron in the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, film icon M.G. Ramachandran, who 
provided an ostentatious gift of Rs 1 million to the group in 1984. International and 
vernacular media, politicians, activists and militants were not the only producers of this 
public discussion. As noted in Chapter 1, large numbers of refugees arrived with first-
hand knowledge of the war, which they shared with locals who became their neighbors, 
friends, and on occasion, affines.   
 Three events, however, changed the discursive conditions for public action in 
response to Sri Lanka’s war. First, the Government of India’s uneven and deceptive 
treatment of Tamil militant groups created mistrust, leading to internecine violence 
among these groups, through clashes and mass killings in Sri Lanka, and targeted attacks 
in India. As early as 1985, a public gunfight between LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, and 
Padmanabha in the busy commercial district of Pondy Bazaar in Chennai’s Thiyagaraya 
Nagar led to public and political discontent. The then Chief Minister Karunanidhi sought 
to distance his coterie from the politics of militancy when “Tamils were killing other 
Tamils.”321  
Second, the rise of the LTTE through internecine violence as “the sole 
representatives of the Tamil people” placed the organization in an increasingly 
antagonistic relationship with the Indian government. The latter had favored other Tamil 
armed groups at various times in an effort to control the movement. When India 
attempted to broker peace with the Sri Lankan government through the Indo-Lanka 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Also see his call for unity among militant groups: Mu. Karunanidhi, n.d. Eelat tamilarkalē onRupaddup 
porādungal! (Eelam Tamils, Unite and Fight!) 
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Accord of 1987, it used strong-arm tactics to secure the begrudging consent of the LTTE, 
the dominant militant group, and sent peacekeeping forces to the island. Within months, 
the island returned to war, with the LTTE fighting the IPKF, with arms provided by the 
Government of Sri Lanka to their erstwhile enemy. The IPKF war created immense 
suffering among Tamils, and the LTTE incurred severe losses despite claims that it 
successfully routed the 4th largest army in the world.322 This violent and traumatic war 
drove many Tamil refugees to leave the island. 
Bad blood between the LTTE and the Indian government culminated in the third 
event, which continued to have repercussions throughout the war: In 1991, a female 
suicide bomber detonated herself in Chennai before Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. 
Though never claimed nor actively denied by the organization, the assassination was 
quickly ascribed to the LTTE. The group that executed the plan was based in Tamil 
Nadu. With this one explosive act, the lives of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India 
changed overnight.  
The 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi turned many of India’s citizens against 
Tamils from Sri Lanka, and altered Tamil Nadu’s political climate. Tamil activists in 
India told me that local Tamils had “forgotten” the sufferings of their Sri Lankan 
brethren. By late 2008, however, these “public feelings” had changed. Everyone—from 
the daily wage laborer to the Chief Minister himself—seemed to be concerned with “the 
war against Tamils,” (tamilarkal meethana poor) or the “genocide” (inapadukolai). I felt, 
at times, a palpable sense of distress and a desire to alleviate Tamil suffering as I moved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 The LTTE used guerrilla tactics throughout the 1970s and 1980s, while fighting the IPKF. Indian forces 
were often suspicious of the population for this reason—most in the first round could not communicate 
with civilians, as they were Punjabi, and not Tamil-speakers. The LTTE developed a more conventional 
military force while fighting the Sri Lankan government during the 1990s. 
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through the city.323 Auto rickshaw drivers looking for conversation would comment on 
my ‘different’ Tamil (however much of it had been assimilated to Standard Indian Tamil) 
and ask whether I came from Ilangai (Lanka); one evening, on my way to a protest, a 
driver asked me to promise that my family would “never return to that land,” telling me I 
would certainly be killed.324 The night watchman at the flats where I lived often told me 
about what he saw on the news that day, remarked that it was an unfortunate thing, a sin 
(paavam) and invited me to his church’s prayer vigil. These common expressions of 
sympathy and concern were accompanied by another form of talk buzzing throughout the 
city: public speech about the politics of war.  
On October 2, 2008, the CPI (Tamil Nadu) organized a protest to draw attention 
to the war in Sri Lanka, kicking off months of protests throughout the state. Tamil Nadu’s 
major political parties—the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and All-India Anna 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK)—and several other parties, including the 
Marumalarchi DMK (MDMK), Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), and Viduthalai Ciruthaigal 
Katchi (VCK), all had a history of politicking on the issue, and were eager to weigh in. 
Tamil activists from India called on the Indian and Sri Lankan governments to “Stop the 
War!” by using a political idiom of shared Tamilness to “voice” the grievances of 
civilians who were said to be unable to speak for themselves. Activists in Tamil Nadu, 
using a rhetoric of fictive kinship, substituted their bodies for those of Tamils in the war 
zone, to not only seek an end to war, but chastise the ‘Sinhala government’ and praise the 
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 This desire to alleviate Lankan Tamil suffering was somehow de-linked from the situation of refugees 
who were living in Tamil Nadu, including recent arrivals from the war zone. 
324
 ‘Threewheeler’ or auto-rickshaw drivers belong to unions that rely on the backing of political parties for 
their negotiations, and were in turn readily mobilized to attend rallies. 
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LTTE for fighting the army. In doing so, however, their protests did not include the tens 
of thousands of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka, who crossed the Palk Strait to find refuge 
in camps and cities throughout Tamil India. Tamil refugees quickly organized protests of 
their own. 
The Figure of the Refugee 
 In the course of short-term research prior to my extended fieldwork, I had been told 
time and again—by activists and academics in India and the wider Tamil diaspora—that 
refugees in India did not and could not participate in political action. No distinction was 
made in these claims between camp and urban refugees, between sites of refuge, or 
modes of action. Rather, the shared basis of these claims was the legal and social identity 
of “the refugee” as a singular figure, and consequently, interpretations of what this 
meant: a person cast out of a territory, no longer a citizen, and therefore purged of “the 
rights attached to a national community as such” (Ranciere 2004: 298). As one local 
Indian activist told me, “If they do these things, they will be arrested and thrown into the 
Special Camp.”325 The refugee was rightly understood to be subject to the extremity of 
state violence, as well as everyday regulatory techniques that defined and managed 
refugees (like prisoners, detainees, the tortured and the quarantined) as a population 
apart: techniques of containment, enumeration, categorization, surveillance, etc. 
Outsiders presumed that Tamils who were identified as refugees could only be subject to 
state power; as a consequence of these operations of power, they could not be subjects of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 As noted in Chapter 1, special camps are internment camps for Tamils from Sri Lanka who are 
suspected to have militant, and especially, LTTE connections. 
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power. In other words, “the refugee” did not have a political subjectivity or the capacity 
for action.  
 In this regard, activists’ and local scholars’ claims converged with the constitution 
of “the refugee” in the domains of international law, development, and humanitarianism. 
The anthropologist Liisa Malkki's critical review of the ongoing construction of a 
generalized domain of “refugee studies” provides a starting point for this analysis. 
Malkki situates the emergence of “the refugee” as an object of bureaucratic knowledge in 
the wake of the Second World War, during which “certain key techniques for managing 
mass displacements of people first became standardized and globalized” (1995b: 497). 
Chief among these was the refugee camp, a technology modeled on the military camp—
as hundreds of work and concentration camps were transformed into “Assembly Centres” 
for the displaced—and enabled the spatial concentration and ordering of people, their 
quarantine, confinement, segregation and “perpetual screening” (498-99). In parallel, 
legal instruments were devised to organize mass displacement and migration, state-
centered policies developed to secure national borders, and organizations formed with a 
decisive role in consolidating an “international refugee system,” in which refugees 
became a “problem for development.” Taken together, “the refugee” of this discursive 
field could only be a figure of pure abjection; an individual case of a mass phenomenon 
who must be returned to “the national order of things” (Malkki 1995a; 1995b). 
 Refugees were recognized as political agents and those denied of political rights in 
this period. On the one hand, as the sociologist Hein has suggested, “Research on 
refugees accumulated with minimal conceptual elaboration: Immigrants constituted an 
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economic form of migration, refugees a political form” (cited in Malkki 1995b: 496).326 
That refugee determination is a politicized process also finds ample evidence in the post-
WW2 era: in the granting of asylum to political dissidents of the Cold War, as well as the 
more recent resettlement of Iraqi and Afghan asylum-seekers after the American invasion 
and occupation.327 However, as the work of Malkki and others demonstrates, the making 
of “the refugee”—from techniques, institutions and legal instruments developed in the 
post-World War II management of Displaced Persons, to the post-Cold War growth of 
humanitarianism—is a process of depoliticization. “The refugee” in this view is not a 
subject of history or an agentive person, but an object of charitable aid and development 
that remains a potential threat to national security. 
There has been a surge of interest among philosophers, legal scholars and social 
scientists in studying refugees and refugee camps in the two decades since Malkki’s 
review essay was published in 1995. Anthropological studies of refugees have analyzed 
the powerful institutions and discourses of development and humanitarianism that 
manage and order refugee lives (Malkki 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Redfield 2005; Feldman 
2007, 2008; Ticktin 2011). These studies draw heavily on Foucault’s (1977, 1978, 1991, 
2003) analysis of power—specifically, the modes of power he terms discipline, biopower 
and governmentality. In Discipline and Punish (1977), Foucault traces the prison 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326  Academic scholarship has since developed more complex understandings of the reasons for 
immigration and asylum-seeking. Refugee determination among states nevertheless remains tethered to the 
UN Convention’s requirement of a “fear of persecution.” 
327  During the Cold War, one can also point to the screening of Cambodian refugees at a camp at the Thai 
border for connections to Khmer Rouge in U.S. resettlement programs, as discussed in Ong 2003. 
Cambodian refugees were construed by INS agents as victims of political persecution – and thus admissible 
under a right to asylum - as the violence that instigated their flight was perpetrated by a 'communist' 
regime. However, those who were even perceived to have connections to the KR, even under coercion, 
were deemed “undeserving” and therefore not eligible for resettlement. As I discuss here and elsewhere, the 
shift from resettlement programs to “source control” has profound implications for the movement and 
asylum-seeking strategies of Tamil refugees. 
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system’s emergence in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the paradigmatic 
site of modern power—itself the culmination of disciplinary techniques disseminated 
across a variety of social institutions, ranging from the barracks and the school to the 
hospital and the asylum. The “microphysics” of disciplinary power and its finely-
calibrated arrangements of time, space, and movement produces self-regulating “docile 
bodies” resulting in a more “humane” approach of “perpetual reform” and 
“rehabilitation.” Whereas discipline acts on individual bodies, biopower entails the 
regulation of populations through the application of disciplinary techniques on 
individuals. Governmentality organizes the conduct of populations, which is exercised as 
the power to make live and let die.  
While anthropologists deployed and expanded Foucault’s theories of biopower 
and governmentality in their work on refugees, “the refugee” also became the 
subject/object of critical debates in political philosophy, most notably in the influential 
work of Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben. In his book, Homo Sacer: Sovereign 
Power and Bare Life, Agamben begins his investigation of biopower and what he sees as 
“the paradoxical logic of sovereignty” by revisiting the history of Western political 
theory from the separation of political life (bios) and biological life (zoē) in the classical 
Greek city-state to the Holocaust and mass deportations in the twentieth century. The 
philosopher takes his cue from Foucault’s genealogy of power, which he then reverses. 
Agamben argues that biopower—the power over biological life, or “bare life”—was at 
the heart of sovereign power all along; the sovereign, as the power to decide the 
exception to the rule, holds power over “life itself. Where Foucault finds in biopower a 
transformation of modern politics, Agamben finds the essence of all politics.  
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In making his argument, Agamben turns to an obscure figure in ancient Roman 
law: homo sacer or “sacred man,” the life that is impossible to sacrifice, and may be 
killed with impunity. Homo sacer is the human being who is cast out of the polis by the 
sovereign ban, and in the process becomes “bare life,” which has “the peculiar privilege 
of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men” (1998: 7). Included by virtue of its 
exclusion from political life, “bare life” becomes “the originary political element” and its 
production “the originary activity of sovereignty” (83). In other words, “bare life” 
inscribes the power to kill in the biopolitical exercise of sovereignty, through the decision 
to eliminate some individuals from the body politic in order to preserve the life of the 
population. This ability to decide who lives and who dies through the structure of the 
state of exception culminates in “the most absolute biopolitical space to have ever been 
realized” (171)—in Auschwitz, and the Nazi concentration camps of the Holocaust. 
At this point in his work, Agamben turns to the final chapter of Part Two of 
Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism, “The Decline of the Nation-State and the 
End of the Rights of Man,” to consider the problem of refugees in the twentieth century. 
He quotes the paradox from which Arendt (1968) departs, 
The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a 
human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who 
professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people 
who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships—except 
that they were still human (299, also cited in Agamben 1998: 126). 
 
What we take to be “the sacred and inalienable rights of man”—also known as 
human rights—is revealed to lack protection and reality when it is no longer in the form 
of the rights of citizens of a nation-state (Agamben 1998: 126). Agamben considers how 
this distinction between man and citizen was enshrined in the founding document of 
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popular sovereignty—the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789. 
Refugees reveal the fiction of human rights and signal the end—in the doubled sense of 
“purpose,” and “completion”—of the nation-state. In their exclusion from the political 
life of citizenship, refugees (the displaced, the stateless and asylum-seekers) are made 
into “bare life” that may be killed. This is the “secret solidarity” between 
humanitarianism and the state. However, it is in the refugee's depoliticization that such a 
figure augurs a new form of politics for Agamben. Included by their very exclusion, 
refugees are not merely exceptions to the rule of modern citizenship for Agamben; rather, 
they exemplify a political modernity shared by all human beings. In other words, the 
exceptional figure of “the refugee” becomes the exemplary political subject of late 
modernity. 
The example of the Holocaust leads Agamben to declare that the camp is the 
structure in which the state of exception is realized normally. The camp is revealed as 
“the hidden matrix of politics” appearing at a time of crisis in the nation-state. “The 
camp, which is now securely lodged within the city’s interior, is the new biopolitical 
nomos of the planet” (176). 
The French philosopher, Jacques Ranciere, levels an important criticism at 
Agamben, and his use of Arendt. Ranciere calls into question Arendt’s rigid separation of 
“private” and “public” spheres, noting that her argument about the subject of rights has 
paradoxically allowed Agamben and others to depoliticize life by setting it apart in a zone 
of exception, in “an anthropological sphere of sacrality situated beyond the reach of 
political dissensus” (2004: 299). Ranciere argues that the difference between the political 
subjects of “man” and “citizen” does not void the rights of the former; instead, the gap 
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between these subjects is an opening for political subjectivization (304). In this process, 
the rights of man are enacted through the staging of specific scenes of dissensus. 
Ranciere writes, “These rights are theirs when they can do something with them to 
construct a dissensus against the denial of rights they suffer” (305-6). He seems to 
suggest that by identifying “man” with a subject deprived of any right, Arendt and 
Agamben reinscribe the subject’s depoliticization. In a shrinking political space, Human 
Rights are inherited by others—i.e. citizens—who can enact them and in the process are 
transformed into the cosmopolitical “right to humanitarian intervention.” 
If Agamben’s theory of the exception reveals critical insights about the nexus of 
biopolitics and sovereignty in modernity, I remain wary of his claim that “we are all 
virtually homines sacri” (115).  Such a statement flattens the historical dynamics of social 
power under colonialism and capitalism, as explored in the work his theories are built 
upon: Arendt's account of imperialism in analyzing the origins of totalitarianism 
(1968[1951]), and Foucault's theory of governmentality and the development of state 
racism (2003). Agamben himself qualifies his general theory with the word “virtually.” 
We are not all actually homo sacer. Indeed, the notion that the “we” addressed by 
Agamben are all refugees or “virtually homines sacri” does not account for the specific 
ways in which human beings are othered and cast out, nor does it explain what happens 
to those who are already subjects of political exclusion (Ziarek 2008).   
The legal theorist, Patricia Tuitt, expresses her concern over such appropriations 
of the refugee figure. She writes,  
…I am concerned with those works that assert that the refugee condition is 
potentially productive of a new political consciousness able to challenge 
the nexus of state, territory and identity… the refugee has become 
	   314	  
complicit (albeit unwillingly) in what is becoming an increasingly 
categorical determination of the ‘rightless’ person or the ultimate ‘other.’ 
Such a determination is troublesome simply because it masks other forms 
and instances of violence (2004: 37). 
 
As Tuitt puts it, the manner by which political theorists invoke “the country-less 
refugee” does not enable a strong reappraisal of the state-system and its violences. Tuitt 
goes on to argue that refugees have instead “all too successfully been reduced to a legal 
construction” (2004: 38). 
Even as I find value in Tuitt’s critique of the appropriation of “the refugee” by 
Agamben and others, I caution against her depiction of international law as a total 
system. Refugees live within the constraints of international and national laws, while 
living and acting in ways that exceed or evade the limits of these laws. Moreover, not all 
who are bound to the identity of a “refugee” are included within the legal definition—as 
was the case in my research among Tamil refugees in India, who received de facto 
recognition from the state government, but continue to live without international legal 
status. This very process of de facto inclusion and de jure exclusion shapes formations of 
social and political identity that cannot be reduced to a simple legal construction. I argue, 
following Agamben’s probe of sovereign power and bare life, that refugees become new 
political subjects in the very sites and processes of their depoliticization and “inclusive 
exclusion”: the (biopolitical) camp. 
However, this study departs from Agamben on the nature of refugees’ political 
subjectivization. Following the abovementioned critiques of Agamben’s work, it must be 
emphasized that the legal and discursive construction of “the refugee” does not wholly 
determine refugees’ political subjectivities. Further, as important as Foucault and 
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Agamben’s theories have been for analyzing the the biopolitics of humanitarianism, 
biopower and the universal figure of “bare life” do not fully account for the political 
subjectivization of refugees, and more specifically, the ways in which refugees negotiate 
power relations in their everyday lives. Bare life, as the anthropologist Miriam Ticktin 
writes, ‘always comes with political and social attributes allowing it to be identified as 
human, as bare, and as “life”…’ in need of management and care (2011: 14).  
What are we to make of all this? When and how does the figure of “the refugee,” 
an object of technical interventions and bureaucratic management, and a subject theorized 
in political philosophy, appear in the social and political life of displacement?  
Ethnographic research among refugees and displaced persons destabilizes the 
notion of a universal refugee figure by directing our attention to the social and historical 
context of specific camps, urban settlements, and dispersed populations (Sayigh 1994; 
Malkki 1995; Daniel and Thangaraj 1995; Daniel 1996; Ong 2003; Peteet 2005; Ticktin 
2006; Feldman 2007, 2008) and their various formations of identity and community, or 
what Ilana Feldman (2012) calls “the politics of living within a humanitarian space.” 
Such studies have also analyzed the varied ways in which refugees negotiate power 
relations and differently experience constraint and freedom in these settings. Moreover, 
recent work has challenged the notion that refugee subjectivity is entirely determined by 
powerful international humanitarian aid and development regimes, through analyses of 
community formations within refugee camps (Chandrasekar 2014; Gabiam 2012), 
governing practices and law (McConnachie 2014, Feldman 2007), and memories of past 
humanitarian experiences (R. McKay 2012). In the following sections, I attend to such 
formations of community and power in Tamil Nadu’s camps, which are analyzed here as 
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partitioned spaces of protection and surveillance. In particular, I examine how refugees 
negotiated power relations as they mobilized a variety of actions to protest the war in Sri 
Lanka from within the spaces of their camps. 
Camp protests 
Three weeks into my fieldwork in Tamil Nadu, in late October 2008, camp 
refugees watched political parties staging actions throughout the state, and seized 
the opportunity to gather and hold events of their own. Tamil refugees followed 
the war in Sri Lanka and Indian protests closely through multiple media: they 
watched the news on television, read newspapers and visited internet browsing 
centers, listened to local radio and diasporic channels on the web, received 
intermittent calls from their families, and sought firsthand accounts of the war 
from other Tamils who had recently arrived from Sri Lanka.328  When Tamil 
Nadu’s Chief Minister, Mu. Karunanidhi329, called for a human chain in Chennai 
on 21 October to “support” and “protect” Eelam Tamils, Tamil refugees felt 
compelled to voice their own protest. Two days before the human chain, 1,550 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 I observed the following media being read or listened to, and discussed: Newspapers such as 
Thinathanthi, Thinakaran, Thinamani, The Hindu; Sri Lankan newspapers online such as Virakesari, 
Uthayan, The Sunday Leader, Daily Mirror; websites such as Tamilnet.com, Tamilwin.com, puthinam.net; 
and Canadian Tamil Radio. On more than one occasion, Tamils said that it was important to read multiple 
sources of news, including sources that were clearly partisan for, as I was told by one avid reader at 
OfERR, “the truth lies somewhere in between.” In this practice of reading, what was not said could be as 
important as what any particular media outlet had written about. 
See Chapter 1 for a discussion of recent arrivals to the camps following an escalation of violence in April 
2006. Camp refugees in Tamil Nadu were joined by more than 18,000 people between April 2006 and 
September 2008, fleeing the return to war in the eastern and northern districts of Trincomalee, Mannar, 
Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. Many people were seeking refuge for the second and third time.  
329 This was Karunanidhi’s fifth term. Political power in Tamil Nadu has alternated between two parties—
the DMK and the AIADMK—since the DMK’s C.N. Annadurai became Chief Minister of Madras State in 
1967. Either Jayalalithaa (AIADMK) or Karunanidhi (DMK) have been head of state for almost 25 of the 
last 26 years. Karunanidhi first became CM shortly after the state’s boundaries were redrawn and renamed 
Tamil Nadu in 1969.  
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men, women and children at four refugee camps in the northern district of Salem 
observed a fast to protest Sri Lanka’s war. In a statement to the press, they 
highlighted that, as Tamils from Sri Lanka, it was their people who were caught in 
the crossfire of the offensive against the Tigers. They termed the issue a “human 
rights violation,” and asked the Indian government to intervene to bring a 
peaceful end to the war. A reporter from The Hindu, a Chennai-based English-
language national daily, happened to be at one of these camps for another story, 
and wrote up the protest. Three days later, another protest took place at a camp in 
Tirunelveli district, and became front-page news in the Tamil-language media.330  
I first heard about camp protests at the OfERR head office in Chennai, where 
refugee advocates received word of these demonstrations through phone calls from camp 
leaders and discussed ways to control the protests, for reasons and by methods of internal 
criticism, opposition and surveillance that are discussed in greater detail later in this 
chapter. Such internal oppositions added to already prevailing circumstances that limited 
the ability of refugees to gather and demonstrate outside their camps. For now, however, 
I focus on the specific ways in which camp residents articulated their grievances, and 
situate them in the context of camp life and its management and administration: how 
refugees understood their protests as a demonstration of and for peace in Sri Lanka, a 
country from which they had fled and to which they claimed they would return. This 
discussion reveals how, for many camp refugees, their actions were an extension of peace 
activism and preparations for return during Sri Lanka's ceasefire and peace process 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 See also Deccan Chronicle 2008 and Sundaram 2008. Apart from these early events, Tamil refugee 
protests received scant attention in the local and national press. 
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A not-so-silent front  
Refugees organized protests less than three weeks after the Communist Party of 
India fast that initiated a wave of public opposition to Sri Lanka's war. In the days and 
weeks that followed, according to newspaper reports, at least twenty refugee camps 
organized fasts during the months of October, November and early December. Hundreds 
of “inmates”—as they were termed by state officials and the media—gathered in each 
camp. Tamil-language print and television media provided visibility to some of these 
protests, as state-wide television and newspapers' local editions apprised readers of the 
events and delivered refugee statements to a broader Tamil-speaking public. However, a 
number of protests were not reported. 
One of the first protests in October took place at a camp two hours from Chennai, 
where hundreds of residents held a fast and led a procession around their camp. Residents 
of the camp demonstrated on a Sunday. Two OfERR workers were longtime residents of 
this camp, and quietly told their co-workers about the demonstration at work the next 
day. Seated on a bench near the office threshold, I listened as John Ayya331 described how 
hundreds of demonstrators marched through the by-lanes of their camp, banging 
household implements against metal vessels that had been given to them in the annual 
government ration to refugees.332 The group called themselves amaithi pērani, or Silent 
Front. Lowering his voice, John whispered the slogans that the protesters had shouted the 
day before:  
Thamil makkal kolaathe!    Don't kill the Tamil people! 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 Ayya is term of respect and status for an elder Tamil man. 
332 As noted in the tables above. 
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Engada thamil makkal kaapaathunga!  Save our Tamil people! 
Mahinda Rajapaksevai olikka!    Destroy Mahinda Rajapakse! 
The slogans were simple and repetitive, and shouted three or four times before the next 
one. These phrases mirrored those used by strident nationalist politicians, party activists, 
and cinema stars in their recent demonstrations against Sri Lanka’s war. Asking listeners 
not to “kill” but to “save our Tamil people” (my emphasis), John and his fellow 
protesters claimed Tamils in Sri Lanka as their own people.  In addition, they highlighted 
concern over civilian casualties, and expressed anger over the return to war under the 
government of Sri Lanka’s President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, and his brothers. 
However, as Mark reminded me in his recounting of the event, the term amaithi 
has a doubled meaning. It can refer to both “silence” and “peacefulness,” and also means 
“calm” or “contained,” i.e. that which is “without disturbance.”333 Clanging pots and 
roaring chants, the protesters were anything but silent in their protest of war. Their name 
was thus an ironic commentary on the conflation of “silence” with “peace,” or the oft-
propounded idea in the international community and refugee rehabilitation that an 
uneventful state of being without disturbance – i.e. without war – was “peace.”334  Sri 
Lanka’s “troubles” were often described as a disturbance, while in India, militancy was 
seen as having the potential to incite disturbance among refugees, who themselves were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 SJV Chelvanayakam once used the expression, amaithi perani, during in a 1972 interview with E. 
Valentine Daniel in which he described the Federal Party’s performance of “calmness” in satyagraha, a 
Gandhian action of non-violent protest. Chelvanayakam, a Christian, cited his inspiration as Isaiah 30:15 
[“In quietness and confidence shall be your strength”.] This ideal was interpreted by Hindus as an 
expression of dharma, i.e. action without attachment, as exemplified by Arjuna the charioteer in the 
Bhagavad Gita (Personal communication, June 2015, E. Valentine Daniel.)  
Interestingly, the LTTE also drew on the notion of “calm” or “contained” rebellion in their emphasis on the 
discipline and self-control of their cadres.  
334 For an example of rehabilitation rhetoric reliant on a negative definition of peace, see Rao 1993. 
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construed as a disturbance to the nation-state order. As John and others explained, the 
protest was itself a “peaceful” one. By this, he meant that they expressed their grievances 
without the tactical use of violence, but also that the protesters did not demonstrate 
support for militancy. The camp leader, Xavier, echoed John’s claim when he told me, on 
a visit to the camp, that the event was organized to provide refugees with a “peaceful 
way” to air their frustrations and fears. Xavier, instead, saw organized protest as a kind of 
carnivalesque “safety-valve” (Bakhtin 1984; Turner 1969) that would counter, not 
catalyze, militant aspirations .For these reasons, he allowed refugees to gather together 
and march—actions that also required permission from the police, if not the Department 
of Rehabilitation.   
The camp was a place rife with tension, despite a strong OfERR presence: Xavier 
was, after all, the brother of a senior OfERR member, and maintained close 
communication with the organization; staff who were camp residents returned to visit 
their families every Sunday. In spite of the organization’s presence, Xavier related that he 
had difficulties in managing different factions of the camp that loosely coalesced around 
their feelings about the NGO’s leadership and the politics of the war. While many 
refugees supported OfERR's mandate to work with governments to secure refugee lives 
and livelihoods, a few camp residents sought to participate in more confrontational 
political action, including but not limited to participation in Indian politics, and/or 
demonstrating support for militancy. In their understanding, OfERR’s rehabilitation 
programs made limited gains toward the development of Tamil refugees, and did not 
create significant changes in their everyday lives and the war that led to their 
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predicament. These refugees tried, with difficulty, to mobilize other camp residents, but 
they were largely unsuccessful. 
 “By Peaceful Means”: Between Protection and Surveillance 
Camp protests continued throughout October and November 2008, and were 
organized again in January and February 2009 as military operations in Tiger-controlled 
territory cut off nearly all communications between refugees and their families. Sri 
Lankan armed forces had captured the LTTE’s headquarters in Kilinochchi on January 2, 
and continued their offensive in the Tigers’ last remaining territory: the district of 
Mullaitivu. Few households were left untouched by this sudden development. As I 
traveled from camp to camp with OfERR fieldworkers, many residents complained that it 
had been months since they last received word from their relatives—whether by letter or 
phone. Many of these close relatives—among them, elderly parents, siblings and cousins, 
aunts and uncles—were displaced from their villages in Mannar, Kilinochchi and 
Mullaithivu districts. Meetings were held with Miss Sooriyakumary, the Secretary of 
OfERR Ceylon, who traveled from Colombo to Tamil Nadu to visit the camps, explain 
the latest news about the war and describe OfERR’s efforts to track down their relatives. 
During and after such meetings at camps in mid-February 2009, women passed scraps of 
paper inscribed with their contact info and their missing relatives’ name(s), their ur and 
the missing person’s last known location to the Secretary. Women’s names—in blue 
ballpoint ink, lettered in Tamil—were on these scraps of paper, more often than not. 
Worried for their loved ones, Tamil camp refugees re-mobilized to demonstrate 
against the war. The protest at ‘Manikandan’ camp in Tirunelveli, one of several refugee 
protests in the region, was one such event. 
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At the fast—unnāviratham, in Tamil—people sat cross-legged on grass mats, 
shaded from the hot, afternoon sun by a makeshift pandal. The young men have tied red 
bands of cloth around their heads, thereby indexing blood spilled at war and their protest 
at one and the same time.335 While state politicians dressed in a white verti inaugurated 
the event with passionate oratory, speaking, as one person told me, “in such a way that 
those who hear would immediately understand,” it was refugees who primarily spoke to 
the assembled. Young men, elders and the camp leader took turns at the microphone, 
describing how war has affected them and their families. A group of women led the youth 
group in a song, beginning, as in every event, with “Valka Eelath Thamil Akam” (Long 
Live Eelam Tamil Homeland!)  Some of these singers work as teachers and health 
workers for OfERR. 
Sooriya supervised ten camps in the Tirunelveli district. He was central to 
organizing this protest and its mass dissemination, which he explained was to “seek a 
ceasefire” (porai niruttum) “by peaceful means,” a phrase that in Tamil employs the same 
word, amaithi, as used by Mark and others (oru amaithiyāna muraiyilē). Sooriya related 
to me how the war has affected him and his family. From Mannar, he and his family had 
lived in a camp in Coimbatore between 1983 and 1987, returned to Sri Lanka after the 
signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord, and left for India once again when fighting 
recommenced in 1990. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Red is the color of blood, but it is also a color strongly associated with Tamil politics, as it is claimed by 
all parties in Tamil Nadu, and the most prominent color in the Tamil Eelam flag. 




Figure 5.5: Protest at a refugee camp in southern Tamil Nadu  
(Photograph courtesy of Sooriya) 
 
Sooriya also explained to me how the protest was organized. He and the other 
organizers had initially asked the District Collector for permission for the rally. The 
Collector (also known as the District Magistrate, and typically male) is a central 
government appointee in charge of governance within a state district.336 As an officer of 
the Indian Administrative Service, he is entrusted not only with revenue collection and 
taxation, but planning, law and order, and the power to initiate an emergency response. In 
other words, the Collector was a key authority figure representative of the state, and in 
Tamil Nadu districts with camps, refugees sought his permission to gather outside their 
households. Manikandan’s organizers had planned to hold the fast on February 4th, Sri 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 The district is a key administrative unit of the Indian state. Districts may be further subdivided into sub-
divisions, tahsils, also known as taluks. In 2009, there were 32 districts in Tamil Nadu, and 610 districts 
throughout India. In 2004, there had only been one woman in the job of District Collector in 55 years of 
Indian independence. At the time of writing, there are only three women District Collectors in Tamilnadu. 
For this reason, I use the pronoun “he.” 
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Lanka’s independence day, but were denied permission. They then submitted a request by 
fax to Department of Rehabilitation in Chennai. In this message, they pleaded, “Give us 
an opportunity (vāyppu) to bring out our feelings (unarvu).” They were allowed to hold 
their event a few days after the 4th. The event was held as an all-day fast.   
This protest was typical of fasts held in several camps throughout the state. 
Around 300 people attended the event, at which Sooriya and other activists gave 
interviews to major Tamil-language networks. Held within the confines of the camp on 
the margins of a rural village, the immediate audience could only be participants and 
camp dwellers. Refugees were able to overcome this obstacle by employing protest as a 
modular media spectacle, detachable from the “context” of their camp and readily 
available to be circulated and cited by mass media. Several camps also joined to write to 
the United Nations to press for a ceasefire. Sooriya and a few camp leaders drafted the 
letter, and refugees were encouraged to attach their signatures to the letter as a petition.337  
The relative ease with which Sooriya’s camp and others organized was followed 
by a clampdown in view of upcoming general elections. Officials were concerned to mute 
criticisms of the state and central governments, and worried that refugee protesters might 
be encouraged to display public support for the LTTE, like their Indian and diaspora 
counterparts. While surveillance (kankānippu338) was a part of everyday camp life, it was 
renewed and intensified during this time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 OfERR placed a premium on education and literacy to ensure that refugees were able to sign and thus be 
recognized as individuals belonging to a household. Signatures were important for the refugee identity card 
and log books (which recorded entry and exit from the camp), among other things. See Das 2005, “The 
Signature of the State” and on signatures and literacy activism in rural Tamil Nadu, see Cody 2012. 
338 It is worth noting that the Sri Lankan word, kangani, for the supervisor of the plantation, derives from 
kankānippu, and that the word for surveillance carried this valence, especially among malaiyaha Tamils. 
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Camp protesters were well aware of this surveillance and suspicion; they lived 
with it everyday. Sooriya explained to me why the protesters at ‘Manikandan’ did not and 
could not demonstrate support for the LTTE.  
Older people say ‘There is no chance to get Tamil Eelam.’ (thamil 
eelam engira oru chance-um illai.) When I watch the media, I also 
think there is no chance. Without problems (fighting) it is ok. 
…The LTTE made some mistakes. The assassination of Rajiv 
Gandhi, like that. So we cannot work with them. But we will 
definitely ask for protection (pāthukāpu) for Lankan Tamils 
(ilangai thamilar). 
People abroad (velināttu makkal) can tell--international countries 
(sarvathēsa nadukal), they can definitely tell. But we cannot say 
that [about the LTTE] here. We have come here to live peacefully. 
Why pick a fight? 
Sooriya’s rhetorical question, “We have come here to live peacefully. Why pick a 
fight?” underscores how refugees understood protest not as a “disturbance” or 
“disobedience,” but as peaceful action to oppose war. This action for civilian protection 
(pātukāppu) was to be distinguished from other forms of diasporic political action by 
Tamils abroad. In this way, their protests were in keeping with the rehabilitation efforts 
of the NGO that attempted to impose limits on demonstrations that might criticize the 
state; this demand also corresponded to India’s role in “protecting” Tamil refugees from 
the war. Throughout my fieldwork, both refugees and the social activists among them 
highlighted their desire to act “in a peaceful way.” A peaceful life, as Sooriya outlines 
above, demands “protection” for Lankan Tamils, but this was not a peace that could be 
secured through the then-present phase of armed struggle. Refugee protests thus steered 
clear of providing any visible support to the LTTE. They did not wave flags, or demand a 
separate state, as activists did in Canada (in the mass demonstrations under discussion in 
Chapters 4 and 7). As Sooriya’s reminder of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination 
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indicates, they cannot do this, as refugees were “guests” of the Indian state; to wave the 
LTTE’s Tamil Eelam flag was to “pick a fight.”  
Instead, camp refugees demonstrated by using a practice with a long tradition in 
South Asian societies: fasting. Studies of South Asian religions have theorized fasting as 
a ritual that cleanses the body, purifies the soul, and prepares the body as a ground for 
ritual reincorporation. However, fasting also has a role in the actions of the secular world, 
through the conduct of politics. Fasting as a practice of protest and civil disobedience was 
most famously used by Mahatma Gandhi in the non-violent movement to secure India’s 
independence from British colonialism. Gandhi’s writings reveal the spiritual and 
political dimensions associated with the act: At once an act of bodily purification and 
self-overcoming, fasting, as a form of public communication, was resorted to “for the 
good of others” (1996: 206, cited in Alter 2000: 41). “The effect of such action on the life 
of the people is that when the person fasting is known to them their sleeping conscience 
is awakened” (quoted in Iyer 1987: 208, in Alter 2000: 44). Refugees thus chose to 
protest using a practice with strong associations of non-violence, self-discipline and 
righteous action for Indian and Sri Lankan audiences.339  
Muthukumar’s sacrifice 
One morning in late January, an Indian friend returned unexpectedly from her 
daily routine of waiting at the regional passport office for an official stamp to travel on a 
new passport. The office was shut down, and the road was surrounded by police and 
cordoned off from traffic. Shaking, my friend told me what she had seen: On the road 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 Knowing that camp refugees had experienced food insecurity and malnutrition may have heightened the 
moral significance of their fasts, particularly when viewed as a sacrifice for others. 
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was the charred outline of a body. A man had lit himself in flames. She did not know 
anything else. 
We turned the television on. Cable news channels were already looping reports 
about the death-by-fire. The dark lines on the road marked the spot where Ku. 
Muthukumar, a Tamil Nadu journalist and PMK party-worker, had burned himself to 
death to protest Sri Lanka’s war. Muthukumar had doused himself with petrol and 
announced his intention to ignite his body midday in front of Shastri Bhavan, a central 
government office on Haddows Road in Chennai. He left behind a four-page letter to 
communicate his demands. Addressed to a Tamil-speaking audience, and later translated 
into English for global circulation, the letter encouraged Tamils everywhere to continue 
to protest by other means.  
Muthukumar’s self-immolation ignited a wave of a protest throughout Tamil 
Nadu, beginning with his funeral. Several Tamil political parties, under a newly-formed 
umbrella group, the Eelam Tamils Protection Movement (eela thamilar paathukaapu 
iyakkam) mobilized their party-workers, students and locals to hold a funeral for 
Muthukumar in his neighborhood of Kolathur on the northern edges of Chennai.340 That 
day, the air was taut amid a dense, pulsing crowd as Tamil activists carried 
Muthukumar’s body, shrouded and enclosed in a glass case, in a hearse decorated with 
pink and red garlands, and a colour-printed headshot of the deceased. At the front, young 
men occasionally raised and held the LTTE’s national flag, or printed paper versions of 
it. Some participants also held mass produced images of Muthukumar alongside portraits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 This movement was comprised of the following parties: Vaiko’s MDMK, Dr. S. Ramadoss’s PMK, 
Thirumaavalavan’s VCK, and P. Nedumaran—who left his post in the state’s Congress Party to found the 
Tamil National Movement (thamilar thesiya iyakkam). They later decided to change the Movement’s name 
to the Lankan Tamil Protection Movement to include the state’s CPI led by Tha. Pandian. 
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of the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran. The march was the first time in recent years—since the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi—that the flag of the LTTE and Prabhakaran’s photo had 
been given public display in India.341 For these activists, the procession had also become 
a protest against the Government of India’s ban on the LTTE. They chanted anti-
government slogans, and defaced posters that praised Karunanidhi and other leaders in 
power.342 The march continued, in spite of rumors that the state would shut it down. 
Politicians, activists and film personalities paid tribute to the deceased, while media and 
onlookers watched, pulled along by a stream of people. An estimated one hundred 
thousand people joined the funeral procession, which lasted over eight hours. 
In the following weeks and months, protests continued in cities and towns 
throughout the state. Possession of Muthukumar’s body and his ashes became a 
contentious issue for students who mobilized around his death, as per his instructions.343 
Black flag protests were held in Chennai and towns and cities throughout the state. 
People gathered at memorials for Muthukumar, where they listened to speeches about the 
war in Sri Lanka and the “genocide” (inapadukolai) of the Tamil people. Student activists 
held protests on their campuses in January and February 2009, leading to a government 
shutdown of all state-run colleges in Tamil Nadu. Law students also presented a 
memorandum to Russia’s ambassador to India. Protesters even gathered in front of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341
 "Muthukumar triggers off mood of defiance in Tamil Nadu," Tamilnet 
<http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=28245> Accessed: 2 Feb 2009. 
342  Larger-than-life cutouts of leaders and billboards and posters praising their qualities are a significant 
part of the public and political landscape of Tamil Nadu. See Bate 2003 for further discussion. Also see 
Pandian 1992 for an original study of M.G.R.’s use of film hero archetypes to mobilize Tamil Nadu’s 
subaltern classes. 
343 In a portion of his suicide letter addressed to law students who had begun a hunger strike, Muthukumar 
wrote: “The police force will try to lay my body to rest. Don't allow them to do that. Capture my dead 
body, don't bury it, and use it as a trump card to sharpen your struggle.” 
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Spencer Plaza, a shopping mall in Chennai. Women’s groups held hunger strikes. In 
continuing with their protests, activists ensured that the Sri Lankan war and India’s recent 
assistance would be a major issue in the upcoming state and central government elections 
in May. Moreover, Muthukumar’s sacrifice led others to follow his example. Eight other 
Tamil men in India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka’s Tamil diaspora—in Switzerland (Geneva) 
and the UK (London)—self-immolated to protest the war.344  
The letter 
Muthukumar’s four-page statement ranges widely across hot topics in Tamil Nadu 
and Indian politics, including allegations of political corruption and dynastic politics, the 
Cauvery water dispute, attacks on Indian fishermen, and Sri Lanka’s ceasefire, among 
others. The letter interpellates “the Tamil people,” but also makes more specific 
addresses to law college students, people with origins in other states living in Tamil 
Nadu, the Tamil Nadu Police Force, “the people of Tamil Eelam, and the Liberation 
Tigers,” and the “International Community, and our hope Obama.” The letter is, above 
all, a lengthy and fiery condemnation of the Indian state, and more specifically, its 
assistance to the Sri Lankan military.345 It was read widely, as it was photocopied, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 These self-immolations took place between February and May 2009, but continued among Tamil Nadu 
activists after the war’s end, as late as March 2013 in Cuddalore. 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/selfimmolation-for-twin-cause-of-sri-lankan-tamils-
corruption/article4476179.ece 
Self-immolation is a not-uncommon tactic of protest among political workers in Tamil Nadu. This tactic 
was infamously used during 1965 protests against making Hindi the national language of India, and by fans 
after the death of Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran. In 2013, 2,098 people died by self-immolation—




 The Government of India provided training and radars to the Sri Lankan Army. This assistance was 
repeatedly denied by the state, which further argued that Sri Lanka’s conflict was an “internal affair,” 
despite a history of Indian involvement since 1983. For an excellent study of India’s political and military 
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photographed, scanned, translated and disseminated through Tamil media and websites to 
reach a global, diasporic audience. Indeed, this was done as per Muthukumar’s own 
instructions at the conclusion of his screed: 
Dear Tamil people, in the struggle against injustice our brothers and 
children have taken up the weapon of the intellect. I have used the weapon 
of life. You use the weapon of photocopying. Yes, make copies of this 
pamphlet and distribute it to your friends, relatives, and students and ensure 
that this support for this struggle becomes greater. Nan'ri. 
 
By using the “weapon of photocopying,” student activists replicated and spread 
Muthukumar’s message far and wide. Flyers of the letter were printed up for the dozens 
of political demonstrations and memorial ceremonies that were staged by Tamil Nadu’s 
citizens in the weeks to come. 
Surveillance and limits to collective action 
Where were Sri Lankan Tamil refugees amid these protests? Muthukumar’s self-
immolation was a solemn event that touched the minds of refugees in Tamil Nadu. For 
days, it was all anyone could talk about. At OfERR’s head office, the mood among 
refugee workers was solemn. Quietly, we read the papers and clicked links and scrolled, 
as we did everyday for news and analysis about the war. This time, we tried to assess the 
meaning of this spectacular death and wondered what it might portend. Reactions were 
mixed, with a few people noting that Muthukumar’s analysis of Lankan politics was 
lacking. One woman asked, “What use is this death, when so many people are dying in 
our homeland?” Most of her co-workers interpreted Muthukumar’s death differently. To 
them, Muthukumar’s letter was a sincere genuflection about the role of the Indian state in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
intervention in Sri Lanka’s conflict, see Krishna 2000. Also see Rupesinghe 1988, Muni 1993 and 
Sivakumar 2001 for analyses of the IPKF period. 
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the Sri Lankan war. They appreciated his candor, despite his support for the Tigers. Even 
Siva, who vehemently disliked the LTTE and was usually so quick to jab local politicians 
with his jolly cynicism, was careful with his words when he spoke to me about 
Muthukumar. “We cannot dismiss what he did. He did it for us.”  
If Muthukumar’s death was for Eelam Tamils, their actions in Tamil Nadu 
became subject to even greater scrutiny by state authorities and intermediaries, who also 
directed greater attention to local agitations acting in their name, or on their behalf. Camp 
refugees, as a result, experienced new limits to their previous efforts at mobilization. As 
the Tamil Nadu protests continued, and diaspora protests took off, refugees were 
increasingly discouraged and prevented from demonstrating inside their camps. In a few 
locations, camp residents were given permission to gather in protest, as long as there was 
no media coverage; in most other camps, they were denied permission.  
For some, the denial of permission was not surprising; those who did not organize 
protests of their own explained to me that local people were protesting, and “since they 
are doing it for us,” it was better to avoid trouble. Others felt aggrieved. On February 15, 
when four camps submitted a request to hold a demonstration to the District Collector, 
they were denied and told they could talk among themselves—something they were not 
ordinarily allowed to do. There should be no media, they were explicitly told. One 
woman then told me, “We have a concern (akkarai, or compassion) for our people. But 
we cannot do anything. We are refugees (ahathiyal). I see their suffering (vētanai), their 
sorrows (varuttam), the news. We shall do it by peaceful means—they say Indians can do 
it, but we must not?” Her statement asserts a desire to protest as an affective response to 
Tamil suffering. 
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Not all refugee camps protested the war. In fact, the majority did not. At 
Manikandan, Sooriya and the camp leader were both deeply concerned about the effects 
of war on civilians in northern Sri Lanka. On the other hand, in the aftermath of 
Muthukumar’s death and student mobilizations in Tamil Nadu, other camp leaders 
worried about upsetting the police and creating friction with the local communities near 
their camps. Instead of coordinating with other refugee leaders to organize protest, they 
watched for signs of “disorder” (ozhunkīnam), “movement” (iyakkam346 – both in the 
sense of activity and militancy) and “opposition” (ethirppu347) around their camp. Such 
was the case at Gangaipuram, a camp adjacent to Manikandan.  
I had come to the newly-built camp at Gangaipuram with Shanthi Akka, a female 
OfERR worker whose own camp was a few hours away by bus. Shanthi had come to 
inaugurate the camp’s first self-help group, inviting women from several different camps 
in the area, as well as those who had just recently moved to this one, to participate. I was 
invited to observe the group and talk with the women after the meeting. Shanthi and I 
visited some of the women in their new, brick and whitewashed concrete dwellings, to 
make sure they attended the meeting. 96 families live here now. Though pleased to be in 
bright new homes, they had not been consulted about their needs, and voiced concerns as 
they showed us around: the latrines were inside, making the rest of the house smell; the 
indoor kitchens were long but narrow, and kept cooking fumes inside the house—they 
should have been built in the back, where the fumes would blow away. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 I use “movement” to translate two senses of iyakkam, a word that refers, in some contexts, to activity 
related to protest to end the war, and in others, more specifically to militancy through membership in the 
LTTE specifically. 
347 This use of ethirppu referred to opposition to OfERR and/or the Indian state, in contrast to the use of the 
same term in the pro-/anti-LTTE binary of nationalist activists. 
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After visiting the houses and listening to the women's concerns, we walked over 
to a newly built open-air tuition centre, where the meeting was to take place. Thin reed 
mats were spread out on the cool concrete floor, and as we arranged ourselves in a circle, 
people continued to arrive and took their seats. Before long, we had a group of twenty-
seven women. Not a few minutes later, an elderly man rushed into the room, demanding 
to know what we were doing. He, it turned out, was the camp thalaivar. He was worried 
about the meeting. Shanthi Akka told him that we were from OfERR and holding a self-
help group, but this did not calm him. "Yes, but we must know-- we don't want any 
troubles (piraccinai)." The camp leader, referring to “troubles,” used the same word that 
Lankan Tamils use to refer to the conflict. As he said this, I noticed that he was on his 
cellphone. He was on the phone with the camp’s Q Branch officer. Our meeting was 
unexpected, and it made him nervous. He reminded us that there had been "tensions" at a 
nearby camp, where a meeting had become “disorderly” and the police had gotten 
involved. The thalaivar felt the same thing could happen here. At any sign of outsiders, 
he was ready to inform the local police.  
Shanthi tried to reassure him. "We did not know. Hereafter, we only will tell (you 
about the meeting)." (Inimel nāngalē colliduvom.) The thalaivar continued to explain his 
concerns. "If they say something against the country, if they say something wrong... it 
could show up in a newspaper, and we will have problems." Akka repeated what she had 
already said and added, "How were we to know we had to inform you?" OfERR, after all, 
had good relations with the police and the regional office informed the collector and 
officers of their planned visits. The thalaivar was not listening to her explanations; he 
simply wanted us to follow his protocol. He wants us to follow protocol. After Shanthi 
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explained the purpose of the self-help groups and our meeting, the thalaivar said, "That is 
your freedom, it’s your money. This is my duty." (athu ungoda cuthanthiram, ungoda 
panam... ithu ennoda kadamai).  
Before he left, the camp thalaivar's attention turned to me. "And who is she? What 
is she doing here?" I had been quiet, and he had noticed. Akka explained that I was 
visiting the camp to do a research project (āyvu) and documenting OfERR's history. The 
thalaivar related this to the officer on the phone.348 Now appeased, the formerly-perturbed 
leader left us to the meeting. 
Akka later explained to me some of the circumstances behind the conflict. The 
thalaivar had spoken to Loka Anna the day before, who said that there was "no program"-
- “That is why he is so angry!” she says (athanālē avarukku orē kōpam!) The camp was 
new, and we were holding the first meeting there. There was confusion among the 
various levels of NGO management and camp leadership. Even though the thalaivar’s 
role was created by OfERR, he questioned our motives. We had not sought his 
permission, and had circumvented his rules. These acts created a conflict between the 
camp leader, whose "You should have told me" was challenged by the OfERR worker, 
Shanthi, with "How did we know we had to tell?" Shanthi Akka was also upset because 
she was being treated as any refugee or village visitor to the camp would be. She 
reminded me that she was not ‘any’ visitor—she was there on behalf of OfERR, though 
she herself was a refugee from another camp. Like all OfERR workers, Shanthi had photo 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 The Q Branch officer was likely already aware of my work, as I had visited several camps in the area 
prior to this visit, and was staying at OfERR’s regional office. The office head had already vouched for me.  
 I had also received a visit from a Q Branch officer the morning after my first camp visit. He asked 
questions about the nature of my research and checked my documents during this visit. Upon seeing my 
Canadian passport, the officer noted the country and asked whether I had any connections to the LTTE 
there. I was surprised by the directness of his question. 
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identification from the Department of Rehabilitation that authorized her to work in the 
camps and required renewal every two years. This documentation was not proof enough 
for the thalaivar, who clung rigidly to the rules he knew.  
We sang “Valka Eelath Thamil Akam”—the song typically used at OfERR 
meetings was also sung at the camp protest described above. Each woman then 
introduced herself by stating her name, district or region of origin in Sri Lanka 
(sometimes adding their home-village), date or year of arrival in India, and her present 
camp residence. After the introductions, the thalaivar returned. He had suddenly 
remembered something. "There are people from other camps here, are there not?" (veli 
mukaamilirunthu vanthavarkal irukkille?) He told them to come and write their addresses 
in a log after the meeting. Then, and only then, was the women’s ‘self-help group’ 
meeting allowed to proceed. 
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Figure 4.6: Women’s self-help group meeting, Gangaipuram camp, February 2009. 
Photograph by author. 
However, just as OfERR could not anticipate camp protests, the camp thalaivar’s 
interrogation of Shanthi Akka and the women’s meeting had consequences he did not 
foresee. Since this was the first meeting to be held in this camp, the women who attended 
were curious but non-committal. Some had known Shanthi Akka from her visits to their 
neighboring camps and felt obliged to attend out of friendship, loyalty and gratitude, 
many were curious about opportunities to earn extra income and save for their family’s 
health and education expenses; still others found the meeting to be an occasion for 
company outside their camp or their new houses. After the camp leader’s outburst, the 
group of women was now transformed.  
A moment’s silence gave way to observations about the meeting’s disruption. One 
woman opined that the extra surveillance was because they were in a new camp, and a 
few agreed. Shanthi Akka decided to direct the discussion. “Let’s talk honestly/truly 
about our troubles” (engada piraccinaiyai patti cattiyamā pesuvom), she said. “It won’t 
go outside.” With that prompt, we considered what had just happened. Explaining that the 
NGO gives its ‘program’ in advance and talks to “our Q Branch people,” Akka reminded 
the group that it was their responsibility to get permission/approval (anumathi) from their 
local Q Branch officer. 
The thalaivar’s anxious outburst—and the reminder of the need to secure 
permissions to hold a meeting—spurred the women to reflect upon constraints on 
mobility and action in the camp, and led to a discussion about what they could do as the 
war continued in Sri Lanka. A group of women were working on a statement (aRikkai) to 
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remember Muthukumar, who had immolated himself less than two weeks ago. They 
wanted to know whether they could hold an event, and circulated a list among themselves 
to collect addresses. Not all women were familiar with the protocols, however. A woman 
asked whether they required permission to fast (unnāviratham ceyrathu anumathi edukka 
venumā?). Yes, she was told. What else could they do to demonstrate? “We could have a 
human chain,” offered one woman. Another woman suggested an arts competition (ōviya 
pōtti) or an exhibition (kankkātchi) of stories, essays, or folk artforms like the kōlam, 
suggesting it would interest the young women in the camp as well. We should sign a 
petition (kaiezhuttu pōttu) stating that there should be peace in Sri Lanka, and send it to 
the UN, another woman remarked. 
During this discussion, it became clear that the thalaivar’s concerns were not only 
due to the ‘newness’ of this camp. Some women commented on increased surveillance of 
the camps, after Muthukumar’s immolation the previous month. I learned that whereas 
camps usually have a roll call once a month, they have since been subject to “checking” 
(the English word is used here) once a week. And in the weeks leading up to central and 
state government elections, they would be closed to entry or exit. State officials justified 
these actions as being for the “protection” of refugees from pro-LTTE activists and 
militants, in addition to their concerns for India’s national security.  
Camp refugees also worried about the potential repercussions of their protest. 
“Until it [the war] is over, it must be done peacefully,” suggested an older woman. “We 
don’t want problems (cikkal) to come to us. Look at what happened with Seeman,” she 
continued. “Only two or three words—like that, when our people do, they could put us in 
jail.” The Tamil film director had delivered a fiery speech during a fast and black flag 
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protest at Rameswaram in December, and traveled throughout the country, inciting 
Tamils to rise up against the Indian government.349 He was detained briefly under India’s 
Prevention of Terrorism Act and summarily released. Refugees who were suspected of 
any connections to militancy, on the other hand, were taken to “special camps,” open-air 
prisons for detainees who could not be returned to Sri Lanka. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided a thick description of life for Tamil refugees from 
Sri Lanka living in the refugee camps and cities of Tamil Nadu, India. I unpacked “the 
refugee” and explored the ambivalent and multiple values of this polysemic figure for 
displaced Tamils living in southern India and mobilized by, in Hannah Arendt's words, a 
“new global political situation” (1968: 297). It is precisely in contested attempts to 
reinhabit a world that “makes opinions significant and actions effective,” and to invoke 
and appropriate its loss, that Tamil refugees enacted a new political subjectivity at the 
limits of modern citizenship. In contrast to discourses of development and 
humanitarianism that depoliticize and construct refugees as passive, powerless victims, 
and scholarship that idealizes the refugee as a political subject ‘included’ by virtue of her 
exclusion by the state, this chapter has shown that refugees are political subjects with 
heterogeneous social identities. In Tamil Nadu’s refugee camps, OfERR’s non-
governmental politics of development created conditions that generated political 
possibilities not foreseen by the NGO. Tamils in the camps made strategic claims to 
“refugee” as a social and political identity in order to protest war in Sri Lanka and India’s 
military aid. They did so as refugees who were treated as “guests” seeking India’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 For further details, see New Indian Express (2008). 
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protection from violence, and as those subjected to state surveillance. If the architecture 
of the camps exemplified processes of inclusion and exclusion in the production of state 
boundaries, camp refugees’ actions temporarily disrupted the state’s ordering of their 
lives. Refugees responded creatively to the state’s shifting tactics of policing and 
surveillance by finding new ways to protest the war and the silencing of refugees. 
The next chapter discusses another facet of refugee life in Tamil Nadu amid 
protests against Sri Lanka’s war. It tells the stories of two Tamil refugees living as 
undocumented refugees at the edges of the city of Chennai, as they prepare to migrate 
from India to the West. 
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Chapter 6 
Waiting to Leave: Migrant Non-Belonging in the City  
 
Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed how refugees negotiated camp life and the politics 
of Sri Lanka’s war by organizing protests and other forms of collective action in Tamil 
Nadu. However, not all Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India live in the camps. As noted in 
Chapter 1, Tamil refugees also live in Tamil Nadu’s cities and towns, and to a lesser 
extent, the state’s rural countryside. While camp refugees mobilized and organized fasts 
and processions to demonstrate their opposition to Sri Lanka’s war, their counterparts 
living outside the camps had a very different relationship to public action and protest. 
How did refugees who were suspended between the camp and the city interpret and enact 
opposition to Sri Lanka’s war? If camps were at times sites of activity and contention for 
residents and those who worked with them, what forms of life characterized everyday 
politics for refugees who did not live within them? Why did camp inhabitants gather to 
fast and demonstrate as refugees, while those living in the city did not? 
In this chapter, I shift from the social and political action of camp refugees to the 
lives of urban refugees350 and their relationship to collective action during this time. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 I use the term “refugee” (in Tamil, ahathi) here to denote a social identity that was self-ascribed by 
nearly all of my interlocutors. Insofar as they are not recognized as de facto refugees who are registered and 
living in camps, and some Tamils from Sri Lanka—typically, more recent arrivals who left Sri Lanka after 
the return to war in 2006—have not registered with the Tamil Nadu police, while preparing for migration 
abroad, some urban refugees may also be described as “migrants.” In this chapter, I alternate the terms 
“refugee” and “migrant” to refer to displaced Tamils without legal status who prepare to move from India 
to another country (that is not Sri Lanka). 
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the midst of local, daily demonstrations against the war that displaced them, I explore the 
everyday forms of life that led Tamil refugees in Chennai to avoid public demonstrations 
and other forms of protest. I begin with a discussion of undocumented or “illegal” 
migration, and the precarious status of “overstay.” This is followed by a mapping of the 
peri-urban and suburban areas where Sri Lankan Tamils live in Chennai, and my entry 
into fieldwork among Tamil urban refugees and migrants at the western edges of the city. 
The bulk of this chapter centers on the lives of two urban refugees waiting to 
migrate to Western countries with large Tamil diaspora communities. I examine the life 
histories of Komathy, a woman who was preparing to migrate to France to reunite her 
family, and the story of Ruban, a young man who was awaiting the outcome of his 
refugee claim via group sponsorship to Canada. These two cases reveal the political 
rationality of migration for Sri Lankan Tamils in urban India. Tamil refugees live in the 
city to expand their prospects for everyday mobility, yet face social, economic and 
political constraints that shape their desires for migration to another country. I argue that 
urban refugees prepared for their migration abroad by temporarily sacrificing their ideals 
of Tamil community and struggle, while imagining their political futures as citizens. 
Tamil migrants in Chennai—and arguably, throughout the global South—believed that 
formal citizenship coupled with community (the idea and experience of living in large, 
organized Tamil diasporas in the West), would provide them with the sense of cultural 
belonging, political rights, and economic opportunities through which they would 
become “settled” and no longer have to move. 
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Refugees at the edges of the city 
 Tens of thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils live in Chennai (the city formerly known 
as Madras), but exact numbers are unknown. Those who arrived in the early years of the 
war were counted upon arrival, but were not required to register with local authorities. As 
noted in a previous chapter, the state decided after the assassination that all refugees 
living in Tamil Nadu would be required to register with the police. Most did not comply 
with this order. Sri Lankan Tamils, as refugees lacking status, have preferred instead to 
avoid interaction with the authorities unless absolutely necessary.  
 Urban refugees live in a precarious situation they called “overstay.” They usually 
entered India on a tourist visa, while some young men arrived on student visas.351 It was 
relatively easy for middle-class Jaffna Tamils to get tourist visas to visit South India’s 
holy temples; Hindu and Buddhist Sri Lankans have made pilgrimages to these religious 
sites, individually and collectively, and continued to visit as possible during and after the 
war. Moreover, some Jaffna families were historically connected to these temples, which 
owned lands in the peninsula. Jaffna Tamils could also obtain a tourist visa to see other 
sights or visit relatives. Tourist visas could not be extended or converted to another 
category, and the period of validity was decided on a case-by-case basis. As a result, once 
duration of the visa was up, the visitor was “overstaying” the visa. This meant being 
deemed an “illegal immigrant.” If caught, a person on overstay would be subject to fines 
and up to five years of imprisonment. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Student visas are provisional upon admission to a government-approved college. 
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Tamil Refugees and Migrants  in Chennai 
 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in Chennai live in several neighborhoods throughout the 
city. At first, they clustered in neighborhoods like Besant Nagar and Thiruvanmiyur on 
the city’s southeastern coastline, or more central locations like Kodambakkam. Most of 
OfERR’s refugee staff lives in quarters owned by the organization near its offices in 
Egmore. By the mid-2000s, middle-class families were moving to neighborhoods like 
Anna Nagar where they could acquire newer, more spacious flats and housing. During 
my fieldwork, more recent arrivals lived in suburban and peri-urban neighborhoods on 
the western and southern edges of the city: Porur, Chromepet, Ashok Nagar, K.K. Nagar, 
Alwar Thirunagar, Vadapalani, Valasaravakkam. Several of these neighborhoods were 
once villages that became residential colonies during the post-independence growth of 
Madras, and have witnessed rapid population growth in the last twenty years. 
 My fieldwork during this time centered on the peri-urban municipality of 
Valasaravakkam, and adjacent Chennai neighborhoods. Like many places on the western 
outskirts of “Greater Chennai,” Valasaravakkam attracted refugees and rural migrants for 
one main reason: Rents were cheap. Chennai was often referred to as a collection of 
villages, and the ever-expanding city of 12 million encroached on this one too.352 
Residents felt that it was only a matter of time before their urban splinter would be 
incorporated into the city, and watched as land prices rose while new luxury flats spread 
and plans were drawn to expand commuter train lines to Chennai’s center. A Mega Mart 
had opened on the main road, allowing shoppers of the new and aspiring middle-class to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 In 2008-2009, Valasaravakkam was a separate municipality in Thiruvallur district; by 2011, it had 
become part of Chennai Corporation (Wards Nos. 149 and 152). Before 1991, a refugee camp was located 
not far from this neighborhood; as noted in Chapter 1, the government moved and resettled refugees away 
from urban areas in the name of security. 
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purchase cheap “readymade” garments and disposable goods in one convenient location; 
on an adjacent corner, a swath of verdant green was not a sign of local vegetation, but the 
painted billboard of a supermarket run by the communications conglomerate, Reliance. 
The air was filled with the industrious optimism and hubris of investors who hoped to sell 
high and get rich quick. Tamil refugees, however, did not expect to partake of these grand 
schemes. They instead trained their sights on more modest enterprises attuned to these 
changes, and obtained loans to start small internet browsing centers, roadside restaurants 
serving “Ceylon” food, clothing stores and more. 
 I first traveled to Valasaravakkam with Lakshmi, a young woman who had come to 
OfERR to provide assistance to another visiting researcher who required Tamil 
translation. A number of Sri Lankan families lived in Lakshmi’s neighborhood, as did a 
family friend, and she was keen to learn more about her neighbors. Lakshmi offered to 
make introductions and help me with my research. While I spent my days at OfERR, she 
introduced herself to people with the help of her family friend.  
 Lakshmi was at first taken aback by the difficulties she encountered in getting 
people to agree to meet with her, an Indian citizen. They were worried about their 
families, and did not wish to speak idly. One day, she took me to meet Mahendran, a 
Jaffna Tamil who worked at a local internet browsing centre. He was still a little 
suspicious after her approach. To put him at ease, Lakshmi told him, “Don’t worry. She 
is Sri Lanka people too.” Upon hearing this, Mahendran, like most Sri Lankan Tamils I 
met, asked me, “What is your home-village?” Once again, I was asked a chain of 
questions that I also used in my research and everyday life to emplace other Tamils. 
Convinced of my background, Mahendran made a few calls on his glossy black mobile. 
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 The next day, Pradeepan, Mahendran’s friend and co-worker, took me to the latter’s 
cousin’s house. Komathy, a Tamil Christian from Jaffna, was thirty-five years old at the 
time of my fieldwork in 2008-2009. She had been living in Tamil Nadu for nearly twelve 
years, with her son, her sister, and their elderly mother. Her husband was in France, and 
she had not seen him in six years. When we first met, she had just begun preparations for 
Christmas celebrations, a process that would continue for weeks—and which sometimes 
interrupted our conversations. We sat on brown plastic chairs in a sparsely furnished 
drawing room in her modest flat, while relatives walked in and out of adjacent rooms, at 
times listening in to our conversation, at others chiming in or having one of their own. 
Though we went on to discuss political events and their broader dynamics, Komathy first 
related to me a narrative of her displacement. Mapping a trajectory of displacement is a 
form of storytelling that has become widely shared by Tamils of Sri Lanka—and is in 
abundant evidence throughout this dissertation—whether in camps, in cities, or diasporic 
metropoles. The narrative that follows is summarized from my fieldnotes and a recorded 
interview. 
Komathy’s displacement 
 Komathy’s family had nothing when they left their village in Jaffna. The army 
bombed their village at four in the morning, and the government provided no shelter or 
recompense. “If they had at least given us a place, it wouldn’t have been a problem.” 
Instead, she found herself on the run. Komathy was displaced several times within Sri 
Lanka before arriving in India by flight in June 1997. The move to India, she points out, 
was her tenth displacement. As we spoke, she began to chart the family’s itinerary of 
displacement, beginning with her home village (conta ūr). Her fully-formed sentences 
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quickly fell away from place-names issued in a rapid-fire list.  I hastened to record the 
whole list  – from her village on the peninsula to another, back to her village, to another, 
then another, to Kilinochchi, to Colombo – but when she finished, I was still writing. She 
laughed. “You won’t get it all down!”  (niingal athellaam note-panna maattiinga!)  
 They moved each time, due to the fighting (candai). Her home village was near a 
Sri Lankan military camp. With each round of bombing and shelling, they moved from 
place to place. Ending up in Colombo, away from the theatre of war, they found it 
difficult to survive. They were among thousands of Tamils who had arrived from the 
North and East seeking work. Instead, they received checking. This, she says, is when 
they decided to leave the country. Her husband went first, in 1996, and Komathy and her 
son flew to Chennai the following year.  
Life in urban India 
 Komathy’s narrative of displacement and migration did not end with her departure 
from Sri Lanka. In India, she first stayed with her father’s sister who had moved thirty 
years before to Kodambakkam, a bustling Chennai neighborhood that housed many 
families who arrived and resettled after 1983. From there, they went to the camps at 
Mandapam in southern Tamil Nadu to register as refugees, but decided against it; 
Komathy felt that the camps were poorly maintained and unsanitary, and did not want to 
stay there with a small baby. After some time again with her aunt, the family moved to a 
rented flat, where they continue to reside. They do not have any form of government-
issued identification, like a ration card, or a voter’s ID, which would give them access to 
government-subsidized commodities, including cooking gas. The family purchased theirs 
on the black market. As with others who were not registered in the camps, they did not 
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receive any government assistance. Komathy’s expenses were met instead through 
remittances: her husband’s work abroad, and money from her sister in London. Like 
many refugees living inside and outside the camps, Komathy complained that everything 
in India required money, but it was difficult to find work.  
 Life on the edges of the city was (and is) not easy for refugees like Komathy and 
her family. On the one hand, they shared difficulties with other urban dwellers: The 
houses they rent have electricity and access to running water, but it was difficult to secure 
regular supplies of both; like much of the city’s working class, they visited municipal 
trucks with plastic buckets for regular access to potable water. Their physical and social 
mobility was constrained by their location, which lacked affordable public transportation 
options. The neighborhood had little connectivity to local trains, autorickshaw rides were 
expensive over a long distance (approximately 200-250 rupees from the city center), and 
the aging diesel buses that plied the main road burst with young men riding footboards at 
the open door, while older women crouched next to the driver. A trip to the city center 
took well over an hour by bus, while points further north and south could require more 
than two hours each way.  
 Yet, unlike citizens, refugees could not legally obtain a driver’s license, or any 
other form of government-issued identification as noted above. Even if some city drivers 
do not obtain such licenses and avoid punishment through informal payments, the 
importance of these documents to refugees must not be overlooked. An exchange 
between Lakshmi and Komathy reveals the pervasiveness of government documents and 
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their everyday circulation to life in urban India.353 After a discussion about the difficulties 
of securing employment, Lakshmi offhandedly asked, 
L: Do you buy lottery tickets? 
K: (laughs) She's asking whether I buy-- no, even for that, you must have 
government ID! (everyone laughs) 
 
 Komathy's response reveals how even the possibility for social mobility that relies 
on the lottery's “luck of the draw” is conditioned by one's relationship to the bureaucratic 
state. Tamil refugees, included by their exclusion from the law, could only wait and find 
creative means to survive. Like camp refugees, urban refugees often complained of their 
inability to find work; in the city, they did not have access to government jobs, and often, 
private sector businesses would not hire them. With their urban physical and social 
mobility constrained, members of a family left to find work in other parts of the country 
abroad. While men traveled on their own or used agents to find work in restaurants or 
factories in Europe or North America, some women found work as a viittu kaari 
(domestic worker) in the neighboring state of Kerala, or took the voyage to Lebanon, 
Jordan, the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia. Unlike domestic workers who leave from Sri 
Lanka, their numbers are unknown. 
The dual promise of foreign citizenship 
 Unable to find regular work in India, Komathy’s husband went to Qatar, where he 
worked for 2.5 years. His status as a temporary, migrant worker led him to pursue options 
for a more permanent migration through which he could reunite his family. He returned 
to Sri Lanka, where he approached an agent to migrate abroad in 2005. Though Komathy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 On documents in India, see Tarlo 2005. 
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and her husband did not have enough money to pay the agent, their friends contributed to 
the agent’s fees. The route was not a direct one, requiring travel from Sri Lanka to 
Malaysia, several countries in Eastern Europe, and eventually, France. He now lives in 
Paris, where he works two five-hour shifts at a restaurant everyday.  
I. 
 At the end of 2008, Komathy’s husband received asylum in France, and had just 
become a permanent resident by receiving his carte de résident, a card that allowed him 
to live in France and was renewable every ten years.354 He soon started the process to 
bring his family to France legally.355 Komathy awaits the day she can go to France, not 
only because she wants to reunite her family abroad. She would like to get citizenship, 
she explains, because it means she can return to her motherland (thāyakam). “People 
from all over the world – Canada, UK, France, Australia –go back to Sri Lanka.356 But we 
are only one hour away by plane, and we cannot.” Komathy knows that if she leaves 
India to travel to Sri Lanka, she has forfeited her de facto identity as a refugee in India, 
by returning to the country that she had fled. This identity, made visible through state 
bureaucratic practices of documentation, is not only a legal construction, insofar as her 
refugee status is not an official one. The recognition of her refugee identity, however, 
relies on a set of globally-circulating discourses that produce “displaced persons” and 
“refugees” within and across the borders of nation-states. If the UN Convention (and 
subsequent Protocol) does not bear the signature of the Indian state, the state nevertheless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 The card replaced his carte de séjour, or “stay document,” which provided proof of legal residence in 
France and had to be renewed regularly. He was able to apply for permanent residence after living in 
France for 3 years, with proof of financial self-sufficiency.  
355 Applying for Komathy and her son to enter France on a privée et familiale residence visa. 
356 Most of the travel she refers to here took place during the ceasefire period. 
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bears the imprint of the convention. Though some government officials and police 
instigated involuntary refugee returns, and subsequent administrators were aware of the 
problem, voluntary return and re-return to India can be viewed with suspicion. The sense 
that one must be fleeing persecution in order to be a refugee pervades. This enables the 
state to wield the force of international law in order to undermine a claim for protection 
that it is already not legally bound to heed. 
 Komathy’s imagined “return,” like that of her husband’s actual one, is not a return 
that allows her to resettle in her village in Sri Lanka. Without state or international 
assistance, her family was not willing to live in perpetual internal displacement. Her 
return, then, is not a return to Sri Lanka, but one that compels her migration to another 
country. Instead, for Komathy, it is life abroad and the promise of citizenship in a country 
that is not Sri Lanka that ensures her return to a homeland. The certainty of her belief in a 
future of temporary “return” contrasts with the uncertainty camp refugees express when 
they discuss their possible futures. 
 That urban refugees occupy a liminal space, not only in Tamil Nadu, but in 
diasporic social life, can be seen in the ways in which other locales were figured in 
Komathy’s discussion with me. As noted above, she explained that she traveled from 
Chennai to Mandapam (the large transit centre) to register with the police as a refugee, 
but ultimately decided not to stay in the camp with her infant son. She continued, “You 
would have seen what it is like there.” She knew that I had done some work with the 
NGO, OfERR. Similarly, when I later asked her what she thought it might be like to live 
in France, she told me, “You have come from foreign [from abroad], you would know 
what it is like there!” In each of these statements, (Sri Lankan) Tamil life was described 
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as being somewhere else, not here but “there.” Throughout our conversation, Komathy 
did not discuss what people did “here” and explicitly counterposed diaspora and camp 
protests to their inability to participate in political action. If the former, the camps, were a 
form of life she sought to avoid, the latter, is what she aspires to. France is not a 
particular social and geographic location, but part of a broader social space of foreign 
countries (veli naadukal).  
 Komathy would like to go back to Sri Lanka, but as she tells me, she will not go 
without a “good solution.” Her reflection upon the im/possibility of return brings forth 
the following statement: “Wherever we go, we are strangers, strangers… refugees.” She 
lingers on the words as she alternates between “stranger” (anniyan) and “refugee” 
(ahathi). They are interchangeable, Komathy implies, as she makes a general claim about 
Tamil displacement. I ask Komathy to clarify what it means to be a refugee. For her, 
“This means someone without a motherland (thāyakam) in which they can live, or to 
which they can return. France… Canada… wherever we go, we are refugees. Refugee 
means refugee.” In its attempt to fix linguistic meaning, Komathy’s tautological 
conclusion -- “refugee means refugee” -- reveals not only that displacement has become 
self-evident for Tamils from northern Sri Lanka, who then acquire a de facto, if not legal 
identity by crossing waters and borders. It is also a performative enactment of a public 
identity, an act of naming that calls forth a being that seeks recognition. Komathy, her 
family and friends, like thousands of other Tamils before them, appropriate this name. 
For it is only if they are recognized as refugees - if they become and are refugees before 
the law - that they can move. Urban refugees like Komathy forgo the containment and 
community of camps, and thus, even the fiction of a “de facto” refugee identity. Instead, 
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they live within the constraints placed on their living conditions and livelihoods—their 
formal inability to own property, cultivate land, receive government rations, etc.—to 
make themselves moveable persons/properties with an eventual claim to resettlement. In 
doing so, they remake the borders of the state-centered refugee laws that would contain 
them (Aleinikoff 1995). By not participating in protest, they wait and defer their futures 
to participate in another form of action: international migration. 
II. 
 Before we left to meet another family, Lakshmi offhandedly asked Komathy a 
question that surprised me. She had been relatively quiet, up until that point. Her question 
was one I had asked during the early phases of my work, and had been disabused of its 
relevance by refugees, activists and academics alike: “Are there any organizations for 
Lankan Tamils here?” Sometimes, this question had to be clarified, to distinguish civic 
associations from the relief and rehabilitation work of non-governmental organizations. 
But Komathy stiffened in her chair; she understood the question perfectly. At the time, an 
immediate worry rushed in: Would Komathy think we were interrogating her to gather 
intelligence for the police or the CID? If Lakshmi’s question caught me off-guard, 
Komathy, to my even greater surprise, was quick to respond: 
No, there aren’t, and I do not go out often so I would not know if there 
was one. No, there are no meetings. There aren’t events here like there are 
in Canada, because if people do such things here, they will be arrested for 
being LTTE. 
(Looks to me) We don’t have your kind of freedom. You can move about, 
come and ask questions, but we cannot do the same.357 
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naangal appadi seyya mudiyaathu. 
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 Komathy’s words here echoed a refrain among “non-camp” Lankan Tamils. They 
felt alone and abandoned, and deprived of the political rights enacted in global protests 
against Sri Lanka’s war, whether abroad or here in their temporary homes. Komathy both 
makes a claim to nation-based citizenship (desiring the legal status bestowed by a nation-
state) and offers a critique, by speaking of its exclusions. Her critique does not suggest 
doing away with the system itself, but seeks to expand its inclusion, to acquire full 
citizenship for herself and her family. Citizenship abroad was not only a legal status, but 
entailed political and social rights denied to her in India. Although Komathy was still 
formally a citizen of Sri Lanka, she and other Tamil refugees described themselves as 
being stateless and without citizenship. My discussion with Komathy reveals a distinction 
among refugees, located as she was within a form of life that bridges the Tamil camp 
refugee and the diasporic, yet remains excluded from the political community that allows 
them to protest. Her statements are those of the refugee who does not protest, out of 
desire to migrate and live in another diaspora community. As she recounted the 
difficulties of life in India, Komathy transitioned to discussing her husband’s departure 
from India and imagined her own, with plans to reunite her family. Komathy felt that 
Tamil Nadu presented limited opportunities for her family. She focused instead on 
getting to France, studying words and phrases in French with her son. She knows it will a 
difficult life, from what she has read and what her husband has told her, but she believes 
that with hard work they will have a better life. Life in Tamil India remains foreign, and 
does not guarantee this better life. Komathy’s diasporic desire critiques the exclusion of 
Tamil refugees from India, where even in a Tamil nadu, they are denied belonging to a 
national community. 
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Ruban’s story 
Ruban is a Jaffna Tamil man who fled Sri Lanka for India after surviving 
abduction and torture. At the time of our first meeting, he was twenty-six years old and 
had been living in Chennai for approximately one year. Chennai was a temporary refuge, 
and he had no plans to settle there; he was planning to migrate to Canada, with the help 
of his mother’s brother in Toronto. He has an older brother who works abroad, and a 
younger sister who recently immigrated to Toronto to join her husband. His mother still 
lives in a rural village in Jaffna.  
Ruban was born in Maviddapuram, a small village in the northern reaches of the 
peninsula, but grew up throughout Jaffna due to several displacements. The war between 
the LTTE and SLA in 1985 displaced his family within Tellipalai; when the IPKF arrived 
in 1987, they moved to Chundukuli, near Jaffna town. The following year, 1988, they 
returned to Tellipalai, where Ruban continued his studies amid crossfire between the 
LTTE and IPKF. In 1989, the IPKF arrested Ruban’s father, a pharmacist, for giving 
medicines to the LTTE. His father was tortured, resulting in lung damage and though he 
was released, his heart was severely weakened. He died of heart failure, when Ruban was 
seven years old.  
The next year, 1990, the IPKF left and the SLA and LTTE returned to war with 
each other. The LTTE controlled most of Jaffna at this time, and the army sought to 
recapture the town, and eventually, the entire peninsula. Like Komathy, Ruban 
remembered “bombing and shelling everywhere” and living in a bunker “night and day” 
for several months during this time.  In 1995-6, his family was displaced again, after the 
SLA took control of Jaffna. They stayed in the Chavakachcheri area, in a small village on 
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his father’s family’s land, where they built a hut from the trunk and dried leaves of a 
palmyra tree. This was a time of hardship (kastam) for Ruban’s family and many Jaffna 
Tamils, living in overcrowded villages with little food and no sanitation. They had little 
money, and inflation was high.  
The family was eventually able to move closer to Jaffna town again, which was at 
this time under SLA occupation. Ruban describes this time—1997-2001—as being 
“torturous.” At military checkpoints, Jaffna residents presented a military ID issued for 
such checks, instead of the government-issued National Identity Card, and were subjected 
to full body searches and questioning. They also had to abide by a 6 pm to 6 am curfew—
the same period of curfew Indian authorities have imposed on Sri Lankan refugees in 
Tamil Nadu camps. Eventually, Ruban completed his secondary studies and entered 
Jaffna University in 2001, a few months before the LTTE declared a ceasefire. The next 
year, an agreement was reached and the peace process began. Ruban’s story—up to his 
time at Jaffna University, and later abduction—reveals the extent to which militarized 
violence pervaded every aspect of life for his generation of Tamils. Only the first year of 
the ceasefire felt like freedom to him.  
At the university, Ruban made new friends and became actively involved on 
campus. In 2004, he joined a group of students in organizing the Pongu Thamil event—
the same event that students in Toronto cited as their inspiration when they organized a 
Pongu Thamil rally in September 2004, as discussed in Chapter 2. He was elected as a 
student leader, but unable to take the position due to his degree requirements. Instead, he 
offered advice to a friend who took the role in his place. Ruban described the politics of 
the students union and the students in general as supportive of the LTTE, while 
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government appointees in the university administration were viewed as pro-EPDP.358 The 
mistrust between students and the administration created a climate of suspicion and 
secrecy at the university.359 
Disappeared and returned 
During his final year of study, Ruban was grabbed in broad daylight outside his 
house by unidentified masked men in a white Toyota Hi Ace van, where he was beaten 
and blindfolded. Illegal “arrests” were made throughout Sri Lanka using such vehicles, 
which were known nationally as “white vans.” These abductions targeted minorities—
primarily Tamils who were suspected of links to the LTTE, and Tamil and Muslim 
businessmen in Colombo—as well as dissenting journalists of all ethnicities (Human 
Rights Watch 2007). At the time, Ruban did not know where he was when the van 
stopped. He later identified the place as a military camp. 
The year before Ruban was “taken by the army,” the ceasefire had completely 
unraveled, and white vans and paramilitaries roamed the peninsula. University students, 
and young men especially, were visible targets. In 2006, several other male university 
students went missing, and Ruban’s friend was shot while riding his bicycle. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 The Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor of the university are appointed by the President of Sri Lanka; in 
Jaffna, university council appointments are monopolized by the pro-government party, the EPDP. See the 
Sub-committee for Academic Integrity, Jaffna University Science Teachers’ Association (JUSTA), The 
Jaffna Precedent In University Council Appointments And Militarization of Education In Sri Lanka, 5 
December 2014. < http://jfnusta.blogspot.com/2014/12/the-jaffna-precedent-in-university.html> Last 
accessed: 8 January 2015. 
359 Many have written about the changing politics of the campus during the war. See Hoole et al. (1990) for 
an account of faculty and student dissent and anti-LTTE activism during the first Eelam war and the IPKF 
war (1987-1989). Many dissenting activists were forced to leave LTTE-controlled Jaffna. After the 
government secured control of Jaffna in 1995, students became increasingly pro-LTTE in their politics. 
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When Ruban and I first met, we spoke of Jaffna and Tamil politics, of India, and 
his hopes and plans for his future. He was very opinionated about all of these topics. 
Though he was open with me about the circumstances that led to his departure for India, 
he did not dwell on the details of the week he spent detained and tortured by the Sri 
Lankan army. Instead, when I gently asked him about what had happened and why, he 
told me of the documents related to his case. Everything was in those documents, he said, 
and he would send them all. True to his word, I received copies of his affidavit, his 
hospital records of treatment for his injuries, and letters that confirmed his submission of 
complaints filed to the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka. These documents 
transfigured his injuries into evidence, creating claims to truth for legal assessment. 
Ruban’s family was distantly related to a Tamil lawyer in Colombo who advised him, 
filed the affidavit and filed a case against the police and military in the High Court. No 
investigations were made, however, no one was arrested, and the case never went to trial.  
In his affidavit, Ruban describes his abduction, detention and torture plainly, and 
in chronological detail. His statement is a testimony in the first-person that begins with 
“I,” stating his name and place of residence in Jaffna, before describing what happened to 
him. He was abducted by army officers in a “white van” and blindfolded before they took 
him to one of their camps. At the first camp, Ruban was tortured for two days straight. 
They hung him upside down and beat him with rods. They covered his head with a 
shopping bag filled with petrol, until he passed out from the fumes. Between such 
procedures, the army asked whether he recognized LTTE members among the men who 
were paraded before them. The soldiers violated him, and his body, in other ways: They 
forced a stick into his anus. They mixed chili powder with water, and put it in his eyes 
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and nostrils. His tormentors then covered the stick they used to rape him with chili 
powder. Over the next five days, Ruban was moved from army camp to army camp, 
where the violent interrogations continued, until his captors led him to a desolate expanse 
of land near the old railroad tracks. They left him there.  
With broken bones and open wounds, Ruban managed to find his way to a 
hospital. He was examined by the Judicial Medical Officer, who made note of the 
patient’s many injuries: left ear bashed and oozing discharge, an inability to use his left 
arm, and the many fractures, bruises and pains that resulted from his ordeal. His kidneys 
were also failing. Ruban received treatment at a Jaffna hospital for his injuries, but when 
the hospital’s dilation machine did not work, the ICRC helped him complete the rest of 
his treatment in the capital. He continued to suffer nevertheless. Unable to eat, he lost 
nearly twenty pounds. 
Ruban did not know why he was abducted—it was never stated—but he had some 
ideas. He noted that the army interrogated him about links to the LTTE. They wanted him 
to identify LTTE members on campus; some were said to have completed their A/Ls and 
were studying at the university during the ceasefire; military personnel assumed that any 
Tamil man—and some women—could be a Tiger. His interrogators suggested that Ruban 
himself was a Tiger; they expected he could tell them about satellite communications and 
where weapons were stored. 
He also believed he was targeted by the army for speaking out about human rights 
violations. The state took notice of anyone who criticized the state and the military’s 
actions. Ruban was especially conspicuous, through his campus activism. He assisted an 
international NGO that engaged in unarmed civilian peacekeeping, by documenting local 
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human rights violations. He had also spoken to foreign journalists. One day, a television 
reporter approached him and a friend about being interviewed. They agreed, provided 
their identities were concealed, and spoke about political tensions in Jaffna and Tamil 
students’ aspirations. Ruban thought it probable that the interview factored into his 
situation: Word must have traveled back to the local army division, via EPDP informers 
on campus. However, Ruban suggested that a senior EPDP leader—a family friend—may 
have also helped in securing his release.  
Ruban counted himself “lucky.” Hundreds of Tamil men had been “white 
vanned,” only to never be seen again. Ruban was one of the few who survived to tell the 
tale. He attributed his release to political pressure from Tamil politicians, media, and 
other activists. 
Escape to India 
At the end of the affdavit described above, Ruban states that he was subjected to 
“inhuman and degrading treatment”—making citational use of international human rights 
law—and that due to the trauma he suffered, he wished to move abroad. He planned to 
immigrate to Canada through his family, but the process would take several months, if 
not years. He decided to go to India to ensure his physical safety, weeks after submitting 
his complaints to Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Commission, which would serve as a record 
of his ordeal. The affidavit was an important legal step, as his future migration relied on a 
review of his case based on his narrative of the events and documentation of his injuries. 
He planned to travel to Chennai by plane, and applied for the visa required to enter the 
country. His first application was denied. He then decided to apply for the document via 
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an agent, who delivered the embassy’s “fee” of SLR 12000 (roughly $100 USD).360 This 
time, the visa was granted.  
Life in India was challenging at times. Now that his physical safety was assured, 
Ruban struggled to re-establish his life in a new land—one that he knew would be 
temporary, without knowing for how long. Chennai, like Colombo, was an expensive 
city. As a single, working bachelor, Ruban moved around the city, from neighborhood to 
neighborhood— Porur, Chromepet, Kodambakkam—where he lived in rooms in 
boarding houses. Young men like Ruban were constantly on the move, away from the 
surveillance of suspecting landlords and tenants, and toward cheaper housing and better 
jobs. Though dispersed, they formed a network that helped each other in times of need. 
Ruban recalled having to leave one neighborhood when foreign press about his case led 
to police surveillance and harassment. When Ruban was approached to tell his story of 
torture and exile to a journalist for a widely-circulating international publication, he 
hoped to communicate his experience to a wider audience. This time, a few sentences 
about his abduction—placed in a longer story about the war—caught the notice of India’s 
Q Branch. They visited and questioned him frequently, and confiscated his passport, as 
well as the identity documents of the Sri Lankan owner of the house where he stayed. 
These documents included a rations card, and a voter ID. Ruban’s passport was 
eventually returned, but the landlord’s illegally-obtained documents were not. Q Branch 
officers continued to question him, and followed him around the city. This was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 By contrast, the visa fee would have been approximately one-sixth of the agent’s fee, or SLR 2000. I 
was told that Tamils often had to make such payments to an embassy’s local staff. For example, the Sri 
Lankan staff of the Canadian High Commission in Colombo was believed to discriminate against 
applicants on this basis. 
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“psychological torture” for him, until a friend was able to help him find another room for 
rent. 
An incompatible place 
Ruban had traveled the length and breadth of Tamil Nadu, and found that it was 
not to his liking. Kerala, he said, was more like home. He also liked Bangalore, where he 
had worked for a few months, and on occasion after returning to Chennai. The climate 
was good, and it was a modern city. Chennai, on the other hand, was not suited to his 
body. Other refugees living in Chennai made similar statements. When Ruban introduced 
me to new friends who were from the same district in Jaffna, they described to me their 
first month living in Chennai. Kugen and his wife had arrived nine months ago, in March 
2008. He and his wife were struggling to survive in the city; they did not want to live in 
the camps, but were too afraid to return to Sri Lanka, and could not afford to move 
abroad. Living in the city was difficult for other reasons: They began to fall ill. Kugen 
described coming down with a cold, and his body being covered with splotchy red 
“rashes” that sounded much like hives. Ruban commiserated, and described falling ill 
with a fever, and having difficulty breathing in the city. Ruban and Kugen, like many Sri 
Lankan Tamils, interpreted these illnesses as indicating the unsuitability of the city, and a 
sign of their being “out of place.”  
Chennai, then, is an urban landscape that enters the individual body and produces 
physical ills. For Sri Lankan Tamils like Ruban, Kugen, and his wife, its substance is not 
compatible with their bodily qualities. Though they spoke together of doctors taking their 
temperature and medicines, biomedical discourses do not saturate or fully encompass 
their explanations of illness. Rather, the body erupts when taken out of “one’s own” soil 
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(sontha mann). As Tamils, their ur (home-village) was a substance that composed their 
selves (cf. Daniel 1984); now living outside it, their bodies became ill. Chennai was not 
as unliveable as Colombo had become for Tamil refugees like Ruban. As Kugen 
explained that he and his wife had left Sri Lanka, and did not stay in Colombo because of 
the war, Ruban interjected to say, “We Tamils cannot live there anymore. It is a 
genocide. They are killing Tamils everyday.” Colombo was a place of transit for Tamils 
leaving the island, or a place from which they were to be violently expelled (as in, for 
example, the anti-Tamil violence of 1983, or during lodge raids and “deportations” in 
2007-2008). Chennai, on the other hand, was ostensibly a “Tamil” city, but Sri Lankan 
Tamils could not claim the city as their own.  
Linguistic difference and non-belonging 
My conversations with Ruban and other refugees in Chennai revealed that a 
shared language was not enough to create belonging for Tamils in the city. Language has 
typically been the basis of a presumably shared ethnic identity among Tamils in Sri 
Lanka and Tamils in India. Indeed, as we observed in the previous chapter, the notion of 
a shared language—and the extension of this notion into metaphors of relatedness—was 
mobilized during political actions by camp Tamils and citizens alike. 
Ruban and other Tamils from Sri Lanka referred to linguistic and cultural 
differences between “Sri Lankan” or “Eelam Tamils” and “Indians” to make sense of 
their unease and non-belonging as refugees and migrants in an otherwise “Tamil” land. In 
one of our first conversations, Ruban began by pointing out the differences between 
Indian and Sri Lankan Tamil dialects as he knew them—that is, Chennai versus Jaffna 
Tamil. He describes the latter as “pure Tamil” (in English), while “Tamil in Chennai is 
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25% English, 10 or 15% Telugu, 10% Hindi, and maybe 50% Tamil.” In Ruban’s attempt 
to quantify language use, Chennai Tamil is adulterated, and only half Tamil. It is a hybrid 
language; a mongrel that lacks the “purity” claimed on behalf of Jaffna Tamil. 
Unsurprisingly, he got into fights with friends at work about his views on the Tamil 
language. The notion that Jaffna Tamil was “archaic” and thus “pure” was widespread 
among Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils alike, particularly among lower- to upper-middle 
class Tamils of Ruban’s generation and his elders, but consequently, Indian Tamil 
dialects could be positively valued as “modern” and “cosmopolitan.”361 
Ruban noted some of the regional differences he observed while he traveled 
occasionally for work, to the city of Bangalore in Karnataka, Kerala, and throughout 
Tamil Nadu. In Coimbatore, he felt that people were very polite in speaking Tamil. In 
Chennai, however, he saw rudeness and a lack of respect. “Ingē vā, vā mā (come here, 
come woman), they’ll say to their parents even!” Ruban’s example uses slang (mā) and 
informal conjugation to address a second-person (vā instead of the formal vānga in 
Standard Indian Tamil, or vāngō in Jaffna and Brahmin Indian Tamil dialects. When I try 
to explain that, in some dialects, the use of informality can be a sign of intimacy 
(nerukkam) between the speaker and addressed, he says that it cannot be so. 
What Ruban does here is rely on the distinction between koccai thamizh and 
centhamizh.362 The distinction is an important one to him, as it is connected with the 
reason he left Sri Lanka. When he later described his torturers to me, Ruban noted that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 In contrast to Ruban’s assessment, Sam Sudhanandha, a Tamil professor at Columbia and former 
principal of American College in Madurai, has argued that a sentence is Tamil even if it is mostly 
comprised of loan words, provided it is structured by a Tamil grammar. Personal communication. 
362 “Rough” versus “pure” Tamil. For more on this cultural politics of this distinction in Tamil Nadu, see 
Bate 2009; in a diasporic context, see Das 2008. 
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they spoke koccai thamil. To Ruban, their manner of speech indicated that Tamil was not 
their first language, i.e. their mother tongue (thaay mozhi). It was learned, in order to 
communicate and commit violence. After describing the circumstances that led him to 
leave Sri Lanka, and his experiences in India, Ruban told me, “This is a separate country. 
The language, culture—everything is different.” 
As noted in Chapter 1, many Tamils fled Sri Lanka for India due to the physical, 
cultural and historical proximity of the island and mainland. However, proximity does not 
presuppose identity, or even intimacy. Ruban was not alone in making distinctions 
between “Indian Tamils” and “Sri Lankan Tamils” (also described as “Eelam,” “Ceylon,” 
or “Jaffna” Tamils). At OfERR’s regional office in Tirunelveli, I met a young woman 
whose story I described in Chapter 5. She was in her mid-twenties and lamented that the 
generation born in India was using “Indian” slang. She, like many Ceylon Tamil 
refugees, viewed the island dialects as being “purer” forms of Tamil. She wanted to 
preserve this cultural distinction. The irony was that her complaint was made using an 
Indian Tamil dialect’s pronouns, vocabulary, and conjugations (for example, the third 
person plural, avanga, rather than avaiyal, the verb pēcu instead of kathai, and the 
conjugated form –ānga instead of –īnam.) These complaints also effaced differences 
among the island’s dialects—and their relationship to the mainland—in favor of drawing 
differences between “India” and “Eelam.” 
Rather than feeling more secure and confident about their cultural and linguistic 
belonging in a Tamil nadu, Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka—and especially those of 
Jaffna origin—worried about the long-term future of their language and cultural 
practices, ranging from their food preparations and styles of dress to kinship and marriage 
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preferences. Far from being secure among “co-ethnics,” Sri Lankan Tamils had once 
again become a “minority” in search of a new land of their own. 
Waiting to migrate to Canada 
For Ruban, India—and Chennai in particular—was a waystation to a better place 
that would allow him to fulfill his aspirations. Like many other middle-class Tamils 
whose sights were trained elsewhere, he reminded me, “We cannot get citizenship in this 
place. So why should we bother to stay here?” Citizenship presented him with the 
possibility of opportunities that were largely unrealizable for Tamil refugees in India—
employment opportunities, physical mobility, political rights, belonging and security. 
In India, Ruban was able to complete graduate coursework, through funds he 
received from his mama (mother’s brother) in Toronto. His uncle’s family had emigrated 
to Canada in 1984 after being driven out of their house in Colombo during Black July. 
Ruban’s uncle, aunt, and two cousins were taken by ship to Jaffna. They were sponsored 
by Ruban’s mami (mother’s brother’s wife)’s elder brother, who had gone to Canada, via 
Britain, in the late 1970s. Now they hoped to help Ruban start a new life in Toronto. 
Ruban was not seeking political asylum, a category of migration he could easily 
fit, and yet, was too risky to chance, due to a backlog in processing refugee claims.363  
Ruban’s mama’s family was sponsoring him as a group. At the time of our conversations, 
it would take approximately thirteen months for the Government of Canada to process his 
application. The application for group sponsorship of a refugee required five or more 
sponsors (Canadian citizens or permanent residents) and proof that his sponsors were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 It is important to note that he had to apply in advance if he wished to avoid detention, as making a 
refugee claim at the border—as many Tamils did in the 1980s and 1990s—was no longer possible, due to 
the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Act passed after 9/11. 
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equipped with the financial resources, expertise and commitment to support him for one 
year.364 Ruban would live under their roof, and they had to indicate their financial 
commitment and provide bank balances as proof of their financial support. In October 
2013, the estimated total annual settlement cost amounted to CAD $12,600, not including 
in-kind donations of shelter, clothing, furniture, food, etc., amounting to CAD $8500.365 
Before I left Toronto for Chennai, Ruban’s mama wanted me to impress upon him 
the challenges of life in Canada as a new immigrant. He worried that his nephew would 
see his spacious and comfortable suburban home, his car, and his family’s professional 
careers, and assume that life would be easy in Canada. He was also concerned that, as 
Ruban encountered obstacles such as non-recognition of his credentials or everyday 
racism, he might get frustrated. What Ruban had to learn, he told me, was that it had 
taken him 25 years to become “settled.” Knowing that I had done research among Tamils 
in Toronto, including recently-arrived refugees, Ruban’s mama implored me to provide 
his nephew a more “realistic” picture.   
In Chennai, I asked Ruban what he knew about Canada. He knew little about 
Canada, he said, but one thing he knew—and that put him at ease—was the country’s 
sizeable Tamil diaspora. Moreover, the Tamils had become citizens of Canada, and if 
sponsored for resettlement, he would eventually become one too. He felt he could belong 
there: “In Canada, there are many Tamils. It is like having our own country.” (kanadāvilē 
niramba thamil ātkal irukkinam. oru sonthanādu māthiri vazhrānga.366) Notably, what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 Effective October 19, 2012, a G5 may only sponsor applicants who are recognized as refugees by either 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or a foreign state. 
365 See “Settlement Plan and Financial Assessment—Group of Five,” 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/kits/forms/IMM5373AE.pdf, tables on p. 4 
366 Literally, “They live as though in their own country.” 
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Ruban refers to is a country (nādu), and not a motherland (thāyakam) or home-village 
(sontha ūr). For Tamils, an ūr has shifting and contextual meanings that vary according 
to a given person’s spatial orientation. However, one’s sontha ūr is a place from which 
one’s ancestors hail; it is one’s “real home,” and “the place whose soil is most compatible 
with oneself and with one’s ancestors’’ (Daniel 1984: 63-67). Like ūr, nādu is a 
contextual term with multiple referents, depending on the person’s spatial and cognitive 
orientation, and may be as large as a continent, or small as a group of villages (Daniel 
1984: 68-69). Canada—and more specifically, Toronto, or Scarborough—could become 
like “one’s own country,” but as Ruban’s words indicate, it is still not imagined as his 
own home.  
A few of Ruban’s friends and former classmates were in Canada, and he could 
think of more than thirty people he knew in the United Kingdom. His other friends in 
Jaffna and Colombo wanted to move abroad too. They have heard that it is a “machine 
life,” but see Canada as a place where “one can adjust and get by well.” Ruban hopes to 
complete an MSc, and is considering a PhD in his field, and would like to work at a 
university. His mother in Jaffna has asked him about marriage, but he is in no rush. Once 
he is “settled,” he will answer her. He tells me that his future partner can be “a different 
religion, different culture, or even Sinhalese.”367 He wants to “live with a human being.” 
Ruban and many of the Tamil refugees I spoke with in India were firmly 
convinced that Tamils living outside Sri Lanka have an important duty. “Tamils in other 
countries must pressure their governments to help Tamils. That they can do—nothing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 Even as it expresses liberal values of tolerance, this statement also presents the Sinhalese as ultimate 
Other to a Tamil Self. This distinction was common among some Jaffna Tamils during my fieldwork. For 
example, in Toronto, one young man described something as singalam to refer to something being 
completely foreign. 
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else.” Non-camp refugees found it especially difficult to fulfill this duty, but hoped that 
international migration to a country with a path to citizenship would allow them to do so. 
In Canada, Ruban imagines that he will be able to go to demonstrations, like the ones 
many Tamils in Toronto were joining to protest the war. “I will do as people do there, 
within the country’s laws—not against. That is the duty of the displaced, living in 
diaspora (pulam peyarnthor).” Ruban understood that foreign governments were unlikely 
to do anything perceived not to be in their own interests. Nevertheless, he looked forward 
one day to actions he associated with full citizenship. Citizenship, for Ruban and other 
Tamil refugees, was connected to the notion of belonging to a place. Concerned about the 
length of his “temporary” stay in India, he told me one day, “I’m without an address—
how can I have a future here? I want to be settled.” Here Ruban associates a temporal 
progression, or “future” time, with an end to his displacement that re-emplaces him in a 
location with specific coordinates—just as the notion of refugee “resettlement” implies. 
A Tamil person’s resettlement becomes legible through the institutions and discourses of 
the nation-state. The future is to become a citizen of a nation-state. Cast out from Sri 
Lanka by discrimination, violence and war, migration became the Tamil’s chance for a 
“settled” future. But as his imagined future in Canada indicates, citizenship is not only a 
question of legal status and recognition; for Tamils like Ruban, it is embodied and 
practiced through action. The centrality of citizenship to Ruban’s life as a Tamil was 
made clear in a rhetorical question he asked me at the end of a long conversation about 
his resettlement and future: “What is a human? Fundamentally, it is someone with 
citizenship (kudiyurimai).” 
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Komathy and Ruban were both migrants in search of a country that would allow 
them to live as citizens. Each felt that there should be a separate country for the Tamils of 
Sri Lanka, whose lives were marked by the insecurity of war. In lieu of that country, still 
yet-to-be after a quarter-century of war, they decided to migrate to another country, 
where they could live among Tamils, and with the status, dignity and rights they felt 
citizenship would accord them. They moved in order to one day become “settled” and 
thus fully secure, and in Komathy’s case, to be able to return as a visitor one day. 
Tamils like Komathy and Ruban decided to migrate to pursue what was desired 
and yet unavailable to them during the war: the idea of belonging to a people and 
territory. In this way, migration is a form of social action that must be understood in 
relation to political action. The “Tamil nation” and nationalism that emerged, as we saw 
in Chapter 3, in response to Sinhala chauvinism and the majoritarian logic of liberal 
democracy, becomes dispersed through Tamils who migrate abroad. While the nation is 
“unavailable” to many Tamil refugees (Daniel 1996: 167-169), and particularly those 
living in the camps, the nation as abstraction provides a sign of belonging that compels 
Jaffna Tamil urban refugees to migrate abroad. This is not, however, a simple case of 
“diasporic nationalism,” of a political ideology dispersed and transposed from homeland 
to host. Tamil migrants like Ruban and Komathy are instead guided by the social 
imaginary of a political community in future destinations that will secure Tamil life. As 
we have seen in this chapter, transnational belonging among Tamil refugees and migrants 
is shaped by experiences of violence and social exclusion—both at home in their country 
of origin, and just as importantly, in transit locations and impermanent settlements that 
promise a refuge from physical violence and death. 
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Conclusion 
 In this brief chapter, I considered why and how Sri Lankan Tamils in Chennai did 
not participate in protests, temporarily sacrificing notions of struggle and community in 
their desire to remain mobile. I discussed how this mobility invited practices of self-
surveillance that limited community formation and public action in India. In particular, I 
examined the political rationality of migration for two urban refugees from Jaffna now 
living in Chennai, India: Komathy, an urban refugee who waits to join her husband in 
France, and Ruban, a young man whose political activism and abduction in Sri Lanka led 
to exile in India, where he waits to be sponsored as a refugee before immigrating to 
Canada. Tamil activists often argue that it is their position, living outside Sri Lanka, that 
makes possible their acts of protest, and political activism more generally. But this 
“outside” is not an undifferentiated space; in fact, not all feel equally capable of 
articulating protest. Komathy made this observation as she led me through the twists and 
turns of her life in displacement. Her narrative, along with the challenges she posed to me 
as a diasporic ethnographer, demonstrated basic limits to philosophical attempts to 
position an ideal-type refugee as the prototypical political subject.  
 Further, I argue that when the previous chapter and this one are read together, the 
juxtaposition of ‘the city’ and ‘the camp’ provides insight into the ways in which the 
practice of citizenship, as a form of social membership and subjective belonging, 
intersects with the legal and political recognition of formal citizenship. This discussion 
also reveals how extraordinary camp protests were in their enactment of substantive 
rights.  The camps, described by some as jails or open prisons, were also sites of 
politicization and a paradoxical kind of freedom; in contrast, refugees in the city enjoyed 
	   371	  
greater personal freedom of movement but felt unable to organize collectively or 
participate in public action. 
Tamils inhabited the figure of the refugee in different ways between the camp and 
the city. In Chapters 2 and 5, we saw that Tamils in the camps made strategic claims to a 
refugee identity in their activism. For Tamils living in the city, on the other hand, 
‘refugee’ was a stigmatized personal identity. Tamils in Chennai who were waiting to 
migrate abroad nevertheless had to conform to the figure of ‘the refugee’ in official 
discourses of international law and humanitarian action in order to facilitate their 
movement. In sum, while camp refugees participated, along with NGOs, in the creation 
of new forms of community and action in their displacement, urban refugees prepared 
imaginatively and economically for their migration from India to the West.  
The final chapter of this dissertation turns to the ways in which Tamil diasporic 
communities were formed out of action in response to (Tamil) suffering at the end of the 
Sri Lankan war. I examine two attempts to document, archive and exhibit Tamil 
suffering, and how these events revealed orientations to protest and dissent that shaped 
Tamil community formations in Toronto. As the war in northern Sri Lanka continued, 
and the number of casualties grew, camp refugees and diasporic activists turned to 
protests and street demonstrations to ask for an end to the war.
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Chapter 7 
Suffering Community: Tamil Protests & Dissent at the End of War 
 
The last two chapters delved into the social and political lives of Tamil refugees 
in Tamil Nadu, India. Chapter 5 explored how camp residents were mobilized, amid 
conditions of non-governmental rehabilitation and state surveillance, to protest the war in 
Sri Lanka, while Chapter 6 considered how urban refugees in Chennai pursued 
international migration as a form of action. In pursuit of diasporic futures, these Tamils 
hoped that their lives abroad would be “settled” when they became citizens, enabling 
them to participate in political action. In order to migrate abroad, however, Tamils had to 
be recognized as refugees; they, like Ruban, had to become suffering subjects before the 
international media and legal authorities to claim a need for protection. This chapter 
explores the relationship between suffering and action in diaspora politics. It considers 
how Tamil diaspora activists and protesters—whether immigrant citizens or refugees—
were mobilized to protest Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE.  
During the final months of war in January to May 2009, Tamil diasporic 
communities mobilized in spectacular demonstrations around the world. In this chapter, I 
examine how these communities were formed out of actions in response to (Tamil) 
suffering at the end of the Sri Lankan war. Before I turn to these protests, however, I first 
examine two multimedia exhibits Tamil activists organized to raise awareness about 
violence and suffering in Sri Lanka. I suggest that these events reveal orientations to 
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protest and dissent that shaped Tamil community formations in Toronto. My analysis of 
these exhibits also reveals that, whether in protest, dissent, or otherwise, Tamil activists 
shared a desire to alleviate and end Tamil suffering in Sri Lanka. In contrast to received 
theories about the relationship between the spectatorship of suffering and action, I argue 
that Tamil activists were neither distant spectators, nor immediate sufferers, but 
intermediaries whose diasporic positioning created a new political subject compelled to 
“take action” to end the war “back home.” 
As the war in northern Sri Lanka led to thousands of casualties, camp refugees in 
India and diasporic activists in Canada turned to protest through fasts and street 
demonstrations to ask for an end to the war. In the second part of the chapter, I describe 
these protests, and analyze the ways in which activists invoked and performed suffering 
to mobilize action against the war. This section of the chapter explores connections 
between affect and agency in the relationship between suffering and political action. 
Finally, by looking at the politics of protest and dissent, this chapter considers the notion 
of a “suffering community” in another sense: suffering from community, or the non-
belonging experienced by Tamil activists who dissent and whose sufferings were 
excluded from recognition by the community of Tamil nationalism. 
Violence, Suffering and the Ethical Politics of Humanitarianism 
The imperative to act to alleviate human suffering is a foundational tenet of 
modern humanitarianism and its contemporary ethics—and one that has received critical 
scrutiny from socio-cultural anthropologists. This scholarship, as outlined in the 
Introduction to this dissertation, critically informs my study of Tamil activism in 
response to the violence and suffering of Sri Lanka’s war. I also draw inspiration from 
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ethnographic and theoretical work that considers how suffering is deployed as a resource 
for making political claims (Brown 1995; Das 2007; Halpern 2000; L. McKay 2008; 
Ticktin 2006, 2011; Trnka 2013), and anthropological studies of the political aesthetics of 
suffering in the form of the nation-state (Daniel 1996; Axel 1997) and in transnational 
circuits of media and activism (Kleinman and Kleinman 1997; McLagan 2005). 
In what follows, I shall describe and analyze how the “suffering body”368 of the 
Tamil victim of war was deployed by diasporic activists to mobilize Tamils to join 
protests and street demonstrations, and in doing so, appeal to the “international 
community” and Western governments to “take action” to end the war and the suffering it 
has caused. Activists protested the denial of humanitarian aid and accused the 
government of genocide; the government argued that it was fighting a “humanitarian 
war” against the LTTE—who used the aid to continue to fight—and promised a military 
victory to end the war and the suffering it caused. Each party thus described their actions 
as humanitarian endeavors to end the suffering of Tamils and other Sri Lankans. 
In other words, what this chapter reveals is a seemingly unlikely alliance between 
transnational humanitarianism and diaspora activism in the ethical turn to suffering—a 
relationship that has not been sufficiently explored in ethnographic work on humanitarian 
action. The following pages illustrate the power of humanitarian discourses and affects in 
mobilizing political action among Tamil immigrants and refugees. This requires a closer 
look at recent theories about the ethics of viewing and responding to the suffering of 
others. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 I draw this term from Ticktin’s (2011) discussion of the “morally legitimate suffering body,” a 
recognizable victim figure that has also been analyzed in postcolonial feminist theory (Mohanty 1988; Abu 
Lughod 2002; Kapur 2002). 
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Suffering, Spectatorship and Power  
In his influential book, Distant Suffering, the French political sociologist, Luc 
Boltanski examines the moral and political implications of the spectatorship of the 
“distant suffering” of others. He begins with a discussion of Hannah Arendt’s On 
Revolution, and her critique of the modern “politics of pity” as it emerged since the mid-
eighteenth century, particularly in the work of the French philosophe, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau. The politics of pity has three basic features according to Arendt (2006[1963]). 
First, it involves a distinction between those who suffer and those who do not. Second, 
this politics focuses on what is seen and on looking, or in other words, “the spectacle of 
suffering.” Finally, as a consequence of the introduction of pity into politics, Arendt 
argues that politics becomes centered not on action in a plural world but on observation—
as Boltanski puts it, this is the “observation of the unfortunate by those who do not share 
their suffering, who do not experience it directly and who, as such, may be regarded as 
fortunate or lucky people” (1999: 3). Boltanski then draws on ideas developed in Adam 
Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments to examine three ‘topics’ through which the 
observer, or spectator, expresses a response to another’s suffering: the topics of 
sentiment, denunciation, and the aesthetic.  
Boltanski argues that, in lieu of the ability to act directly in a “politics of pity,” 
modern spectators can commit themselves to action by speaking about what they have 
seen in the other’s suffering, and how they were affected by it. It is his understanding 
that, “For a politics of pity, the urgency of action needing to be taken to bring an end to 
suffering invoked always prevails over considerations of justice. From such a perspective 
it is only in a world from which suffering has been banished that justice could enforce its 
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rights” (Boltanski 1999:5). However, he also argues that the mass mediation of distant 
suffering under conditions of globalization has led to a “crisis of pity” in relation to 
modern forms of humanitarianism.369 
 Boltanski’s theory assumes a necessary physical and social distance between 
spectator and sufferer as, in the rhetorical topic of denunciation, the active spectator’s 
sympathy must not derive from personal or group interests. Paradoxically, however, a 
spectator’s denunciation of suffering can be criticized as “false” when the spectator does 
not share in the sufferer’s plight (Chap. 4). Speech about suffering cannot be guaranteed 
as “truth,” and may be dismissed as “mere words”—or worse, as opportunistic. Similarly, 
on the topic of sentiment, Boltanski shows that the spectator’s sympathy may give way to 
a critique of sentimentalism (Chap. 6), in which the spectacle of suffering becomes a test 
through which spectators prove their own humanity. In other words, those who do not 
suffer may “feel bad” about another’s suffering, but in doing so, “feel good” about 
confirming the humanity by which their selves are defined. This leads to a questioning of 
the authenticity of emotions and selves, and the politics of pity becomes an endless 
politics of suspicion (in which justice is forever deferred). In the final chapter of his 
book, Boltanski attempts to lead readers out of this morass when he asks whether 
“action” is realistic in response to contemporary mediations of distant suffering. He 
answers, yes, with an emphasis on facing present suffering in response to the “crisis of 
pity” generated by mass media. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 Boltanski’s work on the relationship between suffering and spectatorship has produced debates among 
scholars about the politics of media, leading one scholar, Chouliaraki (2013) to theorize “the ironic 
spectator” in an era of “post-humanitarianism” in the modern West. This chapter questions the 
pervasiveness of this “ironic gaze” via a consideration of immigrant activism. 
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Suffering Spectators 
As we will see in the sections to follow, practices of diasporic activism among Sri 
Lankan Tamils complicate the above reflections of Boltanski and others on the morality 
of spectatorship and humanitarian responses to ‘distant suffering.’370 Much of this 
scholarship presumes a distance (physical and structural) between the sufferer and 
spectator (Boltanski 1999; Chouliaraki 2006, 2013). Insofar as activists recall their own 
experiences of war to respond to suffering ‘back home,’ Tamil protesters are neither 
immediate sufferers, nor wholly distanced spectators in diasporic public action. I argue 
that Tamils, who feel they constitute a ‘suffering community’ in Sri Lanka, became 
diasporic ‘survivors’ who felt obliged by shared experiences, and personal and social 
memories of violence and displacement, to act to end Tamil suffering in Sri Lanka.  
As Rancière (2009) argues in The Emancipated Spectator, the very attempt to 
suppress distance between the spectator and the sufferer (and perhaps by extension, the 
agent and the recipient of humanitarian aid) is constitutive of that distance. On the one 
hand, Tamil activists generally understood this; namely that they were not living in the 
war zone. Attempts to act from diasporic locations, in order to bridge the distance with 
those who suffer in Sri Lanka, in fact reinscribed a constitutive distance between 
diasporic activists and Tamil suffering in Sri Lanka. In other words, demonstrations that 
sought to unify the diasporic spectator and the wartime sufferer—to enact a desired 
togetherness, as one people, “united in struggle and suffering”—revealed they are apart. 
When Toronto Tamils convened and joined together in public to claim a global unity, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 Calhoun (2008), Chouliaraki (2006, 2013) and Wilson and Brown (2008) invoke and build on these 
reflections. Boltanski’s “commitment to action” in speech about suffering relies on a model of 
communicative ethics called into question by Agamben’s (1999) reflections on speech that bears the 
impossibility of true witness. 
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they embodied its very fracture—their physical and social separation from the Tamils of 
their homeland. 
The transformation from immediate “sufferer” to “survivor” was the ground for 
extensive political and cultural work as Tamil activists mobilized a second generation to 
be the forefront of their struggle. In doing so, diasporic activists navigated between a 
desire for their community’s children to understand pain and suffering in Sri Lanka and 
the social realities of “life on the outside” (Fuglerud 1999) in a new country. In the first 
part of this chapter, I examine how diaspora constitutes an ‘archive’ for Tamil activists in 
Toronto who seek to communicate narratives of Tamil loss and suffering to a younger 
generation and a wider Canadian public. 
PART ONE: Stories of Suffering 
“Please Give Us Justice” 
In the bitter cold of a snowstorm in early March 2008, nearly two hundred Tamil 
women (along with a sprinkling of middle-aged men) gathered to celebrate International 
Women’s Day inside the Scarborough Civic Centre.371 The event was organized by the 
Tamil Women’s Service Providers Working Group, an ad-hoc group of social workers 
and service providers in Toronto’s Tamil community.372 The evening aimed to celebrate 
the achievements of Tamil women and draw attention to their struggles, as women within 
a community of Tamils living in Canada and around the world.373 The event showcased 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 In Tamil, the event was translated as penngal ezhucci nikazhcci, or Women’s Uprising Event. 
372 The Women’s Day event was one of a few community events led and organized entirely by women, 
while the leadership and membership of their financial sponsor was primarily male. 
373 Organizers presented a lifetime achievement award to Kuramagal, the pen name of a diasporic Tamil 
woman writer. 
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arts and cultural performances by women active in Toronto’s Tamil community, ranging 
from a film about a young Toronto Tamil woman’s changing relationship with her 
mother, to songs about the devaluation of women’s work. That evening, before 
announcing the event’s finale, the emcee took the opportunity to remind the audience that 
women were suffering all over the world from multiple forms of violence: Political 
cruelties (araciyal kodumaikal), domestic violence (kudumpa vanmuraikal) and social 
violence (samuga vanmuraikal). The next drama would show us how women are affected 
by political violence. 
The short dramatic play, “Please Give Us Justice,” begins with a scene of a 
woman huddled on the ground with three children. The woman massages the faces and 
shoulders of the children to comfort them. A recorded voice plays over the event’s 
speakers, and the actors perform in silence while a woman explains, in Canadian-
accented English, the scene before the audience: 
This is my sister… fleeing as a refugee, all through life. She has lost her 
peace of mind entirely.  
For the past thirty years, having no shelter to call her own, she is in search 
of a permanent mailing address. From the day she got married, and up to 
now, she’s been chased by the atrocities of the military. Deprived of the 
opportunity to enjoy even an iota of the bliss of married life. 
Having lost all hopes in life, her only aim now is to provide, at least, the 
basic protection for her children. With no income, and the added burden of 
the family on her shoulders she is drifting with the ebbs and tides of fate, 
hoping against hope to see the light at the end of the tunnel. 
 
In the above, the narrator describes her sister as a woman “chased by the atrocities of the 
military,” “fleeing as a refugee” without a shelter, “in search of a permanent mailing 
address.” The voice continues, telling the audience about the woman’s sister and her 
relatives: 
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My sister-in-law is spending her life, expecting to see her husband, who 
was arrested and taken away by the military, within a few months of her 
marriage. For the past twenty years, shedding tears, is my mother. She is 
losing [her] grip and [the] strength to move about. And also, her eyesight 
is forever looking at the photograph of her son, my father. Having never 
seen the face of her father, my niece only can imagine the appearance of 
him from the description provided by her mother and her grandfather.  
Fighting against all odds, and living with the hope that there would be 
peace in the future, is my sister. Even-willed, living with desperation, with 
her husband whose mind [???] in an earlier rocket attack.  
(Narrator’s voice wavers) Having witnessed, the death, of her young 
child, in an air bombardment at Vanni, she now resembles a person who 
has lost all mental facilities. 
Only women and children appear in this dramatic scene; the men are either dead or gone. 
Children are represented as especially vulnerable to the devastation of war: the sister in 
the scene has lost her daughter to an aerial bombing. The life of a Tamil woman in Sri 
Lanka is marked by such losses and emotional pain. The narrator’s sister, having suffered 
a great deal of loss, appears to go mad.  
The diasporic narrator is the “voice” of this drama. She is the only one who 
speaks, verbalizing and translating the actors’ silent embodiment of pain to present a 
coherent narrative of suffering to a diasporic Tamil audience. After representing the 
suffering of her relatives, the narrator then invokes her own suffering: 
I have no complaints, as such, about life in this adopted country of mine. 
But I am unable to detach myself, from my kith and kin, and lead a 
completely independent life. The deprivation and desperation of my 
relatives are having a terrible impact on my body. I am unable to smile or 
laugh. The sufferings of my mother, and my siblings, are torturing me. 
The play depicts the tremendous hardships and the suffering of Tamils in Sri Lanka, as 
mediated through a diasporic relationship to that suffering. The narrator observes the 
family’s suffering, but not from a position of total distance—though physically separated, 
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the diasporic narrator and the suffering Tamil woman are close relatives. The diasporic 
narrator feels “tortured” by the suffering of her kin. She feels psychic pain at the thought 
of their suffering, but their “deprivation and desperation” also has somatic effects. The 
narrator thus shows the audience how she is affected by the thought of her relatives’ 
suffering. The performance transforms their suffering into hers. In addition, the narrator’s 
voice reports her sister’s suffering to an audience, but in doing so, her sister’s suffering 
becomes the ground on which her own thoughts can be voiced. In other words, the act of 
narrating suffering substitutes the diasporic Tamil’s voice for that of her sister, displaced 
within the homeland.  
The narrator then asks, 
Why is the world refusing to see the sufferings of my race? When will this 
white humanitarian world of ours bring us justice? Please! Give us justice! 
The above questions indict the international system for ignoring Tamil suffering, 
while simultaneously recognizing the power of this unequal system by appealing 
to a “white humanitarian world” for justice. The final words of “Please Give Us 
Justice” thus speak to a tension in the contemporary politics of humanitarianism. 
On the one hand, diaspora activists recognized the limits of humanitarianism, 
which was in contradiction to their pursuit of justice. On the other hand, they 
understood that assertions of “humanity” had become a new way of doing 
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Remembering Black July 
July 2008 was a busy month for Tamil community activists. Twenty-five years 
before, in July 1983, Tamils, and their homes and businesses in Colombo and other parts 
of Sri Lanka, were targeted with violence over several days, killing an estimated three 
thousand people.374 The destruction was later estimated at $1 billion dollars in damage to 
the Sri Lankan economy. In spite of government censorship of the national media, 
foreign tourists’ photographs and eyewitness accounts were published abroad, drawing 
international attention to the events.375 And in time, it was learned that the state was 
involved in planning and organizing the violence, which the police and army did nothing 
to stop. These dark days came to be known as Black July.  
One quarter-century later, the Canadian Tamil Congress organized several events 
to commemorate the event’s twenty-fifth anniversary of July 1983. The CTC had 
organized an annual vigil in the city’s public squares, where Tamils gathered to 
remember the violence and war. These events were organized by and primarily for 
(Canadian) Tamils, and invited local, provincial and federal politicians to address the 
crowd; featured speakers were often parliamentarians who echoed the diasporic 
audience’s desire for an end to war in their homeland, and expressed their support to 
Tamils demanding Canadian engagement to exercise pressure on the Sri Lankan 
government. For the twenty-fifth anniversary, the CTC also planned a number of events 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 The violence occurred between between July 23rd and 29th. The government’s official count of the dead 
stood at 317, but it was not in the state’s interests to reveal the extent of the damages and losses incurred. 
The higher figure of three thousand deaths is frequently cited, while other estimates have suggested a 
number between one and two thousand. For one contemporary account of the violence, see Piyadasa 
(1984). 
375 The New York Times, Washington Post, and Times of London were among the international 
publications that reported the events. For one example, see William Claiborne (1983), “Sri Lanka’s Tamil 
Refugees Fear Massacre as Killing Continues.” Washington Post. July 30. A1. 
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to address and communicate “the issues” and a narrative of Tamil suffering to a wider 
audience: a website to archive their community’s Black July stories, an exhibit to present 
these stories—through personal narratives, media coverage, material artifacts and a 
documentary-in-progress—at various locations in the Greater Toronto Area and Canada, 
and a play dramatizing the violence of July 1983 through the story of a Tamil man’s 
migration to Canada. Other events were aimed at Canadian Tamil youth, including an 
essay contest to encourage second-generation youth to learn their relatives’ stories and to 
reflect on the meaning and importance of Black July for Tamils in Canada. Activists also 
organized a day-long conference for Tamil youth on the history and politics of the 
struggle and connected it to their lives in Canada. 
  “Remembering Silenced Voices” opened on Saturday, July 26, 2008, with an 
afternoon artists’ reception featuring poems and stories by survivors, and performances of 
an original play—What If the Rain Fails?—composed by the Tamil poet, sociologist and 
activist, Rudramoorthy Cheran, and performed by the Asylum Theatre Group. The play 
depicted the events of Black July through a series of flashbacks during the refugee 
determination hearing of a survivor seeking asylum in Canada. The play, as described to 
me by one activist, was made to answer the question, “Why are we here—why do Tamils 
live in Canada?” 
The exhibit and the play were presented in an art gallery and performing arts 
centre in Toronto’s hip new Distillery District, a pedestrian-only “village” where fashion 
boutiques, restaurants, cafés, artisanal chocolatiers and fine art galleries jostled for 
consumers’ attention in a former whisky distillery; the District was a collection of 
reclaimed and redeveloped Victorian-era industrial buildings and streets that were 
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reopened to the public—with great excitement—only five years earlier in 2003. The 
venue, with its downtown location and upscale shops, was not a typical location for 
Canadian Tamil events.376 On the other hand, the District was registered as a National 
Historic Site of Canada in 1988, and was known as a place one went “to visit the past.” In 
this instance, attendees were invited to visit a scene of Sri Lankan violence and Tamil 
suffering. 
The exhibit: Remembering Silenced Voices 
The lights were dim, and people spoke in hushed tones, as I walked into the Arta 
Gallery on a summery afternoon. The gallery evoked the past, with its twelve-foot high 
ceiling, antique copper-colored distillery equipment, and exposed nineteenth-century 
brick walls, while concrete dividers and floors, exposed silver ducts, and track lighting 
added to the industrial feel of the space. A banner in the doorway explained to visitors the 
significance of the event they were about to enter:  
Black July is an unforgettable part of Canadian Tamil history. At a time 
when Tamils from Sri Lanka were seeking refuge from persecution, 
Canada opened its doors to provide a safe haven. 
  
In commemoration of its 25th Anniversary, this exhibit is a powerful 
collection of survivor stories, archival footage and work of local artists 
which narrates the recurring episodes of discrimination and violence over 
the decades and the journey of Tamil Canadians out of Sri Lanka. 
 
Framed photos and documents hung from metal chains and formed a line of black 
boxes that snaked around the room; before these boxes, people slowly shuffled from side 
to side while they took in a historical narrative about the events that led up to July 1983 
in Sri Lanka. I joined a group that was forming around a guide near the entrance. Our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 The location appeared to reflect the organizers’ intent to reach out to “mainstream” Canadians—a term 
that referred not only to “non-Tamils,” but to a dominant public of non-immigrant White Canadians. 
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tour guide turned out to be someone I had already met during my fieldwork, a young 
student of Indian (and Tamil) origin. That day, he wore a crisp white t-shirt screenprinted 
with two splashes—one red, one black—and covering them, the address for the exhibit’s 
web archive: BlackJuly83.com.  
The first half of the exhibit constructed a narrative of the events leading up to 
Black July, and it began with two images:  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Map of three kingdoms “before” (left) and Ceylon “after” colonial occupation 
(right), at Remembering Silenced Voices, July 2008 (Photograph by author) 
 
The first was a print of a small colonial map titled A New Map of Ceylon, 
surrounded by a thick wooden frame labeled “Before, with highlighted lines dividing the 
Low-country and Kandyan kingdoms, each ascribed to the Sinhalese, and the Jaffna 
kingdom (of the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries) in the north, ascribed to the Tamils. 
Placed next to the first map was a second: the same map, this time labeled “After” with 
the lines stitched together with blue, red, and white ribbons—the colors of the Union 
Jack. With these two maps, the exhibit makes its first argument—one that is common to 
Tamil nationalist histories, as discussed in Chapter 3: Decades of political conflict and 
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ethnic violence in Ceylon/Sri Lanka began with British colonial unification of the 
island’s administration in 1796. 
Our tour guide then led us through several events in the island’s postcolonial 
history: the Ceylon Citizenship Acts in 1948, which disenfranchised and made stateless 
Tamils of Indian origin; the 1956 Sinhala Only Act; the abrogation of pacts between the 
Prime Minister and Tamil political leader, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam in 1957 and then again 
in 1965; the anti-Tamil riots of 1958, accompanied by a survivor’s account of how he and 
his brother prevented a mob from entering their home, where ninety other Tamils were 
hiding from attackers; peaceful protests in the Federal Party (ITAK) activists’ satyagraha 
of 1961; the start of university standardization in 1971; a poster of the full text of the 
1976 Vaddukoddai Resolution, demanding a separate state for the Tamils; and a painter’s 
rendering of the burning of the Jaffna Public Library’s rare and irreplaceable Tamil-
language texts in 1981.377 This last event was viewed by many Tamils around the world 
as an act of “cultural genocide”—an attempt to eliminate the Tamil language in Sri 
Lanka, and its speakers’ documented linguistic and cultural history, and thus the claim of 
Tamil-speaking people to territory and sovereignty in Sri Lanka’s north.   
The aforementioned events were presented chronologically as part of a chain of 
violent episodes in “Remembering Silenced Voices,” building up a historical narrative of 
discrimination and violence against Tamils in Sri Lanka that culminates in the violence of 
July 1983. The atrocities of that week were the subject of the second half of the exhibit. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 This was a coordinated act of arson by elements of the state that went unpunished. Carried out by 
approximately 200 police officers in the presence of two Sri Lankan ministers of the ruling UNP: Cyril 
Mathew and Gamini Dissanayake. See Leary 1981 for discussion. 
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Survival and the Witness 
The second part of the exhibit presented the events of 1983 with material artifacts 
and survivor testimonies from Canadian Tamils. At this point, our tour guide left us to 
wander the exhibit on our own. In the back of the gallery, installations, documentary 
videos, material artifacts and panels about the events of July 1983 alternated with large, 
glossy black posters that hung from the concrete walls. Each poster presented a first-
person testimony of a survivor’s experience of Black July and their life in Sri Lanka, 
culminating in his/her migration to Canada. The following excerpts from survivors’ 
stories exemplify the general structure of the narratives presented at “Remembering 
Silenced Voices,” and in the exhibit’s digital archive: 
“One Sunday, after my classes in Jaffna, I was travelling with my husband 
towards Mullaitivu. All of the sudden (sic), we heard the firing and the 
screams of people. When we passed Punkankulam Railway station, we 
saw a body hung on a tree. I was shivering. It reminded me of the 1977 
riots, when thugs entered our house in Negombo and threatened us with 
death if we did not leave. We were refugees in our own hometown. All the 
way to Jaffna, stones were thrown to the train. Luckily, we were all safe 
but left with nothing.” (#9) 
“When it started on our street, it came all of [a] sudden. Vanloads of loud 
men started driving down the road. While my parents were scurrying 
around the backyard trying to figure out a way to escape, I got out of the 
bedroom where they had asked us to wait and went to watch the mob from 
near the living room. A group of men had gathered outside our home, 
throwing stones and breaking windows, while others started pouring 
kerosene on the house. I also saw a few outside with axes and other 
weapons. I was dragged by my dad back to hide in the bedroom. (#18) 
“There was a lot of police, army jeeps and helicopters flying above but 
none of them attempted to stop the thugs from maiming Tamils publicly, 
looting and burning their homes.  
“A lot of people, who were doing well before the riots, were suffering 
without any food or proper clothing in the camp.” 
“Through the support of external donations from Tamil businesses and 
volunteered services of the camp refugees, there was a single daily meal, 
medical services for the injured and maintenance of the toilets. We were 
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on our own without any protection or assistance from the government.” 
(#16) 
“My paternal grandfather was a Senator and my dad had lived in Colombo 
since childhood. Colombo was no longer a home for the Tamils who had 
lived there for many decades.” (#39) 
In the stories quoted above, the Tamil survivor describes how she learned of the 
violence, and where she was at the time. An angry Sinhala mob armed with basic 
weapons (such as hatchets and sticks, or petrol and matches) arrives, setting houses on 
fire, and beating people up in the streets. The survivors describe how they were affected: 
the fear they felt, their sense of loss, and the means by which they escaped, often thanks 
to relationships with Sinhala and Muslim neighbors, co-workers, and friends, to whom 
they are grateful. In these stories, the survivor found no solace or justice in the local 
police, and several express their disbelief and anger at the police for condoning and 
abetting the July pogrom. Made homeless by the violence, they were taken to makeshift 
“refugee camps” created out of schools, temples and churches, until they were placed on 
a ship to Jaffna. While some of the survivors end their narrative quickly, making brief 
reference to their migration abroad to Canada, others describe living through the early 
years of war, until they decided to leave. These survivors thank Canada for giving them 
“new life” in “a safe country,” and express their deep gratitude to the country’s leaders 
and public. 
Several of the testimonies linked their experiences of Black July to the violence 
that continued to beset Tamil civilians during the war: 
“We suffered only 14 days. However, many Tamils continue to suffer in 
Sri Lanka without food or shelter every day. It is quite unimaginable.” 
(#16) 
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“Still, we are lucky to be in Canada now…. Most Tamils who are in 
Canada now, might have died long ago if they stayed in Sri Lanka. We are 
very grateful to Canada, their people, and their leaders.” (#38) 
Canadian Tamil survivors linked their personal experiences of suffering collective 
violence to the suffering created by Sri Lanka’s war in 2008. Even if July 1983 was a 
turning point in the lives of these survivors, many of their narratives concluded with a 
brief description of life during the early years of war before migration abroad. One 
woman describes how her family became “refugees in our own land,” after leaving 
Negombo for Jaffna after the 1977 riots. Their stories mention the violences that “still 
continue today”—events that makes Sri Lanka inhospitable for them, as Tamils. 
Survivors also noted their difference from the victims of war, by stating they were 
“lucky” to now live in Canada, to have escaped.  
 
Figure 7.2: Survivor testimonies and silhouettes of Tamil refugees fleeing violence at 
Remembering Silenced Voices, July 2008 (Photograph by author) 
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Each story presented was of someone who was still alive at the time of the 
exhibit. The survivor’s story was accompanied by their name, a brief quote from their 
testimony, and a black and white photo of the story’s subject(s). The photos were close-
to-medium shots, allowing viewers access to the subject’s facial expression and bodily 
gestures. The survivors appear in these photos in a variety of naturalistic poses in their 
everyday life—some stand before their home’s doorway, while others sit at a window; 
some look at the camera (and the viewer), while others look to the side or gaze into the 
distance; a few smile, one woman laughs. 
One of the most striking pieces in the exhibit was an installation of piled objects: 
Two tires, and inside them, two cricket bats, a bicycle chain, a petrol can, and two brass 
lamps strewn about—the kind lit by Hindus during ceremonies. On top of the pile sits a 
document of several pages, singed at the corners and filled with Sri Lankan names: A 
voter’s list. While photos and first-person testimonies invited viewers into the survivors’ 
subjective experiences of violence, this installation presented the tools of the perpetrators 
of violence, without narration. Instead, the scene implicitly asked viewers to imagine how 
these everyday objects were used, in acts that were described in some of the testimonies. 
Tamil survivors vividly remembered these scenes when speaking about their experiences. 
And for many second-generation diasporic Tamils (including this ethnographer) such 
scenes were quite easy to imagine, as we had grown up piecing together the fragments of 
our families’ stories about anti-Tamil violence. 
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CTC activists also built and launched a website to gather and archive the 
abovementioned stories alongside the exhibit.378 The website holds forty testimonial 
narratives from survivors, whose stories are listed by name.379 At the end of the website’s 
list of survivors is a link, “Submit your story,” which invites readers to contribute a 
narrative of their own experience of Black July. While the Remembering Silenced Voices 
exhibit transformed an art gallery into a temporary, physical space for imagining, 
remembering and reflecting upon violence against Tamils and their suffering, the website 
continues to serve as a virtual repository for survivors’ testimonies. Indeed, the creation 
of a digital archive allowed Canadian Tamils’ recollections of violence and stories of 
survival to “survive” beyond the life of the exhibit in a decentralized network.  
 
 
Figure 7.3: Remembering Silenced Voices homepage at blackjuly83.com 
(Original source: Canadian Tamil Congress; screenshot by author) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 The exhibit was displayed in four Toronto-area locations during the month of July; in addition to the 
Distillery District opening, an abbreviated version of “Remembering Silenced Voices” was displayed in 
Mississauga, Toronto and Scarborough city halls. 
379 Several of these stories were added after the anniversary weekend. 
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The diasporic meanings of Black July 
Community activists commemorated Black July to remember the victims of that 
particular event, and the effects of that event and anti-Tamil violence more generally on 
the Tamils of Sri Lanka.  They also felt it was important to remind the “international 
community” at large of the “state terror” that spurred Tamil militancy and the turn to 
armed struggle. Black July was (and still is) widely understood to be a turning point in 
the Tamil national question, when decades of political action in response to 
discrimination and growing conflict gave way to an all-out war with the state.380 
Garnering a great deal of international attention, Black July also became the last large-
scale, state-planned act of mass violence against Tamils in Sri Lanka. The violence of 
Black July mobilized thousands of Tamil youth to join fledgling militant groups. All 
future violence would be deemed a necessary consequence of war and ‘collateral 
damage’ in fighting terrorism. 
However, Black July ceremonies did more than encourage Tamils to remember 
the loss of Tamil lives in Sri Lanka, and remind audiences of the violence that led to war 
with the Sri Lankan state. In the CTC’s words, “The annual event commemorates the 
exodus of Tamils to the West in the wake of the anti-Tamil riots staged with the 
connivance of the Sri Lankan government of the day in 1983” (Canadian Tamil Congress 
2007). The event commemorates an exodus, a forced departure from Sri Lanka. In doing 
so, the event reminds Tamils of the sufferings they endured, as individuals and as a 
collectivity, at a fixed moment in time – at a turning point, just before the war officially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 See, for example, Ponnambalam 1983; Tambiah 1986; Wilson 1988. For anthropological accounts of the 
violence, see Roberts 1994; Siriwardene and Rajasingham-Perera 2003; see also Kanapathipillai 1990, 
2003 for interviews with survivors living in Sri Lanka. 
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began. And it is this moment that provides the “humble beginnings” of a diasporic origin 
story. The violence of Black July and the “untold suffering” it has caused generates a 
Tamil diaspora, and justifies to Canadians why “we” are “here.” Black July is not just a 
watershed moment in Sri Lankan history; for activists, the event is—as stated on the 
banner at the exhibit’s entrance--“An unforgettable part of Canadian Tamil history.”381 
Black July was not the only commemorative event Tamils held, but it was unique. 
Unlike Maaveerar Naal (Great Heroes Day), an explicit commemoration of martyred 
LTTE cadres that was, by 2006, under a great deal of scrutiny, the CTC’s Black July 
events allowed Tamil activists to remember a moment of apparently unalloyed 
suffering—it provided a space within which Tamils could inhabit the space of the 
blameless victim. The violence was a touchstone in the lives of these activists – every 
activist who was old enough to remember could narrate where they were, and how it 
affected them, and the children of Tamil immigrants learned to narrate a version of their 
parents’ stories. This moment of intense conflict between Sri Lankans is, historically and 
politically, a unifying moment for diasporic Tamils in that the violence did not 
discriminate among Tamils—indeed, as has so often been the case in the contemporary 
history of Sri Lanka’s Tamils, we find unity only in death.   
 Moreover, the exhibit depicts Canadian Tamils not only as victims who suffered 
from violence and its after-effects, but as survivors who have established successful new 
lives for themselves in Canada.   
Call of the Conscience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 Canadian Tamil Congress. 2008b. Black July ’83: Remembering Silenced Voices. Brochure. Also see 
the homepage of the archive’s website.  
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 One month after Remembering Silenced Voices, another exhibit was held in 
Toronto. “Call of the Conscience: Photographs and documentary films on Sri Lanka” 
opened on August 23, 2008, at Roy Thompson Hall, a performing arts venue in the heart 
of downtown Toronto and home to the city’s symphony orchestra. The exhibit was billed 
as a momentous occasion: 
 Call of the Conscience is a landmark event that will walk you through the 
history of violence in Sri Lanka with six short documentary films and 
more than 500 historical and contemporary photographs—showing how 
all sides of the civil war have contributed to the suffering of ordinary Sri 
Lankans. 
Invitations to the event pointed out the exhibit’s unique chronicling of the historical 
suffering of “all peoples in Sri Lanka,” in its aim to unite Sinhala, Muslim and Tamil 
aspirations. What was the purpose of this chronicle of suffering?  
A postcard for the event provides some insight into the event’s purpose. The 
postcard promised attendees “a greater awareness of the roots and the outcome of the 
conflict in Sri Lanka.” The postcard continued: 
An accurate understanding of the problem is essential, before we can lend 
a hand to end the agony of war.  
Walk through the suffering of the Sri Lankan people trapped between a 
known devil and a better known devil. This audio-visual tour will show 
how the forces that maintain the crisis are as oppressive as the currents 
that brought the country to war. 
In the above statement, “Call of the Conscience” interpellated viewers as subjects who 
could act to end the war, once provided with a factual understanding of the war. (The 
final line of the statement is a coded one that appears to refer to the LTTE and the state, 
and attributes oppression to both.) The exhibit’s goals of awareness and action were 
reiterated in an invitation to the opening ceremony for the exhibit: 
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Our objective is two-fold: to activate Canadians in the struggle for peace, 
human rights and dignity in Sri Lanka; and to facilitate a constructive 
dialogue among the rich and diverse Sri Lankan diaspora. 
 
How were the exhibit’s representations of suffering connected to these aims? Before I 
address these questions, I tell the life history of Mano, the primary organizer of Call of 
the Conscience, and the Coordinator of a new initiative he called the International Forum 
for Peace and Justice in Sri Lanka.382 Mano’s life as a journalist and dissenting activist in 
Sri Lanka led to his eventual exile in North America, and Call of the Conscience marked 
his return to public activism, for the first time in a diasporic location. I turn to his story of 
dissent, exile and persistence to provide context for an analysis of his exhibit’s 
representation of suffering.  
A life of dissent: Mano 
Mano was born in 1959, one year after the anti-Tamil riots of 1958; his mother 
liked to claim it was the reason for his involvement in politics. His mother was a Tamil 
Catholic from Mannar, in northern Sri Lanka, while his father was a Tamil born in 
Kandy, to parents of Indian origin. Mano was raised in Kandy, a pluralistic city in a 
mostly Sinhala region, and lived in a Tamil neighborhood with his family of seven. When 
he was 16, the family was caught up in the anti-Tamil riots of 1977. Mano was attacked 
at his school, and his father was beaten up two times. A neighbor warned them of thugs 
roaming the village, and anticipating violence, they decided to leave their home that 
night. The anxiety of displacement took a toll on the family: Mano’s mother became 
“emotionally disturbed” and would not eat. After his mother received some treatment, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 This forum is not to be confused with the Canadian Forum for Peace and Justice in Sri Lanka, a different 
forum coordinated by another left activist in Toronto at the time. That forum sought to engage Tamil 
community organizations and especially progressive Tamil youth. 
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Mano and his family went to Mannar. As he put it, “We went to our native village as 
refugees.” 
 In Mannar, Mano joined the TULF’s Youth Front (ilaiñar pēravai) unofficially, 
putting up posters and getting swept up in the rising tide of Tamil militancy. He took care 
of his family, while his brother was tapped to join the Tigers (which he later left, due to a 
bout with brain malaria.) Now that his brother was back at home, Mano wanted to join 
the Tigers, but his brother advised him against joining: “That’s not the right 
organization.” When Mano asked why, he was told, “There is no space for our opinions.” 
Instead, Mano continued to work odd jobs. When approached by a friend about a job 
organizing laborers in the plantation areas, Mano moved back to the Hill Country in 
1980. He learned “the ABCs of Marxism and the Socialist language” and as he saw “the 
real life of [his] father’s people” he started to feel that the Tamil struggle in the North had 
little to do with him.383  
 The events of July 1983 changed Mano’s relationship to Tamil nationalist politics 
once again. Mano began to argue with the friend who had taken him out of “Jaffna 
politics,” and told him, “This [the national question] has become the primary struggle 
again.” Mano went to Jaffna and met with Tamil leftists, on the suggestion of his friend; 
many were Maoists who dismissed the national struggle as a bourgeois one. The next 
year, he went to Madras, received training from the National Liberation Front of Tamil 
Eelam (NLFTE), and went back to Jaffna by boat at the end of 1985. When Mano moved 
back to Mannar for work, the NLFTE opened a branch. When the LTTE started attacking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 He noted, however, that during this time, he was held in detention for three days, after being seen by the 
police as someone who had come from the North to organize Hill Country Tamils. 
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TELO in May 1986, Mano was transported back in time to the violence of 1977. He 
began to understand the need to challenge the LTTE. 
  From 1987 to 1990, Mano worked with a group of Tamil human rights activists 
who documented violations by the state, the LTTE, and the other armed groups, produced 
analyses of the war, and documented its effects on ordinary people. This group was the 
University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna). When the group had to escape the 
LTTE’s control of the north (after the assassination of Dr. Rajani Thiranagama384), Mano 
also moved to Colombo, where he began a new career in journalism. For three years, he 
wrote a column for the Movement for Interracial Justice and Equality (MIRJE)’s Sinhala-
language newspaper, Yaukataya (Justice), to provide “a window on the Tamil struggle” to 
readers in the south. In 1991-1995, Mano became involved with peace activism and, with 
the South, in his words, “opening up,” he began to focus on Tamil politics. He was 
approached by Lake House, the government press, to write for their Tamil magazine. In 
his writing, he criticized the Tigers and the notion of ‘the traitor’ in Tamil nationalism. 
In 1995, Mano campaigned among Tamils and Sinhala villages in the south to 
gain support for President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s devolution proposals, a package 
that was widely viewed at the time as the best option presented to minorities. He 
eventually became the Managing Director of Lake House and a television manager at the 
Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation. 
For his work as a journalist, Mano became the target of two attempts to take his 
life, which he attributed to the Tigers. He did not receive security during the second 
attempt, which took place during a transition of power from the SLFP to the UNP, and he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 See Appendix III in Hoole et al. (1990) and Thiranagama (2011). 
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had to live underground. During this time—the start of the peace process—the LTTE 
intimidated and killed dozens of their political opponents. For the next two years, Mano 
moved from safe house to safe house, without a job. After an American journalist 
interviewed him, the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists helped Mano 
leave Sri Lanka in 2003. He spent two years in the United States on journalism 
fellowships, where he read Sri Lankan news everyday; during this time, three of his 
colleagues were killed and he grew very unhappy about living in exile. In 2005, his wife 
decided they would move to Canada, where she had relatives and a good friend. 
 Mano was wary of Toronto, a hub for LTTE nationalists and activism in the 
diaspora; he worried he might be recognized there, and feared for the safety of his family. 
Unlike most Tamils who moved to Toronto seeking relatives or “known people” and a 
community, Mano and his family settled in a smaller town in southern Ontario, where 
they would be largely unknown to its residents.  
 One day, while we were talking, Mano told me about the exhibit he was planning. 
He had spoken with other dissenting activists about this idea, and had been thinking 
about it for more than three years. He wanted to talk about the thousands of people who 
had died during the war, including those who had died at the hands of the LTTE and 
other militant groups. He also wanted to reframe the way people saw activists critical of 
the LTTE as “traitors”; for Mano, dissenting activists were “the people of conscience, the 
soul of our society.” “After the 23rd [of August], everything will change,” he said. This 
was the date of the opening. He called it his “coming out”385 to the diaspora. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 A turn of phrase that references “coming out of the closet” as a form of queer and LGBT liberation. 
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The timing of Mano’s exhibit was not a coincidence. He explained, “During 
Black July, we always talk about Welikade, but these things [imprisonment and torture] 
were also done within Tamil society—political prisoners—I have seen it.” He hoped that 
at least the second-generation would have access to a history that is “not so one-sided,” 
and might bring it back to their parents. The timing was right for Mano, in 2008; as the 
situation got worse in Sri Lanka, anti-LTTE activists could not get the government to 
work on Tamil disappearances or other issues.386 Mano wanted not only to end support 
for the Tigers, but to create the conditions for political dissent in general. 
Mano hoped that he would one day be able to take the exhibit to wherever Tamil 
and Sinhala people lived in diaspora, together or apart; in an invitation to the event, he 
announced plans for a tour of the United States, Europe, Australia, and India. In his 
dream scenario, the exhibit would be seen in every district in Sri Lanka. 
The exhibit 
On a late Saturday afternoon in August, nearly two hundred people—Canadians 
of Sri Lankan origin, Tamil and otherwise—gathered to inaugurate Mano’s “chronicle” 
of suffering in Sri Lanka. The audience sat in rows of seats before the stage, in the open 
lobby of the grand, drum-shaped concert hall. Above us, the summer sun streamed in 
through a glass canopy overhead, spotlighting the exhibit’s pitch-black panels of image 
and text—events of war in stark contrast with the city outside the dome. That afternoon, 
the audience was an amicable one: Many of the people present were Mano’s friends and 
colleagues, or were part of his wider network, as dissenting activists or members of Sri 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 On the issue of disappearances and abductions at this time, see Human Rights Watch (2008). 
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Lankan community associations. A few non-Tamil (and mostly White) journalists and 
leftist activists were also present.  
 “Call of the Conscience” opened with songs by a local band and four speeches: 
Mano, as the creator of the event, spoke of his life and the brutal war; Melani M., a singer 
and musician of Tamil and Sinhala Catholic background; Kevin Shimmin, a labor 
organizer who had worked with human rights activists in Sri Lanka for sixteen years; and 
V. Anandasangaree, the President of the TULF who was well-known in Sri Lanka and the 
diaspora for his criticism of the Tigers (and had written the letter about Pongu Thamil 
addressed to a Tamil diaspora cited in Chapter 2).  
Each of these speeches placed “Call of the Conscience” in the context of an 
ongoing war in Sri Lanka: they linked past sufferings to the present suffering of civilians 
caught between two warring parties. Several of the speakers criticized the government 
and the LTTE, and emphasized the difficulty of dissent. In doing so, these activists also 
spoke of and addressed a Tamil diaspora that was widely presumed to support the LTTE, 
and thus complicit in continuing the war and the suppression of dissent. At the conclusion 
of the opening ceremony, the audience made their way through the exhibit.  
“Call of the Conscience” directed viewers’ attention to those who had suffered 
and/or been killed due to violence inflicted by the state and the LTTE. The first panel 
formed the backdrop of the stage: a digital collage of photographs of Tamil activists, 
politicians and community leaders who were killed during the emergence of Tamil 
militancy and throughout the years of war (Figure 7.4). Other panels presented lists of the 
names of aid workers, media professionals, and political leaders who were killed; these 
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names were color-coded to indicate whether they had been killed by the LTTE, on the 
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Figure 7.4: Call of the Conscience banners: “Tamil Torture Chambers” (above) and four 
banners depicting Tamil activists, politicians and high-profile cases of civilians killed 
(below). Toronto, August 2008 (Photographs by author) 
 
In addition to the activists, politicians, community leaders and media personnel 
whose lives were lost, “Call of the Conscience” highlighted the suffering of three socially 
marginalized groups among Tamils on the island and in diaspora: Sri Lanka’s internally 
displaced, war widows, and refugees in India. The first two were depicted as sharing 
experiences with members of the Sinhala and Muslim communities. In the first instance, 
in addition to the expelled northern Muslims and the eastern Muslims displaced by war, 
Sinhala residents of the northwestern and eastern “border zones” (Rajasingham-
Senanayake 2001a) are among the people described and depicted as displaced due to war. 
In the second instance, the widows of war are not only Tamil, or even Muslims from the 
north and east, but Sinhalese too, as the panel includes the government’s figures for 
widows of soldiers in the armed forces and home guards.387  
The “refugees in India” are specifically Tamil, however, and as discussed in 
previous chapters of this dissertation, this group was often omitted from representations 
of the Tamil diaspora and diasporic discussions about Tamil suffering. “Call of the 
Conscience" included Tamil refugees living in India, and in doing so, claimed their 
suffering for Sri Lanka, rather than as part of a global diaspora. 
The exhibit also showed viewers that Tamils were not the only ones who had 
suffered during the war. During the exhibit’s opening reception, guest speakers noted that 
many of the soldiers who fought and died in the war were from poor, rural Sinhala 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 At the end of the war, women who were widowed by the war headed an estimated 40,000 households in 
the Northern Province. See Human Rights Watch (2009). 
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families. Mano also noted one event in particular that upset him and turned him toward 
the path of dissent: When the LTTE hijacked a bus in Anuradhapura, killing 146 
predominantly Sinhala civilians in 1985 (Hoole et al. 1990); until then, Tamil militants 
had stuck to targeting the state’s institutions and leaders. The suffering of Sinhala 
civilians at the hands of Tamil militants thus raised an ethical question for the diasporic 
activist; Mano used this event to reframe a popular narrative of the war as one between 
“Sinhalese persecutors” and “Tamil victims.” The exhibit revealed a more complex 
narrative than this, even as Tamil civilians were the majority of victims, in the names and 
photographs shown. 
Most critically, Call of the Conscience dissented from Tamil nationalist and 
community-based activism by raising two issues that were erased from dominant 
community representations of suffering during the war. The first was the problem of 
LTTE violence against the Muslims of northern and eastern Sri Lanka, communities that 
also suffered greatly during the war. The exhibit’s panels centered on three historical 
moments of violence and social suffering: the Kattankudy mosque massacre of August 
1990, including a list of names of the men who were killed during Friday prayers; the 
LTTE’s expulsion of nearly 75,000 Muslims from the Northern Province in May 1990; 
and “Forgotten Muslims,” which depicted the struggles of northern Muslims resettled in 
the northwestern district of Puttalam, where they continued to live in neglected refugee 
camps with no assurances of return.388 A few Sri Lankan-Canadians expressed surprise to 
one another that these events had occurred—particularly the eviction of Muslims—and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 For discussions of these events and Muslim displacement from northern Sri Lanka, see Thiranagama 
(2011) and Brun (2008). 
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they had not known about it.389 This provided visitors with an opportunity to sit down, 
talk with each other, and ask questions of each other and Mano, the event’s organizer. 
The second issue that challenged dominant community activists’ representations 
of Tamil suffering was that of intra-ethnic violence, and particularly, the LTTE’s use of 
prisons and torture to punish the cadres of other militant groups, dissenters and Tamils 
who did not comply with the organization’s rules and demands.390  
Two panels of quotes from a February 1992 UTHR(J) report titled The Trapped 
People Among Peacemakers and Warmongers flank the story of “Samaran,” an escapee 
from an LTTE detention camp. Samaran’s pseudonym meant “warrior,” and was a 
reference to his militant past.391 All three panels depict human body parts—hands, ankles 
and legs—in chains and shackles. Below these three panels are two quotes: 
It is sad enough to note that neither responsible organisations nor religious 
institutions such as churches have raised these things with the LTTE. 
Some Church dignitaries who go abroad and speak about justice to the 
Tamil people, and some leading intellectuals from the expatriate 
community who are the apologists for the LTTE never ponder why these 
things are happening in the midst of a liberation struggle. – UTHR 
The quote is juxtaposed with a second quote, in which Samaran describes one aspect of 
his torture at the hands of an LTTE leader: 
“He [Carles] (sic) puts about hundreds of prisoners in a tiny room (10” x 
12” and shuts them in. Later he chooses 10 of them and chains them in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 I did not learn the ethnicity of these visitors, but they were apparently from a Sri Lankan group in 
Canada and were likely from the western or southern regions of the island, as minorities in the north and 
east were all too familiar with these events. 
390 The UTHR(J) also notes that some of the prisoners held were the parents or siblings of those who 
belonged to non-LTTE groups (1992). 
391 One of my informants told me that samaran was also chosen to evoke the term’s use in Tamil 
Christianity, but I could not confirm its meaning. In any case, the latter connotation would not have been 
evident to most Tamils, including many Tamil Christians. 
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strange way, i.e. right leg with the left leg with the right hand and asked 
them to walk and he enjoys the suffering. While he tortures the prisoners, 
he mocks at them and laughs.” – Samaran 
The quote from Samaran reveals that the LTTE had at times a different relationship to 
Tamil suffering than what was presented in diasporic community narratives, which 
typically depict the Tigers as the Tamils’ protectors and defenders. In his story, Samaran 
documented the existence of a network of LTTE prisons. He described how an LTTE 
leader tortured Tamil prisoners in the early 1990s, and enjoyed the sight of their 
suffering. In contrast to the image of the Tamil Tiger as a protector or a heroic martyr 
dying while defending the Tamil people, the Tigers are shown to be responsible for 
inflicting pain and thus causing the suffering of some Tamils.  
Over sixteen years after his imprisonment, Samaran was living in Canada, and 
attended the event. He knew Mano and a few other dissenting activists quite well. Mano’s 
“coming out” evinced the modest political space that had opened up for dissenting 
activists in Canada after the ban on the LTTE and the return to war in Sri Lanka. Still, 
activists like Samaran were cautious. We were introduced, and after agreeing to speak 
with me, Samaran provided his contact information, paused, and watched as I jotted 
down his phone number. When I was done, he said that he was waiting to see whether I 
would write down his proper name. (I had not done so.) He did not want to be publicly 
identified. Even in Toronto, he feared what might happen to him for making public 
criticisms of the Tigers. 
 The panels on Tamil prisons were the most controversial part of “Call of the 
Conscience” and upset many community activists. Most diasporic supporters of the 
LTTE were unaware of the group’s prisons, even though they had been documented by 
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local human rights groups in Sri Lanka. When confronted with information that tarnished 
the Tigers’ reputation, they were likely to dismiss it as “anti-Tamil” misinformation put 
out by the Sri Lankan government. Since “Call of the Conscience” was not organized 
under the auspices of the dominant community groups, the exhibit was viewed by these 
activists with suspicion. Rumors swirled about the funding behind the exhibit before and 
after the opening. When another researcher arrived during the public event after the 
opening ceremony, she asked me, “Is this being put on by the EPDP?”392 When I said no, 
not as far as I knew, she explained that was what she had been told. Members of another 
organization speculated about funding from the Sri Lankan government. Dissenting 
activists frequently had to contend with such accusations, and the notion of being a 
“traitor” (thurogi). 
In presenting cases of Muslim and Tamil suffering, Call of the Conscience posed 
two problems to the diasporic viewer, each of which suggested that those who claimed 
‘sole representation’ of the Tamils were responsible for the suffering of others, whether 
the ‘other’ was defined as internal or external to the group. The first problem presented 
members of one minority group (the Tamils) as responsible for oppressing another 
minority (the Muslims) in their midst. To put it another way, where Tamils were 
numerically significant and dominant in the north and east, LTTE nationalism operated 
according to a majoritarian logic analogous to Sinhala nationalism, meting out the 
discrimination and violence experienced by Tamils in southern and central Sri Lanka 
upon a minority within the north and east: the Muslims. While Tamil-speaking in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 The EPDP, as explained in Chapter 1, are a militant group turned political party that formed in 1988 
under the leadership of Douglas Devananda. During my fieldwork, they ruled the north via their alliance 
with Mahinda Rajapakse’s SLFP, and were known to many Tamils in Jaffna and abroad as a violent 
paramilitary force. 
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north and east, Muslim specificity could not be subsumed within a category of “Tamil-
speaking people,” as Tamil politicians and other militant groups had tried, and so in 
Muslims, the LTTE created an internal other, which it then expelled or killed. Violence 
against Muslims, and the unwillingness of the LTTE and many Tamil nationalists to 
acknowledge these events as a moral problem, thus became a central political problem for 
the dissenting Tamil.393 
The second problem pointed to the internal oppression of those identified as 
Tamils. The exhibit revealed that some Tamils suffered (and in the return to war, 
continued to suffer) at the hands of other Tamils. In doing so, the exhibit questioned the 
notion of the LTTE’s “sole representation” of Tamils, and refuted the idea that the 
Tigers’ nationalism was a ‘defensive’ nationalism in response to state violence and ethnic 
chauvinism. However, the exhibit did not refute the image of the Tamil as a “victim” in 
need of protection; instead, it identified the LTTE as a second persecutor alongside the 
Sri Lankan government.  
Finally, Call of the Conscience also used photographs to construct an iconography 
of suffering shared by Sri Lankans of many ethnic and religious backgrounds. For 
example, the panels about the expulsion of Muslims in 1990 and of Tamil refugees in 
India used historical photographs of people carrying babies and small children, and 
framed a mass of people carrying their belongings while traveling on foot. The panels on 
the multiethnic cities of Trincomalee and Colombo presented photos taken at funerals for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 During my fieldwork, nationalist and community activists did not publicly discuss the LTTE’s use of 
violence against Muslims, and rarely did so in private. I once observed an attempt to discuss this during a 
casual conversation among activists following an event at the CTC office. When a young man who was 
sympathetic to Tamil nationalism raised the issue of the 1990 expulsion (less out of moral than political 
concerns) an older member became very upset and did not wish to talk about it—to the point of walking 
away from the conversation. 
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the casualties of war; the former, about the execution of five Tamil students in 2006, and 
the latter about a suicide bombing in the capital’s main railway station that killed eleven 
people and injured nearly one hundred in February 2008. Under the panel’s title, 
“Trincomalee,” a notice about the five young men appears in the Tamil language; a 
similar notice about those who died at the railway station appears in Sinhala on the 
Colombo panel. The different languages in each notice signal the ethnolinguistic 
audiences for which these deaths became legible and grievable, marking a difference 
between communities in order to demonstrate similarities in their suffering and public 
mourning.394 
While “Remembering Silenced Voices” constructed a history of violence against 
Tamils that culminated in the events of July 1983 and the Tamil diaspora, “Call of the 
Conscience” constructed an alternate history focused on the years of war from 1983 to 
2008, the year the exhibit was held, and primarily on the decades of the 1980s and 
1990s—the period during which Toronto’s Tamil diaspora grew. Moreover, while the 
former exhibit centered on acts of physical violence, and the results of these acts in 
displacement and emotional trauma, the latter also directed viewers to the “social 
suffering” of economic marginalization. 
The one event that both exhibits presented was the massacres of Tamil political 
prisoners at Welikade prison on July 25 and July 27, 1983. Remembering Silenced 
Voices presented this event in the context of a historical narrative about Black July, in 
which anyone could be a victim simply for the “crime” of being a Tamil. Call of the 
Conscience instead located this event alongside other prison massacres: an LTTE 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394 There are clearly other differences, but this is beyond the scope of my argument here. 
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massacre of surrendered TELO cadres at Kanthan Karunai on March 30, 1987, and the 
murder on October 25, 2000 of Tamil inmates at the Bindunuwewa rehabilitation 
camp.395 
Above all, both exhibits underscored the distinct ways in which diasporic 
activists, whether Tamil community activists or dissenters, turned to the problem of 
Tamil suffering—whether exclusively, or as interconnected with other sufferings—to 
intervene in Sri Lanka’s war. Whether publicly mobilized as a Tamil community, or 
sharply critical of community politics, Tamil activists shared a diasporic ethics and 
politics requiring engagement with the problem of suffering—and Tamil suffering in 
particular. As we shall see in the sections that follow, activists’ orientations to protest and 
dissent continued to shape diaspora activism, as Tamils in Canada and India mobilized 
against the war. 
PART TWO: Suffering and Protesting the ‘Humanitarian War’ 
Discourses of humanitarianism pervaded and fundamentally shaped the conduct 
of “the final war” in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan government argued that it was fighting “a 
humanitarian war” to liberate the Tamils, who were being held hostage by the LTTE. The 
LTTE countered these claims, and lambasted the government for blocking international 
aid (including food and medicine) to the suffering Tamil population of the north. During 
the 2002 ceasefire, the group had focused much of its energy on establishing parallel 
state-like structures396, cultivating international relationships, and redirecting international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395 The Bindunuwewa massacre, like the massacres at Welikade, was done with the police in attendance. 
Officers stood by, and some even fired at the prisoners who came seeking their protection. 
396 For a discussion of these structures, see Stokke (2006); for a rejoinder to the notion of an LTTE quasi-
state, see Sarvananthan (2007). 
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aid through its coffers. And as noted in Chapter 2, a dispute over the distribution of 
international aid in response to the 2004 Asian tsunami was a critical factor in the 
breakdown of the ceasefire. 
The Sri Lankan war was thus also fought on the grounds of public relations.  This 
is not surprising given that scholarship on humanitarianism has revealed the power of 
“humanity” as a subject of politics, with the latter also known as a waging of “war by 
other means” (Foucault 1978). Moreover, while humanitarianism and militarism have 
long been connected through “the laws of war,” they have become tightly interlinked to 
each other in new ways (Chandler 2001; Fassin and Pandolfi 2010), allowing 
governments to justify all manner of violence against others in the name of “saving” 
humanity, and along with it, the political project of democracy. 
Human rights and humanitarian discourses also provided activists with a way to 
“do morals and politics with new words” (Fassin 2008: 532). Anthropologists have, by 
and large, focused on the institutions of transnational humanitarianism and the 
unintended consequences of their work for those in their care (Ticktin 2014). This chapter 
reveals how such discourses circulate in times of crisis, when humanitarianism—as an 
ethos and a moral imperative to end suffering—provided the discursive terrain for a 
government fighting the war, and those who mobilized collective action against the war. 
The focus here is on activists and protesters who felt it was their diasporic duty to act 
collectively to secure a “humanitarian ceasefire” to reduce Tamil suffering in northern Sri 
Lanka. In the sections that follow, I turn to the ways in which activists mobilized Tamils 
to alleviate and protest suffering through cultural productions and political action. 
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Camp protests in Tamil Nadu 
In Chapter 5, I described two of the dozens of demonstrations that were organized 
by Tamil refugees in their camps in Tamil Nadu to protest the war in Sri Lanka. I focused 
on the work of Sooriya and Mark, two refugee activists who organized and participated in 
these protests, and examined how these camp protests appealed to the Indian government 
to “protect” the Tamils. I also examined the context of surveillance in which these 
protests occurred, and how statist discourses of protection and security were entangled 
with camp activism and created limits to refugee protest. In this section, I return briefly to 
these protests to describe and analyze how they invoked Tamil suffering to mobilize 
action to end the war. As noted in the previous chapter, camp refugees were careful not to 
show signs of support to the LTTE or their political goals.  
Instead, refugee protesters located their political participation in their predicament 
as refugees, which they connected to that of displaced civilians in Sri Lanka. By 
organizing protests against the war, camp refugees also demonstrated against the 
interconnected forms of political and structural violence that shape their lives in India. 
They demonstrated in the space of their camps. They made visible their own suffering, as 
the relatives of those suffering through the war in northern Sri Lanka, but also as Tamils 
who were living as de facto refugees of that war. In their everyday speech and acts of 
protest, camp refugees appropriated circulating discourses of human rights and 
humanitarianism (in ordinary language) to make claims upon the states that govern and 
neglect their lives. 
 “We live as refugees” 
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The protest Sooriya organized at Manikandan exemplifies how camp refugees tied 
their struggles as refugees to Tamils suffering in Sri Lanka’s war zones.  
At the protest, a new generation of refugee children chanted slogans asking the 
Indian government not to give weapons to the Sri Lankan army. The extent of India’s 
military assistance to Sri Lanka was not fully known, but Sri Lankan soldiers had 
received training in Tamil Nadu, prompting protests from local nationalist parties.397 It 
was also later reported that Indian radar operators were found in the war zone. They held 
hand-written signs that read, “We who were born in my motherland, we live as refugees.” 
(en thaay mannil pirantha naam… ahathikalaaka vazhkinroom.) Seeking a solution, they 
proclaimed, would be the refugee’s greatest gift.  
The juxtaposition of their chant, “India, don’t give [weapons] to the [Sri Lankan] 
army!” (inthiya ranuvathai kodukkathe!) and the sign, “We live as refugees” implied 
what could not be explicitly said at the protest: We, who live as refugees, are here 
because of the war. India played a part in this war. We are here because India, along with 
other powerful states, help the Sri Lankan government continue this war. We are here 
because you are there. Such a statement could not be explicitly made because, in Tamil 
Nadu, the dominant narrative in refugee rehabilitation made no mention of India’s 
support to Tamil militant groups, nor its role in the Indo-Lanka Accord and subsequent 
war. Sri Lankan refugees in Tamil Nadu were thus expected to be grateful as recipients of 
India’s “hospitality,” instead of an approach that would grant them legal status, and take 
responsibility for India’s entanglement in the Sri Lankan conflict. 
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Moreover, the children’s posters revealed important ambivalences in the social 
location of Tamil refugees in India. The statement, “We who were born in my 
motherland…” appears to refer to Sri Lanka as their retrospective point-of-origin, the 
land from which their parents had fled. For some of the children, almost all under ten 
years old, this would be possible. But for many in this camp, their parents arrived during 
the early 1990s. These children were born in Tamil Nadu, in Manikandan and other 
camps. Their ur was not that of their parents, who claimed consubstantiality with the soil 
of villages in northern (and, to a lesser extent, eastern) Sri Lanka. When asked, most were 
able to name this place. Some, following their parents’ example, located it with markers 
of proximity after first naming the region or district to which the village belongs (e.g. “It 
is in Mannar, close to Talaimannar, where we left by boat.”)398 By taking into account 
this critical distinction between the birthplace of an older generation of migrants and their 
children, the statement reads differently. The “motherland” of the statement becomes 
India, and the rest of the statement laments the differential treatment meted out to its 
children, the Tamils, and these children, in Tamil Nadu camps. The signs thus drew on a 
discursive tradition in Tamil historical and literary texts that sees Tamil India and Sri 
Lanka as part of a wider, pan-Tamil-speaking world of goodness (thamil ulaga nanmai), 
and Indian and Lankan Tamil activisms that explicitly refer to Tamil Nadu as the mother 
of Eelam Tamils (Cheran 2007).399 
By making claims upon India as their motherland, camp protesters provided a 
subtle critique of their non-legal status in India by linking the conditions of their lives as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 Refugee children and youth who mistakenly connected one place to the incorrect region or district were 
the subject of laughter from their peers and adult consternation. 
399 This also recalls the image of the Tamil language personified as one’s own mother (tamizhttay) in Tamil 
language devotion (Ramaswamy 1997). 
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refugees to their children’s futures. Furthermore, they used this claim—the claim of a 
child upon mother, thus reworking a familiar trope of regional paternalism—to invoke 
the state’s responsibility to protect, which becomes analogous to a mother protecting her 
children. They did so while chanting slogans that asked the Indian government not to 
assist the Sri Lankan army: “Don’t give! Don’t give! India, don’t give [weapons] to the 
[Sri Lankan] army!” (kodukkathe! kodukkathe! inthiya ranuvathai kodukkathe!) They 
ascribed this responsibility to India without reference to the Indian state’s earlier role in 
the conflict, which exacerbated the war and produced more suffering. The protesters 
instead focused on what India could do to end Tamil suffering due to the current phase of 
the war.  
Refugees connected the social uncertainty of their present lives in India to the 
physical vulnerability of Tamils caught in the crossfire of Sri Lanka’s war—people 
whose very lives were threatened by a war that had the Indian state’s tacit and material 
support. The same war, in earlier phases, had driven them out of their homes and brought 
them to India’s shores. Their immediate concern was to stop the war to protect the lives 
of Tamils in Sri Lanka. However, even if the war ended tomorrow, most Tamil 
refugees—camp residents and OfERR staff alike—explained that they would not return 
to Sri Lanka without a just political solution to the conflict. They doubted whether that 
solution would be forthcoming under the Rajapaksa government. They had survived the 
war, and had become refugees in the process. They often wondered: Would their children 
remain refugees?  
When refugees were denied the permission to protest, they felt aggrieved and 
distressed. On February 15, 2009, four camps submitted a joint request to their District 
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Collector to hold a demonstration. The request was denied, and in the words of one active 
camp resident, they were told they could talk among themselves instead. They were told 
that the media should not be present. One woman then told me, as she held out her 
upturned palms, “We have a concern (akkarai) for our people. But we cannot do 
anything. We are refugees. I see their suffering (vētanai), their sorrows (varuttam), the 
news. We shall do it by peaceful means. And they say the Indians can do it, but we must 
not?” Many camp refugees felt this to be deeply unfair. They understood that the reason 
they were denied rights to protest was their status as refugees who were dependent on the 
state for their refuge and welfare and lacked citizenship rights in their country of 
residence. But it was precisely their lives as refugees that many camp residents felt bound 
them to the plight of displaced Tamils in Sri Lanka. The camps were heavily surveilled 
by police, and every gathering in the spaces outside their huts required permissions that 
were usually secured through bureaucratic administrative protocols. In this case, the 
collector’s denial of their request foreclosed the possibility of action through organized 
protest and media coverage. Feeling unable to “do something” to intervene in the war 
compounded anxieties among camp refugees, and contributed to a sense of isolation and 
helplessness. 
The “Tamil diaspora protests” in Toronto 
May 2009: Toronto had never seen the likes of protests like these. Tens of 
thousands of protesters lined the streets of downtown Toronto, calling upon the Canadian 
government to take action on the war in Sri Lanka. Their actions were a part of several 
weeks of “non-stop” protests organized by Tamil activists. The protesters were mostly of 
Sri Lankan Tamil origin. These demonstrations also took place in several locations 
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outside Canada. They included protests in the Western world’s financial and political 
capitals and cities with sizeable Tamil diasporas: Ottawa, New York, Washington D.C., 
London, Paris, Geneva, Oslo; smaller protests took place in Australia, Germany, 
Malaysia and Sweden. The media referred to them as “the Tamil diaspora protests.” 
Tamil activists organized several public events between September 2008, when 
the Sri Lankan government evacuated international aid workers and banned all media 
from the country’s northern war zones, to March 2009.When the government’s assault on 
the Vanni400 region began, youth activists from CanTYD, TYO and Tamils Against 
Genocide formed a new organization, Canadian-HART (Humanitarian Aid and Relief for 
Tamils) to draw attention to the impending crisis. In November, they constructed a 
makeshift IDP camp surrounded by barbed wire in the middle of Yonge-Dundas Square, 
a large concrete public square in the middle of a shopping district downtown, and handed 
out pamphlets and flyers. 
On January 25, 2009, Sri Lankan government forces took over Kilinochchi, home 
of the LTTE’s headquarters and their last stronghold. The state announced it had the 
Tigers cornered in Mullaitivu. At the time, anywhere from 250,000 to 400,000 people 
were trapped between the warring parties. Within days, Tamil activists organized several 
events. On January 27, they held a protest in front of the Sri Lankan consulate, and a 
university TSA held a 30-hour fast to raise awareness about the war. On January 30, tens 
of thousands of Canadian Tamils stood outside in subzero temperatures to form a human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 The Vanni is a dry zone in northern Sri Lanka and consisted of the parts of the Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu 
and Vavuniya districts that were under the control of the LTTE. According to a TRO report, by the end of 
August, 249, 612 people were internally displaced in the region, out of a total population of approximately 
500,000 people. See “Humanitarian Crisis in the Vanni: Need for Action by the International Community.” 
September 1, 2008. 
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chain around the city’s downtown core; the next month, the Canadian Tamil Congress 
organized a protest on Sri Lanka’s Independence Day (on February 4). The following 
month also saw a protest in front of the U.S. consulate, and a second human chain. 
Sri Lanka’s war was referred to as “a war without witnesses”: It was not televised 
outside the country, for the most part. The government had banned journalists, most aid 
workers, and other independent observers from traveling to the war zones. Western 
mainstream media outlets provided little coverage of the battles and casualties. Tamil 
writers and journalists were, by and large, the only source for daily coverage of the 
events. 
Protesters organized increasingly spectacular demonstrations in response to the 
crisis and lack of attention it received. They rallied in the Canadian capital at Parliament 
Hill in Ottawa, and blocked traffic for several days; in New York, they marched from the 
UN’s headquarters to Times Square. They marched in front of the Toronto Sun 
newspaper’s offices, demanding coverage of the war and the ensuing humanitarian crisis, 
and in February, held memorial services for the young men who had immolated 
themselves in Tamil Nadu and Europe to draw attention to the war. Activists organized in 
the suburbs of Toronto as well. In the Peel Region, youth held a three-day hunger strike 
and outdoor performances as snow fell from the sky.401 In Markham, community elders 
held a 30-hour fast in a Tamil ‘banquet hall,” where they brought student and youth 
activists together with members of home village associations and other political 
organizers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 Images of this and other events appear in an issue of TYO Reach, Feb 2009. 
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By April, two things became apparent to those who impartially gathered 
information about the war from outside the country: The Sri Lankan army was firing into 
the “no-fire zones” it had announced and created to ostensibly protect civilians; the 
Tigers, who were hiding among civilians, were preventing people from escaping to 
government-captured territory. The war continued, with government spokespersons 
denying allegations that the army was firing into the no-fire zone, amid increasing 
international concern over rising civilian casualties. Pro-LTTE activists organized 
protests, accusing the government of “genocide” while deflecting questions about the 
organization’s conduct. Over the next few months, the LTTE and its diasporic supporters 
claimed that civilians were following the fighters further inland out of fear of what the 
government forces would do to them if they surrendered—a fear that was not entirely 
unfounded, and that some people surely had. In the months to come, however, this 
assertion proved increasingly difficult to sustain, as human rights groups reported that 
civilians who escaped the war zone said that cadres shelled and fired shots at them. 
Tamil protests took an even more dramatic turn at the end of April when Tamil 
activists and protesters blocked traffic for one week on University Ave, a major 
thoroughfare in the center of Toronto’s downtown core. Youth activists decided to 
occupy the street with their seated and prostrated bodies to ensure the community could 
maintain a continuous presence in front of the U.S. consulate, where they had just held a 
demonstration. The protesters demanded an end to the war, along with recognition of the 
Tigers and their goal of a separate state as “the only solution” to the conflict. Toronto 
Police tried to negotiate with the event’s spokespeople, who refused to move. (Second 
generation diaspora youth were at the forefront of these protests, and sometimes had 
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tense confrontations with the police.) After several days, they were forcibly dispersed by 
horseback riding officers with batons. Activists’ rallies and demonstrations in front of the 
provincial and federal parliaments, culminated in a group of young activists, children, 
parents and grandparents walking onto the ramp of an urban expressway. (Their actions 
were unprecedented for a recent immigrant community in Canada.402) They brought 
Mother’s Day traffic to a standstill for several hours (and were eventually talked down 
from the ramp by the leader of Canada’s liberal Party.) 
A Tamil diasporic public was mobilized in Canada at the intersection of two 
circulating forms of public communication: actions of protest, and digital video. In what 
follows, I describe video footage of a protest aired live and re-edited for broadcast on a 
Tamil-language channel in Canada, as a program titled Adankāpatru. I analyze the social 
semiotics of how diasporic activists transformed suffering into action through the 
coordinated use of public performance, personal testimonies and appeals. 
Love without Bounds (Adankāpatru) 
The opening sequence to a protest video, produced by the subscription service, 
Tamil Vision International, projects this desire to demonstrate a community unified in 
struggle and suffering. Adankāpatru (Boundless Love) named after the protest event it 
depicts, took place a mere two days after the Gardiner expressway demonstration spurred 
widespread condemnation in Canadian public discourse. The video begins in media res, 
with discontinuous images of the crowd that it seeks to mobilize. Whereas videos 
circulating among Tamils during the 1990s and 2000s documented the Tigers' battlefield 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 Before this, indigenous activists had occupied the expressway to protest government inaction, and there 
has been a Critical Mass rally in 2008. For one commentary on this point, see James Bow (2009), “Human 
Shields on the Gardiner?” http://bowjamesbow.ca/2009/05/13/human-shields-o.shtml 
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prowess exclusively, videos such as this one depicted civilian injuries and death in an on-
site dramatic re-enactment of the war edited in-camera. (These re-enactments drew on 
images and videos that were posted online and circulated among diasporic activists.) In 
the video, an electric speaker plays sounds of aerial bombing and shelling as local actors 
(from the WTM’s Central Toronto Arts and Culture group) run and take cover. Some 
sustain injuries, while others appear to die. The living remain beside the bodies of those 
injured and killed, wailing in pain and singing oppāri403 (songs of lament) to the dead. 
Mostly women and children, they shout for someone to save them, crying for their own 
loss.404  
In their midst rise a group of young girls, some clad in black blouses and slacks, 
others in dark blue sarees, who dance with bold gestures. The young women are Tigers, 
who have come to fight for the civilians. But their suffering continues. For when the 
Tigers are gone (leaving to fight elsewhere?), the army arrives to round them up and 
assaults them. 
This scene reveals the dominant image of the war among Tamil protesters – a 
scene of inevitable death and suffering in Sri Lanka – and is anchored by testimonial 
appeals in another video. A self-styled “documentary” of the same name aired three days 
later with titles, fast-paced editing, intercutting between scenes, and a soundtrack of local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403 These songs are classified according to categories of social relationship, particularly kin. See Clark-
Deces (2005) and Trawick (1990). 
404 In her book, No One Cries for the Dead: Tamil Dirges, Rowdy Songs and Graveyard Petitions, the 
anthropologist Isabelle Clark-Decès describes the groups of women who encircle the mourner at a Tamil 
funeral: “As the crowd continues to swell, the number of clusters increases to twenty or more, made up of 
women swaying, moaning, and crying out dirges beside the dead person” (2005: 22). She argues, based on 
fieldwork in Tamil Nadu, India that Tamil women cry at funerals not for the dead or the mourner but for 
themselves and their own losses in life. In doing so, they also fulfill a gendered social obligation to mourn 
publicly. Tamil women’s grief is linked to kurai, or the experience of “deficiency” or “want” and the 
anthropologist suggests that “Kurai is also associated with a particular symptomology, etiology or “cure” 
that stresses the necessity to cry out laments and make others suffer for you….” (my emphasis) 
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Tamil hip-hop and propaganda songs. First, the documentary’s producers make a specific 
appeal to a Tamil viewing audience, later repeated in its entirety. A Tamil Vision 
announcer, accompanied by one other person, stands in front of a milling crowd, faces 
the camera and tells the audience in Tamil, 
We have gathered here once again in front of the Ontario parliament in 
Queen’s Park… we have come to make the following demands:  
The international community, and particularly the Canadian government 
must make a great effort to heed our demands, the international 
community must recognize the Tamils’ rights to their own, separate 
motherland (tani tayaka urimai) to self-rule; they must recognize the 
united and indivisible Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, they must 
strengthen the leader, the leader of the Tigers… to this end these people 
are struggling to put forward many such demands. 
 
Whether protesters or viewers would agree or not, the announcer denotes these multiple 
statements to a Tamil audience as “our demands,” which are taken to be self-evident to a 
diasporic viewing public. These demands are intercut with a montage of protesters 
depicting suffering on the island, ranging from a man dressed as Sri Lankan president, 
Mahinda Rajapaksa, covered in babies dripping in fake blood, to protesters holding 
images of charred and disemboweled bodies over their own.  
The announcer then narrates a brief history of the national struggle. The video 
cuts from photos of past actions and violence in Sri Lanka to the event at Queen’s Park, 
and in doing so, establishes a visual continuity between Tamil politicians’ and activists’ 
historical opposition to majoritarian rule in Sri Lanka, the plight and future of Tamils 
within the country, and diasporic action. Tamils were thus presented with a historical 
duty of “non-violent” protest “within Canadian laws” distinct from, but parallel to, the 
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military efforts of the LTTE within the island. The narrative of the video echoes what I 
was told by several activists in our conversations about these protests. 
The diasporic Tamil’s historical duty is rendered as being inseparable from 
obligations to kin, as illustrated in testimonial appeals that urge viewers to attend the 
ongoing protest. In one segment, an elderly woman explains why she has come to the 
protest by describing her displacement and suffering to the audience, and her subsequent 
move to Canada that left dozens of relatives behind. In another, a young woman speaks in 
English, reminding the viewer that the cousins with whom she played as a child are now 
scared to leave their bunker. She says, “I am here, protesting today, because I want my 
people to be safe.” Both conclude by reiterating demands for a free Tamil Eelam. These 
statements are delivered within a medium close-up shot, in which the speaker takes up 
much of the frame to make an intimate appeal to the viewer.  
In the longest and least-personalized testimony, the video returns to the two-shot 
with which it began. The TVI announcer introduces a man, bandaged and apparently 
bleeding, as a “man of the people,” or literally, “common son” (pothu makan) before 
asking him, “Why are you participating in this event? Can you tell us why you are 
dressed this way?” The man replies,   
Why? Because… look a little closer! Look at what is on my body. This 
many blood relatives (udanpiRappukal) are before your eyes. Thousands 
of relatives… yesterday, today, this has been going on for sixty years. The 
international community is doing nothing. (…) 
 





Figure 7.5: Adankāpatru (Boundless Love) protest in Toronto, May 13, 2009 
(Original source: Tamil Vision International; screenshots by author) 
 
The speaker, Kalainathan, continues 
At this time, three or four lakhs of Tamils are living in this country, 
Canada. This country has not betrayed us in any way. If we had not set 
foot in this country, we would have been destroyed there. Therefore, in 
this country, Canada, everyone must think and do something. Our Tamil 
people, please try thinking of them. Who will be killed? Your siblings 
(sahotharangal). Your blood relatives. 
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Those of you who would be watching TV, please come! Please come! 
Bring out the suffering (vētanai) that lives inside you (like a potato in 
darkness) and tell our Canadian government! 
Kalainathan is a member of the WTM arts and culture group that performed the re-
enactment described earlier. His body is covered with photos of Tamils who were killed 
on May 11, 2009, when over a thousand people were estimated to be killed during 
fighting that day. (This was the same event that prompted diaspora youth to occupy the 
Gardiner Expressway.) Kalainathan’s speech creates continuity between “this” (intha) 
violence of “yesterday, today” and the past sixty years of post-independence history. He 
refers to the people in the photos as his “blood relatives” and “siblings,” making fictive 
kin of the hundreds of Tamils killed in the previous day’s battles, and reminds viewers 
that, had they not left Sri Lanka, “we [Tamils in Canada] would have been destroyed 
there.” This knowledge is a part of the suffering that “lives inside” the diaspora audience. 
Kalainathan invokes this suffering to remind diaspora Tamils of their obligation to “do 
something,” as those who escaped the war and continue to live.  
Kalainathan’s speech continues in this vein, alternating appeals to viewers to join 
the protests with descriptions of Tamil suffering. He reports a rumor circulating at the 
time, “You would have heard that they are taking our relatives to Sinhala villages, tearing 
their bodies apart, and—[stumbling] I cannot even say it!” He gestures toward his sign 
instead, reminding the viewer to look at his body, which acts as a screen for mutilated 
and violated Tamil bodies. In doing so, Kalainathan relies on images to communicate 
what cannot be said. Images of war victims are “a species of rhetoric” that invoke a 
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hypothetical shared experience and “create the illusion of consensus.”405 When viewing 
these images, “we” feel able to agree on one thing: Tamils in Northern Sri Lanka are 
suffering. This affect does not require dialogic or analytical thinking of how this suffering 
came to be, aiming instead to motivate action. Moreover, Kalainathan's speech 
demonstrates the commitment to act made through public speech that, according to 
Boltanski (1999), reports to another “both what was seen and how this personally 
affected the spectator.” Kalainathan has seen the violence and death, and communicates 
how it affects him not by saying it, but showing us images of that violence, and how he 
feels about it—his rising voice, anguished expression, and tears allow us to see and sense 
his pain, and thus become entangled with Tamil suffering. 
However, Kalainathan’s public speech blurs the sociologist’s distinction between 
sufferer and spectator by asking viewers to recall their own experiences during the war, 
and join the protests to “bring out the suffering that lives inside [them].” In other words, 
unlike Boltanski’s “distant spectator,” diasporic Tamils felt intimately connected to the 
war in Sri Lanka. These public acts of suffering, as subjects of a community, constituted 
the ground for diasporic Tamil activism, even as activist speech enacted a split between 
diasporic action here and Tamil suffering there. Activists invoked moral discourses of kin 
and community as grounds for solidarity to encourage identification with Tamil suffering 
and compel action. In asking the viewer to look at his body, however, the activist became 
the medium through which Tamil suffering was rendered visible. Protest and its mass-
mediation here constituted a dispersed form of transnational political action, in which 
activists and media-producers were acting upon Tamils to act upon others—international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405 This point by Susan Sontag (2003: 6) is also discussed in Butler’s (2009) discussion of the “frames” of 
war. 
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media, governments, and ‘the international community’—in a kind of inverse 
governmentality. 
Signs of Protest 
 In addition to representations of the suffering body of the Tamil civilian, diasporic 
activists and protesters used two other signs that gave aesthetic and political form to their 
suffering, grievances and aspirations: the LTTE-designed Tamil national flag, and the 
map of their aspired-to homeland, Tamil Eelam. These signs were used to create a 
spectacular appearance of unity in the public formation of a Tamil identity and diasporic 
political community. However, these controversial signs and their significant effects also 
created disagreement and dissension among Toronto Tamils during protests. 
In Toronto, early demonstrations against the war in January 2009 focused 
primarily on the humanitarian crisis as a result of embargos on supplies to the north and 
inadequate aid to the war zones—aid that was also reportedly used by the Tigers. 
Protesters formed a human chain that circled the city’s downtown core, and held signs 
demanding a ceasefire, as well as food and medical supplies for Tamils in the north.  
As the protests continued, however, diasporic activists added explicitly “political” 
claims to their “humanitarian" appeals: They asserted their support for the LTTE and 
their desire for Tamil Eelam as “the only solution” to the devastating war.406 They did so 
by chanting slogans, hanging banners printed with the map of Tamil Eelam, and above 
all, by hoisting and waving the Tiger flag—which they referred to as “the national flag.” 
In doing so, the Tamil diaspora protests of 2009 visually resembled prior events, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 While some commentators viewed the abovementioned “political” claims and “saving the Tigers” as the 
“real” reason for the protests, I argue that “humanitarian” and “political” claims were both central to 
activists’ demands. 
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including Pongu Thamil (discussed in Chapter 2) and protests against Canada’s 
proscriptions of the LTTE and WTM. 
The LTTE was, however, still banned as a terrorist organization in Canada (as 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation), and consequently, the Tamil Eelam flag 
became a focal point of action and debate during the Toronto protests. In response to 
questions raised in the Canadian media, Toronto police deemed the use of the flag 
legal.407 However, the Tiger flag was still read by most non-Tamils as a sign of militancy 
in Canada, within a counter-terrorism narrative that did not consider what the flag meant 
for those who held it. Tamil activists’ use of the flag of a “banned” organization thus 
placed them—and the civilians on whose behalf they protested—outside the law. 
For the American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce, a sign is “something 
which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (1955: 99). If the 
Tamil Eelam flag (Figure 7.7) is one such sign, who is the “somebody” to which it stands 
“for something,” and what is that thing? Why did activists and protesters hold this 
controversial flag when trying to gain sympathy for their cause? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 In London, however, some protesters were reportedly arrested for holding the flag. In Toronto, a white 
Canadian student activist, Angela Regnier, was also arrested, and Tamil students claimed the arrest was 
made to make an example out of her and isolate their protests. 
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Figure 7.7. National Flag of Tamil Eelam (Source: Wikipedia.org) 
 
The LTTE’s Tiger emblem was created in 1977. While hiding in India, the 
group’s leader, Prabhakaran, chose the tiger as a symbol expressing heroism, as well as 
the strength, courage, agility and aggression of the animal presented. He commissioned 
his friend Nadarajan, a Madurai-based artist, to design the new flag (Figure 7.6). 
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For the LTTE, the tiger was a symbol of a revivified martial tradition (Taraki 
1991). As stated in a February 1991 issue of the eponymous periodical, Viduthalai 
Puligal (Liberation Tigers), 
The Tiger symbol illustrates the martial history (vīra varalāru) and 
national upheaval of the Tamils. It signifies strength, valour and self-
confidence of Tamils. It was under this symbol the Chola Kings led their 
campaign of conquest in the whole of South and Southeast Asia in 10th 
and 11th centuries AD. Tiger symbol echoes Tamil ethnic patriotic and 
courageous feelings. This symbol is deeply imprinted in the minds of the 
people. The soul of the nation is rejuvenated because of this symbol. 
Moreover, Tiger was chosen to recreate each and every member of the 
LTTE as a Tiger to fight with enough courage and agility. 
If the tiger, as a symbol, “was chosen to recreate each and every member of the LTTE as 
a Tiger,” what did the repeated use of this image do for Tamil activists? When held at 
Tamil demonstrations against the war, the Tiger flag semiotically regimented protesters 
and their actions, creating and recreating their membership in a Tamil community they 
believed was inexorably bound with the LTTE.  
The LTTE removed the its name from the Tiger flag and declared the new version 
“the national flag of Tamileelam" on Maaveerar Naal (Great Heroes Day) on November 
27, 1990. An LTTE document on the flag includes a code of usage that stipulates that "all 
important ceremonies and events in the Tamil homeland are begun with the hoisting of 
the national flag accompanied by the singing of the song of veneration meant for it." 
When asked by outsiders why they held the Tiger flag, activists said, “It is our 
national flag,” and asserted their right to hold it. They pointed to a key difference 
between the LTTE flag and the one designated (by that organization) as the national flag 
of Tamil Eelam—only the former was imprinted with the words, “Liberation Tigers of 
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Tamil Eelam.” This minor difference aside, most Tamils and non-Tamils viewed the flag 
as the flag of the Tigers.  
Protesters held and the flag, the map of Tamil Eelam, and photos of Prabhakaran 
as representations—using Spivak’s terms, in the sense of a portrait and proxy—of their 
cause. 
They felt that holding the flag was “an act of resistance” to the media and 
politicians who told them to put it down. (To Canadian media and politicians, and some 
activists, the flag indicated a “remote-control politics” in which the LTTE dictated 
diaspora activism through its agents abroad.) Putting down the flag was analogous to the 
demand that the LTTE put down their weapons and surrender. However, for many 
protesters and activists, the flag was a sign of their political unity; the Movement made 
possible the coordination and organization of popular demonstrations, and effected this 
unity by printing and disseminating posters and flags. 
In Toronto, the Tamil Eelam flag was both an indication of normative aspirations 
to statehood, and a practice of everyday identification for Tamil activists and protesters in 
Toronto. Its ubiquity was clear to anyone who lived or worked in Scarborough. At one 
intersection near Kennedy and Eglinton in 2008-2009, a van sold this mass-manufactured 
flag alongside those of Canada, the United States, Italy, Jamaica, Brazil, and others. 
Although much less visible after the 2006 ban on the LTTE, the flag returned to public 
demonstrations after the ban on the WTM when, as discussed in Chapter 4, thousands of 
Tamils gathered at Pongu Thamil in 2008, Pro-LTTE activists handed out small, paper 
flags, and some participants brought their own flags printed on t-shirts, umbrellas, and 
other items received at past events. 
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The Tamil Eelam flag also traveled beyond spaces of public protest and 
throughout the suburban grid, shaping public space in Tamil Toronto. It fluttered in the 
wind of moving vehicles as families tied small flags to their car’s radio antenna. Pasted to 
the bumper, the Tiger sat alongside a school decal. It also found company in the parking 
lot of schools and banquet halls to which Tamils took their children to perform in dance 
and music recitals, cultural programs, soccer tournaments. The flag announced to one and 
all the family’s public, political stance. More than that, it indicated, through iconic 
resemblance, their membership in a Tamil community that is both local and transnational, 
wherever the flag and its colors might wander. 
After the ban, some Tamils feared that the flag and other emblems could be used 
as evidence of “material support” to the LTTE. However, they did not wish to dissociate 
themselves from images that had become integral to their social identities and political 
activism. Tamil activists and protesters found other ways to signify political support for 
the Tigers in their community. My interlocutors felt it was important for me to become 
adept at reading these signs, which became a popular subject of discussion among us. 
“You’ll see things like an umbrella with Tamil Eelam on it,” I was told. This umbrella 
was present at many demonstrations, made of black and red nylon panels with a yellow 
homeland—the colors of the LTTE flag. On other occasions, I observed a stuffed toy 
tiger or decal in the back of a car. At home, one might find a framed picture of an orange 
tiger. As one community member and brother of a pro-LTTE activist explained: “There is 
a desire here to identify with something that is not necessarily about nationality. Tamils 
cannot embrace the Lankan flag. In the absence of such a symbol, that Eelam silhouette 
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becomes important. We don’t necessarily want to be “Separate, but equal.” We want to 
have a symbol of power, and not just a stripe on the flag.” 
 
 
Figure 7.8: Map of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka  
(Source: Wikipedia.org) 
The Sri Lankan flag was often pointed to as a potent sign of inequality for Sri 
Lanka’s minorities, and on more than one occasion, this flag was described to me as one 
in which the country’s majority, in the form of a lion, points its sword at the minorities, 
which were represented by saffron and green stripes, for (Tamil) Hindus and Muslims 
respectively.408  
In lieu of a more “representative” Sri Lankan flag, diaspora Tamils were 
mobilized under the sign of the LTTE as a symbol of the dignity and political power to 
which they aspired. The Tiger, as a symbol of the Chola kingdom, also connoted an 
ancient sovereignty and cultural heritage that Tamil nationalists claimed and wished to 
revive. With the return to war, the Tamil Eelam flag became more visible than it had ever 
been before. The flag, alongside images of the “national leader,” visually asserted the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 This of course omitted other minorities, such as the Christians among Tamils and Sinhalese, and groups 
such as the Burghers and indigenous Veddas. Activists’ critiques of the flag rhymed with Qadri Ismail’s 
(2005) observation that the armed lion is a Sinhalese nationalist symbol that “dominates the Sri Lankan 
flag” and commands the allegiance of all citizens (151). 
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LTTE’s cultural and political hegemony among active sections of Toronto’s Tamil 
diaspora. 
The map of Tamil Eelam was another organizing sign. Just as the Sri Lankan 
anthropologist, Pradeep Jeganathan, argues about the diasporic webspace of Eelam, the 
map of the homeland is “devoted to an argument for and about a nation that might be—it 
tells of its right to existence through a history of adversity” (1998: 527). It is not a 
specific, locational identity, but an “emptied-out map” that, in its imaging and imagining 
in diasporic life, “preserves the form of the nation-as-territory” for those who wish to 
believe in its mission (528). 
In the images that circulated at the protests, the map was an outline of the 
homeland for which Tamil militant youth have fought, now under the “sole” leadership of 
the Tigers. This form is a solid and undifferentiated territory, usually appearing in red or 
yellow. It was defined not by geographic features of its territory, but by political 
boundaries that functioned as a de facto border. According to Kittu, a senior leader of the 
LTTE, acts of violence created this territory: Tamil Eelam could be mapped wherever the 
government had dropped a bomb.409 However, the outline of a map can only approximate, 
rather than indicate what it contains. Another map at the protests attempted to do this.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409 Kittu noted this at a Maaveerar Naal speech in Zurich in November 1990: ''I was once asked by an 
Englishman connected with the British Refugee Council: 'You say Tamil Eelam, but where are the 
boundaries of this Tamil Eelam that you talk about? Show me.' I was taken aback by the directness of the 
question. I thought for a while, searching for an appropriate response. Then I replied: 'Take a map of the 
island. Take a paint brush and paint all the areas where Sri Lanka has bombed and launched artillery attacks 
during these past several years. When you have finished, the painted area that you see - that is Tamil 
Eelam''' (Satyendra 1993). 
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Figure 7.9: States and Cities of Tamil Eelam image used on protest banner in Toronto, 
April to July 2009 (Source: Tamilnation.org) 
 
On a fence hangs a large vinyl-printed map of Tamil Eelam. At the top, it reads 
“States and Cities of Tamil Eelam” (Figure 7.9). This map shares an iconic resemblance 
to the flags, t-shirts, and other propaganda images that move through the crowd. Like 
them, its disputed territory hangs apart from the rest of the island. This map, however, is 
colored green. It features major roads, some tributaries, and indicates cities and towns. A 
Tiger flag stands atop a flagpole to indicate the capital at Kilinochchi, the base and 
headquarters of the LTTE’s parallel state. Further, unlike the undifferentiated arc of 
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Tamileelam, this map indicated regions within the map as “states” and designated “state 
capitals.” 
If the map provides the form of a homeland that Tamils may imagine as theirs, 
and provides an argument for the LTTE’s exercise of state power, it also does something 
else for Tamils living in diaspora. The map is an index of a place they have left behind, 
and to which they stand in relation. As families pass through the protest, parents 
sometimes bring their children to stand in front of this map. Most often, they are young 
children, who tightly grip an adult’s hand as they listen. I observed a father in his thirties 
do this with his young daughter. He asked the girl, “What is your home-village?” She 
repeated the name, Neerady. “Where is it on the map?” and told her to point to it. She 
touched the map with her index finger. He moved it over to where the village was, 
unmarked on the map.410 
At the edges of protest 
 Protesters’ use of the Tamil Eelam flag, map and other signs of LTTE separatism 
generated debates among Toronto Tamils. Many in the community questioned activists’ 
use of the flag, beginning with the second human chain held in March 2009. They felt it 
was more important to highlight the ongoing humanitarian crisis due to the war, and its 
toll on civilians. They argued that the flag, as a symbol of a banned organization, 
obscured this concern.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 Not knowing one’s home village was a source of painful anxiety for the parents, aunts and uncles, and 
grandparents of this new generation: “They should know their culture, they should know where they are 
from,” I was told. On one occasion, however, the map was an object of scorn: “They don’t know anything 
about the ur, they only know how to point to it on the map!” 
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Some Tamils who attended the first human chain described how upset they felt 
when activists raised the LTTE’s flag during subsequent events. Community activists like 
Chandran tried to persuade youth and Movement activists to shift their tactics. On the 
other hand, Tamils who were less active dropped away from the protests altogether. 
Many did not attend them at all. One young professional who had previously been more 
involved in community activism explained that he avoided the protests at Queen’s Park 
by taking alternate routes to his workplace. Another young woman who worked for the 
provincial government felt “embarrassed” by the pro-LTTE protesters, who were visible 
from her office window, and found it difficult to discuss the political nuances of the war 
and the protests with her colleagues. 
 For a few dissenting activists, the protests provided a space where they could 
gather together with other Tamils in opposition to the war. Like the woman above, 
Jeevani, the feminist activist who appeared in Chapters 1 and 4 of this dissertation, 
watched the protests from a distance. She explained that, on the one hand, it was hard to 
see that people were suffering due to the war. On the other hand, the protesters were 
holding flags and posters in support of an organization that was party to the war—
although not as powerful as the government—and was thus culpable in creating human 
suffering. The LTTE and the government had both created immense difficulties for her 
and other Tamils, as activists and civilians, and she could not muster support for either 
side. But as the military assault on the Vanni intensified, and with reports that Tamil 
civilians were unable to leave the no-fire zone, she felt compelled to visit the protests, 
“just to see what was happening.” 
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 When she arrived, Jeevani stood on the edges of the crowd at Queen’s Park. That 
day, she cried. It was the sight of so many Tamils who needed a place to express their 
distress. People were streaming to the site, and “it was an emotional time.” Her friend 
Thivya (who was discussed in Chapter 4) and Thivya’s husband wanted to join the 
protesters—they followed the diaspora media, and were upset by the government’s 
actions—but Jeevani felt she could not join them. She continued to watch from the 
sidelines. 
 The second time Jeevani went to the protests, she had a very different experience. 
She went with a mutual friend of ours—a journalist who had helped Ranjan organize 
“Call of the Conscience.” A man approached them, and told Jeevani to stay away from 
our friend, whom he assumed was Sinhala and sent to spy on the protests for the Sri 
Lankan government.411 He warned Jeevani in Tamil, “Sister (akka) don’t go with her… 
she’s a bad person.” They decided to leave, and Jeevani did not return. 
Jeevani’s friend, Leena, whose story of activism and migration was briefly 
discussed in Chapter 1, also went to the protests. In 2008, Leena felt that public actions 
were not the most effective form of activism. Many of her friends had been killed, were 
kidnapped, or in hiding, and she was fed up with “the politics back home.” In Toronto, 
she engaged in “grassroots work,” ranging from organizing immigrant workers to 
forming a volunteer response group to domestic violence in the community. She 
explained that she wanted to protect her work from “the politics” that seemed to infiltrate 
all forms of community activism. In April 2009, however, she joined Tamil activists on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 She was, in fact, a diaspora Tamil raised in Canada; when this friend visited the protests with her 
Sinhalese friend, he was threatened by a group of men. 
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University Avenue. She told me she felt she had to “shout with the people,” even though 
she did not agree with some of their demands. She politely refused when activists gave 
her the LTTE flag. When protesters shouted slogans in support of the LTTE, Leena 
improvised and shouted her own chants. 
Even though the crowd’s chants drowned out her message, Leena felt it was 
important to register her feelings and demands among and with them. Her modest 
performance of dissent was a part of her belonging to a Tamil political community. (It 
mirrored how Tamil activists protested the ban from within, as Canadian citizens.) 
Leena felt that other dissenting activists were not critical enough of the state, and 
that their focus on publicly denouncing the LTTE drew attention away from civilian 
suffering in the final months of the war. She criticized some of her colleagues: She, like 
them, had experienced violence at the hands of the LTTE, but she told me that her pain 
could not motivate her politics.  
Feminist and dissenting activists like Jeevani and Leena stood on the margins of 
the Tamil diaspora protests, literally and figuratively. Like community activists and 
protesters, they were drawn by a desire to affectively respond to Tamil suffering in Sri 
Lanka; a desire shaped by prior experiences of violence and action. They too felt 
compassion and empathy for the plight of civilians, and shared feelings of distress that 
shaped their limited participation in collective action. Their affective and critical 
engagement did not transform the protests and its spectacular image of a Tamil 
community mobilized in support of the LTTE while demanding an end to the war. 
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Conclusion 
While the 2009 protests failed to achieve its participants’ demands—which 
ranged from a “humanitarian ceasefire” for civilians to recognition of the LTTE and a 
separate state—they accomplished one thing: The “agentive moment” of protest, as a 
form of linguistic and social action, brought together diverse groups of Tamils. Protests 
expressed and enacted diasporic Tamils’ desire to “do something” in response to Tamil 
suffering. They mobilized middle-class professionals who generally stayed away from 
“politics,” and workers from factories and laundries who took time off work and traveled 
with their co-workers to protest; a small group defining themselves as Queer Tamils 
joined the protests, as did a few dissenting feminists. All of these people, and their 
various cross-cutting identities and social and political differences, were mobilized as 
Tamils under the sign(s) of the LTTE. Photos and videos contributed to this making of an 
apparent unity in the public formation of a Tamil diaspora. 
Ruban’s aunt, Vani, was one of the many Tamils who attended the first human 
chain. When she saw activists raising LTTE flags at the second event, she left. The flag 
left its imprint anyway. As Vani told me later, “Now the war is over, and we can never go 
back. It is as though we all held the flag.”
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The war’s end 
On May 18, 2009, the war ended. Twenty-six years of civil war were brought to 
an end by one simple declaration. Sri Lanka’s President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, made the 
announcement along with his brother, the Defense Secretary: The LTTE’s senior 
leadership were all killed in a fight to the finish, and now the fighting was over. A 
military victory parade was held in Colombo. In the streets, people celebrated by lighting 
up firecrackers, dancing, and feeding each other milk rice. In many parts of Colombo, 
however, Tamils stayed indoors, afraid to leave their houses. Stories were told of those 
who had ventured outside, only to be required to eat in celebration, or to hand over their 
gold jewelry.  
 In Toronto and other Tamil diaspora communities around the world, a very 
different response to news of the war’s end took hold. Tamils poured into the streets to 
hold public vigils in which they mourned for the victims and their own losses. Many were 
in shock and disbelief that the war had ended with the Tigers’ defeat—in other words, 
that it had ended with a military victory for the Sri Lankan government and Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalists—or that it had ended at all.  
Some diaspora Tamils refused to believe that Prabhakaran had been killed. Within 
days, they had come up with theories about how he had escaped. These theories 
circulated around the Tamil internet, and diasporic community newspapers and small 
newspapers in Tamil Nadu published speculations of what had occurred in the last days 
of the war. An image of Prabhakaran watching news of his death on television was 
published by a magazine in Tamil Nadu, and replicated across the diaspora. 
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I returned to Toronto at the end of May to attend a memorial for my paternal 
grandmother, who had passed away in Jaffna, less than two months before the war ended. 
Most of Appamma’s children and grandchildren now lived in Toronto, and so we 
gathered at a local ‘banquet hall’ with our uraatkal (people of the same village) to 
remember her. The thirty-first day ceremony had already taken place in Jaffna. When the 
memorial was over, we ate together at the tables at which we were seated. It was difficult 
not to talk about recent events: The war, and the way it had ended. The conflict and the 
war had shadowed our lives. My cousins and I had grown up on the other side of the 
world from our grandparents because of the war; our parents had lived for decades not 
knowing whether their parents, siblings and other loved ones would survive it. The war’s 
end converged with our personal grief. 
In Toronto, before and after the memorial, I heard a great deal of talk about the 
end of the war. People explained to one another why and how Prabhakaran had escaped. 
The photos aren’t real, many Tamils said. The government would do anything to prove 
they had won. You could do anything with Photoshop these days! He must be hiding in a 
place no one knows about. 
Or, perhaps Thalaivar dug a tunnel below his bunkers and took a boat to 
Malaysia. Maybe he really was alive. He was going to revive the Tigers from abroad. It 
would take months, yes—years, even—but he would never give up on Tamil Eelam. He 
would never give up on his people. 
These stories spoke to the hope so many Tamils had invested in the LTTE, and 
the future of their homeland. 
	   442	  
Amid this talk, however, was an overwhelming sense of loss, grief, and the 
exhaustion that had already begun to settle upon a community of people who were 
beginning to lose that hope. They did not know which way to turn. 
The LTTE’s representatives abroad differed about how to respond to the 
government’s claims that Prabhakaran had been killed. They began to fight among 
themselves, as they jockeyed for power. K. Pathmanathan, who had been appointed Head 
of International Relations by Prabhakaran, released a statement that confirmed the 
leader’s death after a few weeks. Another group, known as the Nediyavan faction, 
continued to deny the news, even as most of the diaspora had come to accept it. 
In the days and weeks and months after the war, some Tamils continued to 
protest. 
I wanted to know why the protests continued, even though the war was over. I 
headed down to their epicenter, University Avenue in downtown Toronto, to find out. 
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Conclusion  
After the War 
 
Two weeks after the end of the war, Canadian Tamils continued to demonstrate 
on University Avenue. Their protests resembled their protests in the preceding months, 
with a few changes: The war’s end made the demand for a ceasefire unnecessary; they 
focused more attention on the camps at Menik Farm, where over 350,000 Tamils who 
had escaped the Vanni war zone were being interned (UTHR(J) 2009; HRW 2009). Now 
fewer in number, protesters stood on the sidewalk in front of provincial law courts, and 
opposite the United States consulate—at one point, barricaded from the road—and held 
posters while chanting slogans: 
“Dear President Obama! Save the Tamils!” “Media! Media! Open your eyes!” 
“Tamils need! Food and medicine!” “Shut down the! Concentration camps!” “World 
recognize! Tamil Eelam! Recognize! Tamil Eelam!” 
Many Tamils either did not know, at the time, that these protests continued, or 
had lost hope after the Tigers were defeated. Activists on the street, however, felt that it 
was more important than ever to continue to voice their concerns. As one young second-
generation activist explained to me, the Menik Farm camps were a serious problem: “The 
Times [of London] says that 1400 people are dying every week [in the camps]. If that’s 
without a war, there’s still an issue.” She wanted the Canadian and US governments to 
pressure Sri Lanka to release Tamil IDPs right away. Other activists argued that the 
internment camps were part of a genocidal government’s plan to eliminate Tamils from 
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the island. Protesters and many diaspora Tamils understood that the war that had ended 
on May 18th now continued by other means. 
And indeed, as their protests illustrated, while the conventional war had ended, 
the conflict was not over.  
Two months later, in July and August 2009, activists’ protests continued. In 
addition to the ”non-stop” demonstration on University Avenue, events were held 
opposite the Sri Lankan consulate. Amnesty International worked with CTC activists on a 
rally named “Unlock the Camps,” demanding that Tamils be allowed to return to their 
homes throughout the north.  
The end of the war was also a time for reflection for many Tamils.  
During follow-up interviews, Tamil activists in Toronto expressed shock and 
dismay at the way the war ended. Some of these activists had felt that past protests were 
ineffective (see Chapter 3), even as they recognized the assertions of Tamil unity and 
strength made through these public events. Those who were skeptical of the efficacy of 
protest attended them anyway; they felt it was the only thing they could do to intervene. 
They did so, in part, by expressing their anxiety and frustration. Chandran was one of 
these activists. While many activists were hurt and confused by the end of the LTTE, 
Chandran was not surprised by the end, but by “the brutal manner” by which it had 
ended. 
The widespread international support for the Sri Lankan government’s military 
defeat of the LTTE led one supporter to tell me, “We didn’t realize they hated us so 
much.” As we sat in her living room, and she recalled the final weeks of the war and its 
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end, her body slumped, and sank further and further, until she was lying down on the 
couch with her forearm over her eyes. In this way, some activists embodied the 
organization’s defeat. Indeed, for many diaspora Tamils, the LTTE’s defeat weighed 
heavily, as they had learned to identify the LTTE with the struggle. They wondered 
whether the struggle would continue—the LTTE had claimed “sole representation” of the 
Tamils, and their defeat had created a vacuum in leadership.  
In the months to come, however, nationalist activists rebounded. They announced 
diaspora-led activism as “the third phase of the struggle” (Tamilnet 2009). They created 
new organizations, such as the National Council of Canadian Tamils, and networked with 
other Tamil diaspora groups. TYO youth activists who had mobilized protests took up 
leadership positions within these emerging political structures. When I interviewed these 
nationalist youth activists in July and August 2009, they recognized that the protests had 
failed to secure a ceasefire, but remained hopeful. One nineteen year-old woman, Rani, 
was one of several student activists who had taken a semester off from university to 
organize the protests full-time. According to her, the protests had achieved one important 
result: “Today, Tamils are now more united than ever. Now everyone knows what the 
struggle is about. We had to feel that pain.” For youth activists like Rani who were born 
and raised in Canada, “that pain” refer not to an experience of the war’s physical 
violence, but diaspora activists’ digitally mediated practices of witnessing, and the failure 
of their protests to end the violence and Tamil suffering. This diasporic suffering of 
failure, guilt, and shame—as well as a sense of responsibility and commitment—
motivated their continued activism for an independent homeland. 
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However, the end of the war also led some Tamils to question the LTTE’s legacy, 
and especially the means by which it fought the struggle. As discussed in the final chapter 
of this dissertation, negative media coverage and a public backlash against the protests 
generated debates among Toronto Tamils about the efficacy of protest as a form of 
political action. The social circulation of protests disseminated and dispersed Tamil 
actions, producing new forms of dissent within a putatively “unified” community. Taken 
together with the end of the war, and the dissemination of information about how it 
ended, some Tamil activists who had supported the Tigers expressed their feelings of 
disappointment and betrayal.     
Father Antony, the community leader whose story of activism and migration I 
briefly told in Chapter 1, was among those who became disillusioned with the Tigers at 
the end of the war. He had been a prominent and vocal supporter of the organization. “No 
one can hope to understand popular support for the Tigers unless they understand how 
much Tamils have suffered in this war. We must enter into their hearts and their psyches. 
Above all, to experience the pain—which is home of hope.” The hope to which Fr. 
Antony referred was the desired political future of an independent homeland. 
Experiencing the pain of Tamils on the island and entering into their hearts and minds 
was what solidarity meant to Fr. Antony. He was disappointed that the LTTE had lost the 
war, leaving the Tamils at the mercy of the government. Upon learning from other Tamils 
(and human rights reports) that the Tigers were shooting at civilians trying to leave the 
war zone, he felt betrayed. Reflecting upon the end of the war in July 2009, he felt that 
the Tigers had violated this diasporic desire to show solidarity. He questioned some 
activities he had observed in the community: those who were trying to raise funds, 
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shopkeepers with boxes that promised to send money to suffering civilians—how were 
they able to send it? Were they keeping the money for themselves? Could the Tigers—in 
the diaspora, in Sri Lanka—have been so selfish all along? 
This disappointment and, to some extent, a sense of betrayal was experienced by 
many throughout the diaspora. During a trip to London in February 2010, I visited 
Kanthan, the EROS activist whose story was told in Chapter 2, at his home in a south 
London suburb. He introduced me to other local activists, including a Jaffna Tamil man 
in his late-fifties who had raised money for the LTTE for nearly twenty years. With the 
end of the war, this man felt disillusioned. He had believed in the struggle, and he wanted 
to help the people. When we spoke, he had just returned from a trip to the Vanni, where 
he was trying to learn more about local needs. “We are a devastated people,” he said. 
In November 2009, six months after the war’s end, the protest on University 
Avenue had dwindled down to a committed group of between ten and twenty people. 
Pro-LTTE community activists organized and held their annual Maaveerar Naal 
ceremony to mourn and commemorate LTTE martyrs in the struggle. Thousands of 
Tamils queued around the perimeter of a convention center northwest of Toronto, where 
two consecutive ceremonies were held to allow all to attend, and remember. University 
students organized ceremonies on their campuses as well. Every year on this day, 
November 27, Prabhakaran had given a speech addressing the Tamil people. This year, 
there were no words from the charismatic leader. Prabhakaran’s iconic image continued 
to preside over Tamil events and homes, in the form of posters and calendars, while his 
death cleared the way for a “new phase” of diasporic struggle. 
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Through this dissertation, I have attempted to address the following concerns: 
First, this dissertation is a historically-informed ethnographic document of the 
social and political life of Sri Lanka’s Tamil diaspora through a study of Tamil activists 
in Toronto, Canada and Tamil Nadu, India.  
The first two chapters of the dissertation focused on the social transformations of 
Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka and migration abroad that led to the creation of new 
diasporic political subjects. In Chapter One, I described two different trajectories of 
migration, and the state policies, institutions, and juridical practices that produced 
sizeable Sri Lankan Tamil communities in each of my fieldsites. In Chapter Two, I 
argued that the Norwegian mediated peace process and ceasefire of 2002-2008 was a 
critical period during which the subject of a Tamil diaspora emerged. In making this 
claim, I tracked two political movements: The Pongu Thamil movement, and the events 
organized by activists in Toronto; and a refugee movement organized around the idea of 
“return” to Sri Lanka. 
In Chapter Three, I argued for the ethnographic utility of historiography in 
analyzing diaspora politics and community formation. A synthesis of historical and social 
scientific accounts of Sri Lankan politics was followed by a reading of Tamil political 
histories written by scholars and activists during the war (1983-2009), in order to trace 
the emergence of “Tamil politics” in Sri Lanka. The second half of the chapter 
supplemented this historiography with the ethnographic insights of my fieldwork by 
examining how diaspora Tamil activists narrated stories of their lives in politics. In 
contrast with the linear and continuous historical narrative presented by individual 
nationalist writers and other activists, I juxtaposed several narratives and the ‘critical 
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events’ (Das 1995) they invoke to construct a genealogy of the political conditions and 
contestations at the core of an emerging Tamil diaspora politics. In doing so, the chapter 
revealed how the emergence of a specifically “Tamil” politics and the production of 
Tamil political identities in postcolonial Sri Lanka was displaced—figuratively and 
literally—in the parallel developments of Tamil militancy and diaspora activism. I also 
briefly considered how these varied and intersecting trajectories of Tamil politics have 
contributed to the concepts of “community” and “struggle” used by diaspora activists. 
Third, the dissertation considers the nature of moral and political formations of 
community and dissent among Tamils as new modes of transnational belonging and 
citizenship.  
Chapters Four, Five and Six ethnographically detailed diaspora social life and 
politics in each of my fieldsites, and examined how Sri Lankan Tamils live as 
communities on the margins of liberal democratic and pluralist states. In Chapter Four, I 
examined how Tamils in Toronto mobilized in the context of a ban against the LTTE, and 
the politics of Tamil “unity,” as a community living within and between Sri Lanka’s war 
and Canadian multiculturalism. In Chapter Five, I described the underresourced and 
heavily surveilled conditions of camp life in Tamil Nadu, India, before discussing how 
camp refugees organized protests to make claims upon the Indian state as a substantive 
practice of social citizenship. In contrast to this chapter’s discussion of formations of 
camp community and protest, in Chapter Six, I traced life histories of two Jaffna Tamils 
preparing for migration abroad, hoping to gain citizenship and political rights in Canada 
and France.  
	   450	  
Finally, in all of these chapters I have examined how diaspora subjects were 
mobilized to action as a Tamil diaspora (or, pulam peyarnthor). In spite of many 
differences among them—whether in protest as a community, or in dissent from that 
community, in an Indian refugee camp, or suburban Toronto, of Sri Lanka’s Hill-Country 
region, or the northern Jaffna peninsula—and wherever they lived in the world, Tamils 
felt obligated to act to end the war in their homeland.  
Chapter Seven examined how Tamil diasporic communities mobilized at the end 
of Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE. The chapter began with a study of two multimedia 
exhibits organized to raise awareness about violence and suffering in Sri Lanka. On the 
one hand, this discussion continued a central concern of Chapter Four, which analyzed 
orientations to protest and dissent that shaped Tamil community formations in Toronto. 
On the other hand, my analysis of these exhibits revealed that, whether in protest, dissent, 
or otherwise, Tamil activists shared a desire to alleviate and end Tamil suffering in Sri 
Lanka. In contrast to received theories about the relationship between the spectatorship of 
suffering and action, I argued that Tamil activists were neither distant spectators, nor 
immediate sufferers, but intermediaries whose diasporic positioning created a new 
political subject compelled to “take action” to end the war “back home.” I described how 
camp refugees in India and diasporic activists in Canada turned to protest fasts and street 
demonstrations to ask for an end to the war. I also explored how Tamil activists and 
protesters invoked, represented, performed and embodied suffering to mobilize action 
against the war. In so doing, I argued that Tamil protests constituted a form of ethical and 
political action and intervention shaped by transnational humanitarian discourses and 
affects. 
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The conclusions of this dissertation reveal that Sri Lanka’s Tamil diaspora 
became a recognized and influential political subject at the end of the war. Sri Lanka’s 
‘post-war’ political futures will depend, to a great extent, on how the country addresses 
the conflicts and grievances that produced decades of political violence and war, as well 
as the transnational dimensions developed throughout. 
Indeed, devising a political solution to the conflict will not only require a leader 
with ‘political will’ or a ‘return’ to liberal democratic norms, as is commonly suggested. 
As this inquiry into the diasporic Tamil political shows, a lasting peace entails significant 
social transformation and a radical rethinking of what constitutes Sri Lankan democracy 
and citizenship in a globalizing world.
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Epilogue 
Post-War Sri Lanka, Diaspora and the Tamil Refugee 
 
Over six years have passed since the end of Sri Lanka’s war. This warrants an 
update on the social and political changes that have followed since the time of my 
extended fieldwork. 
The war is over, but the conflict has continued in a new form, one that is now 
primarily between the state and a small but influential network of diaspora nationalist 
activists living in Canada, Britain, and other parts of Western Europe. The Sri Lankan 
state detained thousands of ex-combatants in “rehabilitation camps” throughout the 
country, and continued to intern Tamils who had escaped the war zone at Menik Farm, 
and nearly forty other army-run camps. Menik Farm was, at the time, the largest IDP 
camp in the world with over 300,000 internees (HRW 2009). Amid an outcry from 
international human rights organizations, governments, and diaspora activists, the state 
slowly allowed civilians to leave.412 In late 2009, USAID intimated that it would cut off 
aid to the World Food Program in the camps if the Sri Lankan government did not release 
and resettle and the internees. By early 2010, thousands of people were leaving the 
camps. However, they could not return to their homes. They received little to no 
assistance from the state for their resettlement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412 In the beginning, a small number of people with family connections abroad bribed army officials to 
secure their release (Personal communication, relatives of internees). 
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The government continued to claim that there had been “zero civilian casualties” 
during the war, and severely limited access to the former war zones. Humanitarian 
assistance was thus limited in the months immediately following the war. The policy also 
deterred foreign visitors and journalists planning to report conditions in the former war 
zone. 
Moreover, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government made no moves to address Tamil 
political grievances and aspirations. Instead, what followed was a growing militarization 
of the Northern Province—now governed by a military commander—and, to a lesser 
extent, the rest of the country. Between the end of the war in May 2009 and 2015, the 
number of military personnel deployed in Sri Lanka was projected to double, from 
200,000 to 400,000. In lieu of political transformations of the state and society, 
Rajapaksa’s government pushed economic development projects mostly funded by 
China, India, Iran and other powers in the global South. Private companies from abroad 
brought in their own contract workers instead of unemployed locals, who already had 
mixed feelings about “development” that did not take into account their needs. In 2012, a 
visit to the north revealed the nature of this much-publicized development. Much of the 
government’s money had gone into roads and other infrastructure to encourage private 
businesses and multinational corporations—such as Cargills and HSBC—to “open” the 
northern economy. 
Tamil diaspora activism 
Diaspora activists were concerned about all of the above, as actions continuing 
what they viewed as “genocide” during the final months of the war. They mobilized to 
pressure the international community, and the United Nations in particular, to investigate 
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Sri Lanka for war crimes.  In so doing, they continued to protest, but also organized 
campaigns, a boycott on Sri Lankan products sold in their communities, and most 
importantly, met with politicians and lobbied their governments, and made presentations 
to international bodies such as the UN’s Human Rights Council. They became more 
active in local and national politics, and in 2011, Toronto Tamils elected Canada’s first 
Tamil MP (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2011). 
Tamil diaspora activists also created new political organizations to continue their 
struggle to achieve a separate state. They felt that separation was warranted now, more 
than ever, by the manner in which the war ended. In Toronto, these organizations 
included the National Council of Canadian Tamils, a national body to represent Canadian 
Tamils, Two transnational organizations were also created: The Transnational 
Government of Tamil Eelam, led by the LTTE’s former New York-based legal counsel, 
V. Rudrakumaran, and the Global Tamil Forum, and umbrella group for several national 
organizations led by Fr. S. J. Emmanuel. They held elections in 2010, as well as a 
refererendum on the Vaddukoddai Resolution, among their community. Similar elections 
and referenda were held in Britain and throughout Europe. While the vast majority of 
Tamils did not participate in these fora, these organizations claimed to represent all 
Tamils in their countries of residence and/or citizenship. In sum, diaspora activists 
continued to build up their transnational networks and developed new forms of 
organization across them.  
The politics of the LTTE remains contentious among diaspora Tamils, and in their 
countries of settlement. However, some youth continue to articulate and inhabit the 
LTTE’s nationalist politics as a form of Tamil culture and identity in diaspora. For 
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example, in 2011, TYO youth organized online and offline campaigns to promote 
understanding of the use of the Tamil Eelam flag.413 In 2014, a twelfth grade student who 
carried the Tiger flag at his London, Ontario high school’s multicultural assembly was 
barred from the event. The student identified the flag with his culture, saying, “It’s pretty 
upsetting that I can’t represent my culture in a multicultural country like Canada where 
we embrace other cultures” (Carruthers 2014). 
With the end of the LTTE, dissenting activists became much quieter. Some 
activists in Toronto initially attempted to work with CTC activists in a group organized 
by a prominent Canadian union to conduct Sri Lanka-focused advocacy.414 The effort, 
called Canadians Concerned about Sri Lanka, did not last for long. Some dissenters, like 
Jeevani, whose story bridges a few chapters of this dissertation, instead turned to 
organizing working-class Tamils who were employed in—and often exploited by—
Tamil-owned businesses. These efforts crossed lines previously drawn by homeland 
politics, and were mutually rewarding. 
However, new diaspora groups that are partially or fully outside the orbit of LTTE 
nationalist politics have also emerged. Some, like The Sri Lanka Campaign, were human 
rights advocacy efforts that brought together non-Tamil advisors and Tamils. Others, like 
Lanka Solidarity, a multi-ethnic diaspora network of second-generation scholars, writers 
and activists based mostly in North America, held critical political dialogues in 
conjunction with rights-based advocacy. In Toronto, young professionals from Tamil, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 The campaign was primarily endorsed by TYO groups around the world. See their website, Tamil 
National Flag, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20100210161024/http://tamilnationalflag.com/ 
414 I was told that CCASL was initially comprised of members of this union and the CTC—in line with 
community activists’ claims to representativeness—but a union activist who had worked with dissenting 
activists made the case for including others. 
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Sinhala, and Muslim communities formed Sri Lankans without Borders to engage Sri 
Lankan-Canadians in dialogue and development efforts. The latter’s efforts were 
criticized at times for including too many differing views. More recently, they launched 
Comdu.it, a diaspora network that places students, professionals and retirees in local 
sustainable development projects. In 2012, the prominent Sri Lankan-Canadian writer, 
Shyam Selvadurai (who now splits his time between Toronto and Colombo), created 
Write to Reconcile, which organizes workshops in locations throughout the country.  
Tamil refugees 
Amid great insecurity, thousands of Tamils have left Sri Lanka to seek asylum 
abroad. They have mostly taken boats to Indonesia and Thailand, from where they hoped 
to leave on ships bound for Australia and Canada. Several of these ships were intercepted 
before they reached their destination. However, in the first two years after the war, two 
boats reached British Columbia, on the western coast of Canada. The first was the MV 
Ocean Lady, which was seized on the northern coast of B.C. in October 2009 with 76 
Tamil passengers; the second ship, the MV Sun Sea, arrived in August 2010 with 492 
passengers. The Conservative government of Stephen Harper decided to intervene in the 
refugee determination process: All of the passengers were detained in local prisons, and 
government officials spoke to the media, framing the issue as one of national security by 
suggesting the possibility of ex-LTTE “suspected human smugglers and terrorists” and 
“war criminals” on board. Hearings were held, one at a time, over a period of several 
months.  
The CTC, activists from No One is Illegal, and local community members visited 
the detained refugees, who were given calling cards to connect to any family or friends 
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they may have had in Canada. The CTC also spoke to the media to challenge the 
prevailing narrative, by describing the circumstances under which the refugees had left. 
Although the government had done much to slow the process, almost all of the people 
whose cases were heard received asylum.  
Tamil refugees living in India’s camps also tried to migrate abroad. The 
conditions of camp life—heavily surveilled, impoverished, and lacking opportunity—
motivated these risky journeys. They paid agents in Tamil Nadu to arrange the trip, 
usually on ships leaving from Kerala. One such ship, bound for Australia, was intercepted 
by authorities and the passengers detained. Under pressure from local and international 
human rights groups, who feared the passengers would be returned to Sri Lanka, the 
government sent the group to Nauru for further detention and application processing. 
Some detainees (in India, as well as the UK) have been deported to Sri Lanka where they 
fear persecution from authorities that perceive exiles as potential threats.415  
Camp refugees who stayed in India organized processions to demand legal 
residence and citizenship. Chief Minister Karunanidhi took up this demand, making 
headlines in 2009 for saying he would get the Centre to grant citizenship. (He later 
stepped down to asking for permanent residence.) No such assurances have been made 
since. While camp refugees were reluctant to return to Sri Lanka immediately after the 
war, over the last five years more than 6,000 people have decided to return to the island. 
They returned to reestablish their lives and hoped for better opportunities—from 
education and employment, to everyday survival—as Sri Lankan citizens. This was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415 Indeed, in 2014, the Government of Sri Lanka published a list of names and addresses of diaspora 
Tamils living in Canada, Europe, and India who were believed to be LTTE activists. This list had been 
rumored for some time in Toronto, and some Tamils feared they would be placed on it for simply attending 
a protest. 
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simply not possible for some families. Although OfERR made painstaking efforts to 
obtain legal documentation—including birth, marriage and death certificates—for Sri 
Lankan Tamil refugees, more than 17,000 remained without documents that would lead 
to citizenship. Many of these stateless persons are children born in the camps to Tamil 
refugees. 
The future for post-war Sri Lanka, and its relationship to its Tamil diaspora is 
uncertain. While Tamils in Canada and the United Kingdom are mostly citizens who have 
formed sizeable and influential multi-generational communities in diaspora, more than 
half of Sri Lanka’s Tamil diaspora lives as refugees in India and Europe. The Rajapaksa 
government antagonized diaspora activists, who publicly shamed the government in 
international fora for its actions during and after the war. Consequently, its approach to 
this diaspora alternated between demonizing its political activity and desiring its foreign 
exchange and investment potential. In doing so, the government fundamentally 
misunderstood the social and political heterogeneity of Tamil diaspora communities; it 
also swept aside Tamil refugees’ concerns. In January 2015, the country elected a new 
president: Maithripala Sirisena, the Rajapaksa government’s Minister of Health, defected 
to the UNP and ran on an anti-corruption platform of government transparency, and 
promised to mend international relationships. Let us hope that Sirisena’s government 
learns from the mistakes of the previous regime, especially as it prepares to write a new 
constitution for Sri Lanka. If the government acknowledges the impact of the past 
violence and war, and addresses it alongside the political problem of power sharing with 
the Muslim and Tamil communities, it would find broad support from the Tamils of Sri 
Lanka and the diaspora.
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